Manuale Thomistarum

Volume Two: On the Triune God, Angels, and Man

Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

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MANUAL OF THE THOMISTS

OR

A BRIEF COURSE OF THEOLOGY

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By the Right Reverend Father

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Introduction

This volume continues the translation of Jean-Baptiste Gonet's Manuale Thomistarum begun in the first part of this series, and readers of that volume will already be acquainted with its author: the Béziers-born Dominican who held the chair of scholastic theology at Bordeaux for most of his working life, who was suspended from teaching for three years in 1660 after judging Pascal's Lettres provinciales free of Jansenist heresy, who served as provincial of Toulouse in 1671, and who died at Béziers on 24 January 1681, the same year in which the revised, six-volume edition of his great Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae — and the Manuale that summarizes it — appeared at Leiden.

Where the first part of the Manuale treated the unity of the divine nature, the existence and attributes of the one God, the present volume takes up the matter that follows immediately in Gonet's own Clypeus: the Trinity of Persons within that one divine nature, the angels God created as pure spirits, and man, the creature in whom spirit and matter are joined. In the systematic architecture both Gonet and Saint Thomas before him inherited, this is the natural and necessary sequel to a treatise on the divine unity — one moves from what can be known of God by reason alone to what only revelation disclosed, and from the Creator to the highest and lowest of his rational creatures.

Treatise VI, on the Most Holy Trinity, opens with the article of faith itself: that the divine nature subsists really and eternally in three distinct Persons, a truth Gonet defends first from the plain testimony of Scripture and only afterward, and always subject to it, by the theological reasoning that had accumulated around the mystery since the Cappadocian Fathers and Saint Augustine. The treatise proceeds through the celebrated apparatus of Trinitarian theology — the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the relations that constitute the divine Persons as really distinct despite their one undivided essence, and finally the Persons considered individually, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in turn, together with what is proper to each. Gonet does not pretend to render the mystery transparent to reason; his stated aim, following Saint Thomas, is the more modest and more defensible one of showing that revelation contains no contradiction, and that the mystery, however far above natural light, does not stand against it.

Treatise VII turns to the angels, a subject that occupied scholastic theology at a length that can surprise the modern reader but that follows directly from the logic of a complete treatise on creation. If God's rational creatures are to be considered in full, the pure spirits — created, unlike God, but immaterial, unlike man — demand their own extended treatment: their nature and manner of knowing, the trial by which some stood

and some fell, and the hierarchy and ministry of those who stood. It is in good part through his handling of the angels that a scholastic author displays his metaphysics most clearly, since here the philosophical analysis of form, act, and potency must do its work with no matter to lean on at all.

Treatise VIII, on man and the various states of human nature, brings the volume to its close by turning from the purely spiritual creature to the composite one, and from creation to the long controversy that had, by Gonet's day, come to dominate Thomistic theology: the states of human nature considered before and after the fall, and the relation of each state to grace. This is the ground on which the seventeenth-century battles over Baianism, Jansenism, and the sufficiency or insufficiency of the powers of unaided nature were fought, and Gonet, true to the polemical energy that marked his entire career, engages that ground directly, defending the traditional Thomist account of a human nature that is genuinely capable of certain natural goods by its own powers, while insisting no less firmly that the supernatural end for which man was in fact created lies entirely beyond what nature, wounded or unwounded, could ever attain or merit on its own.

As in the first volume, Gonet's method throughout is that of the Manuale as a genre: a thesis stated plainly, the principal reasons that support it set out in order, and the standard objections of adversaries — here chiefly the Scotists on the angels and the Jansenists and Baianists on the states of human nature — answered in turn, all compressed from the far larger apparatus of authorities and disputations that fills the corresponding books of the Clypeus. The aim, as before, is to place the substance of that larger work within reach of the student and the working theologian, in a form compact enough for regular use.

It is in the hope of extending to English-language readers the same access to this stage of Gonet's synthesis — on the Trinity, the angels, and man — that the present translation has been undertaken.

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Treatise VI

On the Sacred and Ineffable Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

Nazianzen not undeservedly calls this Mystery a most sacred enigma, whose perfect understanding must be deferred until the clear vision of God. Whence it is not without purpose that in the Gospel it is said that someone came by night to his friend, and asked: Friend, lend me three loaves — which are nothing other than the knowledge of the Trinity, which is the true food of the soul, as Augustine teaches, Sermon 29 on the Words of the Lord. For he comes by night, because the investigation of the three Persons in the unity of nature is obscure and dark, so long as we are in this mortal life, and belongs more truly to the Blessed than to those who are here wayfarers. Which too is perhaps indicated under a mystery in Genesis 18, when it is said that Abraham was at the door of the tabernacle, when he saw three and adored one: as if the soul then begins to behold the unity of nature in the Trinity of Persons, when, placed at the extremity, it goes forth from the tabernacle of the body. Wherefore Augustine excellently says, book 7 On the Trinity, last chapter: Hold fast to the Trinity by faith, until it shines forth in our hearts, He who says through the Prophet, unless you believe, you will not understand. In investigating this Mystery, therefore, the anchor of faith must be constantly held; whence before we approach the scholastic difficulties, and dispute with the Scholastics concerning the processions, relations, and Divine Persons, and their properties, we have judged it necessary, so that the faith and truth of so great a Mystery may be more firmly established in our hearts, and the chief errors of heretics against it be uprooted at the threshold of this Treatise, to premise some things, by way of a preamble to the scholastic difficulties, concerning its truth and knowability.

Chapter I

On the truth of the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

The faith of this Mystery consists chiefly in this, that we firmly believe and profess one God subsisting in three persons; whence, in order that its truth be established, in the first place the real distinction and plurality of the persons must be proved against Sabellius; then their consubstantiality against the Arians and Macedonians.

§ I

There is given in God a real distinction of persons.

This truth can in the first place be proved from the Old Testament, in which, although it was not openly and explicitly declared, it was nevertheless most often insinuated and adumbrated. For in the first place, at the beginning of Genesis, where it is said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," in the Hebrew is had "created Elohim," that is, Gods or judges. By which words, through the word "created," which is in the singular number, the unity of the Divine nature is designated, and through the word "Elohim," which is in the plural, the plurality of persons. The same truth is declared by the following words, "Let there be light, and light was made," etc., for as Saint Thomas notes, I, question 74, article 3, ad 3, the Person of the Father is insinuated in God saying, "Let there be light"; the Person of the Son, in the Word by which it is said; and the Person of the Holy Spirit, in the complacency by which God saw the light that it was good.

Then the Royal Prophet, Psalm 32, thus says: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth." Where Jerome most plainly declares the majesty of the Trinity: the Lord, the Word, the Spirit of the Lord. Likewise Psalm 66: "May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us, and all the ends of the earth fear him." Where also Jerome: May God the Father bless us, our God the Son; for he himself is our God. And "thou shalt call his name," says Isaiah, Emmanuel, that is, God with us. May God the Holy Spirit bless us. Behold the Mystery of the Trinity comprehended in one verse. But lest, in naming God, he should be thought to have said three Gods, forthwith insinuating unity, he added: "and all the ends of the earth fear him." Finally, Isaiah 6: the Seraphim cry one to another: "Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of hosts": where the Trinity of persons is designated in the name "Holy" repeated three times, and the unity in essence by those words of singular number, "the Lord God of hosts." Whence Ambrose excellently, book 2 On the Faith, to Gratian, chapter 4: What does the threefold repetition under one name of authority mean? If it is a threefold repetition, why one praise? If one praise, why the threefold repetition? Why the threefold repetition? Except because the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in sanctity. He did not say it once, lest he leave out the Son; not twice, lest he pass over the Holy Spirit; not four times, lest he join a creature to himself. And to show that the Trinity is of one Deity, when he had said "Holy" a third time, he added in the singular, "the Lord God of hosts."

The same truth is openly declared in the New Testament, especially Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." And 1

John 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit."

Nor is Sabellius's evasion of any force, saying that those things in Scripture which designate a distinction of persons ought to be referred, not to a diversity of the persons themselves in themselves, but to a difference of offices, or actions, of the same person: so that the same person, as unbegotten, and the principle of creating, is called the Father; as incarnate, is called the Son; as sanctifying the creature, is called the Holy Spirit — as it were by a certain extension and dilation of the same person into diverse effects. This evasion, I say, is not valid: both because Scripture in various places admits a true Paternity and Filiation in God, as is established from that saying, 1 John, last chapter: "that we may be in his true Son"; but where there is true Paternity and Filiation, there must be a diverse suppositum or person, since these are relatively opposed. Whence Tertullian excellently, Against Praxeas: In order that I be a husband, I must have a wife; for I am not a wife to myself: so also, in order that I be a Father, I must have a Son; I will not be a Father to myself. Also because in Scripture, generation and procession are posited in the divine realm, antecedently to all created things, and before the incarnation and sanctification of the creature: for the Son is said to have been begotten before the daystar, and the Divine Wisdom to have come forth from the mouth of the Most High, before every creature, and the Word to have been in the beginning with God, and through it all things to have been made: therefore within the Godhead itself there is given a true and real distinction of persons, and not only from a diverse connotation or relation to effects ad extra, or to the incarnation. Whence excellently Pope Leo, Epistle 92: The Catholic faith believes the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, without confusion, distinct; without time, everlasting; without difference, equal; because the same essence, not the same person, fulfills the unity in the Trinity.

The same truth can be persuaded by a threefold congruence. The first is: There must be found in God perfect friendship, since this is a simple perfection, mixed with no imperfection: but friendship cannot be preserved without a real distinction of the one loving and the one loved, since this imports mutual love and equality, as the Philosopher testifies, Ethics 8, chapter 3; whence Gregory, Homily 17 on the Gospel, says that charity cannot be had among fewer than two: Therefore there is given in God a real distinction of persons.

The second: The highest good must communicate itself in the highest manner: but without a real distinction of persons, the highest communication of God cannot be preserved, since between the one communicating and him to whom the communication is made, a real distinction is required: Therefore a real distinction of persons is to be

admitted in God. Whence Cyril, book 3 of the Treasury, chapter 1: Deity cannot be perfect, unless it have a Son, and bring forth fruit from itself.

The third: God is most blessed, whence since without society there is no perfect delight, nor true felicity, there must be given in Him a true and perfect society: but with a real distinction of persons excluded, there cannot be perfect society in God, since creatures are unlike God, and did not exist from eternity. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 31, article 3, ad 1, thus says: Although the Angels and holy souls are always with God, nevertheless if there were not a plurality of persons in the Godhead, it would follow that God would be alone, or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with something of an alien nature. For someone is said to be alone in a garden, although there are there many plants and worms. And similarly God would be said to be alone, or solitary, with the Angels and men existing with Him, if there were not several persons in the Godhead: Therefore a plurality of persons is to be admitted in God.

The arguments of the Sabellians were taken from those passages of Scripture in which God is said to be alone: Deuteronomy 32: "See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me." But to these it is easily answered, that that particle "alone" removes from God only a plurality of Gods, not, however, a plurality of persons, which subsist in a single and undivided essence. Whence excellently Bernard, book 5 On Consideration, chapter 8: We are not led away from this profession of unity by the assertion of three; since in this Trinity we do not admit multiplicity, just as neither solitude in unity. Wherefore, when I say "one," the number of the Trinity does not trouble me, which does not multiply the essence, does not vary it, nor divide it. Again, when I say "three," the view of unity does not accuse me, which neither compels those three, or those three persons, into a more confused state, nor reduces them into singularity, etc.

§ II

The consubstantiality of the Divine Persons is shown from Scripture.

Concerning the first person no one has ever doubted that He is true God, for as Augustine says, book 2 On the Trinity, chapter 13: The Father is God, as even all heretics grant. Wherefore it remains only to prove the Divinity of the Son against the Arians, and of the Holy Spirit against the Macedonians, and thus the consubstantiality of the Divine Persons will remain proved.

I say, therefore, secondly, that the second person of the Trinity is of the same substance and nature with the Father.

It is proved, first, from that saying, John 10, where Christ, speaking of Himself, says: "I and the Father are one," where that He speaks of the unity of essence is established from these words immediately preceding: "My Father, as to what he hath given me, is greater than all," for nothing surpasses all things except perfect divinity. Whence Augustine, Sermon 56 on the Words of the Lord: Let the Arians hear what he says, "one"; let the Sabellians hear what he says, "we are"; let them be vain, denying to Him neither equality, nor otherness. Rightly also do some interpreters of Scripture observe that Christ, in saying, "I and the Father are one," named Himself first before the Father; which would seem to carry a certain discourtesy, had He not said this to overturn that heresy which He had foreknown would arise in the Church, which said that the Father was prior to the Son in time, dignity, and power.

It is proved, secondly, from those passages of Scripture in which Christ is called true God, 1 John, last chapter, the great God, to Titus 1, God over all things, to the Romans 9; for these openly declare that He is God not by participation, adoption, or imitation, but by His own nature, and consequently equal and consubstantial with the Father. Whence the Apostle, to the Philippians 2, says: He thought it not robbery to be equal with God. And in Psalm 109, that the same equality of the Son with the Father be designated, the Son is said to sit at the right hand of the Father: "The Lord said to my Lord, sit thou at my right hand," as Augustine there noted. Chrysostom too acutely observed, Sermon 58, that just as in that Psalm the Father is said to sit at the right hand of the Son ("the Lord at thy right hand"), so as to denote that between the Father and the Son there is an equal degree of honor. Thus (he says) the Son of God sits at the right hand, in such a way that the Father does not sit at the left; it is a unique, singular divine concession, where the supreme power admits nothing sinister.

It is proved, thirdly, the conclusion from that saying of John: "In the beginning was the Word, the Word was with God, the Word was God." For as Ambrose excellently says, book 1 On the Faith of the Trinity, chapter 5: By these four or five words our fisherman excluded all heresies. For that which was "in the beginning" is not included by time: therefore let Arius fall silent, who denies the Son to be coeternal with the Father. But that which "was with God" is not confused by commingling, but is distinguished by the solid perfection of the abiding God with the Father, so that Sabellius and Photinus grow mute, who acknowledged no distinction in the Divine Persons. But if "God was the Word," there is an inseparable unity and consubstantiality of everlasting Divinity in the Father and the Son, so that Eudoxius and Eunomius blush.

The arguments of the Arians were of no weight, for they thus argued: The Father is called greater than the Son, John 14: "The Father is greater than I"; and to the Corinthians

15, the Son is called subject to the Father, and to the Philippians 2, obedient to Him; and Mark 13, Christ says He does not know the day of judgment; and John 5, that He cannot do anything of Himself: but these things cannot stand with the equality and consubstantiality of the Son with the Father: Therefore the Son is not equal to the Father, nor consubstantial with Him.

But if this argument proved anything, it would prove the Son not to be supreme over all creatures, as the Arians asserted, since to the Hebrews 2, Christ is said to have been made lower than the Angels. Just as, therefore, from this it does not follow that Christ is inferior to the Angels except by reason of His human nature, so from the fact that the Father is called greater than the Son, and the Son subject and obedient to Him, it can only be inferred that the Son is not equal to the Father according to His humanity, not, however, that He is not equal to Him according to His divinity. To what is added concerning the day of judgment, it must be said that Christ did not know it as Legate of the eternal Father, and Teacher of the nations, that is, in order to its publication; but as it were under a secret, and so as not to reveal it to others: in which manner of speaking we ourselves often use, when, asked concerning those things which we have received under secrecy, we respond that we do not know them. Whence Hilary, book 10 On the Trinity: This profession of not knowing the day is not a weakness of ignorance, but a dispensation of silence. To the passage of John 5, Saint Thomas responds here, question 32, article 4, ad 1, that in this that it is said, "the Son cannot do anything of Himself," some power is not thereby withdrawn from the Son which the Father has, since it is immediately added that whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise; but it is shown that the Son has power from the Father, from whom He has His nature. In one word it is signified that Christ has power through generation, not as an unbegotten person, as the Father is.

I say thirdly, the Holy Spirit is true God, and accordingly consubstantial with the Father and the Son. This is manifestly gathered from Sacred Scripture, in which several things are attributed to the Holy Spirit which can belong to none but God. For in the first place He is said to create the world, and to fill it: Psalm 103: "Thou shalt send forth thy spirit, and they shall be created." Wisdom 1: "The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world." Secondly, He is said to establish the heavens, and adorn them. Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth." Job 26: "The Spirit of the Lord hath adorned the heavens." Thirdly, He is said to search the deep things of God: 1 Corinthians 2: "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God." Fourthly, He is said to have a temple, which belongs to God alone: 1 Corinthians 6: "Know you not that your members are the temple of the

Holy Spirit?" Fifthly, He is said to speak through the mouth of the Prophets and Saints: 2 Peter 1: "The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit." Sixthly, He is said to be the beatitude of the Angels: 1 Peter 1: the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, into whom the Angels desire to look. Finally, Acts 5, the Holy Spirit is openly called God, for Peter said to Ananias: "Why hath Satan tempted thy heart, to lie to the Holy Spirit? Thou hast not lied to men, but to God."

Against the divinity of the Holy Spirit, Macedonius chiefly objected two things: first, that saying, to the Romans 8: "The Spirit asketh for us"; but if He were God, He would not ask, but would give. Secondly, that saying, John 16: "Whatsoever he shall hear, he shall speak, and he shall declare it to you"; but he who must hear and be instructed, that he may speak to others, is not God, who does not need instruction: Therefore the Holy Spirit is not God.

To the first it is answered, from Augustine, Epistle 121, that Paul asserts that the Holy Spirit asks, because He teaches us to ask, whence it is added there: He helps our infirmity. Or it can also be said, with Saint Thomas, on this passage of the Apostle, that the Holy Spirit "asks," that is, makes us ask: just as, Genesis 22, it is said: "Now I know that thou fearest the Lord": that is, I have made known.

To the second it must be said, with Basil, book 1 Against Eunomius, that the Holy Spirit hears from the Father and the Son those things which He speaks, not through instruction and teaching of an inferior by a superior, but through the communication of the very divine essence and knowledge, which He received from the Father and the Son through eternal procession.

Chapter II

On the knowability of the Mystery of the Trinity.

I say first, the Mystery of the Trinity cannot be known by the natural light.

It is proved, first, from Scripture and the Holy Fathers: for it is said, Matthew 11: "No one knoweth the Son but the Father, and he to whom the Son will reveal him." Whence Pope Hormisdas, in his Epistle to the Emperor Justin: The secret of the Trinity could be investigated by the nature of no visible creature. By which words he openly declares that no human or angelic intellect can, by the natural light alone, rise to the knowledge of this Mystery, indeed cannot even suspect it. In the type of which matter, Ezekiel 10, the throne of the Most Holy Trinity is said to be placed above the heads of four living creatures; because indeed (as some interpreters of Scripture note) the sublimity of this

Mystery transcends the fourfold degree of created knowledge, namely the sensitive, figured by the ox; the imaginative, by the lion; the rational, by man; and the angelic, figured by the eagle. Wherefore the Prophet there adds: "And when there was a voice above the firmament, that was over their heads, they stood, and let down their wings." Where Gregory: When we think of the Angels, and other works of nature, the voice is still from the firmament; but when the mind thinks of the unity of nature in God, and the plurality of the three Persons, then the voice is above the firmament; because it conceives that which, by its own incomprehensibility, transcends even the sense of the Angels.

It is proved, secondly, by the reason of Saint Thomas here, question 32, article 1: God cannot be known by us naturally, except from creatures; for of Him we know nothing a priori and through a cause, but only a posteriori, and through effects produced by Him: but from created effects we cannot arrive at the knowledge of so great a Mystery: Therefore it cannot be known by us by the natural light. The Major is clear; the Minor, however, is proved from this, that created effects do not proceed per se from God as triune, but insofar as He is one; because they proceed from Him per se by reason of omnipotence, by way of proximate power, and by reason of divinity, as radical principle. Whence just as effects produced by a craftsman, e.g., a painted panel by a painter, manifest indeed his art and industry, because they proceed from it and depend on it per se; but not his color, figure, stature, clothing, and the like, which do not per se concur to the production of the work, but stand only per accidens and concomitantly in the craftsman, as artfully working: so likewise, although from the inspection of creatures, and the artful structure of this world, we know the infinite wisdom, power, and divinity of that supreme craftsman, we cannot, however, from them arrive at knowledge of the Trinity.

You will say, first, that there shine forth in created things several vestiges of the Trinity, from which we can arrive at knowledge of this Mystery; whence some of the ancient Philosophers had some knowledge of it; for Trismegistus said that Monad begot Monad, and reflected its ardor into Itself: by which words the generation of the Word, and the Procession of the Holy Spirit, seem manifestly expressed. Augustine also relates, Confessions 7, that he read in the books of the Platonists many things pertaining to the knowledge of the Most Holy Trinity: e.g., that which John writes of the eternal generation of the Word: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

I answer that although in creatures some vestiges of the Trinity shine forth, nevertheless from these, with divine revelation excluded, human reason cannot come to any

knowledge of it, or even the slightest suspicion; for as Saint Thomas teaches, Book 3, dist. 33, question 1, article 1, ad 2, all the similitudes which can be adduced from creatures to explain this Mystery have more of dissimilitude than of similitude; wherefore they lead away from the truth of this Mystery more than they induce the intellect into its truth. Whence Augustine, chapter 1 On the Divine Names: No number, or unity, or fecundity, or anything whatsoever, has opened that secret of Divinity, which surpasses all reason and understanding. Wherefore if some of the ancient Philosophers had some knowledge of it, they drew it either from Sacred Scripture, and the books of the Prophets, or from the verses of the Sibyls, or even from the revelation of Demons, who, in the first instant of their creation, had faith and revelation of this Mystery. That they indeed sometimes spoke to men of it is indicated by that response of Serapis, who, to Thulis consulting him, who reigned in Egypt, as to who might be more blessed than himself, is reported to have said, as Ludovicus Vives relates from Suidas, book 10 On the City of God, chapter 23:

In the beginning is God, then the Spirit follows. It is added, these three are coeval, and tend into one.

You will say, secondly, it is known by the natural light that it is the greatest perfection to generate one's like: Therefore by the same light it will be manifest that generation, and consequently the production of a Word, is found in God. Likewise it is established by the natural light that good is diffusive of itself, and consequently that infinite good, such as God is, can diffuse and communicate itself infinitely: whence since the communication of the divine nature ad intra alone is simply infinite, it can be demonstrated by the natural light that God communicates His nature ad intra to another suppositum, and consequently that there are several persons in God.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, for the natural light dictates that generation cannot occur without a division of nature and substance, in the one begotten and in the one begetting, nor consequently without imperfection. Whence that generation is a simply simple perfection, and involves no imperfection in its concept, we do not know for certain, except through divine revelation, by which we are taught that in God there is a Son begotten by the Father, before all ages, and of the same substance and nature with Him. To what is added, namely that it is known by the natural light that infinite good must communicate itself infinitely, it must be said that it is known by natural reason that infinite good can communicate itself infinitely, on the part of the mode of communicating, namely by educing things from nothing, for which infinite power is required; not, however, on the part of the thing communicated, namely the divine nature itself; for although God can communicate it ad intra, we cannot, however, by our

own powers apprehend this power which He has of communicating Himself ad intra, since the principles of this knowledge are not available to us, reason alone being consulted.

I say secondly, although the Mystery of the Trinity is above, it is nevertheless not against natural reason.

It is proved: for as Saint Thomas discourses, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 7, although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, those things which natural reason has implanted cannot be contrary to the truth of faith; for those things which are naturally implanted in reason are established to be most true; and that which is held by faith, since it is confirmed by divine authority, it is impious to believe to be false. Since, therefore, only the false is contrary to the true, it is impossible that the truth of the Mysteries of faith be contrary to principles naturally known: Therefore although the Mystery of the Trinity is above, it is nevertheless not against natural reason.

You will say, this Mystery conflicts with this widespread principle, known by the natural light, which is the foundation of the whole syllogistic art: Those things which are the same with a third thing are the same with one another: for the divine persons are really identified with the essence, and yet are really distinguished among themselves: Therefore the Mystery of the Trinity is not only above, but also against natural reason.

Some, in order to easily extricate themselves from this difficulty, respond that the aforesaid axiom holds only in created things, not, however, in God, in whom, on account of infinity, the same nature in number can subsist in three really distinct persons. But this response is a mere evasion, and an elusion of the difficulty proposed, not a solution. For that principle, as is said in the objection, is the chief, and almost the sole, foundation of the whole syllogistic art; for it, from the identity of the extremes with a third, made in the premises, infers in the conclusion their identity with one another: but the syllogistic art holds no less in God than in creatures: Therefore also the truth of the aforesaid principle. This solution, therefore, being rejected,

I answer, first, with Saint Thomas here, question 28, article 3, ad 1, that that Philosophical axiom is universally true, when the extremes are identified with the third really and rationally; but it is otherwise when they are really identified with the third, and are distinguished from it, by a notion importing relative opposition; for by reason of such opposition, the extremes can be really identified with the medium, and nevertheless really differ from one another; and thus it happens in the case proposed, for although the divine relations and persons are really identified with the essence, because, however, they are distinguished from it virtually and by a notion importing relative opposition among

themselves, they are really distinguished among themselves, although they are the same as the essence. Which can be illustrated by a twofold example. The first is adduced by Saint Thomas in the place cited: for although action and passion are distinguished from motion only rationally, they nevertheless differ really among themselves by a greater real distinction on account of the opposition which they have. And if motion were of such perfection and amplitude, that it could really identify to itself action and passion, with only a distinction of reason, action and passion would still, by reason of the opposition which they enjoy, be really distinguished among themselves. The other is in the properties of being: for if, per impossibile, the three properties of being, one, true, and good, retaining perfect identity with the notion of being, transcendentally included in them, enjoyed relative opposition among themselves, by reason of it they would be really distinguished among themselves, although from the notion of being imbibed in them, they would differ only rationally.

Nor are the two instances valid which can be made against this solution: for wisdom and goodness in God are distinguished rationally from the essence, just as Paternity and Filiation, and yet do not differ really among themselves. Likewise it is rightly inferred that Peter is an animal, from the fact that he is the same as man, from whom, however, Peterhood and animality are distinguished rationally: Therefore although the extremes differ rationally from the third, it is rightly inferred that they are really identified among themselves, from the fact that they are really identified with the third. These instances, I say, are not valid. To the first Saint Thomas responds, Book 1, dist. 2, question 1, article 5, ad 4, that although divine wisdom differs rationally from the other attributes, it is nevertheless not opposed to them, since wisdom is compatible with goodness and the other attributes being in the same subject; and therefore it does not have the function of distinguishing the divine supposita, as opposed relations have: but just as divine wisdom effects the effect of one who is wise, on account of the truth of its own notion which remains, so relation effects a true distinction, on account of the true notion of relation which is preserved. By which words he in the first place insinuates the distinction which is found between goodness and wisdom, on the one hand, and between Paternity and Filiation, on the other, which consists in this, that those attributes, although they differ rationally from the essence, as do Paternity and Filiation, do not, however, include in their formal notion a relative opposition, as do those relations, and therefore they do not differ really among themselves as do Paternity and Filiation. Then he indicates the fundamental reason why the divine relations, notwithstanding real identity with the essence, are really distinguished among themselves, namely because it is proper to an infinite thing to identify things to itself, their formal notions being preserved; whence just as the formal notion of wisdom, which is to know things through the highest causes,

is most perfectly preserved in God, notwithstanding its real identity with the essence; so also the formal notion of relation must be perfectly preserved in Him, notwithstanding its real identity with the divine nature: but the proper notion and essence of relation is to be opposed to its correlative, and to be really distinguished from it: Therefore although the divine relations and persons are really identified with the essence, they are nevertheless really distinguished among themselves, by reason of the relative opposition which they enjoy. From which the response to the second instance is clear, for Peterhood and animality are not distinguished from man by a notion importing relative opposition, as Paternity and Filiation are distinguished from the essence in the divine realm: whence although it is rightly inferred that Peter is an animal, from the fact that Peterhood and animality are really identified with man, it is not, however, rightly gathered that the Father and the Son are really identified with one another, from the fact that Paternity and Filiation are the same really with the essence, and differ from it only rationally.

The difficulty can be solved otherwise, and, secondly, it can be responded that the aforesaid Philosophical axiom, on which the art of syllogizing rests, has place only in those things which are the same with a third adequately, not, however, in those which are identified with the third only inadequately: but the constitutive relations of the divine persons are not identified with the divine essence adequately, but only inadequately. For that is said to be identified inadequately with something, which is not the same as everything with which that is identified; nor is the identifying thing the same as the identified thing alone; but any personal relation is so identified with the divine nature, that it is not identified with the remaining personal relations, with which the essence and nature is identified; and the nature is not so identified with one relation that it is not identified with the others. Just as, therefore, the parts of the body, distant from one another, are present to one third thing, namely the rational soul, without their being present to one another; for the foot and the head are immediately and proximately united to the soul, but are distant from each other; because indeed they are not united to it adequately, but only inadequately, since the soul informs not only them, but also the other parts of the body, and is united to them. And just as Christ is present to several hosts and altars, which, nevertheless, are not mutually present to one another; because He is not present to those altars and hosts adequately, since He is present to many others: so likewise the Divine Persons are identified with the essence, without being identified with one another, because they are not identified with it adequately, but only inadequately.

From what has been said you will understand the reason why this syllogism is not valid: This God is the Father: This God is the Son: Therefore the Son is the Father — this does

not arise from the fact that the form of the expository syllogism fails in this Mystery, but from the fact that such a syllogism is defective, from a lack of a perfect distribution of this term "God," which, although it is absolutely singular, is nevertheless, on account of the real communicability of the divine nature to three persons, equivalently universal, and consequently, in order that it be perfectly distributed in the premises, the syllogism should be formed thus: Whatever is God, is the Father: Whatever is God, is the Son. Therefore the Father is the Son — and then the Major and Minor would be false, since the Holy Spirit is God, and yet is neither the Father, nor the Son.

Chapter III

On the Divine Processions.

The processions of God ad intra are the foundations of the divine relations, by which the Persons are constituted: whence before we discourse on the divine relations and persons, we must treat of the divine processions.

§ I

Whether, and how many, there are processions in God.

I say first, there are given in God real processions ad intra. This is established from Scripture, for Christ says, John 8: "I proceeded from God"; and John 16: "the Spirit who proceedeth from the Father." Likewise in Scripture, the first person is often called Father, the second Son: but it belongs to the notion of Father to generate, and of Son to be generated: Therefore in God there is a real procession, by which the Father generates and the Son is generated.

Reason also supports this: both because the divine Persons are distinguished only by relative opposition, as is said at Florence; but relative opposition of the Divine Persons is founded on the origin of one from another. Also because, as Saint Thomas discourses here, question 27, article 1: Whoever understands, by this very fact that he understands, produces a word: whence since God is understanding, indeed in the supreme degree of intellectuality, He must, in His own knowledge, produce a word — not indeed in order that He understand (for this is supposed to have through essential knowledge), but because He understands, and so that, from infinite intellectual fecundity, He may communicate His knowledge to another, namely to the word itself, and speak to it.

In order that the force of this congruence be better perceived, and the instance which is usually raised to the contrary be resolved: it must be noted that when Saint Thomas says: Whoever understands, by this very fact that he understands, produces a word, this must

not be understood of every intellection whatsoever (for it does not belong to the notion of intellection as such that there be production of a word, as is established in the beatific vision, in which the Blessed produce no word, as we showed in Treatise 2), but of connatural intellection, by which any intellectual creature understands itself. Whence the force of this congruence stands in this, that since intellectual creatures, even the most perfect, in every connatural intellection of theirs produce a word, as we shall say of the Angels in the following treatise, it is congruent that God, who is in the supreme degree of intelligent natures, through His connatural intellection, which is knowledge of Himself, also produce a word, not from need, but from fecundity.

You will object, first, it is repugnant to a being from itself to proceed from another: but any Divine Person is a being from itself: Therefore one cannot proceed from another.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: it is repugnant to a being from itself to proceed from another, by a procession from another as from a cause — I grant the Major; as from a principle of origin, all dependence and causality excluded — I deny the Major. Whence when it is said that any divine person is from itself, or has being from itself, this is true, if "being from itself," or "having being from itself," excludes an extraneous principle, or one of another nature; but false, if it excludes a real principle of the same nature; for thus only the Father is from Himself, since He alone is unbegotten and unproduced.

You will object, secondly: procession cannot be understood without dependence of the one proceeding on the one producing, since to proceed from another is not to be able to be without it: but one person in the divine realm cannot depend on another: Therefore neither proceed from it.

I answer by denying the Major, and to its proof I say that it does not suffice for the dependence of one on another, that it cannot be without it; for one relative cannot be without another, and yet does not depend on it, since relatives are simultaneous in nature; but it is furthermore required that one cannot be without the other, by reason of subordination, for which a diversity in nature is necessarily required; whence although in the divine realm the proceeding person cannot be without the one producing, it does not, however, depend on it; because the essence of both is the same, with only a diverse mode of having it; for the producing person has it from itself, the proceeding one has it from another.

You will object, thirdly: Between the divine persons there cannot be priority and posteriority, since they are coeternal; but procession necessarily involves an order of prior and posterior between the person producing and the person produced: Therefore procession cannot be given between the divine persons.

I answer that although between the divine persons there cannot be given a priority of duration, there can nevertheless be given a priority of origin, which suffices for the procession of one from another; for the light of the sun emits from itself its splendor, and yet the sun is not prior in time to its splendor, but only prior in origin or nature. Whence the Divine Word is called the splendor of the Father, because it proceeds from the Father, as light from the sun, and is coeternal with it.

I say secondly, there are only two processions in God: one through the intellect, by which the Word is begotten; the other through the will, by which love is spirated.

It is proved: Procession in the divine realm is not according to a transient action, but an immanent one: but in God, a most perfect intellectual agent, there can be found only two immanent operations, namely intellection and volition, virtually distinct: Therefore the divine processions can only be two, one through the intellect, the other through the will.

You will say, this argument only proves that in God there can only be processions through the intellect and through the will, not, however, that there cannot be given in the divine intellect several acts of knowledge, from which several words might arise; or several volitions, from which several loves might be spirated.

But on the contrary: if there were several processions in the divine intellect, from which several words might arise, they would either be diverse only in species or in number. Not the first, since divine intellection and utterance is of one specific unity. Nor the second, both because a merely numerical distinction is taken from matter, or from a subject: but the divine processions, and their terms, since they are subsisting through themselves, lack matter and subject. Also because a merely numerical distinction arises from limitation; whence the divine nature, because it is not limited, cannot be multiplied in number: but the divine processions, and their terms, are not something limited: Therefore they cannot be multiplied and distinguished by number alone.

I add that, since the Divine Word is infinite and comprehensive, and the adequate term of divine knowledge, and through it the eternal Father knows the essence, the attributes, the relations, and all possible creatures, it can only be one, as Saint Thomas excellently declares on chapter 1 of John, in these words: This is the difference between the divine word and the human, that our word is imperfect, but the divine word is most perfect: for because we cannot express all our conceptions by one word, therefore we must form several words, through which we may express separately all the things which are in our knowledge. But in God it is not so: for since He understands Himself and whatever He understands, through His essence, by a single act, the one divine Word is expressive of

the whole of what is in God, not only of the persons, but also of the creatures, otherwise it would be imperfect. It is confirmed: among the Angels, the more some excel in dignity, the fewer species and words they use to express their own concepts: therefore since God attains the supreme peak of intellectuality, He manifests, by one most perfect word, all the secrets of His infinite wisdom. Whence the Prophet says: "God hath spoken once, these two things have I heard." For God speaks once, because He has uttered, and continually utters, one word from eternity; but the Prophet hears two things, because by this one word the Father has declared all things.

§ II

What is the proximate principle by which of the Divine Processions?

Durandus thinks that the divine nature is not only the radical, but also the proximate and immediate principle of the divine processions, on account of its fecundity, which belongs to it by reason of infinity. Others teach that such a principle is only the absolute perfection; others, the relation alone. For the explanation of the true opinion:

I say first, the divine nature, as preunderstood to the intellect and will, is not the proximate and immediate principle by which of the divine processions, but the intellect and will of God.

It is proved, first, from the fact that Scripture, the Councils, and the Holy Fathers everywhere call the second person of the Most Holy Trinity the Word and begotten Wisdom; the third they call charity and love: but these names belong to the intellect and will: Therefore the intellect and will are the immediate principle of the divine processions. Nor is it valid what Durandus says, that those locutions are metaphorical: both because Cyril, book 4 of the Treasury, chapter 5, says that God chose the name "Word," because it is most proper. Whence Saint Thomas below, question 34, article 1, ad 1, calls Origen the fount of the Arians, because he said that the Son of God is not properly the Word, but metaphorically. Also because, if it were permitted to interpret those passages of Scripture in which the second person is called Word, in a metaphorical sense, those too in which He is called Son could be twisted to a metaphorical sense: and thus occasion would be given to heretics to elude all the testimonies of Scripture by tropical and metaphorical senses.

It is proved, secondly: We must philosophize about divine things, by analogy and similitude to created things, imperfections excluded: but in created things, to understand and to will are not immediately from the nature, preunderstood to its own powers and faculties, but from the intellect and will: Therefore also in God. Nor is it valid if you say

that this distinction intervenes between God and creatures, that creatures, since they are of a potential and finite nature, need proximate principles for operating; but God's nature, since it is infinite, and purest act, does not need the concurrence of a proximate principle for operations. Not valid, I say: for although the concurrence of a proximate principle, really distinct from the nature, is repugnant to the infinity and purity of the divine nature, the concurrence of a proximate principle only virtually distinct from the divine nature, and really identified with it, is not repugnant: but the intellect and will in God differ only virtually from the divine nature: Therefore it does not prejudice the infinity and purity of the divine nature, that the divine processions be from the intellect and will, as from a proximate and immediate principle, and from the divine nature, only radically and mediately.

It is proved, thirdly, from the inconvenience which follows from Durandus's opinion: for if the divine nature, as preunderstood to the intellect and will of God, were the immediate principle of the divine processions, no reason could be assigned why there are only two processions in God, why one precedes the other, and why the Word proceeds from one person only, and the Holy Spirit from two? Finally, there would be no reason why one procession is a generation, and not the other, since each person proceeds from the same nature, and in the same manner; all of which things are altogether repugnant to the truth of the mystery of the Trinity.

Durandus responds that just as, although properties immediately emanate from the nature, nevertheless one emanates prior to another, and one results from the nature by means of another; so likewise, although the divine processions arise immediately from the fecundity of the divine nature, a sufficient reason can nevertheless be assigned for their order, and why one presupposes another, and belongs to God by means of it. But this solution is not valid, both because properties do not need to flow from the nature by means of proximate principles, as operations do; whence although, in order to assign an order of derivation among properties, it is not necessary to have recourse to proximate principles prior to them, it is indeed necessary in order to assign an order of prior and posterior among operations. Also because, although a finite nature can be the root of finite perfections, of which one is prior to another because it is its cause, as rationality is the root of the capacity for wonder and for laughter; yet if the nature is infinite, no reason can be rendered why it is not exhausted by one procession, but rather by two: Therefore from God's nature precisely taken, which is infinite, the diversity of processions cannot arise, but recourse must be had to proximate principles, namely the intellect and the will.

I say secondly, the intellect and will of God are not the proximate and immediate principle by which of the generation of the Word, and the production of the Holy Spirit, except as they are modified by the relations of paternity and active spiration, and connote such relations.

The conclusion is proved by a fundamental reason: If the principle by which, proximate and immediate, of the generation of the Word, and the production of the Holy Spirit, consisted adequately in the intellect and the will, that is, in absolute perfection, and required or connoted no relation, since all the absolute perfections are common to the whole Trinity, it would follow that the power of generating and spirating would be found in all the persons of the Most Holy Trinity, and consequently that the Son could generate another son, and the Holy Spirit spirate, or produce, another Holy Spirit; whence, since in God every possible thing exists, the Son would in fact generate another distinct son, and the Holy Spirit would spirate another Holy Spirit, and thus there would be more persons in God than three, which is repugnant to the Catholic faith, and utterly destroys the mystery of the Trinity.

What we have said of the intellect and will of God must also be said of the divine nature, proportion being preserved: for it is not the first and radical principle of the divine processions, except as modified by the relations; otherwise, as it is in the Son, it would have the notion of a radical power of generating; and as it is in the Holy Spirit, the notion of a power or radical principle of spirating. Just as, therefore, in created things we see that the same form, as it is in diverse subjects, and diversely modified in them, furnishes diverse effects: for heat, e.g., in an animal generates flesh, not in fire; and in a female produces milk, not in a male; and grace in us, who are an extraneous person, constitutes an adopted son, not in Christ, who is a divine person. The same, with proportion, must be thought in the case proposed: for the divine essence, as it is in the Father, and modified by the relation of Paternity, has the notion of a radical generative power, and a principle by which, first and remote, of divine generation; but the same essence, as it is in the Father and the Son, and as modified by the relation of spirator, is a radical spirative power, and the principle by which, first and remote, of the production of the Holy Spirit. Whence Saint Thomas, question 2 of On Power, article 1, proposes to himself this argument: If the Father generates in the divine realm, this must belong to Him according to His nature, which is a generative power, a radical principle of generating: but the same nature is in the Son and the Holy Spirit: Therefore by the same reasoning the Son and the Holy Spirit will generate. To which argument he responds thus: It must be said that although the nature is the same in the Father and the Son, it is nevertheless according to another mode, namely with another relation; and therefore it is

not necessary that what belongs to the Father through His nature, belong also to the Son.

I say thirdly, the principle by which, whether proximate or remote, of the divine processions, is not the relation alone. The reason is, because the principle by which of a generative or productive action is that in which the begotten or produced is assimilated to the one begetting or producing; since the intention of the agent is that it assimilate the product to itself in the principle by which it acts: but in the divine realm the persons produced are assimilated to the producing person not in the relation, but in the absolute: Therefore not the relation, but the absolute perfection connoting the relation, is the principle by which of the divine processions.

It is confirmed: if Paternity, e.g., were the generative power in the eternal Father, and the principle of the divine generation, would He have this under the express concept of Paternity, and as it is an exercised relation; or under the notion of hypostatic form, and as it has the notion of subsistence and personality? Neither can be said: Therefore the principle by which of divine generation cannot consist in relation alone.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Hilary, book On the Synods, says that will brought substance to all creatures, but nature gave it to the Son. And Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 20, says that the Word through which all things were made, is the Son of God by nature: Therefore, according to the Holy Fathers, the procession of the Word in the divine realm is immediately from nature, and not from the intellect.

But I deny the consequence, for those Holy Fathers only intend to teach against the Arians, that the Word does not proceed from God's free will, as creatures proceed, but that its production is natural and necessary; whence they take "nature" as it is opposed to "free." Or if they mean that the procession of the Son is from God's nature, as from a principle, they speak of the radical and remote principle, influencing by means of the intellect, as a proximate power.

You will object, secondly: We must philosophize about divine things by analogy and similitude to created things: but generative power does not belong to creatures by reason of the intellect: Therefore neither to God.

I answer that we must philosophize about God by analogy and similitude to more perfect creatures, such as spiritual and intellectual ones; but to these, generative power belongs by reason of the intellect, for the production of a created word is a certain intellectual generation, since, as is commonly said: From the object and the power is

born knowledge, and birth signifies generation.

You will object, thirdly, against the second conclusion: if the principle by which of the divine processions did not consist adequately in absolute perfection, but in absolute perfection, namely the intellect or the will, as connoting the relations of Paternity and active spiration, by which they are modified, it would follow that the generative power would not be in the Son, since in Him there is not the relation of Paternity: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The sequel of the Major is evident; the Minor seems to be established from this, that since generative power is some perfection, if it were not in the Son, He would not be equal to the Father in perfection, which is repugnant to the equality of the Divine Persons.

To this difficulty a fuller response will be given below, when we shall treat of the equality of the Divine Persons; now I say briefly, that although the generative power is not in the Son, it does not follow that there is in Him a defect of some perfection which is in the Father; because to be able to generate, and to be able to be generated, in the Divine Persons, are two functions which do not differ in perfection, but only in relation; for the same absolute perfection, by connoting paternity, gives the power to generate, and by connoting filiation, gives the power to be generated.

You will object, fourthly, against the third conclusion: The principle by which of generation is that from which the Father is denominated able to generate: but the Father is denominated able to generate, from the relation of paternity: Therefore that is the principle by which of divine generation. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. A proper denomination, not from a common form, but a proper one, ought to proceed: but the denomination of one able to generate is most proper to the Father: Therefore it must proceed not from the essence, which is common, but from paternity, which is proper to Him. Whence Athanasius, first dialogue on the Trinity, says that the Father begets by hypostasis, creates by command.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor, and to its proof, I distinguish the Major: a proper denomination ought not to proceed from a common form, left in its commonality — I grant the Major; as appropriated — I deny the Major, and, the Minor being granted, I deny the consequence. And so this argument only proves that the denomination of one able to generate does not proceed from the divine nature, absolutely taken, but as modified by the relation of paternity, as we expounded in the second conclusion. Whence when Athanasius says that the Father begets by hypostasis, this must not be understood of the principle by which, proximate or remote, of generation, but only of the complement of the principle by which, both proximate and

remote, connoting the relation of paternity, by which it is modified and completed.

From what has been said it is gathered that the term by which of the divine processions is something absolute in the direct case, connoting a relation. This is clear by the same reason by which we showed it of the principle by which: for in the term by which, or the formal term, the produced term must agree with the one producing: but in the relations there is no agreement, but there is in the absolute: Therefore the absolute, the relation being connoted, is the formal term of the divine processions.

§ III

Why is one of the divine processions a generation, but not the other?

It is certain of faith that, besides the procession of the Word, which is a true generation, as is manifestly gathered from various passages of Scripture, there is given another procession, of love, or of the Holy Spirit. For as Saint Thomas discourses below, question 37, article 1: Just as from this, that someone understands some thing, there arises a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood in the one understanding, which is called the word: so from this, that someone loves some thing, there arises a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the one loving, according to which the beloved is said to be in the lover, as the understood is in the one understanding. Therefore just as it is probably inferred that there is given in God the production of a word, from the fact that God understands, as we showed in § 1: so likewise it can probably be persuaded that there is in God another procession, by way of love, from the fact that God loves.

You will say, with Valentia, to whom this reason is displeasing, that although the beloved must be present within the lover, by inclination, it does not follow that some term must be produced by the created will, which is a weight and inclination toward the beloved; because that presence of the object is sufficiently effected by the act of love, which is an actual inclination.

But on the contrary: just as the object of intellection is not made formally present to the intellect by the intellection itself, but by some term produced by it, which is its expressed image and similitude; so neither is the beloved object made formally present to the lover itself by the act of love, but by some term produced by it, which has the notion of an impulse and weight inclining toward it; according to that saying of Augustine, Confessions 13, chapter 9: My love is my weight, by love am I carried wherever I am carried. This being presupposed:

We inquire the reason why the notion of generation belongs to one and not the other procession, since the definition of the generation of living things, which is the origin of a living thing from a living thing, in the similitude of nature, seems to belong no less to the procession of the Holy Spirit than to the production of the Word. This has seemed so difficult to the Holy Fathers, that Ambrose, book On the Faith, to Gratian, chapter 3, says: To me it is impossible to know the secret of generation; and Augustine, book 3 Against Maximinus, chapter 14, exclaims in wonder: To distinguish between that generation and this procession, I do not know, I am not able, I do not suffice.

The Scholastics, however, have devised various reasons for explaining this enigma. I shall relate here only two ways of speaking which seem more probable, others being omitted for the sake of brevity. The first teaches that the production of the Word is a generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because that receives, by force of its procession, a fecund nature, and one capable of producing another divine suppositum, but not this one, since it produces nothing within God.

But this opinion displeases many, and is rejected, first, because the similitude required in the begotten person for the notion of generation is not in the relatives, but in the absolute: but the similitude in the productive fecundity of another suppositum is not in the absolute precisely, but in the absolute, a relation in something being adjoined, and by connotation, as is established from what has been said in the preceding section: Therefore this is not necessary for the notion of generation. Secondly, even if the Son were not productive of the Holy Spirit, He would still be a son, and consequently His production would still be a true generation: Therefore the notion of generation does not belong to the production of the Son, from this precisely, that He receives a fecund nature, and one capable of producing the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. The Son of God, from Augustine On the Trinity, chapter 2: By this He is the Son, by which He is the Word, and by this the Word, by which He is the Son: but if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, He would proceed in the same manner through the intellect, just as He now proceeds, and consequently would be the Word, since the word is nothing other than the intrinsic term of intellection: Therefore He would be the Son, even though He did not produce the Holy Spirit.

It is confirmed: the spirative power being removed from the Father, per impossibile, the Father would still remain the Father, through the power of generating: Therefore the Son too would remain the Son, even if He did not produce the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear, from the fact that it is repugnant that there be a Father without a Son; whence if, the spirative power being removed from the Father, the Father would still remain, the Son too would remain, even though He did not produce the Holy Spirit.

Thirdly, for a true generation it suffices that the nature, under the notion of nature, be communicated to the produced term: but the concept of nature, in the fullest rigor, is preserved without the productive power of another suppositum: Therefore also the true notion of generation. The Major is established from the definition of the generation of living things; the Minor is thus shown. It does not belong to the notion of nature that it be a principle in another, or in order to another, but it suffices that it be a principle of the motion of that in which it is, as is established in the natures of the heavens and the Angels, in which is found the most perfect notion of nature, without the productive power, even radical, of another suppositum: Therefore the concept of nature, in the fullest rigor, is preserved without the productive power of another, namely by this, that it be the root of other immanent or transient operations. I add that, if the productive power of another suppositum belonged to the quidditative concept of nature, the Holy Spirit would not be of the same nature with the Father and the Son, since in Him there is not the productive power of another Divine Person, as there is in the Father and the Son. Indeed the Son too would not be adequately of the same nature with the Father, since the divine nature, as it is in the Father, is generative and spirative, whereas as it is in the Son, it is only spirative.

The second manner of speaking asserts that the production of the Word is a generation, but not the production of the Holy Spirit, for this reason, that although the divine nature is communicated to both, nevertheless the Son proceeds by way of image, but not the Holy Spirit, since He stands after the manner of an impulse of the lover toward the thing loved.

But this opinion too does not seem to attain the mark of truth: for the notion of image is something consequent upon passive generation, and posterior to it: Therefore it cannot be proved a priori that the procession of the Word is a generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the Word is the image of the Father, but not the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved: both because in human affairs, the Son has it prior that He be begotten of the Father, by the fact that he is produced similar to Him in nature, than that he be the image of the Father, for this follows from that. Also because, in the divine realm, we understand the person of the Son as begotten prior to the relation of image, for as Augustine says, book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 2, from that which is born, the Word, and the Image, and the Son are understood; and as Saint Thomas teaches here, question 40, article 4: Origins passively signified simply precede, according to the intellect, the properties of the proceeding persons, even the personal ones. Whence he adds there, ad 3: Nativity, according to the intellect, precedes filiation. For such origins are conceived by us as the foundations of relations. We conceive,

therefore, prior, the person of the Son as generated, by the fact that the divine nature is communicated to Him, by force of His procession, than we conceive in Him the notion of image: Whence only a posteriori, and not a priori, can we gather that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, but not the Holy Spirit, because the notion of image belongs to Him, and not to the other; just as it is a posteriori rightly inferred that a horse is not a rational animal, because it is not capable of laughter.

Here, however, we inquire the a priori reason, why the production of the Word is a generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit; for the declaration of which:

I say that the proximate and immediate reason why the procession of the Word is a generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is that the Word proceeds into the similitude of nature, by force of its procession, but not the Holy Spirit: but the first and radical reason is taken from this, that the procession of the Word is through the intellect, but the procession of the Holy Spirit through the will.

The first part is proved: Actions terminated at the same term are diversified from the diverse manner of proceeding and tending toward it, as the Philosophers commonly teach, and declare by various examples: Therefore also the production of the Word, and the procession of the Holy Spirit, are distinguished on account of the diverse manner of tending toward the term; and one has the notion of generation, but not the other, because one tends into the similitude of nature, formally, and by its own force, but not the other, although through both the divine nature is communicated.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason, by the example which Saint Thomas uses, Against the Gentiles 4, chapter 23, where he says that if one man could make another man in a twofold way, namely through begetting, or from his own flesh, by a power still divinely conceded to him, the former would be called a Son, but not the latter; although each would be similar in substance, and this on account of the sole diverse manner of proceeding. For which cause too Abel is the son of Adam, not of Eve, formed from his rib; because although human nature was communicated to both, it was nevertheless not in the same manner: to Abel indeed by a generative and assimilative action, but not so to Eve. Similarly, therefore, although the Holy Spirit receives the divine nature from the Father and the Son, because He does not, however, receive it by force or by the mode of His procession, as the Word does, His production does not have the notion of generation, as the procession of the Word does.

From these things the second part of the conclusion can easily be proved. For the reason why the Word proceeds into the similitude of nature, by force of its procession, but not the Holy Spirit, is that it proceeds through the intellect, but the other through the will:

Therefore the first and radical reason why the procession of the Word is a generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, is that the procession of the Word is through the intellect, but the procession of the Holy Spirit through the will. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved by the reason of Saint Thomas here, article 4, where he thus discourses: It must be known that this is the difference between the intellect and the will, that the intellect is brought into act by this, that the thing understood is in the intellect according to its similitude; but the will is brought into act, not by this, that some similitude of the thing willed is in the will, but from this, that the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed. That procession, therefore, which is understood according to the notion of the intellect, is according to the notion of similitude, and insofar as it can have the notion of generation, since every generator generates its like. But the procession which is understood according to the notion of the will, is not considered according to the notion of similitude, but rather according to the notion of what impels and moves toward something. And therefore that which proceeds in the divine realm by way of love does not proceed as begotten, or as a son, but rather proceeds as spirit, by which name a certain vital motion and impulse is designated. By these words he openly declares that the Divine Word has it that it proceeds into the similitude of nature, by force of its procession, but not the Holy Spirit, because the Word proceeds through the intellect, and the Holy Spirit through the will: for the intellect, as it abstracts from created and increate, is assimilative, because intellection occurs through the assimilation of the power with the object, as is taught in the books On the Soul; whence in its most perfect analogate, namely the divine intellect, it is assimilative by the most perfect similitude, which is identity in nature. The will, however, is not an assimilative power, because the proper mode of operating of the will is not through assimilation to the beloved object, but through inclination and propensity toward it; wherefore, however much the perfection of the will may increase, it will not, from its own proper notion, have a term similar to its principle or object to produce, but a most perfect impulse toward it.

You will say, the intellect only requires to be assimilated to the object in intelligible and intentional being, not, however, in natural and entitative being: but it belongs to the notion of the begotten and the Son to be assimilated to the one producing in natural and entitative being: Therefore it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, from the fact that it proceeds through the intellect.

I answer that although the created intellect, because it is imperfect, and produces a word from need, is only assimilative of the term with the object in intentional and intelligible being; the divine intellect, however, because it is most perfect, and produces a word not

from need, but from infinite fecundity, is assimilative not only in intelligible being, but also in natural and entitative being; especially since in God intelligible and natural being are identified without a virtual distinction, because the divine nature is constituted through the very purest and most actual understanding, as was shown in Treatise 1, chapter 3.

You will insist: just as it is proper to the intellect to produce a similitude as the term of its intellection; so it is proper to the will to produce, as the term of its love, a union of the lover with the thing loved: whence Saint Thomas, I-II, question 28, article 1, ad 2, teaches that there is a threefold union belonging to the notion of love: one from which it proceeds, which is a union of similitude, which is the cause of love; another in which it consists, which is a certain impetus and impulse toward the thing loved; and another which it effects or desires, which is a real union, which the lover seeks to have with the thing loved: Just as, therefore, the most perfect intellect produces the most perfect similitude, so the most perfect will produces the most perfect union: but the most perfect union imports identity in nature, under the notion of nature, no less than the most perfect intellectual similitude: Therefore it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word is begotten and Son, but not the Holy Spirit, from the fact that His procession is through the intellect, but that one's through the will.

I answer that although the more perfect love is, the more perfect the union ought to be, this must nevertheless always be within the line of love, not outside it: but identity in nature is outside the line of will and love, though not outside the line of intellect and intellectual similitude; because indeed the will in God, since it is an inclination of the divine nature, is something consequent upon it; but intellection, since it is that which is first conceived in God, and which is the root of the divine operations, or of the attributes pertaining to operation, does not presuppose nor follow God's nature, but constitutes it; whence although in God the most perfect intellectual similitude is identity in nature, under the notion of nature, the most perfect union of love is nevertheless not; for this only expresses the inclination of the most perfect divine nature, constituted through intellection.

§ IV

Another objection is resolved.

There can furthermore be objected against our conclusion: the Holy Spirit has the divine nature, by force of His procession and origin: Therefore His procession is no less a generation than the production of the Word. The consequence is clear from what has been said above; the Antecedent is proved, first: The Holy Spirit has the divine nature from His procession and origin, since He does not have it from Himself, but from the Father and the Son, from whom He proceeds: Therefore He has it by force of His procession and origin. Secondly, to the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, divine existence is communicated, since production is terminated at being: but divine existence is not distinguished, even virtually, from the nature: Therefore by force of the procession the divine nature is communicated to the Holy Spirit. Thirdly, the Father and the Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend to produce their like in nature, and not only in attribute: Therefore the Holy Spirit, by force of His origin, has the divine nature. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved: Every agent intends to produce its like, not only in the proximate principle of acting, but also, and most especially, in the radical one; for fire, for example, in heating, intends to produce not only its like in heat, but also in substantial form; and the father intends to assimilate the son to himself not only in generative power, but also, and most especially, in nature: but the divine essence is the radical principle of the production of the Holy Spirit, just as the will is the proximate formal principle: Therefore the Father and the Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend their like in nature, and not only in attribute. Fourthly, the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, proceeds as God: Therefore by force of His procession He receives the divine nature. The consequence is manifest; the Antecedent is proved: The Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, proceeds as He is; but He is formally God: Therefore by force of His procession He proceeds as God. Fifthly, the Holy Spirit proceeds formally as a divine person: Therefore as having the divine nature. This consequence too is evident; the Antecedent is proved: The Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, has relative subsistence, by which the divine persons are constituted: Therefore He proceeds formally as a Divine Person.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, and to its first proof, the Antecedent being granted, I deny the consequence; for it is not the case that whatever belongs to the term produced through procession is communicated to it by force of the procession, but only that which is the formal reason of terminating the procession. Whence since the divine nature is not the formal reason of terminating the procession of the Holy Spirit, but something identified with the formal reason of terminating, namely with the notion of love or

impulse, which formally terminates, although the Holy Spirit has the divine nature from His procession and origin, He does not, however, have it by force of the procession and origin.

To the second I say that to the Holy Spirit divine existence is communicated, as a general condition required for every production, not, however, as the formal term of His procession, which is love or impulse.

To the third I deny the Antecedent, and to its proof I say that the Major is only true, when the agent acts through a proximate power destined to communicate the nature; but when it acts through other powers, it intends at most its like in the proximate principle: whence since in the divine realm the intellect is a power per se primarily destined to communicate the nature, but not the will, the Father and the Son, in producing the Holy Spirit through the will, do not intend a similar thing in nature, formally by force of such production, but the Father does, indeed, through the intellect, in producing the Son.

To the fourth I deny the Antecedent, for the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, does not proceed formally as God, but as the love of God; to the proof to the contrary I distinguish the Major: the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, proceeds as He is, under every formality by which He is — I deny the Major; under some — I grant the Major, and, the Minor being granted, I deny the consequence. This solution can be illustrated by a twofold example. The first is in a begotten man and a created man, to whom, as to being, the same predicates belong, and yet they terminate under diverse formalities, one generation, the other creation — the one under the common notion of a creatable being, the other under some peculiar notion of being. The second is in the body of Christ the Lord existing in the Sacrament, through transubstantiation; for although in it the Body of Christ is living and animated by a rational soul, it does not, however, terminate the transubstantiation, under the notion of living or animated formally, but under the notion of body, as is taught in the treatise on the Eucharist.

To the fifth I deny the Antecedent, and to its proof I say that the Holy Spirit indeed has, by force of His procession, relative subsistence, by which a person is constituted, but not formally, as constituting a person; because a person is constituted from relative subsistence, as modifying the nature; but the Holy Spirit does not have it formally, by force of His procession, as modifying the nature, but precisely as modifying love, or impulse, toward the beloved object: Whence the Holy Spirit indeed proceeds as subsisting in love formally, but as subsisting in the divine nature, only materially and identically, on account of the identity of the divine nature with divine love.

Chapter IV

On the divine relations.

It is certain of faith that there are given in God real relations, for this is expressly had from Scripture explaining the distinction of persons by the relative names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and is manifestly gathered from that celebrated saying of Boethius: Substance furnishes unity, relation multiplies the Trinity. And certainly, since the divine persons enjoy the supreme unity and simplicity, they must be opposed to, and distinguished from, one another by the smallest of all oppositions: but relative opposition is the smallest of all; for those things which are opposed contradictorily, contrarily, or privatively, mutually exclude one another, and expel one another from the same subject; but those which enjoy relative opposition, far from excluding or expelling one another, rather so mutually imply and posit one another, that, one being destroyed, the other cannot subsist.

Nor is it an obstacle that relations are of the weakest and least entity, as the Philosophers say, and consequently seem repugnant to God, a most perfect and most complete being; for although relation in created things, in which it has accidental being, is of almost no entity and subsistence, of no activity and efficacy, of no solidity and permanence, in the divine realm, however, in which it has substantial being, it not only lacks all imperfection, but is even of such dignity, nobility, and majesty, that the Most Sacred Mystery of the Trinity, than which nothing is nobler and more excellent in the Christian Religion, is founded and subsists in relations of origin alone.

It must also be held with certain faith that the divine relations are not distinguished really and entitatively from the essence, otherwise there would be a quaternity in God, which was condemned in the Lateran Council, and the divine persons would be composed of essence and relation, since composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things. I add that whatever in created things has accidental and created being, translated into God, has substantial and increate being; as Gregory the Great testifies: with God, things that pass, stand; things that are mutable, are permanent — thus accidental things subsist, and are identified with the divine essence. Whence in the Council of Reims it is said against Gilbert de la Porrée, who, as Saint Thomas says here, question 28, article 2, thought that relations in the divine realm were assisting, and as it were externally affixed: We believe that absolutely no things, whether they be called relations, or properties, or singularities, or unities, are present to God, which are from eternity, and are not God.

These things are certain among all Catholics, but it is doubted, first, whether between the relations and the divine essence there is some actual distinction prior to the operation of the intellect? Secondly, whether the essence belongs to the quidditative concept of the relations, and the relations to the concept of the essence? Thirdly, whether the divine relations add some relative perfection to the essence? Fourthly, whether the divine relations enjoy relative existences proper to themselves, and virtually distinct from the existence of the essence? These four difficulties and controversies must be briefly resolved here.

§ I

Resolution of the first difficulty.

I say first, the divine relations, prior to the operation of the intellect, are not distinguished from the essence by a modal or formal distinction. This is against Durandus, who thinks that the relations are distinguished from the essence by a modal distinction, that is, not as thing and thing, but as thing and mode; and against Scotus, and his Disciples, who assert that they are distinguished by a formal distinction, which they call "from the nature of the thing," and which Scotus says precedes the intellect in every way.

It is proved, first, from the Council of Reims, where it is defined against Gilbert that the relations and the essence are not to be distinguished by a theological notion, or from the nature of the thing, insofar as theological notion is opposed to mathematical notion, which is a distinction by the intellect alone.

It is proved, secondly, from the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter Damnamus On the Supreme Trinity, where it is thus had: Although the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, they are not, however, another thing: but that which is the Father, is the Son, the Holy Spirit, altogether the same. The same is asserted by Augustine, book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 6, where he says: It is not one thing for God to be, another for a person to be, but altogether the same: but those things which are altogether the same are not distinguished in act, prior to the operation of the intellect, since altogether-the-same identity excludes every real actual distinction: Therefore the divine relations, prior to the operation of the intellect, are not distinguished from the essence by a modal or formal distinction.

It is proved, thirdly, from the Council of Florence, session 18, in which John the Latin Theologian said: The divine substance and person are indeed the same thing, but according to the mode of our understanding they differ. And session 19, before the

middle: Do not, however, think that these differ in reality, but only in apprehension and understanding. The discourse was about hypostasis and nature, whether they differed among themselves really, or rationally? Likewise in the same session, toward the end: The person of the Father is not distinguished from paternity, or from the substance, except rationally alone. These testimonies are so clear and express, that several of the Recent authors consider the opinion of Durandus and Scotus suspect, and little safe in the faith.

The conclusion can furthermore be proved by the reasons by which, in the treatise on the attributes, we showed that the divine attributes are not distinguished from the essence by a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which reasons equally convince in the present case: For in the first place, if the divine essence were distinguished modally or formally from the relations, the supreme purity and actuality of the divine essence would perish, for it would be in potency to some formalities really distinct from itself: or, what is worse, to some modes; for a mode is an imperfect entity, having diminished and dependent being, and not much removed from the nature of an accident: whence Durandus's modal distinction seems even worse than Scotus's formal distinction. Then, by that modal or formal distinction, divine simplicity is destroyed: for since composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things, just as the union of things distinguished entitatively makes an entitative composition, so the union of things modally distinguished makes a modal composition, and the union of things really formally distinguished causes a real formal composition.

It is confirmed: at least the Adversaries cannot deny that God would be more simple, if no real distinction intervened between His essence and relations: but simplicity is to be conceded to God than which none greater can be conceived, since in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, God is called altogether simple: Therefore no real distinction, whether modal, or formal, is to be admitted between the essence and the relations. Especially since altogether-simplicity is no less opposed to distinction than to composition: Whence Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 3, says that simplicity in the divine realm superlatively excludes every duplicity: Since, therefore, God is not only one, but most-one, as Bernard says, He excludes from Himself every real distinction, except that which arises from the relative opposition of the divine persons.

Thirdly, by that same formal distinction, divine infinity is overturned: for just as infinite entity requires entitative identity with everything which does not, in its concept, denote imperfection; so formal infinity requires formal identity with every notion which imports no defect in its concept, and consequently with the divine relations and attributes, which in their concept denote no imperfection.

There are two chief foundations of Scotus and Durandus. The first is: those things are distinguished really, and prior to the operation of the intellect, by a modal distinction, or at least formal from the nature of the thing, of which one is communicated really and independently of every operation of the intellect, the other not being communicated: but the divine essence is really, and independently of every operation of the intellect, communicated to the Son through eternal generation, but not paternity: Therefore the divine essence and paternity are distinguished by some actual distinction, at least modal, or from the nature of the thing, prior to the operation of the intellect.

But if this argument were valid, it would prove that there is given not only a modal or formal, but also an entitative distinction between the divine essence and paternity, since the divine essence is entitatively communicated to the Son, and paternity is denied of Him, and not only formally; otherwise the Father and the Son would be distinguished only formally or modally, and not entitatively. Since, therefore, this reason proves too much, it convinces nothing at all. Whence I answer by denying the Major; for in order that one be communicated, the other not being communicated, a virtual distinction or plurality suffices, which in God can furnish the same thing that formal multiplicity does in created things. Just as the light of the sun, because it is virtually hot, furnishes all that formal heat does. Since, therefore, in created things formal multiplicity brings it about that one is communicated, the other not being communicated, virtual multiplicity, or the infinite eminence of the divine substance and entity, by reason of which it is perfectly equivalent to the absolute and the respective, and consequently to communicable and incommunicable entity, can furnish the same thing in God. Just as we see in created things that the rational soul, because it eminently contains the sensitive and vegetative, does not communicate itself in the same manner to all the parts of the human body, but informs some only according to the vegetative degree, others according to the sensitive degree, and in others exercises the operations of rational life.

From this the other foundation of Scotus and Durandus remains resolved, which is taken from this, that it is impossible that contradictory predicates be verified of the same thing existing on the part of reality: but of the divine essence it is verified that it is communicable, of the relation, that it is incommunicable: of the essence, that it is not produced; of the relation, or person, that it proceeds and is produced: of the essence, that it neither refers nor is referred: of the relation, that it both refers and is referred: Therefore it is impossible that the essence and the relation be the same on the part of reality.

But I deny that those propositions are contradictory, for it does not suffice for contradiction that opposites be predicated of the same thing, but it is required that they

be predicated of the same thing, under the same formal and virtual notion, since contradictories, as the Philosopher testifies, are of the same thing, of the same thing, according to the same: but communicability and incommunicability, producibility and unproducibility, are verified of the divine substance and entity, according to diverse notions, formalities, or equivalences: for insofar as it is equivalent to the absolute, it is communicable, and insofar as it is equivalent to the relative, incommunicable; for the divine entity and substance is formally one, virtually multiple; because in one and the same most simple formality it includes the absolute and respective notion at once.

But Aureolus, in Capreolus, dist. 2, question 3, insists: an effect in act must have a cause in act: but affirmations and negations including contradictories are effects in act, prior to the work of the intellect: Therefore they must have a cause in act: but their cause is distinction: Therefore between the divine nature and the relations there is a distinction prior to the work of the intellect.

But to this instance Cajetan responds that an effect in act does not necessarily require a formal cause in act, or one formally containing the effect, but a virtual cause suffices for it, or one which virtually contains the effect, as is clear in heat actually produced, which can be not only from fire, which is formally actually hot, but also from the sun, which is only virtually hot: whence the affirmation and negation which are included in contradictories do not necessarily require a formal distinction prior to the work of the intellect, but a virtual distinction suffices for them, which is found between the essence and the relations.

Secondly, it can be responded with Capreolus, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor; for affirmation and negation are only in the intellect, whence they require no formal cause outside the intellect, but only a foundational one, and consequently for the affirmations and negations included in contradictories, a distinction of reason in act, with foundation in the thing, suffices, which distinction is called virtual or foundational.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, against Durandus, that active spiration is not really distinguished from paternity and filiation: both because in the divine realm real distinction does not arise except from relative opposition: but the relation of active spiration is not relatively opposed to paternity and filiation, but only to passive spiration. Also because if it were really distinguished from them, it would constitute a fourth person in God, since to constitute a person in God it suffices that there be a real relation subsisting in the Godhead, really distinct from the other relations. Nor is Durandus's response valid, saying that active spiration does not constitute a fourth person, because incommunicability belongs to the notion of personality, whereas active

spiration is common to the Father and the Son; for it is repugnant that active spiration be really distinguished from paternity and filiation, and yet be common to the Father and the Son, since it cannot be really distinguished from them, unless it is relatively opposed to them, nor can it be relatively opposed, if it is common to the Father and the Son, since incommunicability necessarily follows from relative opposition.

You will say, first, with Durandus, that whatever things are the same with a third thing, are the same with one another: Therefore if paternity and filiation are really identified with active spiration, they will be the same with one another.

But to this we said above, chapter 2, that this principle of Dialectics must be understood only of those things which are identified adequately with a third, not, however, of those which are identified with it only inadequately, as happens in the case proposed; for in the same proportional manner one must philosophize about active spiration with respect to paternity and filiation, to which it is common, as about the essence, which is communicated to three persons; whence just as the essence is identified inadequately with the three persons, because it is not so identified with one person that it is not identified also with the others, so active spiration is identified inadequately with paternity, because it is not so identified with it, that it is not identified also with filiation.

You will say, secondly, paternity and active spiration are two relations: Therefore also two things, and consequently really distinguished among themselves. The consequence is proved from that common axiom, "with the multiplication of the inferior, the superior ought to be multiplied": but "thing" is something superior to "real relation": Therefore if paternity and active spiration are two real relations, they will also be two things.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, for "thing" in common usage is taken for entity, as it is on the part of reality, but relation expresses a pure respect to something extrinsic correlated to it; whence since paternity and spiration are not distinguished entitatively, they cannot be called several beings, or several things, although they can be called several notions, because they are respects to diverse terms. As for the alleged axiom, it must be said that it is only true, when the inferior, as it underlies multiplication, and its superior, are taken in the same manner, which does not happen here.

It is gathered, secondly, against Scotus, that active spiration is not formally distinguished from the nature of the thing from paternity and filiation: otherwise the eternal Father, e.g., would not be altogether simple, but composed of Paternity and spiration; for just as from the union of two entities really distinct, real entitative composition results, so from the union of a mode or formality really distinct, modal or formal composition arises.

It is confirmed: from Scotus's opinion it would follow that the Person of the Holy Spirit would be more simple than the Person of the Father or the Son, since the latter would be constituted from its own personality, and active spiration, formally distinct; the former from passive spiration alone, without any other formality.

It is gathered, thirdly, that just as, although one attribute is identified with another, it cannot be said that the attribute of justice, e.g., is the attribute of mercy: so likewise, although paternity and spiration are distinguished neither really, nor formally from the nature of the thing, but only virtually, it cannot nevertheless be said that the relation of paternity is the relation of spiration; because when "relation" is said, a respect to a term is explicitly imported, which is not the same in paternity and spiration; for the former regards filiation, the other procession, or passive spiration.

§ II

Resolution of the second difficulty.

For the resolution of the second difficulty, namely whether the divine essence is of the quidditative concept of the relations, and conversely whether the relations are of the quidditative concept of the essence, two things must be briefly noted here. The first is, that some things can be really identified among themselves, and yet one not be of the quidditative concept of the other, as is clear in man; in whom singularity is not really distinguished from the specific and generic degree, and yet is not of the quidditative concept of the species, but stands as a Logical or Metaphysical accident with respect to it. The second is, that something can pertain to the essence or quiddity of another in two ways, namely as its constitutive, or essential difference, in which manner rationality belongs to the essence of man; and as an intrinsic mode or term, by which it essentially seeks to be modified, or terminated; just as the modes of being through itself and in another stand with respect to being. It is certain, however, that the divine relations are not of the quidditative concept of the divine nature in the first way, both because the divine nature is not metaphysically constituted through the relations, but through some absolute perfection, which stands as the root of the other perfections, namely through the very purest and most actual understanding, as we showed in Treatise 1. Also because what is in this way of the quidditative concept of the divine nature, must be said of whatever it is predicated of: but paternity, e.g., is not said of whatever the divine nature is predicated of; for the divine nature is predicated of the Son, of whom paternity is not said. There remains, therefore, only the difficulty, whether the relations are of the essence and quidditative concept of God, in the second way, namely as terms or modes by which He essentially seeks to be modified and terminated? In the resolution of this, several of the Recent authors think that neither is the essence of the quidditative concept of the relations, nor the relations of the quidditative concept of the essence. Others think that the essence indeed is of the formal concept of the relations, but the relations are not of the concept of the essence. But the opinion which is more common in the School of Saint Thomas asserts that the essence is of the concept of the relations, and the relations of the concept of the essence.

And indeed the first is taught by Saint Thomas here, article 2, and below, question 39, article 1, and question 8 of On Power, article 2, where he asserts that just as inherent and accidental being stands with respect to a created relation, so substantial divine being stands with respect to an increate and divine relation: but inherent and accidental being is of the formal concept of a created relation, since it is essentially an accident: Therefore substantial divine being, or the notion of divine and increate substance, is of the formal

concept of a divine relation.

Reason also persuades this, for it befits the divine essence, by reason of its infinity, to have that amplitude which belongs to being, by reason of its transcendence: but the notion of being so transcends its inferiors, that it cannot be perfectly abstracted from them: Therefore also the divine essence is so included in the divine relations and attributes, that it cannot be perfectly abstracted from them, but whatever precision of the intellect be made, it is always implicitly included in them.

It is confirmed: paternity, as it is virtually distinguished from the divine nature, is essentially a being, since it is not pure nothing, or a mere being of reason: but it is not a created being, as is clear: Therefore it is essentially an increate and divine being, since between created and increate being no medium can be assigned, and consequently the notion of divine and increate being is so intimately included in the divine relations, that it cannot be perfectly abstracted from them.

The second, however, namely that the relations are of the quidditative concept of God, at least as modes and terms by which the divine nature essentially seeks to be modified or terminated, is gathered from the Holy Fathers, for Athanasius says, Oration against the Followers of Sabellius: The whole fullness and integrity of Deity is the Father and the Son. And Cyril, book 2 of the Treasury, chapter 2: Deity cannot be perfect, unless it have a Son, and bring forth fruit from itself. And book 3, chapter 1: The Holy Spirit is essentially in God Himself. They think, therefore, that the relations pertain to the fullness, actuality, and perfection of the divine essence, as terms of its fecundity, and modes by which it essentially seeks to be modified. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 27, article 2, ad 3, says: In the very perfection of divine being is contained both the Word proceeding intelligibly, and the principle of the Word, etc. Which words Cajetan, expounding, asserts that if Deity were defined by its merits, it would include in its formal notion, not only what wisdom, justice, mercy, and the other attributes are, but also what paternity, filiation, and spiration are.

Reason too persuades this, for if it be admitted that the relations are not of the concept, at least implicit, of the divine essence, it will be conceived as actuable through the relations, and in potency to them, and from them, and the essence will become some composition, at least by reason, which is altogether repugnant to the divine actuality and simplicity. It is also repugnant to the infinity of being, that not every possible being, at least, be implicitly imported in it: Therefore the relations are of the quidditative concept of the divine essence, and thus they cannot be objectively abstracted from it.

This is more openly clear in the opinion of those who, with us, think that the divine essence is essentially included in the concept of the relations; for this being supposed, it is manifest that the relations too are included in the concept of the essence, and cannot be perfectly abstracted from it: for it is impossible that two objective concepts be so compared to one another, that one be essentially included in the other, while the other is not likewise included in it. Whence because being is transcendentally included in all differences, they too are likewise implicitly contained in it, so that between being and its differences perfect precision cannot be made, as our Thomists teach in Metaphysics. The reason of this doctrine is, that abstraction, or precision, is a certain separative motion; but the term to which of separation cannot be found in the term from which of separation: Therefore by this very fact that one is essentially contained in another, that in which it is included cannot be separated, or abstracted, from it, by reason.

It is confirmed: perfect precision by concepts effects what real separation effects in reality: but it is impossible that one be really perfectly separated from another, without the other also being perfectly separated from it: Therefore it will also be repugnant that two objective concepts stand thus, that one perfectly abstract by reason from the other, without the other likewise being perfectly abstracted by reason from it.

You will object, first: the relations are conceived to accede to the Godhead, and to determine it: Therefore they do not include it in their concept.

I answer that the relations, as to the explicit relation, are conceived to accede to the Godhead, and to determine it, but not as to the implicit notion, and this suffices for it to be of the quidditative concept of the relations, as is clear in being; to which, according to notion, the modes of being through itself and in another accede, and determine it by reason, and yet being is of the quidditative concept of them; because only according to the explicit notion are they conceived to accede to it, and to determine and contract it only by a greater expression.

You will object, secondly: the relations constitute the Divine Persons: but they could not constitute them, if they included the divine essence in their concept: Therefore they do not include it in their concept. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. A constitutive cannot say the whole that is in the constituted thing: but if the relations included in themselves the divine essence, they would say the whole that the Divine Persons are, for they import only relation together with the nature: Therefore they could not constitute the Divine Persons.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor; for constitution according to reason, two things distinct as to explicit notion suffice. Whence, to the proof of the

Minor, I distinguish the Major: a constitutive cannot say the whole that is in the constituted thing, explicitly — I grant: implicitly — I deny. For the mode of being through itself constitutes a being in the notion of substance, and yet includes the notion of being implicitly in its concept. Why, therefore, could not paternity, e.g., similarly constitute the Person of the Father, although it implicitly includes the divine essence, and consequently implicitly says the whole that is explicitly imported in the Person of the Father?

You will object, thirdly: if the divine essence were predicated essentially of Paternity, there would also be predicated of it essentially that it is communicable to three Persons: but this is repugnant, since incommunicability is of the notion of Paternity: Therefore also that. The sequel of the Major is proved: of that of which the divine essence is predicated essentially, every predicate essential to it is also predicated: but to be communicable to three persons is an essential predicate of the divine essence: Therefore if the divine essence is predicated essentially of Paternity, there will also be predicated of it essentially that it is communicable to three Persons.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, and to its proof I distinguish the Major: of that of which the divine essence is predicated essentially, every predicate essential to it is also predicated, either absolutely, or with an addition — I grant the Major. Absolutely always — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. And so of paternity it cannot be said absolutely and without addition that it is communicable to the Son, but it can with addition, and with the specification of the essence. Whence although this proposition is false: Paternity is communicable to the Son: this one is nevertheless true: Paternity is the divine essence communicable to the Son.

You will object, fourthly, against the second part of our opinion, which asserts that the relations are of the quidditative concept of the divine nature: whatever is predicated essentially of divinity is also predicated essentially of the individual Divine Persons: but of the Father filiation is not predicated essentially, nor of the Son paternity: Therefore paternity and filiation are not of the essence of divinity.

I answer, first, by distinguishing the Major: whatever is predicated essentially of the divine nature is also predicated essentially of the individual persons; if it is predicated of it essentially, as its metaphysical constitutive, or as its essential predicate, in the manner in which the attributes are predicated of it — I grant the Major. If it is predicated of it essentially, as an inadequate mode of the divine nature, essentially terminating or modifying it — I deny the Major. But paternity and filiation are neither quidditative

predicates of the divine nature, nor pertain to its metaphysical constitution, but are only certain inadequate modes, by which the divine essence, on account of its fecundity, amplitude, and eminence, seeks to be essentially modified and terminated.

Secondly, it can be answered by distinguishing the same Major otherwise: whatever is predicated essentially of divinity is also predicated essentially of the individual persons, either absolutely, or with the reduplication of the essence — I grant the Major. Absolutely always — I deny the Major. Similarly I distinguish the Minor: of the Father filiation is not predicated absolutely — I grant the Minor. With the reduplication of the essence — I deny the Minor, and the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said above: for just as this proposition, "Paternity is communicable," cannot be granted absolutely, but can with addition and specification of the essence on the part of the subject, saying namely, "Paternity is the divine essence communicable to several"; so also this one, "Paternity is filiation," is not to be granted absolutely, but this one is: "Paternity is the essence, by which filiation essentially is."

You will object, fifthly: the Father communicates to the Son the whole essence, and yet does not communicate to him paternity: Therefore paternity does not pertain to the essence of divinity.

It is confirmed: if paternity were of the essence of divinity, the Son would not be perfect and entire God, because something pertaining to the essence of divinity, namely paternity itself, would be lacking to Him.

I answer, first, that these arguments must be solved by the Adversaries too, since the same reasoning holds of identical inclusion as of essential inclusion; for essential inclusion does not add greater inclusion on the part of reality than identical inclusion itself denotes; except that essential inclusion, besides identical inclusion, also adds objective inclusion, in order to the intellect conceiving. But the whole difficulty is about identical inclusion, which is the same in both opinions.

I answer, secondly, that the Father communicates to the Son the whole essence, but not totally, because although He communicates to Him the constitutive of the Godhead in the being of nature, and all the attributes, and essential predicates, He does not, however, communicate to Him every essential mode. From which it only follows that paternity does not belong to the essence of Divinity, as its metaphysical constitutive, or as an essential predicate, but not that it does not belong to its essence, as an essential mode.

To the confirmation I answer, first, by denying the Major absolutely, both because the relations do not add perfections to the divine essence, as we shall say in the following

section; whence from the fact that they do not belong to the individual persons, it does not follow that any person is not entire God, with integrity of perfection: Also because not every essential mode of divinity is owed to the individual persons. Or secondly, for the sake of greater clarity, I distinguish the same Major: The Son would not be perfect and entire God, with the integrity of essential predicates due to Him — I deny the Major. With the integrity of essential modes, which are owed to Divinity, and not to the individual persons — I grant the Major.

From these things you will easily understand and explain some testimonies of the Holy Fathers, by which they assert that the Trinity is not said substantially of God, and that the relations are not predicated of God according to substance; they only intend that the Trinity, or the divine relations, are not predicated of God essentially by way of constitutive, or by way of essential predicate, in the manner in which the attributes are enunciated of God; they do not, however, deny that they are said of God essentially, by way of termination, or essential mode. Similarly when Saint Thomas, question 8 of On Power, article 2, ad 6, taught that this predication, "God is the Father," is not formal, but identical, he only meant that it is not formal, by formality of constitution and expression, not, however, intending to deny that it is formal, by formality of inclusion and termination.

§ III

Resolution of the third difficulty.

The third difficulty is, whether, just as the attributes add to the essence some absolute perfection virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence, so likewise the relations, besides the absolute perfection of the essence which they imbibe, include transcendentally, by reason of the relative concept, and as they are pure respects to a term, or as others say, according to the notion of "toward," explain and say some relative perfection, virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence, or enjoy only the absolute perfection of the essence?

This question is problematic in the School of the Thomists, some affirming, others denying, that there are given in the divine persons perfections of this relative kind. The opinion denying it, however, seems more probable, and more conformable to the principles of Saint Thomas's doctrine, who here, article 1, establishes this distinction between relation and the other categories, that the other categories regard the subject by reason of itself, stopping in it, and positing in it something by which the subject stands to itself and not to another; as is clear in quantity, which according to its proper notion posits in the substance the extension of parts, by which it perfects it in itself and toward

itself: relation, however, according to the proper notion of its genus, does not regard the subject by reason of itself, and stopping in it; or positing in it something, by which it be such in itself and toward itself, but by ordering it toward a term, and by reason of the term itself.

From which doctrine of the Angelic Preceptor, this argument can be formed: the notion of perfection must be taken by respect to a subject regarded by reason of itself, since it must regard a perfectible subject, by commensuration with it: but relation regards no peculiar subject by reason of itself, stopping in it, but by reason of its own term or correlative, since by this very fact that it is some relative concept, even if it regards a subject, it must regard it by ordering it toward a term, and by reason of the term itself: Therefore no relation, by force of its own relative concept, explicates or says a perfection, and consequently the divine relations do not add a relative perfection to the essence.

A certain Recent Thomist responds that although absolute perfection regards a perfectible subject by reason of itself, relative perfection nevertheless regards a perfectible subject in order to another, as is clear (he says) in powers and habits, by which man is perfected in order to an external object.

But on the contrary: although something can regard a perfectible subject in order to another, when indeed it denotes only a transcendental order to it, as is established in the example adduced of powers and habits, it is not so, however, when it is a pure respect, and regards another under the notion of a pure term, as happens in the case proposed: for insofar as something is good and perfect, insofar is it in the act of existence, or denotes an order to it, as Saint Thomas teaches above, question 4, article 5, and question 5, article 1; but a pure respect to a term cannot have existence from it, or from the order to it; because that which confers existence on a relation must have some activity, or at least exercise some causality upon it: but the term of a relation, since it has only to terminate, and exercises the notion of a pure term, lacks all actuality, and exercises no causality upon it.

From this can be formed a second reason for our opinion: the notion of goodness and perfection is taken from the order to being: but the divine relations, according to the relative concept, and as they are pure respects to a term, do not express an order to being, but only by reason of the divine essence, which they include: whence Saint Thomas, question 2 of On Power, article 2, says that relation, insofar as it is relation, does not have it that it be something, but only that it be toward something: Therefore the divine relations, according to the relative concept, and as they are pure respects to a term, denote no relative perfection, but enjoy only the infinite goodness of the divine essence,

transcendentally included in them.

From which you will understand the notable distinction which exists between the relations and the attributes: for since the attributes regard the essence by reason of itself, and perfect it in itself, and not in order to another which has the notion of a pure term, they add to it some perfection virtually and rationally distinct: the relations, however, from their own explicit notion, do not regard the divine essence, but the term correlated to them, and consequently do not add to the divine essence any perfection virtually distinct, but only a pure respect, abstracting from perfection or imperfection. Whence Augustine, book 7 On the Trinity, chapters 1 and 6, says that goodness and magnitude of perfection in the divine realm are said not relatively but "toward-self." And in the Little Questions on the Trinity, at the beginning, he teaches that the three persons cannot be called three great ones, nor three good ones, because "great" and "good" are substantial names, and are said "toward-self." From which passages a twofold argument can be drawn in favor of our opinion. The first is: the relations add nothing absolute to the essence, distinct by reason from them: but from Augustine, the notion of perfection in God is said not relatively, but absolutely: Therefore the relations do not add a perfection to the essence, distinct by reason from them. The second is: if goodness were really multiplied in the Divine Persons, they could be called three good ones, not only adjectively, but also substantively, since both the material and formal signification of this name "good" would be multiplied: but from Augustine related above, the three divine persons cannot be called three good ones, just as neither three great ones substantively: Therefore just as magnitude is not multiplied in the Divine Persons, neither is goodness nor perfection.

I add that the same Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 3, so teaches that perfection is said "toward-self" in the divine realm, that he denies that the Father is something greater than the Son, or that both together are something greater than the Holy Spirit, and that the three persons are something more and greater and more perfect, than one alone. His words are: It is clear, not only that the Father is not greater than the Son, but that neither are both together anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone, nor are any two whatsoever in the same Trinity anything greater than one, nor are all three together anything greater than the individual ones. But if any of them enjoyed a relative perfection diverse from the relative perfection of another, it would stand with respect to it, as exceeding and exceeded; since, as the Philosopher testifies, species are like numbers, among which, with an essential difference, numerical equality cannot intervene: Therefore by this very fact they could not be equal, nor could the sum of the Son with the Father subsist in equality of perfection, and much less the equality of the Holy Spirit

with the Father and the Son; for since in the Father and the Son there are two relations, and in the Holy Spirit only one, there would be more relative perfections in the Father and the Son, than in the Holy Spirit. Likewise the three Persons of the Most Holy Trinity would be something more and more perfect, at least extensively, than one alone: Therefore relative perfections, diverse in species among themselves, are not to be admitted in the Divine Persons; just as the relations themselves, in the notion of relation, differ in species among themselves, since they regard terms diverse in species among themselves, in the notion of term and correlative.

Nor is the common response of the Adversaries valid, who say that those inconveniences do not follow from their opinion, because although the relative perfection of one person is not formally in another, it is nevertheless in it eminently, by reason of the essence, and also in some way formally, through circumincession, and the reciprocal existence of one in another. It is not valid, I say: both because a being supremely perfect must contain in the most perfect manner the simply simple perfection, of whose concept there is no imperfection: but the mode of containing formally eminently is more perfect than the mode of containing only eminently. Also because, granted that paternity is in the Son through circumincession, it does not, however, perfect Him formally, otherwise it would constitute Him a father: Therefore neither mode of having relative perfection is sufficient for the notion of supremely perfect to be preserved in the Son, and His perfect equality with the Father.

The Adversaries object, in the first place, several testimonies of the Holy Fathers, by which they assert that the mystery of the Trinity, which is constituted through the relations, says a supreme and infinite perfection in God: from which they infer that the relations bring a special perfection to God. But this inference and consequence is not valid: for the mystery of the Trinity imports infinite perfection, from a twofold source, namely from the divine essence, which, by reason of its infinite perfection and fecundity, seeks to communicate itself ad intra to three persons; and from the part of the relations, not because they add a relative perfection to the essence, but because they seek to imbibe the divine essence by way of a transcendent, from which they receive infinite perfection. Just as, therefore, from the lack of possibility of creatures, is inferred a posteriori, and by an extrinsic ground, the destruction of divine omnipotence; so likewise the Holy Fathers, from the negation of the processions and relations in God, rightly gather argumentatively, and a posteriori, that God would not be perfect, if in Him there were not the procession of the Word and of love, and if, per impossibile, He lacked paternity and filiation. From which you will easily understand that when Saint Thomas, question 8 of On Power, article 1, ad 1, says: The divine essence, because it comprehends the

perfections of all genera, nothing prevents relation from being found in it, he does not intend that relation brings with it a special perfection, virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence, but only that the divine essence, by reason of its infinite perfection, does not exclude relations from itself, but rather requires them, as terms of its fecundity, and that it would not be perfect, if it lacked the relations and persons by which it diffuses itself, and communicates its infinite perfection.

The Adversaries object, secondly: the subsistence of the Word, as virtually distinct from the essence, terminates human nature, and infinitely sanctifies it, is necessarily and infinitely loved by God, and must be adored with the adoration of latria: Therefore as such it says perfection.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by distinguishing the consequent: Therefore as such it says perfection, relative and virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence — I deny; absolute, and undistinguished from the perfection of the essence — I grant. We do not deny, therefore, that the divine relations, as virtually distinct from the essence, say perfection, since the virtual distinction of the relations from the essence is not a distinction of reason by way of excluding and excluded, as we showed in the preceding section, the divine relations, even as virtually distinct from the essence, implicitly include it, and consequently imbibe its infinite perfection, by reason of which they can furnish all that is recounted in the objection.

The Adversaries object, thirdly: the relations add to the essence an entity virtually distinct: Therefore also a perfection. The consequence seems manifest, because goodness and perfection follow upon entity.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, of which we shall speak below, by denying the consequence, and to its proof, I distinguish the Antecedent: goodness and perfection follow upon the notion of being, as actually existing, or denoting an order to existence — I grant the Antecedent; under the precise notion of entity — I deny the Antecedent. For mathematical things, as they underlie abstraction from sensible and singular matter, are true real beings, and yet, because they abstract from the order to existence, as such, they are not good, as Saint Thomas teaches, question 21 of On Truth, article 2, ad 4. So likewise, although the divine relations are true real and increate beings, because, however, as they are pure respects to a term, they do not express nor connote an order to being, but only by reason of the essence which they include, under this formality they have no goodness or relative perfection, but enjoy only the existence and absolute goodness of the essence transcendentally included in them.

You will say, the notion of good and perfect is nothing other than the notion of being, as it is fitting and consonant with the thing which is called good and perfect: but the divine relations, as they are pure respects to a term, are something fitting and consonant with the persons constituted by them, since nothing can be more consonant and fitting to a thing than its own proper constitutive and distinctive: Therefore the divine relations, as they are pure respects to a term, are good and perfect.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor, for although the divine relations are indeed consonant and fitting to the person which they constitute, as they are, however, pure respects to a term, they abstract from the notion of fittingness and consonance with it; both because under such formality and concept they abstract from existence and from the order to it, as we saw above, and insofar as something is fitting, insofar is it in the act of existence, or denotes an order to it. Also because something is called fitting, from an order to the subject with which it is said to be consonant, so that it stands in it: but the relations, as they are pure respects, do not regard the subject, standing in it, but only the term and correlative.

§ IV

Resolution of the fourth difficulty.

The fourth difficulty is whether the divine relations bring with them relative existences, proper to themselves, and virtually distinct from the absolute existence of the essence. Many of the Recent authors affirm this, who, since they do not distinguish existence from actual entity, from the fact that in God there are given three relative actual entities, infer that in Him too three relative existences are to be admitted. The opposite Saint Thomas teaches in various places, especially question 2 of On Power, article 6, where he writes this: It is not to be conceded that something absolute is multiplied in the divine realm, as some say that in the divine realm there is a twofold being, essential and personal; for every being in the divine realm is essential, nor is there a person except through essential being. Whence one may argue thus: Those things which are absolute are not multiplied in the divine realm: but the existence of a relation is absolute: Therefore it is not multiplied in the Divine Persons. The Major is certain; the Minor is established from what has been said in the preceding section; for there we showed that existence does not belong to a relation through the order to the term which it regards, but is derived from the subject in which it is received, and consequently that the divine relations, as they are pure respects, do not express an order to being, but only by reason of the essence which they include, and through whose existence they exist. Wherefore relative existences are superfluous, in order to render the relations existing; indeed they seem to imply a contradiction, since it is repugnant that the same thing have two ultimate actualities, and two ultimate terms.

I add that, since duration is nothing other than the continuation of a thing in being, there cannot be given several existences in the Divine Persons, unless several durations too are given, and consequently several eternities, since eternity is nothing other than the duration of a thing altogether immutable: If, however, three relative eternities be admitted in the Divine Persons, the Divine Persons could be called three eternal ones, not only adjectively and in a qualified sense, but also substantively and simply; which is against the Symbol of Athanasius, saying that the three Divine Persons are not three eternal ones, but one eternal, just as neither three uncreated ones, or three immense ones, but one uncreated and one immense. Nor is it free of rashness, the response of some, who say that Athanasius only denies three eternal ones in the divine realm absolutely and simply, not, however, with an addition, namely in the relative genus. For since Athanasius, by the same words, denies three Gods and three omnipotent ones, by which he also denies three eternal ones, if it be permitted to interpret him concerning three eternal ones, not relatively, but absolutely, it will also be permitted to expound him in

the same manner concerning three Gods and three omnipotent ones, and consequently to assert that the three Divine Persons can be called three Gods, or three omnipotent ones, not absolutely, but relatively.

You will object, first: it belongs to the notion of production to cause or produce existence in the thing which is produced: but through the productive action of the Son, or the Holy Spirit, the absolute existence of the essence is not produced, which is unproducible, just as the essence itself: Therefore a personal and relative existence is produced, virtually distinct from the absolute existence of the essence.

I answer by denying the Major, for although production must be terminated at existence, it need not, however, always produce it, but it suffices that it communicate it to the entity produced. For to produce a thing is to constitute it existing, which, since it can happen, either by producing existence, or by communicating existence otherwise produced or unproduced, it does not belong to the notion of production to produce existence. Whence through the productive action of the Son or the Holy Spirit, existence is not produced, but only communicated. And certainly production tends more principally to the formal term, than to the existence of the thing, which is not a formal term, but a condition of the term; and yet the divine essence, which, modified by relation, is the formal term of the divine processions, as we showed in chapter 3, is not produced, but only communicated: Therefore although it terminates at existence, it is not rightly gathered that it must be produced.

You will object, secondly: existence is nothing other than actual entity: but there are given in God three actual entities, namely three relations, which are beings in act, and outside nothing: Therefore in God there are three existences.

I answer, first, by denying the Major, for existence is not the actual entity itself, but rather the actuality itself, by which it stands outside its causes, whence existence is said to be, as it were, a standing outside causes.

I answer, secondly, by distinguishing the Minor: there are given in God three actual entities through diverse actuality — I deny; through the same actuality — I grant. For just as the Divine Persons are called three wise ones and omnipotent ones adjectively, from the same wisdom and omnipotence; so they can be called three actual entities, or having actuality, from the same actuality and existence included in them.

From which you will understand that although in the divine realm there are given three modes of existing, as Saint Thomas says, question 9 of On Power, article 5, ad 25, there are not, however, three existences; because for the diverse modes of existing, it suffices

that essential and absolute existence belong in a diverse manner to the Divine Persons, just as the essence belongs to them, and that in the Father it be as had from Himself, in the Son as communicated by the Father through generation, and in the Holy Spirit, as communicated by both through spiration.

You will object, thirdly: if the existence of the Divine Persons were not absolute but relative, it would follow that the eternal Father would be "toward-self" and not toward another, which is against the notion of relatives.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: the eternal Father would be "toward-self," as to existence — I grant: as to quiddity or relative notion — I deny.

You will object, fourthly: existence must be proportioned with the entity of which it is the existence: Therefore the existence of the divine relations must be relative.

I answer that existence must be proportioned with the entity of which it is the existence, as to the common notion of substance and accident, and therefore substantial entity cannot exist through accidental existence, nor accidental entity through substantial existence, but not as to other, peculiar notions; for in man the body exists through the existence of the soul, which is spiritual, just as is its essence.

Chapter V

On the Divine Persons in Common.

Before we discuss the Divine Persons in particular, we must treat of them in common, and some scholastic difficulties, which are usually agitated here, must be briefly discussed.

§ I

The Divine Persons are constituted by relations.

This truth is gathered, in the first place, from Scripture, in which the Divine Persons are expressed by the relative names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and from the Councils: For in the Second Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith, it is thus had: "In the relation of the Persons, number is discerned." And below: "This alone insinuates number, that they are toward one another." Likewise at Florence, Bessarion the Patriarch, in his oration for the union, chapter 6, expressly teaches that the Divine Persons are constituted through relations.

Reason also proves this: For that which is the unique distinctive of a Divine Person ought to be its constitutive: But relation alone distinguishes the Divine Persons: Therefore it constitutes them. The Major is clear from the common doctrine of the Philosophers, who teach that each thing is distinguished from others by that through which it is constituted in its own being, and consequently that the distinctive and the constitutive are the same in things. The Minor, however, is thus shown: Distinction in the Divine Persons arises only from that from which incommunicability arises: But incommunicability comes from relation alone, since all formalities and perfections, absolutely considered, are common to the three Persons: Therefore so is personal distinction.

It is confirmed: Multiplication and distinction cannot arise except either from limitation or from opposition: But in the divine realm it cannot arise from limitation: Therefore it arises from opposition. But in the divine realm there can be no other opposition than relative, which is the least of all, and which does not exclude or expel the extremes which are opposed, but rather so implies and posits them, that, one being destroyed, the other cannot subsist: Therefore the Divine Persons cannot be distinguished and multiplied among themselves, except through relations. Whence that celebrated pronouncement of Boethius is well known: "Substance furnishes unity, relation multiplies the Trinity." And that of Anselm: "All things in the divine realm are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way."

The same truth can furthermore be persuaded by this discourse: The Divine Persons are constituted by something real: But that cannot be something absolute, because all absolute things are common to the three Persons: but what is common to three persons cannot constitute a special Person discrete from another, to which the same perfection is common: Therefore it must be something notional, which is only twofold, namely origin and relation: But the Divine Persons are not constituted through active or passive origins: Therefore only through relations. The subsumed Minor, in which alone there can be difficulty, is proved, first, from the principles established above in chapter 3; for there we showed that origin in God, whether active or passive, imports in the direct case something absolute, and says relation only of the connoted, and in the oblique case, as modifying: But the constitutive of the Divine Persons cannot be something absolute in the direct case, but respective, since it is incommunicable, and really distinguishes the Person, which can belong only to the respective: Therefore origin, whether active or passive, does not constitute the divine Persons.

Secondly, the same Minor is proved by a fundamental reason taken from Saint Thomas, question 8 of On Power, article 3: A thing must be constituted in its own being prior to

operating: Therefore the Father is conceived as constituted in the being of a person prior to generating the Son, and consequently cannot be constituted in the notion of person through generation. The same holds of the Son, for passive generation is not a form giving being formally, but only as a way, insofar as it is a way to filiation, which formally constitutes in the notion of person.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated from the same Holy Doctor below, question 40, article 2: The constitutive of a thing ought to be signified as remaining in it, not, however, as going out from it, or tending toward it: But active origin is signified as going out from the person; passive, however, as tending toward the person: Therefore origin, insofar as it is such, does not have the form constituting a person.

In order that the various and difficult objections, which are usually made in this matter, be more easily and clearly resolved, and the doctrine delivered be further elucidated, it must be diligently observed, that the relation of origin in God is so eminent and perfect, that by reason of its perfection and eminence, it is equivalent not only to all relations, but also to all created subsistences and personalities, from which it comes about that it exercises the offices of relation and of personality, just as if in it the notion of personality and of relation were really distinguished. The reason for this is, that divine relation is not an accident inhering in a subject, as created relation is, but is identified with the divine substance, and thus by force of its own proper line, is something substantial and subsisting. Whence Theologians distinguish, in the divine relations, e.g., in paternity, two concepts, or two inadequate offices, namely of the form referring, or of a pure respect to a term, and of the form subsisting hypostatically; and under the first consideration they say that paternity presupposes generation, and is founded upon it; but under the other, that it precedes generation, and constitutes the person. This doctrine Saint Thomas teaches perspicuously in various places, especially here, question 40, article 4, where he thus says: The personal property of the Father can be considered in two ways: in one way as it is a relation, and thus according to the intellect it presupposes a notional act, because relation, insofar as it is such, is founded upon an act; in another way, according as it is constitutive of a person, and thus it is necessary that relation be preunderstood to the notional act, just as the agent person is preunderstood to the action.

The same doctrine, under other terms, Capreolus delivers, Book 1, dist. 26, question 1, where he teaches that relation in the divine realm is considered in two ways, namely as an individual form, and as it is relation; and under the first aspect he says it gives incommunicability, and constitutes persons; under the other, however, it presupposes the person constituted, and origin. Similarly Cajetan below, question 40, article 4, says

that paternity in the divine realm can be considered in two ways, namely as conceived, and as exercised, and in the first way it precedes generation and constitutes the Person of the Father, and exercises the office of a hypostatic form; but in the second way it follows generation, and is founded in it, and has the exercise of the relative form, and the very act of referring. From this doctrine the chief arguments against our opinion will be resolved.

It is objected, therefore, first: The Father is supposed constituted in the being of a person prior to generation, since a person exists before it operates: But paternity does not belong to the Father prior to generation, but follows upon it, since generation is the foundation of paternity: Therefore the Father is not constituted in the notion of person through paternity.

It is confirmed and further urged by this reason: What follows upon something not constituting, but presupposing, the person, cannot itself constitute it in the notion of person: But paternity follows upon generation, which does not constitute the Person of the Father, but presupposes it constituted, since the constitution of a thing is presupposed to action: Therefore paternity does not constitute the father in the notion of person, but presupposes him constituted.

To this most difficult objection I answer, the Major being granted, by distinguishing the Minor: Paternity does not belong to the Father prior to generation, as it is relation, I grant; as it is a hypostatic form, I deny. Similarly, to the confirmation I distinguish the Minor: Paternity, as it is relation, or as exercising the office of referring, follows upon generation, I grant the Minor; as a hypostatic form, and as bearing the office of subsistence, I deny the Minor.

You will say, first: It is impossible to conceive some form to be united or communicated to a subject, unless it confers on it its formal effect: But the formal effect of relation is actually to refer: Therefore by this very fact that it is understood as united or communicated to the subject, it is understood as actually referring, and consequently it is implied that paternity, prior to generation, be understood to constitute the Father in the notion of person, unless also for that prior it be understood as actually referring the Father to the Son.

I answer that although a form existing in reality ought in reality to furnish all its formal effect to a capable subject; if, however, several formal effects proceed from it, it is not necessary that it confer them all upon the subject for every prior; whence it can be understood, in some prior, as conferring one formal effect without its being understood as conferring another. This is established in the rational soul, which for some prior confers the corporeal degree, for which it does not furnish the degree of vegetating,

sensing, and reasoning. Although, therefore, paternity in the divine realm has for its effect, or quasi-formal effect, to refer the Father to the Son, and for the prior to the act of generation is understood as belonging to the first Person; it is not necessary, however, that for that prior it constitute him actually related, but it suffices that for the posterior sign following upon generation, it furnish such an effect.

You will say, secondly: The constitutive of a thing ought to distinguish it from others: But paternity, under the concept of hypostatic form, in the sign antecedent to generation, does not distinguish the Father from the Son, since in that prior the Son is not yet understood: Therefore neither does it constitute the Father, in such a sign, in the notion of Person.

I answer by denying the Major, for although the constitutive of a thing ought to be its distinctive from others, it is not, however, necessary that it actually distinguish it from others. Just as that by which Adam, before there were other men, was constituted, did not actually distinguish him from others, but was only his distinctive. Whence although the concept of subsistence, or of hypostatic form, does not actually distinguish the Father from the Son, in the sign antecedent to generation, in which the Son is not yet understood; because, however, it can distinguish him from the Son, and essentially requires to be connected with a respect to the term, by which the Father is actually distinguished from the Son, therefore through it the Father is constituted in the notion of person. This solution is Saint Thomas's, question 8 of On Power, article 3, ad 7.

You will say, thirdly: The notion of hypostatic form, and of relation, in paternity, are not distinguished virtually, but are only two formalities and inadequate offices of it: Therefore whatever is said of one ought also to be affirmed of the other; and consequently, if paternity, as hypostatic form, constitutes the person, it will also constitute it, as it is relation.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence: For of the second Person of the Trinity it is true to say that He is the Word of creatures, and that He is not the son of them; and yet the notion of Word and the notion of Son are not distinguished virtually in Him. Divinity too is united to the minds of the blessed as a species, but not as intellection, or nature; and yet, in the more probable opinion, the species, the intellection, and the nature are one and the same formality, without virtual distinction. Likewise in the Divine Word the notion of vital term and of representation are not distinguished virtually, and yet it can be united to the minds of the blessed, as it is the most actual representation, and cannot be united under the notion of the vital term of intellection. Why, then, could it not similarly be affirmed of paternity, as it is a

hypostatic form, that it constitutes the Father, and this be denied of it, as it is relation, although the concepts of hypostatic form and of relation are identified in it without virtual distinction?

You will object, secondly: The Divine Persons are constituted through origins: Therefore they are not constituted through relations. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. The first distinctive of a thing is also its constitutive: But active generation first distinguishes the Father from the other Divine Persons, more than paternity, since it is prior to it, as, so to speak, its foundation: Therefore it constitutes the Father in the being of person.

To this argument the solution is clear from what has already been said: for it is answered that although the distinction furnished to the Father by active generation is prior to that which paternity furnishes as referring, or as it has the mode of exercised relation, it is not, however, prior to that which paternity furnishes, as it has the notion of hypostatic form.

You will say, passive generation is prior to filiation, even as it has the notion of subsistence and hypostatic form, since it is, as it were, its coming-to-be: Therefore the Son is constituted in the notion of person through passive origin.

But I deny the consequence, for although passive generation precedes filiation in priority "from which," it stands, however, as something transient and flowing, not, however, as something fixed and permanent, which is required for the notion of constitutive, as is clear from what has been said above.

You will insist, although origin under the explicit concept of flux, egress, and way, cannot constitute the Person of the Son, why not, as a hypostatic form, and under the concept of subsisting, which it implicitly includes, by this very fact that it is divine, could it constitute Him? Just as in our opinion, although filiation, as referring the Son to the Father, cannot constitute the Son in the notion of person, it can indeed under the concept of subsisting and of hypostatic form, which it implicitly imports.

I answer that this difference intercedes between relations and origins, that the respect of the term which relation explicates is not repugnant to inherence, or to subsistence, indeed relation so explicates the respect to the term, that it demands one or the other of these; created relation demands inherence, and divine relation demands subsistence. But the explicit concept of a way demands implicit permanence; as is established in created generation, which, although it inheres, does not, however, inhere permanently, but by way and transiently: The same must be said of divine generation, namely that although it is in reality permanent, from the force, however, of the concept which it explicates, it

does not demand permanence, which it ought to require, in order that, according to the implicit concept, it might subsequently be able to have the notion of hypostatic form, and be the constitutive of a person.

You will object, thirdly: The constitutive is caused by, and depends on, the constituting thing: But the Divine Persons can be caused or depend on nothing: Therefore neither can they be constituted.

I answer that between the constituted and the constituting there is not necessarily required real causality and dependence, but a virtual one suffices. There is, however, no inconvenience in admitting in the divine realm virtual causality and dependence, as is established in the divine nature, with respect to the attributes, and in the attribute of immutability, with respect to the attribute of eternity. For by virtual causality and dependence, Theologians do not understand equivalent causality and dependence (as the Author of the Theology of Mind and Heart supposes, and therefore rejects it, as inseparable from imperfection, from the divine realm), but they say that to be caused and to depend virtually on another is this, that it is so compared to that, that if, per impossibile, it could be caused and depend on something, it would be caused and depend on nothing other than that. In which not even a shadow of imperfection or defect is implied.

§ II

Corollaries of the preceding doctrine.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, against Scotus, that a Divine Person does not formally signify only the negation of communicability; because a Divine Person formally signifies that by which the Divine Persons are formally constituted: But the Divine Persons are not formally constituted through the sole negation of communicability, but through something real and positive, namely through relation, as was shown above: Therefore a Divine Person does not formally signify only the negation of communicability, but something real and positive, namely divine relation.

You will say with Scotus: A person is an incommunicable substance of a rational nature: But the term "incommunicable" signifies only the negation of communicability: Therefore person in common, and consequently a Divine Person, says, as its formal notion, only the negation of communicability.

I answer by denying the Minor: for just as when it is said that an Angel is immaterial, and a horse irrational, the terms "immaterial" and "irrational" signify not only negation, but something positive, formally, although they explicate negation circumlocutorily or a

posteriori: so also when it is said that a person is an incommunicable substance of a rational nature, the term "incommunicable" does not signify only negation, but something positive, founding the negation of communicability.

You will insist: In a Divine Person nothing positive can be assigned, in which the negation of communicability is founded: Therefore it formally signifies only negation. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. If in a Divine Person something positive were given, in which that negation were founded, it would especially be relation: But this cannot found the negation of communicability: Therefore etc. The Minor is proved: Paternity, for example, either founds the negation of communicability from the notion of relation as such, or from the concept of such a relation? Not the first, otherwise the relation of spirator too would be incommunicable: Nor the second, for paternity, from the concept of paternity, only imports the order of origin of that from which another is: in which no notion of incommunicability is imported: Therefore divine relation cannot be the foundation of the negation of communicability.

I answer by denying the Antecedent; to its proof, I deny the Minor: to the proof of that, I also deny the Minor as to the second part: For by this very fact that paternity in God is a relation of origin through an action of the intellect, it belongs to agree with one person in such a way that it can belong to no other, and accordingly founds the negation of communicability: The relation of Spirator, however, because it is founded in the origin of the Holy Spirit, who is the term of mutual love, requires to be common to two Persons, and consequently cannot found the negation of communicability.

It is gathered, secondly, that a Divine Person does not formally signify relation, as it is formally a respect to a term, but insofar as it is substantially subsisting, and bears the offices of hypostatic form. Thus Saint Thomas here, question 29, article 4, where he says: A Divine Person signifies relation in the direct case, and essence in the oblique; not, however, relation insofar as it is relation, but insofar as it is signified by the mode of hypostasis.

Reason also persuades this: for as the same Holy Doctor teaches, question 9 of On Power, article 4, ad 13, a Divine Person according to the name is not referred to another, and accordingly is not a formally relative name, but an absolute one: Therefore its formal signification is not formally relative; nor consequently is divine relation, as it exercises the office of referring, and as it is formally a respect to a term. The consequence is evident: for a name is formally constituted through signification, and consequently a name not relative, but absolute, requires as its form a signification not relative, but formally absolute.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated: If the formal signification of this name were formally relative, or divine relation insofar as it exercises the office of referring, and as it formally is a respect to a term, this name Divine Person would be said relatively, and consequently, just as the Father is said, and is, the Father of the Son, and conversely, so too it would be said that the Father is the Person of the Son, and the Son the Person of the Father: But the Father is not said to be the Person of the Son, and Augustine, book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 6, reputes the opposite assertion absurd, where he says: It does not please us to say that the Father is the Person of the Son: Therefore the formal signification of this name, Divine Person, is not formally relative, or divine relation itself, as it exercises the office of referring, and as it is formally a respect to a term, but insofar as it is subsisting, and bearing the offices of hypostatic form. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 4, ad 1, explaining that saying of Augustine, "In the Trinity when we say the Person of the Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father: for Person is said toward itself, not toward the Son," says that this name Person is said toward itself, not toward another, because it signifies relation, not by the mode of relation, but by the mode of substance, which is hypostasis.

From which you will understand that the divine relations are signified differently by the name Divine Person, and differently by these three distinct names: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For Divine Person signifies formally and explicitly the divine relations, under the concept of things subsisting incommunicably; just as Person in common signifies subsisting incommunicably in any intellectual nature; implicitly, however, and materially, it signifies them under the concept of relations, and insofar as they exercise the office of referring to a term or correlative. On the contrary, however, the three aforesaid names signify formally and explicitly the relations, under the concept of relations, and insofar as they are respects to a term; implicitly, however, and materially, they import them under the concept of things subsisting.

§ III

There is given in God, considered according to Himself, and as preunderstood to the relations and Persons, some absolute subsistence.

Thus Saint Thomas teaches in various places, especially question 9 of On Power, article 5, ad 13, in these words: The divine supposita are not the principle of subsisting of the divine essence; for the divine essence itself is according to itself subsisting. And 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 14, he says that in God there are several subsisting things, if the relations be considered, and one subsisting thing, if the essence be considered. And Book 3, dist. 6, question 2, article 1, ad 2, he asserts that in God the essence itself is subsisting, whence to it according to itself being is owed, indeed it is its own subsisting being. From which last passage it is manifest that the Holy Doctor does not use "subsisting" for existence, as some interpret, since from the fact that in God the divine essence itself is subsisting, he infers that to it according to itself being is owed, indeed that it is its own being; which discourse would be altogether nugatory, if by "subsisting" he understood existing: For it would be the same as if it were said, that from the fact that in God the essence itself was existing, existence was owed to it.

Reason also favors this opinion: For God, as He is preunderstood to the Persons, is subsisting: but not by personal and relative subsistence: Therefore by essential and absolute subsistence. The Minor is established, for since personal and relative subsistence constitutes a person, if God in that prior were subsisting by relative and personal subsistence, He would be a Person, and thus there would be given four persons in God, which is against the faith and the express definition of the Lateran Council denying in God a quaternity of Persons. The Major, however, in which alone there can be difficulty, is proved, first: God, as He is preunderstood to the Persons, creates, and operates things ad extra, otherwise the works of the Trinity ad extra would not be undivided. He is also, in that prior, understanding and willing: Therefore in that prior He is subsisting, since actions are of subsisting things, and nothing can operate, except what subsists through itself, as Saint Thomas says below, question 75, article 2.

Secondly, the same Major is proved: to subsist says the greatest perfection, for it says the most perfect mode of being: Therefore it ought not to be denied to God, considered according to Himself, and as preunderstood to the relations and persons. The consequence is clear: both because every imaginable perfection ought to be found in the divine essence. Also because the relations add no perfection to the divine essence, but rather receive the whole perfection which they have, from it, as we showed in the preceding chapter.

Thirdly, the same Major is shown: The divine essence within its own line is infinite: Therefore also subsisting. The consequence is proved: A created nature, therefore, does not subsist within its own line, but by reason of its suppositum, because it is finite, and thus depends on it as sustaining it: Therefore if the divine nature, within its own line, is infinitely perfect, it will be subsisting within its own line.

Fourthly, the same Major is persuaded by a reason taken from the treatise on the Incarnation: For as Saint Thomas teaches, Part 3, question 3, article 3, the personalities being abstracted by the intellect, God can assume a created nature: Therefore God, as preunderstood to the Persons, is subsisting. The consequence is clear, for if in that prior He were not subsisting, He could not supply the offices of created subsistence, and render a created nature subsisting; for it is implied that it be rendered subsisting, except through a subsistence proper or alien: Therefore He could not assume it; for in this consists assumption, that God terminate an alien nature, and supply the offices of created subsistence.

By another reason our assertion can be persuaded: for by absolute subsistence, which we say belongs to the divine nature according to itself, we understand nothing other than the perseity excluding dependence on another as sustaining: But the divine nature according to itself, and as preunderstood to the relations and persons, enjoys such perseity and independence, since it does not depend on the relations in existing, but rather the relations exist through its existence, as was shown in the preceding chapter: Therefore the divine nature according to itself and as preunderstood to the relations and persons, enjoys absolute subsistence.

You will say that the notion of subsistence is not preserved in such perseity and independence, but only in a perseity excluding communicability to another as to a suppositum; whence since this perseity, for the prior to the relations, does not belong to the divine nature, because it is communicable to three persons, for that prior it cannot be said to be subsisting.

But on the contrary: Saint Thomas here, question 29, article 2, thus says: Substance according as it exists through itself and not in another, is called subsistence: for those things we say subsist, which exist not in another, but in themselves: Therefore he holds the notion of subsistence to consist in perseity of existing. Whence the rational soul separated from the body is said to subsist for no other reason, except because, thus separated, it enjoys the perseity of independence, even if it be communicable.

It is confirmed: created subsistence presents two things to the nature which it terminates: first, that it exist through itself by the perseity of independence: second, that

it exist through itself by the perseity of incommunicability: But the divine relations, because they give the second perseity, are said to be, and truly are, subsistences: Therefore if the absolute formality gives the divine essence the first, it will truly be a subsistence, and will enjoy the name of absolute subsistence, especially since such a formality not only gives to the divine nature the perseity of existence, but also the notion of the principle by which, with respect to intellection, volition, creation, preservation, and other operations, which belong to God according to Himself, and as preunderstood to the relations and persons: For if for such a prior the divine nature were not subsisting by some absolute subsistence, it could not be the principle by which of such operations, since actions belong only to subsisting things.

You will object, first: If God, for the prior to the relations, subsisted, He would be a Person, since a person is nothing other than a thing subsisting in an intellectual nature: But this cannot be said, otherwise there would be given in God a quaternity of Persons, which was condemned in the Lateran Council: Therefore neither can that.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: If God, for the prior to the relations, subsisted by a personal and incommunicable subsistence, He would be a person, I grant the Major. If He subsisted by an absolute and communicable subsistence, I deny the Major. For it belongs to the notion of a person that it be subsisting in an intellectual nature incommunicably.

You will say, at least He would be a semi-person, because He would have one of the requisites for the notion of person, namely subsistence, or perseity in existing. But I deny the sequel: for just as from the fact that a horse participates in the notion of animal, which is one of the essential predicates of man, it cannot be called a semi-man; so likewise, although God, for the prior to the relations, enjoys subsistence, which is one of the requisites for the notion of person, He cannot, however, be called a semi-person. The reason is, because the essences of things consist in the indivisible, and behave like numbers, which by the addition or subtraction of a unit change species. Whence the essential and specific difference being removed, the species is immediately dissolved, although one of the essential predicates remains.

You will object, secondly: The divine nature, for the prior to the relations, requires to exist in three persons: Therefore for that prior it does not exist independently of another as sustaining, and consequently does not subsist by absolute subsistence.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence; for although the divine nature requires to be in three Persons, by reason of its infinite fecundity, it does not, however, demand to be in them, by reason of indigence, and that it exist through

itself, since it has this by reason of itself; whence it is in three Persons, precisely as terminating them, not, however, as sustained by them. Nor is it an obstacle that the divine essence cannot exist without the relations, for neither can God's omnipotence exist without the possibility of creatures, nor divine intellection without the word, and yet the possibility of creatures is not required from indigence, but from the fecundity of omnipotence, nor is the production of the word from indigence, but from the fecundity of divine intellection.

You will object, thirdly: In created things, personality renders nature independent of another as sustaining, and incommunicable to another as suppositum: Therefore likewise in God, personalities, or relative subsistences, furnish both, and consequently absolute subsistence is posited in vain. But I deny the consequence and the parity: for in created nature it can be furnished by the same form which is of perfection, namely independence from the sustaining thing, and what is of incommunicability: In God, however, what is of perfection cannot be furnished except by the essence, and incommunicability cannot arise except from the relations.

From what has been said it is gathered that there are two chief offices of absolute subsistence, namely to constitute the divine nature existing through itself, and independent of another as sustaining, and to render God, as preunderstood to the relations and persons, the principle by which of creation, preservation, and other operations ad extra, which are undivided, and common to the whole Trinity. Although, however, Deity preunderstood to the persons, be subsisting, and the principle by which of operations ad extra, it cannot, however, be the principle by which of generating ad intra, because for this is required that it be subsisting incommunicably, or by relative subsistence; since between the one generating and the one generated there must be real distinction, which cannot be except through relations, as will be more established from what is to be said in the following section.

§ IV

Besides the absolute and common subsistence, there are given in God three relative and personal subsistences.

This is gathered from various testimonies of the Councils and the Holy Fathers: For it is said in the Sixth General Synod, action 11: The most holy Trinity has been made numerable by personal subsistences. Athanasius, sermon on the Mother of God, thus says: We proclaim one God in three subsistences, in which there is one substance. Cyril of Alexandria, Dialogue 3 on the Trinity: The whole discourse of our faith tends to this, that we see one nature of Deity, which properly subsists in three subsistences. Ambrose, in the Apostles' Creed, chapter 2: It is Catholic, that we should believe one God according to the unity of substance, and that we should perceive the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each in his own subsistence. Finally Damascene, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 9: The Son has His own subsistence, besides that which is the Father's. And again: three hypostases, that is three subsistences. Which testimonies are so perspicuous that they cannot be obscured by any clouds of evasion. Nor is it an obstacle that the Fathers ordinarily take subsistence concretely, so that it is the same as person; for since concrete substantives are not multiplied, unless their formal signification is multiplied, from the fact that the Fathers and Councils teach that in God there are given three subsistences in the concrete, it is rightly inferred, from their mind, that there are given three subsistences in the abstract, just as from three persons three personalities are rightly inferred. I add that the Sixth Synod speaks of subsistences as of forms, or as it were forms, by which the Most Holy Trinity is constituted and numbered; which is to speak of subsistences in the abstract.

The same truth can be persuaded by a threefold reason. The first has already been insinuated, for in order for the multiplication of a concrete substantive, such as suppositum or person is, the multiplication of the form is required, and this name person formally signifies subsistence; if there were given only a single subsistence in God, just as there is given a single divine nature, it could no more be said that there are given in God three Persons, than three Gods could be admitted in God, but we would be entirely bound to admit a single person in God, just as we confess one God, which is fundamentally to destroy the mystery of the Trinity.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated: Person cannot be multiplied in God, unless personality also be multiplied, for personality is constitutive of person, just as humanity is of man: But personality cannot be multiplied, unless subsistence also be multiplied, because with the inferior multiplied, the superior ought also to be multiplied; but subsistence is something superior to personality, which adds above

subsistence that it be incommunicable, and of intellectual nature, as is established from this definition of person delivered by Boethius: A person is an individual substance of a rational nature: Therefore person cannot be multiplied in the divine realm, unless subsistence be multiplied.

The second reason: since actions belong only to subsisting things, and in God there are given not only essential operations, common to the whole Trinity, but also notional ones, proper to the divine persons, such as to generate and to spirate; just as there is given in God, as preunderstood to the relations and persons, absolute subsistence, through which is constituted the principle by which of understanding, willing, creating, and governing the universe; in the Father there must be given relative subsistence, through which He is constituted in the notion of principle by which of generation; and another in the Son, through which, together with the Father, He is constituted the principle by which of active spiration; and another in the Holy Spirit, through which He is constituted the term who of such action; because just as the principle by which, so also the term who of a notional action, ought to be subsisting; for just as actions, so also passions, or quasi-passions, belong to subsisting things.

The third reason: the incommunicability which the Divine Persons say is not a pure negation, but is founded in something positive, as was shown in § 2: But that cannot be other than subsistences: Therefore in the Divine Persons three subsistences must be admitted. The Minor is proved; because if that positive thing were not subsistence, it would behave by way of something adjacent, and since it is the constitutive of person in the personal being, the Divine Person would behave by way of a thing adjacent to an existing thing, which is absurd, and approaches the error of Gilbert de la Porrée, who imagined the Divine Persons to be assisting the Divine essence, and as it were adjacent to it. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 40, article 3, says that personal properties are not preunderstood to accede to the divine hypostases, as a form to a preexisting subject, but bring with them their own supposita, insofar as they are the persons themselves subsisting.

A fourth reason can be added, taken from the mystery of the Incarnation, in which the union of humanity was made primarily to the personal subsistence of the Divine Word, not, however, to the common and absolute subsistence, otherwise the three Persons would be said to be incarnate: But of this in the treatise on the Incarnation, chapter 6.

You will object, first: Saint Thomas, question 9 of On Power, article 5, ad 13, says that the divine nature is according to itself subsisting, but on the contrary personal properties have it that they subsist from the essence. Therefore he holds that the Divine Persons do

not bring with them relative subsistences, but subsist through the absolute subsistence of the essence which is included in them, and is diversely modified by the divine relations. Reason too seems to favor this opinion, for since in the notion of person only two things are imported, namely to subsist incommunicably, the first can be attributed to the Divine Persons by the absolute subsistence included in them, the other, however, by the relations, which, by reason of the relative opposition which they enjoy, found distinction and incommunicability in the Divine Persons. And thus it seems superfluous, besides absolute subsistence, to admit three relative ones in the Divine Persons, since absolute subsistence, as modified by three relations, can furnish the whole that is required for the notion and constitution of a Divine Person.

To the testimony of Saint Thomas I answer that when he says that personal properties have it that they subsist from the essence, he is not speaking of subsistence, as it says perseity of incommunicability, but of subsistence as it says perseity of independence from another as sustaining: for since subsistence under this aspect is the greatest perfection, it comes from the divine essence, not, however, from the relations, which by reason of themselves do not say perfection. In the same sense must Saint Augustine be understood, when he says, Book 5, chapter 5: Every thing subsists toward itself, how much more God. For he speaks there of subsistence, as it says perseity of independence from another as sustaining, which is absolute, and is said toward itself, not toward another.

To the reason, however, the response is clear from what has been said above; for we showed that the Divine Persons cannot be multiplied, unless subsistences be multiplied, and accordingly that absolute subsistence, modified by the relations, does not suffice for the constitution and multiplication of the Divine Persons, but the relations themselves must bring with them relative subsistences, proper to themselves, which found in them the negation of communicability, and constitute them the principle by which of notional actions; just as absolute subsistence constitutes God, as preunderstood to the relations and persons, the principle by which of essential operations, which are undivided, and common to the whole Trinity.

You will object, secondly: Since existence is the ultimate term, it cannot be actuated by another existence, nor is a relative one granted besides the absolute in God, as was shown in the preceding chapter: But subsistence too is the ultimate term in the line of subsisting: Therefore it cannot be terminated by another, nor, besides the absolute, can a relative one be granted.

I answer, the Major being granted, by distinguishing the Minor: Personal subsistence is the ultimate term, I grant the Minor. Non-personal, I deny the Minor; for absolute subsistence, just as it is not incommunicable, so also does not have the notion of ultimate term.

§ V

Which names are said singularly or plurally in God.

For discerning which names are said singularly or plurally in God, this rule is established by Theologians as certain: Those things which belong to the Persons by reason of the essence alone, are said only singularly. Those which belong to them only by reason of the personal properties, are said only plurally. Those, however, which belong to them by reason of the properties, and by reason of the essence, are said plurally and singularly. The reason is, because relation is multiplied in the Divine Persons; the essence, however, remains one in them: Therefore what belongs to them by reason of the essence alone, retains unity: What by reason of relation alone, does not enjoy unity, but is said only plurally; what, however, belongs to them by reason of both, is said singularly, insofar as it belongs by reason of the essence; and plurally, insofar as it belongs by reason of the relations.

From this general rule it follows, first, that three Persons are said in the divine realm, and in no way one Person; because the notion of Person does not belong by reason of the essence, nor can it be taken for that, but only for subsisting relation. Whence since now, by common consent of the Church, person and hypostasis are taken for the same, just as three persons are said in the divine realm, and not one, so also three hypostases, and not one hypostasis, ought to be said.

It follows, secondly, that subsistence is said to be one, and several are granted: the first, insofar as subsistence is taken for the perseity of independence; the second, however, insofar as it is used for the perseity of incommunicability: Because subsistence taken in the first way belongs to the Divine Persons by reason of the essence; in the second acceptation, however, it belongs to them by reason of the relations, as is established from what has been said in the preceding chapter.

It follows, thirdly, that one existence ought to be said in God, and in no way several; because, as was shown in the preceding chapter, existence is said absolutely, and belongs to the Divine Persons by reason of the essence, not, however, by reason of the relations.

From which it follows, fourthly, that neither eternity nor duration are said plurally in the divine realm; because these attributes either are not distinguished from divine

existence, or at least are modes of it, whence, being unmultiplied, they cannot be pluralized.

It follows, fifthly, that the three Divine Persons cannot be called three perfect ones, nor three good ones substantively, but only adjectivally, because (as we showed above) neither perfection nor goodness are multiplied in the Divine Persons, since they do not belong to them by reason of the relations, but only by reason of the essence.

It follows, sixthly, that in the divine realm there is not a threefold sanctity, but one only; because sanctity does not belong to the Divine Persons by reason of the relations, just as neither perfection nor goodness, but only by reason of the nature transcendentally included in them.

It follows, seventhly, that the name of being, if it be concrete, signifying the same as having essence or existence, cannot be multiplied taken substantively, since there is a unique essence and existence in the Persons; well, however, adjectivally, because there are three having the divine essence and existence. If, however, such a name be concrete, signifying the same as having entity, thus it is truly multiplied even substantively, just as there are truly given three entities really distinct.

It follows, eighthly, that the Divine Persons are said to be one thing and several things: One thing, which is the essence, and several things, which are the relations, because reality, which consists not in feigned but in ratified being, is taken both for the essence and for the relations. Whence Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, chapter 5, says: The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And immediately he adds: The Trinity is a certain supreme thing.

It follows, ninthly, that there are given in the divine realm three unities and one unity: the first by reason of the relations, the second by reason of the essence, because unity consists in undivided reality: But reality and indivision belong to each of the Divine Persons, not only by reason of the essence, but also by reason of the relations: Therefore unity by reason of both belongs to them.

It follows, tenthly, that in the divine realm there is not given a threefold truth, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches, question 1 of On Truth, article 7; because truth is either taken formally, which consists in cognition, and thus just as there is a single cognition in the three Persons, so also a single formal truth in them. Or it is taken transcendentally, which consists in intelligible entity, as is taught in Metaphysics: but intelligibility is not multiplied in the divine realm, because it belongs only by reason of the essence, since it alone has the notion of intelligible species, and of motive object, with respect to itself, the

attributes, and the relations, as we showed in the treatise on the knowledge of God: Therefore neither is transcendental truth multiplied.

It follows, lastly, that the three Persons cannot be called three individuals, because in individuals the nature is divided: but in the Divine Persons the essence remains altogether undivided: Therefore they cannot be called three individuals, although they can be called three Persons. Wherefore Saint Thomas here, question 30, article 4, establishes this distinction between Person and individual, that Person has as its formal signification personality, and as its material, nature; the individual, on the contrary, has as its formal signification nature, as its material, personality; whence just as nature is not multiplied in the divine realm, so neither is the individual.

§ VI

On the notions by which the Divine Persons can be known.

We treated at the beginning of this Treatise of the knowability of the Divine Persons, and showed that from natural effects the Mystery of the Trinity cannot be known; now we must briefly speak of their notions, or of the marks and characters, by which they can be known and discerned from one another.

A notion, therefore, is defined by Saint Thomas here, question 32, article 1, as the proper reason of knowing a Divine Person, where by "proper reason" is not understood a formal concept, by which we specially know one person, and discern it from another, but an objective one, that is, the property, or form, or special mark, by which one Divine Person is distinguished from another, and which corresponds to the formal notion. Whence it is described by others thus: A notion is an objective reason notifying a Person, or distinguishing one Person from another, or from others. From this the Holy Doctor infers, first, Book 1, dist. 26, question 2, article 3, that three things are required for something to be called a notion in the divine realm. The first is, that it signify something pertaining to origin, because the Divine Persons are distinguished by relations of origin. The second, that it pertain to dignity, or at least denote it, because Person is a name of dignity, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches here, question 29, article 3. The third, that it say something special, because what is common to three persons cannot be the reason of discerning one Person from another. He infers, secondly, that this distinction obtains between relations, properties, and notions, that although these three agree in the same formality, without virtual distinction, the first, however, belongs to this formality by respect to the correlative, the second by comparison to the person whose property it is, the third comparatively to the intellect, for which it is the reason of manifesting the constituted person. From which he also infers that the notion of respect to the term or

correlative is first understood in relation, then the notion of property, and finally the notion of notion, because nothing can be the reason of manifesting another, unless it be proper to it, nor can it be proper to it, unless it be distinguished from others, which in the divine realm happens through relation.

Five notions, however, are commonly assigned in the divine realm, namely paternity and innascibility in the Father, filiation in the Son, active spiration in the Father and the Son, as they are the principle of the Holy Spirit, and procession or passive spiration in the Holy Spirit Himself. For since the Divine Persons are constituted and distinguished by relations of origin, a person can be known either through this, that it is the principle of a procession, or the term of it, or through the negation of procession. And thus the first person, because He does not proceed from another, is known by innascibility, or improducibility, and because He also produces the Son, He becomes known by paternity: and because with the Son He produces the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are known by active spiration. The Son, however, because He is the term of generation, is notified by filiation, and the Holy Spirit, who is the term of the active spiration of the Father and the Son, is known by passive spiration, or procession, and thus five notions are had in the divine realm. Thus Saint Thomas here, question 32, article 3.

You will say, first, generation and nativity are reasons of knowing the Father and the Son; Therefore they obtain the notion of notion. I answer that in order for something to obtain the notion of notion in the divine realm, it must be a reason of knowing a Divine Person in itself; generation, however, and nativity, since they are names signifying origins in becoming and tending, notify only the notional actions of the Divine Persons, not, however, the Divine Persons themselves in themselves, and therefore they are not notions.

You will say, secondly, it belongs to the notion of a notion that it pertain to dignity: But innascibility, since it is a negation, does not pertain to dignity: Therefore it is not a notion.

I answer that it belongs to the notion of a notion that it be dignity, or at least denote it, as we said above: although, however, innascibility is not formally, by reason of itself, dignity, it nevertheless denotes it, and a posteriori explicates the personal dignity of the first person, namely the authority of principle by way of head and fount of all the Divine Persons, as will be established from what is to be said in the following chapter. From which you will easily understand why innascibility is a notion, but not inspirability, as Scotus thinks; because indeed inspirability, or the negation of proceeding through the will, is neither dignity, nor denotes dignity, as innascibility does; both because,

supposing that something be produced, it does not say, from our mode of conceiving, dignity, that it lack this or that mode of production: also because inspirability, taken by reason of itself, belongs to creatures, since they are not produced through spiration. I add that inspirability, or the negation of passive spiration, is involved in the notion of active spiration, which belongs to the Father and the Son; because by this very fact that one person spirates, there is opposed to it the one which is spirated, and accordingly inspirability belongs to that to which belongs the notion of spirator.

Chapter VI

On the Person of the Father.

There are two names which belong to the first Person, namely the name of Father, and the name of unbegotten, or innascible. The first is established from what has been said on the generation of the Word, for if the procession of the Word is a generation, He from whom it proceeds is necessarily a begetter and Father. The Holy Doctor observes, however, here, question 33, article 2, ad 4, that since divine generation is most perfect, and the term begotten is most perfectly similar to the one begetting, since in them there is the same numerical form and nature, the notion of Father is found more perfectly in the first person of the Trinity, than in any creature, according to that saying to the Ephesians 3: "I bend my knees to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which he infers, article 3, that the name Father is said of the first person notionally prior to essentially, or belongs to the Father, with respect to the Divine Son, prior to with respect to creatures, because the notion of son is perfectly found in the eternal word, since He is perfectly similar to Him in nature; imperfectly, however, and deficiently in creatures, of whom God is called Father, by reason of a fourfold similitude which He impresses on them. For He is called, in the first place, Father of irrational creatures, on account of the similitude of vestige: Job 38: "Who is the father of rain, or who begot the drops of dew?" Secondly, on account of the similitude of the image impressed on the rational creature: Deuteronomy 32: "Is not he thy father, who possessed thee, and made thee, and created thee?" Thirdly, on account of the similitude of grace, which is found in the just: Romans 8: "The Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God." Fourthly, on account of the similitude of glory, which is found in the blessed: to the Romans 5: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." All these similitudes, however, are immensely surpassed by the similitude of the Divine Word, since He is of the same nature with the Father.

Nor is it valid if you say that common things in God are prior to the proper and notional; for this is true of common things absolutely taken, such as to understand and to will, not, however, of those which say a respect to a creature; for since the Divine Word is the principle of the production of creatures, according to that saying, John 1: "All things were made through him," He proceeds from the Father prior to creatures, just as the word conceived in the mind of the craftsman is prior conceived to proceed from the craftsman, than the artifact, which is produced to its similitude.

For a fuller explanation of this splendid name, which is of such religion and excellence, that Cyril and Theodoret assert that the first person places this above the title of God, and delights more in the appellation of Father than of Lord: It must be observed that although Clement of Alexandria, Augustine, and other Holy Fathers call the first Person of the Trinity Father and Mother together, to signify the difference which obtains between the divine father and earthly fathers: for these beget sons outside themselves, but He retains the Word produced within His own breast, and the very bowels of His divinity, by which a certain metaphorical maternal property is declared. Alluding to which, the most ancient author Synesius, in hymn 3 on the Eternal Father, sings: "Thou art father and mother, root and highest branch, female and male: in Thee is that which bears, in Thee is that which is borne." Nevertheless the name of Father is more fittingly attributed to the first person than the name of mother; the excellent reason for which Saint Thomas assigns, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 11, toward the end, where he thus discourses: Carnal generation of animals is perfected through active and passive power, and from the active power indeed is called father, from the passive, however, is called mother: Whence of the things which are required for the generation of offspring, some belong to the father, and some belong to the mother; for to give nature to the offspring belongs to the father, but to conceive and give birth belongs to the mother, as to something passive and receiving. Since, however, the procession of the Word occurs through this, that God understands Himself, there is not attended there a passive power, but active: because the divine intellect is not in potency, but only in act; whence in the generation of the Word, the notion of mother does not fit, but of father. The sense of the Holy Doctor is, that the first person of the most holy Trinity is not called mother, but father, because mother signifies a passive and potential principle, receiving fecundity from elsewhere: the divine intellect, however, although it gives birth and conceives, furnishes this, however, by way of pure act, receiving nothing from elsewhere.

As for the other name, namely of unbegotten, or innascible, which signifies not only the negation of generation, but also of all procession and communication from another, it must be known that formerly some of the Holy Fathers rejected this name as profane

and alien from the Scriptures, as Athanasius, Oration 2 Against the Arians, Epiphanius, heresy 73, and Ambrose, book On the Incarnation, chapters 8 and 9, where he thus says: In the Scriptures I nowhere find "unbegotten," I have not read it, I have not heard it. Because indeed the Arians abused that name, for from the fact that the Father was unbegotten, and not made, they inferred that the Son was made and a creature. Wherefore, to remove their snares, they wished such a name to be suppressed in silence. Whence Basil, book 1 Against Eunomius: The appellation of unbegotten, or innascible, although it exceedingly agrees with our thoughts, nevertheless because I nowhere find it in the Scriptures, and since it is the first element of their blasphemy, I would rightly say it should be handed over to silence. But when the danger of erring ceased, and there was no suspicion in the usurpation of such a name, the Councils and Holy Fathers frequently used it, as is established from the Sixth Council of Toledo, in which it is thus said: We believe the Father to be unbegotten, uncreated, the fount and origin of the whole of divinity. And from Augustine, Book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 26: The Father alone (he says) is not from another, therefore alone is he called unbegotten. The Church likewise, in hymns, often uses this name as proper to the Father.

Furthermore there is difficulty and controversy among the Scholastics, whether this name, as it is a notion of the Father, imports something positive, or only a bare and naked negation? For the resolution:

I say briefly, this name unbegotten, as it is a notion of the Father, formally imports negation, but materially and fundamentally says something positive.

The first part is Saint Thomas's, here question 33, article 4, ad 1, where, after he had refuted the opinions of those who said that innascibility, as it is a property of the Father, either signifies that He is from none, and that He is the principle of others, or universal authority, or fontal plenitude, thus concludes: And therefore it must be said, according to Augustine, that unbegotten imports the negation of passive generation. And, a few things interposed, he adds: Nor does it follow from this that unbegotten ought not to be posited as the proper notion of the Father, because first and simple things are notified through negation. For it is not required for the notion of a notion that it be, by reason of itself, dignity, but it suffices that it circumlocutorily signify or notify dignity, as we noted in the preceding chapter, last section, and by this reason it can be persuaded that the notion of notion requires no more that it signify something pertaining to dignity, than that it signify a personal property, since the first is gathered from the second: But in order that something be a notion, it is not required that, by reason of itself, it be a personal property, but it suffices that it circumlocutorily signify or notify a personal property: Therefore also it is not required that, by reason of itself, it be dignity, but only

that it circumlocutorily notify dignity, which negation can furnish, as will be established from what is next to be said, and accordingly it can formally be imported by this name unbegotten, as it is the notion of the Father.

The second part of the conclusion is proved, therefore: This name unbegotten is not only imposed to remove every passive production, and communication from the Father, but also to signify a positive perfection, on account of which such negation belongs to the Father: since indeed we are unable to conceive this positive perfection immediately and through itself in the Father, we circumlocute it, and explicate it through the negation of production, and communication from another: Therefore this name unbegotten, materially and secondarily, imports some positive perfection.

It is confirmed: we use similar names to explicate the positive perfections of the divine essence, as when we say that God is infinite and immutable; for these names, together with the negation which they explicitly and formally import, also implicitly and secondarily import that positive perfection, on account of which such negation befits God: Therefore likewise this name unbegotten, through itself, first and formally imports negation, secondarily, however, and materially, the perfection in which such negation is founded.

But what that positive perfection in the Father is, which is the foundation of this negation, there is dissent and controversy among the Theologians. For some think that positive thing to be nothing other than the notion of fontal principle of the persons of the Deity, which the Holy Fathers attribute to the eternal Father, especially Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 2, where he says: Alone the super-substantial fount of Deity is the Father. And toward the end: The primordial and fontal Deity is the Father, but the Son and the Holy Spirit are, if it be lawful to say, the fecund offshoots of Deity, planted divinely, and as it were flowers, and super-substantial lights, we have received from the Scriptures. But this opinion Saint Thomas relates and refutes here, question 33, article 4, ad 1, in these words: Some say that innascibility, which this name unbegotten signifies, imports universal authority, or even fontal plenitude. But this does not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration, but would include them, just as the proper is included in the common; for fontality and authority signify nothing other in the divine realm, than the principle of origin.

Others think that positive thing, in which is founded the negation which this name unbegotten formally imports, to be some transcendental relation, distinct from paternity and filiation, by which the Father indivisibly regards the Son and the Holy Spirit, as the

head of the divine emanations. But this opinion lacks probability, for just as there is not given in the Father some influx tending undividedly into the Son and the Holy Spirit; so neither is there given some common relation, tending into each proceeding person, for every divine relation is founded in origin and procession.

Others wish that negation to import, as its foundation in the eternal Father, the notion of being from Himself, through the exclusion of procession from another, which they call aseity. But since to be from oneself formally imports the negation of being from another, which the notion of unbegotten formally says, by aseity that positive perfection is not sufficiently explicated, through which the eternal Father is sufficient to Himself for being independently of any passive origin; whence there remains still to be explicated the reason from which the eternal Father has it that He is from Himself, and not from another, and that positive perfection in which is founded the negation of being from another, which this name unbegotten formally imports.

It must be said, therefore, that paternity, as it is subsistence, or hypostatic form, first terminating and modifying the divine nature, is the foundation of that negation which is formally imported by this name unbegotten; because as such it founds in the eternal Father the incapacity of being from another, and connotes the divine nature, as had from Himself and not from another. Whence since every foundation is prior in reason to that which is founded on it, the notion of unbegotten and innascible is posterior to paternity, not indeed under the explicit concept of Father, as He is referred to the Son, but under the explicit concept of the first hypostasis, first terminating and modifying the divine nature.

You will say, from this it follows that innascibility is not a notion distinct from paternity, since paternity, as hypostatic form, is not distinguished virtually from itself as referring. But the sequel is denied, because although for constituting a diverse notion an objectively virtually distinct concept is required, on the part of that which it formally signifies, it is not always required, however, that it be virtually diverse on the part of that which it fundamentally and materially only imports: Whence since paternity, as it bears the office of subsistence and hypostatic form, first terminating and modifying the divine nature, is materially only and fundamentally imported by this name unbegotten, and it formally signifies negation of every procession, or passive production, which is virtually distinguished from paternity, innascibility will be a notion distinct from paternity.

Chapter VII

On the Person of the Son.

The second Person of the Most Holy Trinity is signified chiefly by three names: Son, Word, and Image. Concerning the first it is established from what has been said above in chapter 3 on the divine processions: for if the procession of the Word is generation, it is evident that its term is the Son. Of the third we shall speak below. As for the second, that the name of Word belongs to the Son, the whole of Scripture so openly teaches, that no Christian doubts this, as Augustine says, Book 9 On the Trinity, chapter 12. The same Holy Doctor testifies, however, Book On Heresies, heresy 30, that formerly there were certain heretics who denied every Word in God, and were therefore called Alogi, that is, without Word. Whence they did not acknowledge the Gospel of John, and his Apocalypse, in which the Word of God is expressly had, as canonical books. But this error most openly contradicts not only Scripture, but also reason: for only two things belong to the notion of a Word, namely the notion of being expressed, and really produced by the one speaking, and the manifestation of those things which are said by the speaker: But it is evident that these two things belong to the second Person of the most holy Trinity: for the Son is truly produced by the Father through dictation or intellection, according to that saying, Psalm 2: "The Lord hath said to me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee"; and He most actually represents and manifests all things which are in the intellect of the Father, as Augustine elegantly declares, Book On the Faith, in these words: The Word of the Father is therefore so called, because through Him the Father becomes known. Just as, therefore, by our words we accomplish this, that our mind becomes known to the hearer, and whatever secret thing we bear in our heart, is brought forth through signs of this kind to the knowledge of another: so that wisdom which God the Father begot, since through it the Father becomes known by most secret signs, is fittingly named His Word: Therefore the second Person of the most holy Trinity not only has the notion of Son, but also of Word, indeed, as the same Augustine says, Book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 2: "He is Son by this that He is Word, and Word by this that He is Son." Because indeed, by this that He proceeds through intellection, He proceeds as similar to the Father by force of His procession, as we declared in chapter 3, and actually expresses and manifests those things which are in the intellect of the Father.

These things are certain and undoubted among all Catholics, but there is difficulty, and celebrated controversy among the Theologians, from which of these objects the Divine Word per se proceeds. I said "per se," for just as all things which are in the knowledge of the Father are communicated concomitantly to the Son, so He proceeds concomitantly

from the notice of all things which are in the intellect of the Father, whether necessary or free. That, however, is said to concur per se to the production of the Word, which behaves such that, if the knowledge of it were not, the Word would not be produced, or certainly would not be produced with that entire perfection with which it is in fact produced. On the contrary, however, that is reckoned to behave merely concomitantly to its production, which, even if it were not, or were not known, nevertheless the production of the Word would still be with the same entire perfection, with which it in fact is. Furthermore, those things which are known by the Father generating the Word, and which by way of object terminate His knowledge, are of a twofold kind; for either they are contained in God formally, as the divine essence, the attributes, and the personalities; or only eminently, as creatures both possible and future. It is asked, therefore, whether the Divine Word per se proceeds from the knowledge of all these?

§ I

The Divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of the divine essence, of the attributes, and of the Persons.

The first part is certain, and denied by no one, nor recalled into doubt; for since the knowledge from which the Word proceeds is quidditative, it ought per se to terminate at those things which pertain to the quiddity of God, and accordingly to His essence and attributes, which are as it were the properties of the divine nature.

The second part, however, is denied by Scotus, Puteanus, and Vasquez: for the first thinks the Word proceeds per se only from the knowledge of the essence and attributes, but not from the knowledge of the Father, or of the other persons. The second indeed grants that the Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of the Father, but denies that it proceeds from knowledge of Himself, or of the Holy Spirit. The third affirms that the Word proceeds per se from knowledge of the Father, and of Himself, but not of the Holy Spirit. This part of our assertion, however, Saint Thomas expressly teaches here, question 34, article 1, ad 3, saying: The Father, understanding Himself, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, conceives the Word, so that thus the whole Trinity is spoken by the Word.

Reason also persuades this: For since the Divine Word proceeds from the most perfect knowledge of the divine essence, it proceeds from a knowledge of it that is quidditative, intuitive, comprehensive, and beatifying: But it cannot have these four conditions and perfections, unless it terminate per se at the three Divine Persons: Therefore the Divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of the three Persons. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved as to each part. And in the first place, that, the Persons not being

known, divine knowledge, as it is in the Father, would not be quidditative, is established from what has been said above in chapter 4, § 2, where we showed that the divine relations belong to the essence and quiddity of God, as modes and terms, by which the divine nature essentially seeks to be modified and terminated, and without which it cannot be understood as fecund. Secondly, that it would not be intuitive of the essence, seems manifest, because intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive in this, that the latter is carried only to the nature and quiddity of the thing, as it abstracts from its subsistence and existence, the former, however, is carried into the thing, as it exists in itself subsisting and existing; whence God's knowledge, insofar as it is terminated at merely possible things, is not intuitive and of vision, but abstractive and of simple intelligence, because things under the state of mere possibility abstract from existence, as is established from what has been said in the Treatise on the knowledge of God: But the divine nature subsists and exists in three Persons; Therefore it is repugnant that intuitive knowledge of it be had, unless the three Divine Persons be known. Thirdly, that it can be comprehensive, is thus shown: In order that something be comprehended, whatever is knowable in it or from it ought to be known: But the divine essence is a medium in which not only the attributes, but also the Divine Persons, can be known: Therefore, these not being known, it cannot be comprehended. I add that the divine essence cannot be comprehended, unless it be known as fecund, and communicable to three persons, and in fact communicated, and accordingly unless the Divine Persons themselves, as the terms of this divine fecundity and communication, be understood. Finally, that the knowledge from which the Word proceeds cannot be beatifying, unless it terminate per se at the three Divine Persons, is established from what has been said in the Treatise on the beatific vision, where we showed that the beatific object concerns not only the essence, but also the persons, as modes of the divine essence, which is the formal object of divine beatitude; whence the intellect of the Father producing the Word, is had not only from knowledge of the essence and attributes alone, but also from knowledge of the Divine Persons, and accordingly if the Father's knowledge did not terminate at them, He would not be perfectly beatified.

Furthermore, the same part of our assertion can be persuaded by this discourse: The knowledge of the Word concurs per se to His production, since the Father, by knowing Him, produces Him, and by producing, knows Him: Therefore also the knowledge of the Father. The consequence seems manifest, for since the Word is the image of the Father, He represents not only His nature, but also His paternity; whence Christ said to Philip: "Philip, he that seeth me, seeth also my Father." And Basil, Homily 16, says: Since He is the image of His begetter, He shows in Himself the whole of His begetter: Therefore the Father, by knowing the Word, and by producing Him, must necessarily

know Himself, and His paternity; since an image, as such, cannot be known, unless the prototype which it represents, and from which it is expressed, be known. The same must be said of the knowledge of the Holy Spirit, because it is impossible that the Father know Himself and the Son, unless He also know the relation of spirator which is in each: But this relation cannot be known, unless the Holy Spirit be known, since it regards Him as its term and correlative.

You will object, first: The relations and Divine Persons are not the primary object, but only the secondary object of divine knowledge, from which the Word proceeds, since its primary and specificative object is the divine essence alone: But knowledge does not depend per se on a secondary object, but only on the primary and specificative one: Therefore the Word does not proceed per se from the knowledge of the Divine Persons, but only from the knowledge of the essence.

I answer, first, by denying the Major, for the divine relations are not properly a secondary object of divine knowledge, but modes of the primary and specificative object, namely of the divine essence, which by reason of its infinite fecundity essentially seeks to be modified and terminated by the divine relations.

I answer, secondly, the Major being granted, by distinguishing the Minor: Knowledge does not depend per se on a secondary object, when without it the primary object can be intuitively and comprehensively known, I grant the Minor. If without it there cannot be had intuitive and comprehensive knowledge of the primary object, I deny the Minor and the consequence. For as was shown above, the knowledge by which the Father generates the Word, would not be intuitive, nor comprehensive of the divine essence, if it did not terminate at the three Divine Persons.

You will object, secondly, with Puteanus: Only knowledge of the essence, as it is in the Father, is fecund for the production of the Word, for as Theologians commonly teach, the intellection fecund for generating is not common, but notional, and proper to the Father: Therefore the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence and paternity alone.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: only knowledge of the essence, as it is in the Father, is fecund: if "as" denotes the subject or generating principle, I grant the Antecedent. If it denotes the object of knowledge, which by way of principle by which concurs to generation, I deny the Antecedent: for not only the essence and paternity, but also filiation and passive spiration, concur per se by way of known object to the generation of the Word.

You will say: in the prior sign in which the Father generates the Word, the Word and the Holy Spirit do not exist, since in such a sign they are not yet supposed produced: Therefore filiation and passive spiration cannot concur by way of known object to the generation of the Word.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: In the prior sign in which the Father generates the Word, the Word and the Holy Spirit do not exist, by priority of origin, I grant the Antecedent; since indeed they do not exist from themselves, which is to exist by priority of origin, but from another, which is to exist as posterior in origin. They do not exist by simultaneity of duration, and in the same sign "in which," I deny the Antecedent. For simultaneity of existence and duration is not removed by priority and posteriority of origin, as is established in the sun emitting a ray or splendor, for the ray or splendor coexists with the sun, although it is posterior to it in origin and causality; and generally every actual principle of an operation precedes it by priority of nature and causality, and nevertheless the operation is simultaneous in time and duration; since it is repugnant for the actual principle of an operation to exist without it. In this argument, therefore, and similar ones, a twofold fallacy and hallucination is found. The first is, that from posteriority of origin, posteriority of duration and "in which" is inferred. For from the fact that the Father is prior in origin to the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is inferred that He, as prior in origin, cannot intuit as existing in themselves, the Son and the Holy Spirit, posterior in origin. The other kind of fallacy consists in this, that the Adversaries are wont to attribute to the things conceived, what is proper to the one conceiving; for from the fact that our intellect, from an imperfect mode of conceiving, conceives the Father as prior understanding Himself, than He understands the Son and the Holy Spirit, they think the eternal Father proceeds in the same manner in His eternal conception, that He first knows Himself, and His essence, than the Son and the Holy Spirit.

From these things is resolved the chief foundation or motive, by which Vasquez is led to assert that the Divine Word does not proceed per se from the knowledge of the Holy Spirit, for he thus argues: Intuitive knowledge is terminated at the object as existing: But in that prior in which the Word proceeds from the Father, the Holy Spirit does not exist, since He is not yet understood as produced, and His production presupposes the generation of the Word. Therefore the Word does not proceed from intuitive knowledge of the Holy Spirit.

But this is easily answered from what has been said, by denying the Minor, for the production of the Word precedes the procession and existence of the Holy Spirit only by priority of origin: Priority of origin, however, since it is not priority "in which," but "from which," does not impede the coexistence of the extremes, nor consequently the

notion of intuitive notice. This is clear in created intellection, for although created intellection, as it has the notion of dictation, precedes the mental word by priority of nature and causality; because, however, it exists simultaneously in the same instant of time, it obtains the notion of intuitive knowledge. Likewise if the visual power were able and efficacious to produce its own object, even if for the prior "from which," the object would not be understood existing before vision; because, however, it would be posited in the same instant in which the vision itself would occur, as its term, that would then be intuitive notice, because it would terminate at the thing as existing.

§ II

The Divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of possible creatures, but not of future or existing ones.

The first part is proved: The Divine Word proceeds per se from comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence and omnipotence, as was established from what has been said in the preceding section. But God's essence and omnipotence cannot be comprehended, unless possible creatures be known in Him as in a cause, as was shown in the Treatise on the knowledge of God: Therefore the Divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of possible creatures.

The second part, which is about future and existing creatures, is persuaded by a threefold reason. The first is: the knowledge from which the Word proceeds ought to be natural and necessary, just as the very production of the Word: But knowledge of future or existing things is not natural nor necessary, but free, for it is that very knowledge of vision, which presupposes God's free decree: Therefore the Divine Word does not proceed per se from such knowledge.

The second is: that does not concur per se to the production of the Divine Word, which, if removed, the Word would remain altogether unvaried, and of the same notion as before: But the knowledge of future contingents, and of existing things, being removed from God, the Divine Word would subsist altogether unvaried, as Anselm teaches in the Monologion, chapter 30, where he thus says: Whether God be thought, no other essence existing, or others existing, it is necessary that His Word coeternal with Him, be with Him: Therefore knowledge of future and existing things does not concur per se to the production of the Word, but behaves merely per accidens and concomitantly with respect to it.

The third reason can be thus proposed: In order that the Word proceed from knowledge of future or existing things, this knowledge would have to belong to the Father prior in

origin, than to the Word: But it cannot belong to the Father prior in origin: Therefore neither does the Word proceed from the knowledge of future or existing things. The Major is clear. The Minor is proved. Since the knowledge of future and existing things is founded on a decree, as was proved in the Treatise on the knowledge of God, one must philosophize about it in the same way as about the decree itself: But the free decrees of the divine will do not belong to the Father prior in origin; for just as actions ad extra are common to the whole Trinity, so also the free decrees are undivided, and common to the three Persons, and accordingly do not belong prior in origin to one than to another: Therefore likewise the knowledge of free things, founded upon and based in the decree, does not belong prior in origin to the Father than to the Word.

From this you will understand that four terminations are to be distinguished in the intellection by which the Word is produced. The first is at the divine essence, as at the formal and primary object. The second, at the attributes and relations, as at the properties, or modes of the formal and primary object. The third, at possible creatures. The fourth, at existing and future things. The first three belong per se, and from the force of the procession, to the Divine Word; the fourth, however, only concomitantly, and as it were per accidens. Whence Saint Thomas speaks of existing or future creatures, question 4 of On Truth, article 5, when he says that the Word is referred to creatures per accidens, and as it were from a consequent; for as is clear from the context, he speaks of creatures to which He is referred by the relation of Lord and Creator, which are certainly existing or future, not merely possible. When, however, Augustine, Book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 14, teaches that the Word is of all these things which are in the knowledge of God, he either speaks of God's necessary knowledge, which is called of simple intelligence, through which He knows merely possible things. Or if he speaks of the free knowledge of vision, which is carried to existing and future things, he only intends that it has this concomitantly with the production of the Word.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: If there were no possible creatures, the Word would still proceed in the same perfect manner as it now is; for it seems absurd to say that if a monkey or an ant were not possible, the Word would not be produced with that fullness of perfection with which it is in fact produced: Therefore the Word does not proceed per se from the knowledge of possible creatures.

It is confirmed: If the Divine Word proceeded per se from the knowledge of possible creatures, it would depend on them as possible, for that depends on another, which without it cannot subsist: But the Divine Word, since it is an uncreated and independent being, cannot depend on possible creatures: Therefore neither does it proceed from knowledge of them.

To the objection I answer by denying the Antecedent, for possibilities being removed, the Word would not proceed as exemplar, art, and productive power of creatures, which perfections, since they are intrinsic to the Word, the Word would not proceed with all the perfections with which it in fact proceeds, if possible creatures were removed. This does not arise from indigence which God has of creatures, but from the supreme perfection and fecundity of God, and from the dependence of creatures on Him; for God would not be God, if He were not omnipotent and infinitely fecund ad extra, nor could this be, if possible creatures were repugnant. Whence,

To the confirmation, I deny the sequel of the Major: for one relative cannot subsist without the other, and yet does not depend on it, otherwise relatives would not be simultaneous in nature and knowledge. For dependence it is required that one cannot subsist without the other, by reason of subordination to it; This, however, does not belong to the Divine Word with respect to possible creatures, for that it cannot subsist without them is not by reason of subordination to them, but rather by reason of the dependence of possible creatures on the omnipotence of God.

You will object, secondly: If the Divine Word proceeded from the knowledge of possible creatures, it could be called the image of creatures, just as it is called their Word: But this seems absurd, and against the Holy Fathers, who assert that the Word is indeed the idea and exemplar of creatures, but not their image: Therefore also that.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, because the Son of God, as Word, imports the notion of manifestation, as image the notion of origin and imitation; whence because the Divine Word represents creatures, He is called their Word; but because He does not originate from creatures, nor imitate them, He is not, nor is called, the image of creatures. The reason, however, why the Word is produced from the knowledge of creatures, and yet does not draw origin from them, is assigned by Saint Thomas, question 4 of On Truth, article 4, ad 7, where he teaches that a Word is said to proceed from an object only when the knowledge from which it proceeds is taken from things; wherefore since divine knowledge, from which the Word proceeds, is not taken from creatures, the Divine Word, although it represents and manifests them, cannot, however, be said to proceed or originate from them. Whence to the objection it can also secondly be answered, by distinguishing the Major: If the Divine Word proceeded from the knowledge of possible creatures, as from an object per se originating, it would be their image, I grant the Major. If it proceeded from the knowledge of possible creatures, as from an object only per se terminating, I deny the Major.

You will object, thirdly, against the second part of the assertion, in which we said the Divine Word does not proceed from the knowledge of existing, or future creatures: The Divine Word in fact represents and expresses creatures, not only as possible, but also as existing, and future: But such expression and representation belongs to it from the force of the procession: Therefore the Divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of existing and future creatures. The Major is certain, the Minor is proved. Whatever the Word has, He received from the Father through eternal generation, according to that saying of Christ, John 7: "All mine are thine." And this: "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me": But whatever the Word received from the Father through eternal generation, He has from the force of His procession: Therefore the expression and representation of existing and future creatures belongs to Him from the force of His procession.

I answer, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, and to its proof I say that although the Word has whatever He has through His procession, He does not, however, have all things from the force of His procession, but some things belong to Him through His procession only identically and concomitantly. Just as above in chapter 3 we said that although the Holy Spirit through His procession has the divine nature communicated by the Father and the Son, He does not, however, receive it from the force of His procession, but only identically and concomitantly.

§ III

The true and proper notion of image belongs to the Son, but not to the Holy Spirit.

The first part is established from various passages of Scripture, in which the Son is called the image of God and the figure or character of His substance. He is also called the seal of the Father, because just as in a seal the figure of the one sealing is wont to be impressed, so in the Son is impressed the image of the Father, sealing Himself in the Son. And as by a seal the secrets of the one sealing are stored, so by the Word are stored the secrets of the Father. He is also called the face, Psalm 96: "Show us thy face and we shall be saved," because just as a man is known from his face, so is the Father known from the Son, according to that saying of Christ to Philip: "Philip, he that seeth me, seeth also my Father." He is also called the brightness of eternal light, and the splendor of glory, because just as the property of light and splendor is to manifest things, so it is the property of the Divine Word to be manifestative of the Father, and of all those things which are in the Father. Finally He is called a spotless mirror, because just as it is proper to a mirror to express all the motions and gestures of the one looking into it; so the Son of God, who is the living mirror of the Father, exhibits and represents all His perfections and operations, according to that saying, John 5: "The Son cannot do anything of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing: for what things soever he doth, these the Son also doth in like manner." Whence Basil, Homily 16: "Since He is the image of the Father, He shows in Himself the whole of His begetter."

Reason too supports this, for image, which is defined as the similitude of one deduced from another, requires only two things, namely similitude and procession; for similitude alone does not suffice for the notion of image, for two eggs are similar, yet one is not the image of the other, because neither is expressed from the other: But both these conditions belong most perfectly to the Son, for He proceeds from the Father, and by force of His procession is similar to Him in nature, as we showed in chapter 3, § 3: Therefore He is the true and perfect image of the Father, and the more perfect, the more perfect similitude He has with Him, namely identity in nature.

It is confirmed: created images either are not true, because they do not faithfully represent the prototype; or are inanimate and mute, because they lack life and the faculty of speaking; or finally are empty and vain, because they lack power and operation: But this image (says Ambrose, Book 1 On the Faith, chapter 4) is not false, because it is truth; is not mute, because it is the Word; is not dead, because it is life; is not empty, because it is power: Therefore the true and proper notion of image belongs to it.

The second part of our assertion seems to be against some of the Greek Fathers, who think that the notion of image belongs not only to the Son, but also to the Holy Spirit, for Basil says, Book 5 Against Eunomius, chapter 6: The image of God is Christ, the image of the Son is the Spirit. And Cyril, Book 13 of the Treasury, chapter 1: The Holy Spirit is true God, since He is the most perfect image of the Son of God. Damascene likewise, Book 1 On the Faith, chapter 18: The image of the Father is the Son, and the image of the Son is the Holy Spirit. There is, however, a common opinion among the Latins, which Saint Thomas here, question 34, article 2, teaches and proves by this discourse: Just as the Holy Spirit, although by His procession He receives the nature of the Father, just as the Son does, is nevertheless not called born; so although He receives a species similar to the Father, He is not called image; because the Son proceeds as Word, of whose notion is similitude of species to that from which He proceeds, but this is not of the notion of love, although this belongs to the love which is the Holy Spirit, insofar as it is divine. Which reason we extensively examined above in chapter 3, in proving that the production of the Word is a generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit.

You will say, the Holy Spirit is infinitely more similar to the Father and the Son, than creatures: Therefore the notion of image belongs to Him much more, than to creatures.

But I deny the consequence, for although creatures have an imperfect similitude with God, they have it, however, from the force of their production; because they are, as it were, certain artifacts, which are required to be made to the similitude of the idea, which God had in mind from eternity: But the Holy Spirit does not have similitude in nature formally from the force of procession, but only identically and concomitantly. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 28, question 2, article 2, ad 3: In an artifact is found the species of the art, even among us, but not in the love of the craftsman; and therefore creatures, insofar as they have the species of eternal art, which is the Son of God, are called image, and to the image, but not the Holy Spirit, who is love. Whence when the aforesaid Greek Fathers call the Holy Spirit the image of the Son, they take the name "image" broadly, for that which proceeds with perfect similitude in nature, although not formally from the force of its procession.

From what has been said is gathered, first, that the Word is the image of the Father alone; for although, as it proceeds from an object known per se, it proceeds not only from the Father, but also from Himself, from the Holy Spirit, and from possibilities; as from the principle originating, however, it proceeds from the Father alone: whence since it belongs to the notion of image not only similitude, but also procession, or expression, the Son is the image of the Father alone. Wherefore it is more than false what the Author of the Theology of Mind and Heart writes in the Treatise on the Trinity, page 300,

namely that because the principle by which of the Word is the Father, but the principle by which of the essence, the Word is said to be the image of the essence. For since between image and prototype there ought to be real relation and distinction, no less than between the Father and the Son; just as the Word cannot be called the son of the essence, but only of the Father, for lack of real relation and distinction between the Word and the essence (although it, as modified by the relation of paternity, is the principle by which of the generation of the Word), so for the same reason, the Word cannot be called the image of the essence, but only of the Father, although the essence is the principle by which of the production or expression of the Word, and has the notion of a species fecundating the intellect of the Father for its production.

It is gathered, secondly, that beauty or species is rightly appropriated to the Son by Hilary, Book 2 On the Trinity: Eternity is in the Father, species in the image, use in the gift. Both because beauty especially shines in the face, and the Son, as we said above, is called in Scripture the face of God; also because, as Saint Thomas discourses below, question 39, article 8, three things are required for beauty: integrity, namely, or perfection; for those things which are maimed and diminished are ugly: due proportion or consonance, as is clear in corporeal things; for that one is not called beautiful, who does not have members duly proportioned and fitted together: finally splendor or clarity; whence those things which have a shining color are said to be beautiful. These, however, belong most perfectly to the second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, for since He is the natural Son of God, He has in Himself the whole nature of the Father, since He is His image, He has with Him perfect proportion, agreement, and similitude; finally since He is the Word, He is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says.

It is gathered, thirdly, from all that has been said in this whole chapter on the Person of the Son, that He is adequately constituted through these three respects of Filiation, Word, and Image, and that all are required per se for the notion of the Son and of the uncreated begotten; because since the uncreated Begotten proceeds through the intellect, He receives the divine nature, from the force of His procession, which is required for the notion of Son; He intrinsically terminates the Father's intellection, which is proper to the Word; for the Word is the term produced or expressed through intellection; and He perfectly manifests His prototype, which is required for the notion of image. These three respects, however, are identified in the second Person of the Trinity, without virtual distinction, and differ only through the order to diverse connoted things: for as Son, He more expresses similitude or identity in nature; as Word, He more explicates the notion of manifestation of those things which are proper to the Father; as image, He more declares the notion of origin and imitation, or representation of His exemplar. Whence

Saint Thomas here, question 34, article 2, ad 3: To express the various perfections of the Son of God, various names are attributed to Him; for that He may be shown connatural with the Father, He is called Son; that He may be shown coeternal, He is called splendor; that He may be shown altogether similar, He is called image; that He may be shown immaterially begotten, He is called Word. See in the Shield of Thomistic Theology the chief encomiums of the Divine Word, taken from the first chapter of the Gospel of Saint John, which we extensively examined at the end of the ninth disputation.

Chapter VIII

On the Person of the Holy Spirit.

Just as no one knows the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him, so the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God; whence for investigating and explaining the mysteries of this Divine Person, we need the special aid of the Holy Spirit, as Hilary, Book 2 On the Trinity, warns: it is fitting neither to be silent, nor to speak much.

§ I

To the third Person of the Most Holy Trinity, three names especially belong: Holy Spirit, of love, and of gift.

Three reasons are usually assigned why the name of Spirit is attributed to the third Person of the most holy Trinity. The first and chief is, because it is proper to the third person to be passively spirated, no less than it is of the Son to be passively generated. The second, which Saint Thomas delivers, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 18, is that the name of Spirit, in corporeal things, signifies a certain impulsion and motion, for Scripture often calls breath and wind Spirit: But it is proper to love that it move and impel the will of the lover toward the thing loved: Therefore the person who in the divine realm proceeds by way of love is fittingly called Spirit. The third reason is that the third Person of the Most Holy Trinity, by His gifts, renders men spiritual, and draws them into a certain participation of divine spirituality; for as the Master of the Sentences observes, Book 1, dist. 18, we have received a twofold Spirit from God, one by which we might be, and another by which we might be holy and spiritual: for by created spirit, which is the rational soul, we are; and by uncreated spirit, which is the Holy Spirit, we are spiritual and holy.

He is also fittingly called Holy, because as Saint Thomas notes in the Compendium of Theology, chapter 74, "holy" is taken in three ways: first, for that which is pure and clean:

second, for that which is deputed and consecrated to divine worship: third, holy is the same as firm or confirmed in good; and in these three ways sanctity is attributed, or appropriated, to the Holy Spirit; for He cleanses the rational soul from the stain of earthly affections, consecrates and applies it to God, and solidifies and confirms it in good, which is the threefold ray or character of sanctity. Whence the whole sanctity of the Church is attributed to Him as author and cause, and is said to be derived from Him, as Chrysostom elegantly weighs, Homily 2 On the Holy Spirit, in these words: By this the Prophets are illuminated, Kings are anointed, Priests are ordained, Doctors are illumined, Churches are sanctified, altars are consecrated, unguent is consecrated, waters are purified, Demons are driven away, sicknesses are cured, sinners are reconciled.

The second name of the Holy Spirit is love, which belongs to Him by a twofold title; first, from the force of His procession and personal property, for the term of the action of the will is fittingly called love, or weight and impulse toward the thing loved. Secondly, by reason of His operation, insofar namely as He renders us loving, by infusing charity within us. Regarding which, Bernard, Epistle 107, thus exclaims: O twofold, and this most firm argument of love toward us! Christ dies, He merits therefore to be loved: the Spirit affects, and makes us love. He causes the reason why He should be loved, this one causes that He be loved. He commends much love in us, this one gives it. In Him we discern what we should love, from this one we receive whence we should love. Charity's occasion, therefore, is from Him, the affection from this one.

The third name of the Holy Spirit is gift, which also belongs to Him by personal property: for He proceeds as love: But love is the first gift which is conferred on a friend, and to which the others follow: Therefore the Holy Spirit has it from His personal property that He is gift. Nor is it an obstacle that gift says a respect to the person to whom it is given, and no creature is from eternity, to whom the Holy Spirit could be given. For as Saint Thomas says here, question 38, article 1, ad 4: Gift is not so called from the fact that it is actually given, but insofar as it has the aptitude by which it can be given: whence from eternity the Divine Person is called gift, although in time He is given.

§ II

The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and the Son.

After the heresy of Macedonius, who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit, a new error of certain Greeks began to sprout concerning His procession; for although they confessed the Holy Spirit to be God, equally with the Father and the Son, they nevertheless denied that He proceeds from the Son, but from the Father alone. With this ancient error the Greeks and Armenians labor even to these present times, and to abolish it several Councils were assembled, among which, last, by order of Eugenius IV, the Council of Florence was convened, where after many accurate disputations agitated among the Fathers, the Greeks at last agreed with the Latins concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, as is established from the very decree of Eugenius, and from the oration which Bessarion, Patriarch of Constantinople, delivered to the Council, on the union of the Greek Church with the Latin: but returning to their own land, at the persuasion of Mark of Ephesus, they returned to their vomit, and relapsed into the same error.

The Catholic truth, which asserts that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, besides having been defined in various Councils, is openly gathered from various testimonies of Scripture, especially from those in which the Holy Spirit is said to be sent by the Son, John 15: "But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you," for one person to be sent by another is, in the divine realm, for one person to proceed from another, with a new mode of existing in another, which He did not have before; whence Augustine, Book 4 On the Trinity, chapter 20: He is sent by Him, from whom He emanates. Wherefore the Father is never said to be sent, even if in time He is known, because as the same Holy Doctor says, Book Against the Arian Sermon, chapter 4: He alone does not have an author from whom He was begotten, or from whom He proceeds. Nor does it matter that sometimes the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, from whom, however, He does not proceed; for as Saint Thomas says, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 24: The Son is sent by the Holy Spirit according to the assumed nature: but the Holy Spirit did not assume a created nature, such that according to it He could be said to be sent by the Son; whence if He is sent by the Son according to the divine nature, He is sent by Him, and consequently proceeds from Him.

Another celebrated testimony is John 16, where Christ, speaking of the Holy Spirit, thus says: "He shall glorify me: because he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it to you. All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine. Therefore I said, that he shall receive of mine." From which words a twofold argument is drawn. The first is: It cannot be, in the divine realm, that one Person receive something from another, except through passive origin; just as, on the contrary, it cannot be that one Divine Person give something to

another except through active origin, since there is no other mode of giving and receiving in the divine realm, than through the active origin of the giver, and the passive origin of the receiver: Therefore the Holy Spirit, who receives from the Son what He is to announce to the Apostles, proceeds from Him. Nor is it an obstacle that He says "shall receive" in the future, because as Augustine rightly says, Tract 99 on John: In the eternal Word of any time, there is no falsehood placed. The second argument is: All things which the Father has, are the Son's, except that in which they are relatively opposed, as the words cited testify: But active spiration belongs to the Father: Therefore it must equally belong to the Son, and consequently the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. This reason the Council of Florence insinuates, in the letters of the holy union, in which it is thus said: Because all things which are the Father's, the Father Himself gave to His only-begotten Son by begetting Him, except to be Father, this very thing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Son Himself has eternally from the Father.

The third testimony is had, John 20, where Christ breathed on the Disciples, saying to them: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost": For as Augustine says, Book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 26: By this it was signified, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, in the manner in which that breath proceeded from His body. Then Bernard, Sermon 80 on the Canticle: He breathed and said, receive the Holy Spirit: it was indeed a kiss, not indeed that corporeal breath, but the invisible Holy Spirit, who was therefore given in that Lord's breathing, that by this it might be understood, that He too proceeds equally from Him, as from the Father, as truly a kiss, which is common to the one kissing and the one kissed.

Finally, there are other testimonies, in which the Holy Spirit is said to be the Spirit of the Son of God, no less than of the Father, to the Romans 8, and to the Galatians 4: But the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father for no other reason, except because He proceeds from the Father: Therefore He will also be the Spirit of the Son for no other reason, except because He proceeds from the Son.

Nor are there lacking testimonies of the Holy Fathers, even the Greek ones: Especially to be noted is that of Nazianzen, Oration 5 On Theology, where he compares the Divine Trinity to the first three persons of the human race: namely the Father to Adam, because the Father is derived from no person, just as Adam from no man; the Son, however, to Eve, because Eve proceeded from Adam's substance, as the Son from the Father alone; the Holy Spirit to Seth, because he originated from Adam and Eve, as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Also to be noted is that of Athanasius, Sermon 4, where he compares the Father to the Sun, the Son to light or splendor, and the Holy Spirit to warmth or heat; and teaches that just as from the Sun proceeds light, and from

the Sun and light heat; so also from the Father the Word is generated, and from the Father and the Son the Holy Spirit is produced.

Nor should it be omitted that the Greek Fathers sometimes ask why the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Son, as is established from Basil, Book 5 Against Eunomius, chapter 12, whose title is: Why is the Spirit also not called the son of the Son? This question, however, lest it be puerile and nugatory, necessarily supposes that the Holy Spirit is produced by the Son; otherwise, as Bessarion notes in the oration cited above, chapter 6, it would have absolutely no difficulty, and would be similar to one who should ask, why the Holy Spirit is not the Father of the Father, and the begetter of the Son, which question no one has ever raised, because it would suppose that the Holy Spirit produces the Father and the Son.

There are also Theological reasons in confirmation of the same truth: Saint Thomas adduces three, here question 36, article 2. The first and chief is, that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him, since every real distinction in the Divine Persons arises from relative opposition, and relative opposition is founded in the procession of one Person from another. On which more in the following section. The second is, that what proceeds by way of love, ought necessarily to proceed from the Word; because nothing can be loved, except what is conceived by the Word: But the Holy Spirit proceeds as love: Therefore He proceeds from the Word. Whence Saint Thomas below, question 43, article 5, ad 2: The Son is the Word, not of just any kind, but the Word spirating love. Nor does it matter if you say that love does not proceed in us from the Word effectively, but only objectively, insofar as it represents the amiability of the object, by which the will is enticed to loving. For besides that the opinion asserting that the intellect effectively moves the will, is not improbable, as we shall say in its place: The force of Saint Thomas's reasoning always stands, for once it is had, from the notion of love in common analogically taken, that it proceeds from the Word, from the diverse condition of the created and uncreated Word, it must then be inferred, that the created concurs to love finally, but the uncreated actively, even by way of principle, to the extent that the uncreated Word proceeds as a person subsisting in the divine nature, and consequently as having the divine will, by which love is elicitively and actively spirated. The third reason of Saint Thomas can be seen in the Shield of Thomistic Theology.

The Greek Schismatics object: in the Scriptures we find only that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, no mention being made of the Son, just as it was not done in the Symbol of the Council of Nicaea, in which there is not had the particle "Filioque," but only "who proceeds from the Father": Whence that particle was added by the Latins;

and yet under threat of anathema it had been forbidden at the Council of Ephesus that anything be added to that Symbol.

I answer that although Scripture nowhere formally and explicitly says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it nevertheless says this virtually and implicitly, when it asserts Him to be the Spirit of the Son, to be sent by Him, and to receive from Him; for from these places it is manifestly gathered that He proceeds from the Son, as is established from what has been said above. Why, however, Christ was unwilling openly to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Himself, as He said of the Father, Augustine assigns the reason, Tract 99 on John, namely that He might refer all things to the Father, as to the first principle and fount of the whole of Divinity. The same reason Saint Thomas delivers, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 24, where he thus says: It is not surprising, if the Lord said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, no mention being made of Himself; because He is wont to refer all things to the Father, from whom He has whatever He has. As when He says, John 7: "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me, the Father's": and many things of this kind are found in the words of the Lord to commend the authority of the principle in the Father. Nor, however, in the aforesaid authority (namely John 15: "who proceeds from the Father") did He altogether keep silent that He Himself is the principle of the Holy Spirit, when He called Him the Spirit of truth: for He had earlier said Himself to be the truth. As for what is said of the Council of Nicaea, and the addition to the symbol, I answer that in the Council of Nicaea there is only had, "I believe in the Holy Spirit," and afterward, on the occasion of the heresy of Macedonius, it was added by the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople, "Who proceeds from the Father," no mention being made of procession from the Son, because the followers of that heresy did not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but rather asserted Him to be a creature of the Son alone; and at last afterward, on the occasion of a new heresy, and necessity so requiring, as the Council of Florence says, the particle "Filioque," in a certain Roman Council celebrated around the year of the Lord six hundred (as the same Florence indicates, session 7, and Estius observes, Book 1, dist. 11, § 2), was added to the symbol, which was not so much an addition, as a greater expression or explication of a truth implicitly contained in the first Symbol of Constantinople. In the same Florence, session 5, Andrew the Latin Doctor produced a most ancient Greek codex of the 7th general Synod, in which there were a great number of Greek Fathers, in whose action 7 it is read of the Holy Spirit, "Who proceeds from the Father and the Son," whence it is believed that other Greek codices, in which that particle "Filioque" is not had, were corrupted by the Greek schismatics.

§ III

The Holy Spirit would not be distinguished from the Son, if He did not proceed from Him.

This is proved, first, from three Councils: For in the first place the Second Council of Toledo, in the profession of faith, speaking of the Divine Persons, thus says: In the relation of Persons, number is discerned. This alone insinuates number, that they are toward one another. By which words it openly teaches that the Divine Persons are multiplied only by relative opposition, and distinguished among themselves: Therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be relatively opposed to Him, since all relative opposition in the divine realm is founded in the origin and procession of one Person from another: Therefore He would not be distinguished from Him.

Secondly, in the Sixteenth Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith, it is said of the Holy Spirit: Who is foreknown to be the third Person in the holy Trinity, for this, that He is given by the Father and the Son. Therefore if He were not the gift proceeding from the Father and the Son, He would not be a third person distinguished from them.

Thirdly, at the Council of Florence, session 18, it is proved against the Greeks that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because among all Doctors, both Greek and Latin, relation alone multiplies the Persons through divine procession. Therefore from the Council, procession ceasing, the multiplication and distinction of the Persons ceases. And although there is not there a definition but a doctrine of the Council, it cannot fail, however, to be of the greatest weight and moment, since the sacred Synod uses it to define a truth of faith.

To these can be joined the celebrated testimony of Gregory of Nyssa, Book to Ablabius, where he thus says: The Spirit is distinguished from the Son by this, that He is through Him: therefore if He were not from Him, He would not be distinguished from Him.

The fundamental reason is insinuated in the aforesaid passages: for the Divine Persons are not distinguished, except insofar as they are opposed, for in that in which they are not opposed, they agree and are identified; they cannot be opposed, however, except relatively; both because, as Saint Thomas says, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 14: In other opposites, one is always imperfect, but this need not be so in relatives, indeed each can be considered as perfect. Also because in God there is nothing except essence, attributes, and relations: Therefore since the Divine Persons are not opposed in essence, nor in attributes, which are absolute and common, it is necessary that they be opposed in relation, that they be distinguished from one another.

Hence arose that celebrated saying taken from Boethius and Anselm, and approved by the common calculation of the Theologians: In the divine realm all things are one, except where the opposition of relation stands in the way; which, since it is founded only in the origin of one Person from another, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him.

It is confirmed: Filiation and passive spiration, in that hypothesis, would no more be opposed, and consequently no more distinguished among themselves, than paternity and filiation are in fact opposed and distinguished on the one hand, and active spiration on the other: Therefore just as the Spirator is not a Person distinct from the Father and the Son, because He is not relatively opposed to them; so neither would the Holy Spirit be personally distinguished from the Son, if He did not proceed from Him.

The Scotists respond, that the opposition of relation, and relative opposition, are not the same, for relation enjoys (they say) a twofold opposition, one relative, and the other disparate: Whence when the Holy Fathers and Theologians say that in the divine realm all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, this is not to be understood of the opposition of relation only relative; but either of the relative, or of the disparate, which the Holy Spirit would have with the Son, if He did not proceed from Him, and accordingly would be distinguished from Him.

But this solution and doctrine, which is the chief foundation of the Scotists, can easily be refuted. For in the first place the testimonies of the Councils adduced above militate against it, especially those words of the Second Toledo: This alone insinuates number, that they are toward one another: For to be toward one another is not verified except of those things which are relatively opposed.

And these of Florence: divine relation alone, through procession, multiplies the Persons; for procession in the divine realm is the foundation of relative opposition, not of disparate. Whence John the Theologian there asserts that substance communicates with the Persons, but the properties are in no way communicable, which indeed is believed to come about from the force of relation: But that which comes about from the force of relation arises from relative opposition, not from disparate: Therefore from Florence, incommunicability, and consequently the distinction of the Divine Persons, comes from relative opposition alone, not from disparate. Which also openly declare these words of Damascene, Book 1 On the Faith, chapter 11: In the sole properties of paternity, filiation, and procession, according to cause and caused, etc., we understand difference. Nor can it be said that these testimonies only prove that the distinction which is in fact found between the Divine Persons, proceeds from relative opposition; not, however, that from

the hypothesis that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, real distinction between them could not be preserved without relative opposition. For in the divine realm whatever is possible, is in fact; and whatever in fact is not, is altogether impossible: Therefore if in fact there is not given distinction in the Divine Persons, except by reason of relative opposition, founded in origin, it is altogether impossible that the Divine Persons be otherwise distinguished among themselves, than by relative opposition, founded in origin, and consequently every supposition removing this opposition between the Son and the Holy Spirit removes equally the real distinction of each.

Finally, the aforesaid solution and doctrine of the Scotists can be confuted by this argument: The distinction which arises from disparate opposition proceeds from finitude and limitation: But the Divine Persons are infinite and unlimited: Therefore by reason of disparate opposition they cannot be distinguished among themselves. The Major is clear in mercy, justice, love, and wisdom, which are disparate perfections, and yet in an infinite being, in which they lack all imperfection and limitation, are really identified. It is also established in the notions of absolute and relative being, which in created things are most disparate, and belong to altogether diverse orders, and nevertheless in an infinite and unlimited being are not really distinguished: Therefore the distinction which arises from disparate opposition proceeds from limitation and finitude, and accordingly can have no place in God.

You will object, first: The constitutive of a thing is the same as its distinctive from every other: But the formal constitutive of the Son in the being of person is filiation, for active spiration, since it is common also to the Father, cannot constitute the Son in the notion of Person, of which incommunicability is of the notion: Therefore the Son is distinguished by filiation from every other person, and accordingly, that remaining, and active spiration being circumscribed, He would remain distinct from the Holy Spirit.

Some respond that the Major is true in absolute beings, but not in relative ones, for just as the being of a relation is in the order to the correlative, so its distinction is only from the correlative: Whence because filiation does not refer the Son to the Holy Spirit, but to the Father, it does not distinguish Him from the Holy Spirit, but only from the Father, and accordingly He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit only through the relation of spirator.

It is better, however, answered, the Major being granted, by distinguishing the Minor: The formal constitutive of the Son of God is filiation, precisely taken, and as prescinding from the order to the Holy Spirit to be produced, I deny the Minor. As requiring the power of spirating, and radically containing it, I grant the Minor; supposing, however,

that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, filiation would not radically contain the power of spirating, and accordingly would not distinguish the Son from the Holy Spirit.

You will object, secondly: If, per impossibile, the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father, but from the Son alone, He would still be really distinguished from the Father, because active spiration being removed from the Father, paternity would still remain in Him, by which He is constituted in the being of an incommunicable person, and distinct from any other: Therefore likewise, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, but from the Father alone, He would still be really distinguished from the Son.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity: for if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son alone, He would still be mediately relatively opposed to the Father, since He would proceed mediately from Him; because the Father would give the Son the power by which He might spirate the Holy Spirit, and thus would mediately produce the Holy Spirit; which would suffice for distinguishing the Father from the Holy Spirit: But in the case in which the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, neither mediately nor immediately, the Son would not be relatively opposed to Him, and accordingly would not be distinguished from Him.

You will object, thirdly, although the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the procession of one would differ from the origin of the other, for one would be through the intellect and the other through the will, and one would have the notion of generation, but not the other: Therefore the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Son, although He did not proceed from Him. Whence Anselm, Book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, says the Son and the Holy Spirit are several, through this, that the Son by being born, the Holy Spirit by proceeding, has being. And he adds: And if by another they were not several, by this alone they would be diverse.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, for since procession through the will differs from procession through the intellect by reason of the order which it says to it, as Saint Thomas teaches above, question 27, article 3, ad 3, the order of origin being removed, it would not be twofold, but one procession really, with virtual distinction only; just as the will in God differs from the intellect only virtually, and is posterior to it by origin only virtually. Nor is it an obstacle that one would be generation, but not the other, for this only argues virtual specific distinction between them, not real formal distinction. To Anselm it must be said with Saint Thomas, question 10 of On the Power [error: should be 'question 10, De Malo, or similar], article 5, ad 2, that he did not utter the aforesaid words from his own opinion, but only disputatively, supposing the opinion of the

Greeks distinguishing the Holy Spirit from the Son, only by this, that the Son is produced by the Father through the intellect, and true generation, but the Holy Spirit through the will, and not by being born, but by proceeding. That this interpretation is legitimate, is gathered from this, that otherwise Anselm would openly contradict himself, for in that book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, which he composed against the Greeks, he often repeats and inculcates that common axiom: In the divine realm all things are the same, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way.

§ IV

The Holy Spirit, from the force of His characteristic property, requires to proceed from two Persons, which, however, are not two principles of the Holy Spirit, but only one.

The first part is proved against the Scotists: The Holy Spirit, from His personal property, has it that He proceeds from the most perfect love, and accordingly from mutual and reciprocal love of friendship, which is much more perfect than the love of concupiscence, or of simple benevolence: But love cannot be, or be understood as mutual, without a plurality of supposita, for as Saint Gregory says, Homily 17 on the Gospel: Charity cannot be had among fewer than two: Therefore the Holy Spirit, from His personal property, has it that He proceeds from two Persons.

It is confirmed: The Holy Spirit, from His personal property, has it that He is the individual bond of the Father and the Son, and the most sweet kiss of each, as the Holy Fathers everywhere teach, especially Bernard, Sermon 80 on the Canticle, where explaining these words of the Bride, "Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth," he says: Let the Father be rightly understood as kissing, the Son as kissed; it will not therefore be beside the point to understand the Holy Spirit as the kiss, since indeed He is the imperturbable peace of the Father and the Son, the firm bond, the individual love, the undivided unity, and the indissoluble bond of the whole Trinity. But these things cannot be understood without mutual love, and plurality of supposita, as is clear: Therefore the Holy Spirit, from His characteristic and personal property, requires to proceed from two Persons. Whence if, per impossibile, He proceeded from the Father alone, He would not be adequately of the same notion as He is, because He would lack some personal property, which He has from the force of His procession, namely to be the term of mutual love, and the most sweet bond and kiss of two Persons. Nor is it an obstacle if you say that in such a case He would proceed from the love by which the Father and the Holy Spirit would love themselves. For love is only understood as mutual, when it is subjectively or principiatively from two supposita, not, however, when it is principiatively of one, and objectively only of the other, as would happen in

the aforesaid case; for the love by which the Father and the Holy Spirit would love each other, would be the Father's subjectively or principiatively, and objectively or terminatively only the Holy Spirit's.

The second part of the assertion is defined at the Council of Lyon under Gregory X, where it is expressly delivered, that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle. Reason also persuades this: For although the Father and the Son are two supposita, they have, however, a single spirative power, just as a single will: But substantive names, such as "principle" is, are not multiplied, unless the form be multiplied, just as adjectives are not multiplied unless the supposita be multiplied, as the philosophers teach in dialectics: Therefore the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit; just as the three Persons are one principle of the production of creatures, on account of the same power and virtue of creating, which is in them.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: When in one suppositum there is adequate power for producing some term, the plurality of supposita behaves per accidens with respect to the production of it: But in one Person alone, e.g., in the Father, there is adequate spirative power, or productive of the Holy Spirit: Therefore for His production the plurality of supposita is not required per se, but behaves per accidens: Just as the Trinity of Persons does not per se concur to the production of creatures, because in any Person the productive power of them resides.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: if in that suppositum there is adequate power, and also every condition demanded by the term, I grant the Major. If some condition is lacking, I deny the Major, and the Minor being granted, I deny the consequence: For although in the Father there is adequate spirative power, or productive of the Holy Spirit, in Him, however, there is not the condition required on the part of the term, since the Holy Spirit, per se, and from His personal property, requires for His production the plurality of Persons. From which the disparity to the example of the production of creatures is clear, for they do not per se require to proceed from three persons, as the Holy Spirit per se demands to be produced by two, from the fact that He proceeds from mutual love, and as the bond and kiss of the Father and the Son. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 29, art. ultimo, ad 2: The reason of creation and spiration is diverse, because spiration requires distinction in the supposita; whence it is in some way from several supposita, insofar as they are distinct, since it is a personal operation: But creation is a work of the divine essence, whence it is the work of an undistinguished suppositum, insofar as the essence is signified as that which it is, as by this name God.

You will object, secondly: The notion of mutuality adds no perfection to divine love: Therefore from the fact that the Holy Spirit demands to proceed from most perfect love, it is not rightly inferred that He demands per se to proceed from mutual love, by which the Father and the Son love each other. The consequence is clear. The Antecedent is proved from the fact that the notion of mutuality only adds a relation of reason, or real personal relations, which in our opinion add no perfection to the essence.

I answer that although the notion of mutuality adds no perfection, it adds, however, a mode of perfection and its complement to essential love; and this suffices for the Holy Spirit to require per se to proceed from mutual love, because He ought to proceed from essential love, as completed and terminated, and as it were affected with a mode owed to it. Just as it belongs to the notion of beatitude to see not only the divine essence and absolute perfections, but also the relations and persons, by which the essence is modified and terminated, as was shown in the treatise on the vision of God.

You will object, thirdly, against the second part of the assertion: Although in the Father and the Son there is one spirative power, there are, however, two spirating supposita, and per se required for spirating, as we showed in the first part of the assertion: Therefore there are two principles of the Holy Spirit, not one. But I deny the consequence, for as we said above, this name "principle," since it is substantive, for its plurality demands the multiplication of the form.

From what has been said is gathered, first, that when it is said that the Father and the Son are the adequate principle of the Holy Spirit, "principle" does not stand determinately for the Father, nor determinately for the Son, but for the Father and the Son by way of a certain collection. Just as in created things when it is said that father and mother are the cause of the son, if "cause" be taken adequately for the total and adequate principle of generation, it stands neither for the father alone, nor for the mother alone, but for each parent by way of a certain collection. And in this sense must Saint Thomas be understood, when here, article 4, ad 4, he says that "principle" does not have determinate supposition, but confused for two persons: for he does not take confused supposition in the dialectical strictness, as when it is said, the other eye is necessary for seeing; but by confused supposition he understands copulative, or collective.

It is gathered, secondly, that the power of spirating imports of the connoted the relation of spirator; but paternity and filiation are only the conditions required in the spirating principle "as which." For that is connoted by the productive principle "by which," which the principle "which" respects the produced term, so that the principle cannot be understood without order to the term: But the Father and the Son do not respect the

Holy Spirit by paternity and filiation; but by the relation of spirator: Therefore not paternity and filiation, but the relation of spirator is connoted by the spirative principle "by which." It is confirmed: if the spirative power imported of the connoted paternity and filiation, it would not be common to the Father and the Son, because to neither of them would its adequate connoted belong, since neither filiation belongs to the Father, nor paternity to the Son.

You will say: The Holy Spirit proceeds per se from mutual love: But love cannot be mutual, unless paternity and filiation be understood in the spirative principle: Therefore such a principle imports paternity and filiation of the connoted.

I answer by distinguishing the Minor: unless in the spirative principle they be understood: in the spirative principle "which," I grant the Minor: in the spirative principle "by which," I deny the Minor and the consequence. In order, therefore, that love be, and be understood as mutual, it suffices that paternity and filiation be the conditions required in the spirating principle "which," but it is not required that they be the connoted, or complement of the spirative power, or of the spirative principle "by which."

It can also be easily gathered from what has been said above concerning the procession of the Word, from whose love the Holy Spirit proceeds: It must be said that He proceeds from the love of all things which are formally in God, that is, of the essence, the attributes, and the persons; for since the love from which He proceeds is infinite and comprehensive, it must extend to all things which are formally in God. But especially the Holy Spirit is produced through the love by which the Father is pleased in the Son, as in His image, and the Son in the Father, as in His prototype, and principle of His origin. Whence just as the Apostle, to the Galatians 5, says that joy is a fruit of the Holy Spirit; so also it can rightly be said that the Holy Spirit is the fruit of joy, by which the Father from eternity rejoices and delights in the Son, and the Son in the Father, according to that saying of Zeno of Verona: The Father rejoices in another self, whom He begot from Himself.

As for possible creatures, although the Word proceeds from their knowledge, the Holy Spirit does not, however, proceed from their love; because although in the state of mere possibility they are intelligible, since they enjoy objective truth; they are not, however, lovable, since in that state they neither exist, nor say an order to existence, but abstract from it, and accordingly lack all goodness, as is taught in Metaphysics.

As for future and existing things, just as the Word does not proceed per se from their knowledge, so neither does the Holy Spirit from their love; because both the knowledge

and the love of them are free to God, and accordingly cannot concur per se to the natural and necessary production, such as is the production of the Word, and the procession of the Holy Spirit: Whence with respect to each, they behave merely per accidens and concomitantly. And this alone Saint Thomas means when he says here, article 2, ad 3: Just as the Father says Himself and every creature by the Word which He begot, so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit. By these words he only intends to declare that just as the knowledge productive of the Word concomitantly extends itself to existing and future creatures; so love by which the Holy Spirit is produced, terminates concomitantly at them.

Chapter IX

On the properties of the Divine Persons.

We have treated of the Divine Persons both in common, and in particular; whence for the completion of this treatise, it remains for us to discuss some of their properties, among which some are intrinsic to the Divine Persons, such as similitude, equality, and circumincession, or the mutual existence of one in another; others, however, are extrinsic and by order to creatures, such as their mission and inhabitation in the souls of the just.

§ I

Among the Divine Persons there is most perfect equality and similitude.

This is established from the Symbol of Athanasius, in which it is thus had: Such as the Father is, such is the Son, such is the Holy Spirit. And again: The three Persons are coeternal with themselves, and coequal. Reason also persuades this: For those things are called similar and equal, of which there is one quality and quantity, as is clear from Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, chapter 5; but since in the divine realm there is not quality strictly taken, as it belongs to created things; nor quantity of parts and extension, but of perfection and virtue; similitude ought to be taken from form, and equality from perfection and greatness of being: But the Divine Persons communicate in the same form of Divinity, and in the same perfection and greatness of being: Therefore they are most perfectly similar and equal. Whence excellently Bernard, Epistle 189: He rightly esteems the divine magnificence, according to his own possibility, who thinks nothing disparate in it, where the whole is supreme: nothing distant, where the whole is one; nothing gaping, where the whole is integral; nothing imperfect, or needy, where the whole is whole. The Father is whole what the Father is, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: the Son is whole what He Himself is, and the Father, and the Holy Spirit: the Holy Spirit is whole what He Himself is, and the Father and the Son; and the whole one is the whole, neither superabounding in the three, nor diminished in the individuals.

It is confirmed, and the equality of the Divine Persons is explained in particular: If there were some inequality between the Divine Persons, it would be either in perfection of nature, or in power, or in duration; for in nothing else can inequality be conceived which is not reduced to one of these three: But in none of these are the Divine Persons unequal: Therefore they enjoy most perfect equality among themselves. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved as to each part. And in the first place, that they are not unequal in perfection of nature, is clear from the fact that one and the most simple nature is found undivided in them; and although it be in the Father, as had from Himself; and in the Son, as given and communicated by the Father; this, however, does not say greater perfection in the Father, than in the Son; because indeed it is not more perfect to give Divinity, than to receive it, nor to generate, than to be generated, or to spirate, than to be spirated; since those modes of having the divine essence are pure respects to a term, which, as we showed above in chapter 4, § 3, add no perfection to the essence, but enjoy only the infinite perfection of the essence. Whence Augustine, Book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 3, teaches that goodness and perfection in the divine realm are said not relatively, but toward-self, from which he infers that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but that not even both together are anything greater, than the Holy Spirit alone,

nor are any two whatsoever in the same Trinity anything greater than one, nor all three together anything greater than each individually. From which you will understand that this supreme and most perfect equality of the Persons is quite difficult to explicate, in the opinion of those who teach that relative perfections are multiplied in God, and are diverse in the relations and Persons, as we showed in the place cited.

From these things is proved the second part of the Minor, namely that the Divine Persons are equal in power, for since power and virtue accompany the perfection of nature, it is clear that the power of the Son is not less, since He has the same nature with the Father. Whence Ambrose, Book 5 On the Trinity: In what, therefore, is He lesser, who has all things which the Father has? For He also expressed all things from the Father by right of generation.

You will say, in the Son there is not the power of generating, which is in the Father, otherwise He could generate another Son similar to Himself, which is implied: Therefore there is some power in the Father, which is not in the Son, and accordingly they are not equal in power.

I answer with Saint Thomas here, question 42, article 6, ad 3, by denying the Antecedent, for just as the same essence which is in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation; so the same is the power by which the Father generates, and by which the Son is generated. Whence it is manifest that whatever the Father can do, the Son can do; not, however, does it follow, that He can generate, but the subject is changed to something else: for generation signifies relation in the divine realm. The Son, therefore, has the same power which the Father has, but with another relation, because the Father has it as giving, and this is signified, when it is said that He can generate. The Son, however, has it as receiving, and this is signified, when it is said that He can be generated.

You will insist, powers are distinguished by acts: But to generate is an act distinct from to be generated: Therefore generative power is distinct from the terminative power of generation.

I answer, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, for just as generative power is the divine essence, paternity being connoted; and generability the same essence, filiation being connoted; so actual generation is divine intellection, paternity being connoted; and to be generated is passive being understood, filiation being connoted: to understand, however, and to be understood, are not really distinct acts in God, and consequently neither are to generate and to be generated really distinguished, as to what they import in the direct case, but only as to the relations, which are said of the connoted; in which manner also generative power is distinguished from the terminative power of generation.

Which doctrine is Saint Thomas's, question 2 of On Power, article 5, in the body, which he thus concludes: Likewise, therefore, it must be said of action and power, for generation signifies action with some respect, and power of generating signifies power with a respect: whence generation itself is God's action, but as it is of the Father alone, and similarly generative power is God's omnipotence, as it is of the Father alone. Thus Saint Thomas, speaking of active generation, and the power of generating: about to say the same thing, that he might proceed consequently, of passive generation, and the terminative power of generation.

From these things it is established that although generation, actively taken, is in the Father, and not in the Son, no perfection is nevertheless in the Father, which is not in the Son; because active generation is not some operation absolutely taken, but is an operation, as modified by the relation of paternity; whence although under this aspect it is not in the Son, because, however, it is in Him under the concept of actuality and operation, every perfection which is in the Father, is found in the Son.

The third part of the principal Minor, which asserts that the Divine Persons are equal in duration, is established from Athanasius in the Symbol; where they are said to be one eternal: but the unity of eternity does not suffer inequality of duration: Therefore the three Divine Persons are equal in duration. The same is clear from this excellent discourse of Saint Thomas here, question 42, article 2: That a produced term not coexist with its principle, either arises from the imperfection of the principle, because namely it is not immediately from the beginning perfect with every perfection, as is established in a boy, who on account of the weakness of his power cannot generate; or because the agent is free, and according to its liberty, does not immediately produce the effect; or finally because the action through which it is produced is successive: But none of these is found in the procession of the Divine Persons, for the Father, e.g., does not produce the Son from free election, but naturally; His nature also was from eternity perfect; and the action too by which He produces the Son, is not successive: Therefore the Divine Persons are coeternal, and equal in duration. Whence as the same Holy Doctor notes here, question 34, article 2, ad 3: The Son is called the splendor of the Father in Scripture, that He may be shown coeternal with the Father, just as splendor is coeval with light. The same Ambrose teaches, Book 4 On the Faith, in these words: Light generates splendor, nor can it be comprehended, that splendor be posterior to light, or light more ancient than splendor; because where there is light, there is also splendor; nor can splendor be without light, because in the splendor is light, and in the light is splendor. Whence also the Apostle called the Son the splendor of glory, because the splendor of the paternal light is the Son; coeternal, on account of the eternity of power; inseparable, on

account of the unity of clarity.

A similar discourse Chrysologus uses, Sermon 60, to prove the coeternity of the Son with the Father: Fragility (he says) is conceived and conceives, gives birth and is born; is generated and generates; receives beginning and end; undergoes death, and passes it on; and reserves in its offspring whatever of its condition and nature there is. But God the Father did not beget in time, because He is ignorant of time; He did not give a beginning, because He does not know a beginning; He does not transmit an end, because He does not have an end: But He so begot the Son from Himself, that the whole which was in Himself, might be and remain in the Son. He who believes the Father to be, confesses the Son; he who believes the Father and the Son, and does not sense ages, does not think of degrees, does not suspect times, does not seek a conception, let him not know a birth: he who believes in God, has confessed divine things, not human.

You will say, Between the Divine Persons there is given prior and posterior according to origin: Therefore between them there is not perfect equality in duration.

I answer that some deny that priority of origin is found in the divine realm, whom Saint Thomas here article 3 seems to favor, where he grants order without priority between the Divine Persons, following Augustine, Book 3 Against Maximinus, saying that between the Father and the Son there is an order of nature, not by which one is prior to the other, but by which one is from the other. And indeed since Athanasius in the Symbol asserts that in the Trinity there is nothing prior and posterior, it seems safer to eliminate every shadow of priority and posteriority from the Divine Persons. Nevertheless several Theologians do not refuse to admit priority and posteriority of origin between the Divine Persons. Cajetan thinks it a question only of the name to be avoided, and that priority ought not to be conceded between the Divine Persons absolutely real, but at most with an addition, namely real priority of origin. But whatever of these be asserted, the coeternity of the Divine Persons, and their perfect equality in duration, always persists; for this is not hindered by real priority of origin, but only by priority of duration, and priority "from which" of real causality, both of which faith removes from the divine realm.

§ II

The circumincession of the Divine Persons is explained.

The circumincession of the Divine Persons, which is called by the Greeks perichoresis, is nothing other than the mutual residence and inhabitation of one Person in another, which is declared in Scripture, John 10, in these words: "The Father is in me, and I in the Father." And again chapter 14: "Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?" And by the Holy Fathers affirming the whole Father to be in the Son, and the whole Son in the Father, as Ambrose testifies in the hymn for the lauds of Monday, in which it is thus said: In the Father the whole Son, and the whole Father in the Word. Saint Thomas also explains it here, question 42, article 5, where he teaches that any Divine Person is in another in three ways: first, indeed by reason of the essence, which is common to all Persons. Secondly, by reason of origin, which, since it is an immanent action, requires that what proceeds, remain in the principle from which it proceeds, and not be separated from it. Whence the Son is said to reside in the bosom of the Father. Therefore Zeno of Verona calls Him the noble inmate of the Father's heart. For (says Chrysologus) He proceeded from the Father, from the Father He has by no means departed. And Tertullian, Book Against Praxeas: God brought forth the Word, in the manner in which the root brings forth the shoot, and the fount the river, and the sun the ray: nor should you doubt to call the Son the shoot of the root, and the river of the fount, and the ray of the sun: nor is the shoot, however, discerned from the root, nor the river from the fount, nor the ray from the sun; for as John says, the Word was with God. Thirdly, one Person is said to be in another, by reason of the relation, by which it is referred to its correlative. But this reason seems difficult to many: for how (they say) can one person be in another, according to that reason by which it is distinguished from it, and opposed to it? But by relations Persons are distinguished and opposed to one another. But to this it is easily answered, that the Holy Doctor does not intend from this to prove, that one Person is in another according to being, but according to intellect, for thus he says in the place cited: According to the relations it is manifest, that one of the relatively opposed is in the other according to intellect. And Book 1, dist. 19, question 3, article 2, ad 2, he says that one person is said to be in another either as to being, or as to the intellect of the relations, because one is understood in the other. I add that, although ordinary relations require only simultaneity of knowledge, not, however, real inexistence; yet those which are of the one knowing and the one known, of the one loving and the one loved, per se require mutual and real union and cohabitation, and effect it, when knowledge and love are in the supreme degree of perfection, as happens in the present case. Whence Cornelius Musso, in the Book On Sacred History: Love indeed

effects ecstasy, because it is the impulse of the lover, yet it brings no separation, because it is an individual bond, a most sweet chain, by which lovers are mutually bound together, so that they are no longer two, but one; in us by unity of affection; in God even by unity of substance, on account of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature.

§ III

On the mission of the Divine Persons.

Mission in common signifies procession or egression from someone, with a destination to some effect, or to some place, anew; for that which someone was already doing before, or where he already was, he is not said to be sent. Whence to mission four things concur, namely the person sending, the person sent, the term to which he is newly sent, and the egression or procession of the one who is sent, to his function. Mission, however, can occur in three ways, as Saint Thomas observes here, question 43, article 1, namely by command, as a lord sends a servant into a farm; by counsel, as a physician is said to send a King to the baths; and by origin, as a flower is emitted from a tree, a ray from the sun, a river from a spring. And only in this third way can the mission of the Divine Persons occur, since the other two ways import imperfection. Whence it can thus be defined, or described: Mission is procession of origin from the one sending, with a new mode of existing in another. From which,

It is gathered, first, that mission in the direct case imports procession, and connotes in the oblique case an effect newly produced in the creature; and accordingly it primarily imports something notional, secondarily, however, something essential and common, since the power of acting and operating ad extra is common to the three persons: otherwise if mission supposed only the very production of the effect, there would be no reason, why the Father is not said to be sent, since He produces the temporal effect, which the mission of the other Persons connotes, namely grace and charity, according to that saying, 1 John 3: "Behold what manner of charity the Father hath given us."

It is gathered, secondly, that one person cannot send himself, although he can give himself; because just as no person proceeds from himself, so neither is he sent by himself.

It is gathered, thirdly, that the eternal Father is sent by none, even though He give Himself, or come with the other Persons, to inhabit in the soul sanctified by grace: because He proceeds from none, since He is innascible, and the fontal principle of the whole of Divinity. Whence Augustine, Sermon Against the Arians, chapter 4: The Father alone is read to be not sent, because He alone does not have an author from whom He was begotten, or from whom He proceeds. I add that, just as every mobile

thing must be reduced to some first immobile mover, lest there be a process to infinity; so also every sent thing, to some sending thing not sendable, as Saint Thomas rightly observes, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 15, question unique, article 2.

It is gathered, fourthly, that the Son is sent by the Father alone, because from Him alone He goes out through eternal generation: The Holy Spirit, however, is sent by the Father and the Son, because from both He proceeds. Nor is it an obstacle that sometimes in Scripture the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit: for this can either be referred to Christ's human nature, or explained of the mission of the Word inadequately taken, by reason namely of the effect connoted by it; for that proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Holy Spirit; whence by reason of it, the Son can be said to be in some way sent by the Holy Spirit.

It is gathered, fifthly, that the mission of the Divine Persons is rightly divided into visible and invisible. Visible is that which occurs in some sensibly appearing effect, and representing the Person sent, as when the Holy Spirit appeared in the species of a fiery tongue over the Apostles on the day of Pentecost. Invisible, however, is said to be that which occurs in some spiritual and invisible effect.

But if you ask what that effect ought to be? I answer that it is none other than grace and charity: For the invisible mission of the Divine Persons occurs only through this, that God exists in the rational creature in a new and special way, and inhabits in it as in His own temple, and makes a dwelling: But by grace and charity alone does God exist in the rational creature in a special and new way; and in it as in His own temple does He inhabit, according to that saying of Christ, John 14: "If any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him": Therefore the invisible mission of the Divine Persons occurs only by reason of grace and charity.

It is confirmed, first: Through the invisible mission of the Divine Persons, God is in man, and man is in God, whence through it there is formed in us a certain image of this admirable circumincession, by which one Person resides in another, on account of which, Canticle 4, those divine emissions are called Paradise: But God is not in man, nor man in God, except through charity, as is clear from that saying, John 4: "God is charity, and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." Which words Bernard, expanding, most beautifully says: God is charity, what more precious? And he that abideth in charity, abideth in God, what more secure? And God in him, what more delightful? Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed, secondly, by a reason of Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 14, question 2, article 2: The missions of the Divine Persons are ordered chiefly to this, that they lead back the rational creature into God, as into its ultimate end, from which through sin it is averted and recedes: But the return of the rational creature into God as into its ultimate end, does not occur except through grace and charity, which joins man to God as his ultimate end: Therefore the invisible mission of the Divine Persons occurs only by reason of grace and charity.

From these things you will understand, first, that the invisible mission of the Divine Persons does not occur through unformed faith, or hope, nor through gratuitous graces, because those gifts can coexist with mortal sin; but mortal sin does not permit God to specially inhabit in the rational creature, as in His temple, since it is rather an aversion and separation from God. The same reason proves that the invisible mission of the Divine Persons does not occur through aids remotely disposing to justification, for through them God does not yet inhabit the soul; but only moves it, and knocks at the door of the heart; whence Trent, speaking of that imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, says it is an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed inhabiting, but only moving. However, the infusion of such aids can be called mission initiatively, insofar as from these aids, and pious motions, our justification begins, and the inhabitation of God among us.

You will understand, secondly, that although to the Supreme Pontiff, or a general Council, defining matters of faith, a certain special assistance and presence of the Holy Spirit is given, lest they err in such definitions, there is not, however, therefore an invisible mission of the Divine Persons to them; because through that special assistance, the Holy Spirit does not inhabit the soul as His temple, but only moves, instructs, and directs the intellect, lest it err in the knowledge of truth: whence such presence does not require a special mission, but pertains to the general presence of God, by which God is in things through operation.

You will understand also from what has been said, that through the mission of the Divine Persons, not only are the created gifts of grace and charity given, but also the Divine Persons themselves are given to us, as is gathered from that saying, to the Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Spirit who is given to us": for the Apostle distinguishes between charity poured forth, and the Holy Spirit given; and accordingly thinks that in justification, not only is grace and charity infused into us, but also the Holy Spirit Himself is given to us. Whence excellently Augustine, Sermon 185 On the Time: The Holy Spirit was present to the faithful on this day, not only through the grace of visitation and operation, but through the very presence of

majesty; and into the vessels, not now the odor of balsam, but the very substance of the sacred unguent flowed down. This is also indicated by those words, John 14: "We will come to him," that is, we will personally approach. Which Bernard, expanding, Sermon 2 On Dedication, thus says: Whence this to me, that the majesty of God should come to me? How great is God's benignity? How great the condescension? How great the glory of souls? that the Lord of the universe, who has no indigence, orders a temple to be made for Himself in them.

But you will ask, whether that mode of presence which the Divine Persons have in the soul of the just, through grace and charity, is special, and diverse from the general mode, by which God exists in each thing through operation, and which the Theologians call the presence of immensity; such that, if per impossibile the Divine Persons were not within that soul by essence, presence, and power, they would nevertheless exist in it by their substance, just as, if per impossibile the Divine Word were not, by reason of its immensity, really present to the humanity of Christ, by this very fact, however, that it was united to it hypostatically, it would become intimately and substantially present to it.

I answer affirmatively, for since it belongs to the notion of love that it tend toward union of the lovers, and to the notion of more perfect love, toward more perfect union, the love of friendship, most perfect, such as that by which God loves the just, demands union not only according to affection, or through conformity of affections, but also real and substantial; whence God, from the force of the grace and charity which He causes in the soul, is united to it not only objectively, and according to affection, but also really and substantially; so that if per impossibile He were not present to it by reason of His immensity, He would still be in it in a most special and most real way; just as He is specially and really in the blessed through glory, and in the humanity of Christ, through hypostatic union. These things suffice concerning the ineffable Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, of which Augustine says, that nowhere is one more perilously in error, nor more laboriously seeks something, nor more fruitfully finds something.

Treatise VII

On the Angels.

After Saint Thomas has contemplated God as one and triune in Himself, he considers Him as the first principle of creatures; and because among these the Angelic nature holds the foremost place, as being more similar to God, and the most lucid mirror of the divine perfection, he treats of the Angels before the other creatures which are purely corporeal, and before man, who is the bond and link of spiritual and corporeal creation. Observing the same order, after the treatises on God, one and triune, we give this one on the Angels, in which we shall treat of the existence, essence, place, motion, cognition, volition, grace, the state of the way, sin, and punishment, speech, and illumination, and the orders and hierarchies of the Angels.

Chapter I

On the existence and creation of the Angels.

That there are Angels, or certain intellectual and incorporeal substances, was formerly denied by the Sadducees, who said that there is no resurrection, neither Angel, nor spirit, as Saint Luke relates, Acts 23. Against this error all Scripture, both of the Old and New Testament, militates: for as Saint Gregory says, Homily 34 on the Gospel, almost every page of sacred discourse testifies to Angels and Archangels. Nor is the response of the Sadducees valid, who say that the Angels of whom Scripture makes mention, are only certain movements of the mind, and thoughts, which God instills in men: for example, that the Angel of whom it is said, Genesis 22, that he prevented Abraham from killing Isaac, was a thought which God excited in Abraham's mind, by which he might know that God did not will Isaac to be actually sacrificed. For this interpretation was a manifest corruption of Scripture, since it says that Angels descend from heaven, appear on earth, wrestle with Jacob, speak, work miracles, preside over men, led the sons of Israel in a pillar of cloud, and similar things, which can belong only to living persons and substances, not to thoughts.

The existence of Angels is also persuaded by the various and marvelous effects and movements which we see in the possessed and the energumens, which surpass the powers of the whole of corporeal nature. Whence it is ridiculous what some say, namely that these proceed from melancholy, or black bile, or a vitiated complexion of body: for how would melancholy make them conscious of others' secrets, and skilled without effort in foreign languages? Nor are those less delirious, who ascribe such effects to the

influences of the stars, especially of the moon. For who would imagine the efficacy of the moon there, where the secret recesses of hearts are opened, where foreign languages and various kinds of tongues are heard; all of which surpass the power of the stars, indeed savor of something divine. Whence excellently Tertullian, in the Apology, chapter 22: The demons, taking certain chances of times, imitate divinity while they steal divination.

The reason, however, by which the existence of Angels can be proved as it were a priori, is delivered by Saint Thomas here, question 50, article 1, and can be briefly proposed thus: Natural reason dictates that God founded a perfect universe: But the perfection of the universe requires that in it there be certain substances purely intellectual, which we call Angels: Therefore natural reason shows that Angels are given. The Major is clear, for God's works are perfect, as is said, Deuteronomy 32. The Minor, however, is thus proved. The perfection of an effect consists in assimilation to the cause: in that notion and perfection, according to which the cause is, if that be possible: But God, since He is of a purely intellectual nature, acts only through intellect and will: Therefore for the perfection of the universe it is required that in some part of it, it be assimilated to God according to this notion, and consequently that in it there be some substances purely intellectual, or endowed with intellect and will, which are called Angels.

Nor is it valid if you say that this reason proves that all creatures in particular, which were founded perfect by God, ought to be intellectual, that they might be perfectly assimilated to God. For since God does not intend the perfection of any creature in particular, absolutely, but only in order to the good or perfection of the universe; just as the perfection of the universe does not require in every creature, but only in some, perfect assimilation with God the creator; so not just any creature, but only some, ought to be intellectual. Especially since otherwise there would be no distinction of degrees in things, and accordingly the perfection of the universe, which arises from the manifold distinction of degrees, would be removed. Whence the reason of Saint Thomas can be confirmed and illustrated by this discourse: Although the perfection of the universe does not require all possible creatures, it demands, however, that it contain all the degrees of being; otherwise it could not be called a universe simply, which from its own notion, as the very name indicates, requires a certain universality of creatures producible by God, at least according to common degrees: But if in it there were not given substances purely intellectual, the most perfect of all degrees, namely the intellective, would be lacking to the universe: Therefore the perfection of the universe demands that in it purely intellectual substances exist.

Nor does it matter if you say that the intellective degree is found in man according to the soul which is intellectual; and accordingly, although there were no Angels, the

intellective degree would not be lacking to the universe. For the intellective degree is very imperfectly participated by the rational soul, because although it is spiritual as to substance, it is nevertheless corporeal as to mode, being the form of the body, and dependent in intellectual operation on the senses and phantasms: But it does not befit the perfection and beauty of the universe, that the other inferior degrees be perfect and complete, while the supreme and noblest of all be left imperfect and incomplete.

As for the creation of the Angels, several of the Greek Fathers formerly taught that they were founded before the corporeal world. But this opinion cannot be sustained without rashness, after the definition of the Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where it is asserted that God simultaneously from the beginning of time founded each creature from nothing, spiritual and corporeal, Angelic and mundane. Reason also favors this; for as Saint Thomas discourses below, question 61, article 3, the Angels are parts of the universe, and together with corporeal creation compose a certain integral whole, which appears from the order of one creature to another: But no part is perfect, separated from its whole: Therefore it is not probable that God, whose works are perfect, produced the Angelic creature separately before all other creatures.

You will say, if the Angels were created in the corporeal world, Moses would have made some mention of the creation of the others, describing exactly the creation of all things at the beginning of Genesis. I answer that Moses did not mention the creation of the Angels, because the reason of his purpose did not demand this: for as Saint Jerome says, Epistle 139, Moses only wished to describe the order of the creation of corporeal things; because only in the creation of corporeal things was there that succession and variety of days, which Moses chiefly intended to explain in Genesis. It can be added, with Saint Thomas below, question 61, article 1, ad 1, that Moses was speaking to a rude people, who could not yet grasp incorporeal nature, and if it had been expressed to them that there were some things above every corporeal nature, this would have been to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were prone, and from which Moses chiefly intended to recall them.

Concerning the place in which the Angels were created, there is dissent and controversy among the Authors: for Rupert, Book 1 on Genesis, chapter 11, teaches that the Angels were created in the first regions of the air, for he thinks them to be corporeal, and formed from this dense air. Others think that they were created in the starry heaven, or in that which is next placed under the empyrean. So Suárez, Lorinus, and others among the more recent authors. But the truer and more probable opinion is that of Saint Thomas below, question 61, article 4, asserting that the Angels were created in the empyrean heaven. For it is more probable that they were founded on the very first day of the

creation of the world, since the Lateran Council says that God from the beginning of time simultaneously founded each creature, spiritual and corporeal, Angelic and mundane: But on the first day of creation, the starry heaven was not created, but only the empyrean; for it is said, Genesis 1, that on the second day the firmament was made, and on the fourth the luminaries and stars were placed in it; by the firmament, however, is understood the starry heaven, as Bede and Strabo teach, cited by Saint Thomas below, question 68, article 1, ad 1: Therefore the Angels were created not in the starry heaven, but in the empyrean.

Reason too, from the place cited from Saint Thomas, persuades this; for since the Angels are the noblest part of the universe, and were created to preside over the whole of corporeal nature, it was fitting that they be created in the noblest and supreme place of all, from which they could preside over the whole of corporeal nature, which can be no other than the empyrean heaven. Whence Strabo, on these words of Genesis: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," says: Here he calls not the visible firmament heaven, but the empyrean, that is fiery, or intellectual, which is so called not from burning, but from splendor, which was immediately made full of Angels.

You will say with Suárez: Man was not created in the earthly paradise, but outside it, and afterward transferred into it: Therefore likewise the Angels ought not to have been created in the proper place of their beatitude, namely in the empyrean, but outside it, that afterward, according to their merits, they might be transferred into it. Whence Lucifer, Isaiah 14, said, "I will ascend into heaven." It also belongs to the dignity of the empyrean that it always be most pure from every stain of sin. If, however, the Angels were created in it, then they also sinned in it.

But to this it can easily be answered: to the first indeed I deny the parity, for as Saint Thomas says below, question 102, article 4, Paradise was a place fitting for human habitation, as to the incorruption of the first state: but that incorruption was not man's according to nature, but from a supernatural gift of God. In order, therefore, that this be imputed to God's grace, and not to human nature, God made man outside paradise, afterward placed him in paradise, that he might dwell there the whole time of his animal life; afterward, when he had attained spiritual life, to be transferred into heaven. The empyrean heaven, however (as he adds in the same place, ad 1), is a place fitting for the Angels as to their nature: therefore they were created in it. The words of Lucifer, however, saying, Isaiah 14, "I will ascend into heaven," the same Holy Doctor explains below, question 61, article 4, ad 3, of ascent according to dignity, and that this interpretation is legitimate, is established from those words which that apostate Angel adds in the same place: "I will be like the Most High." To the other thing which Suárez

adds, it must be said that a corporeal place, such as the empyrean is, is not stained by spiritual sin, such as was the sin of the evil Angels; and accordingly there is no inconvenience that the Angels sinned in the empyrean, and from it were thrust down to Tartarus. Indeed this especially conduces to our humility and instruction: For from this we learn (says Bernard, Sermon on Hay, Wood, and Stubble) that there is nowhere security, neither in heaven, nor in paradise, much less in the world. For in heaven the Angel fell under the very presence of Divinity; Adam in paradise, from the place of delight; Judas in the world, from the school of the Savior. Let us ascend, therefore (says Jerome), through humility, whence Lucifer fell through pride.

Chapter II

On the substance or essence of the Angels.

The existence and creation of the Angels having been explained, it follows that we expound their substance or essence, and briefly declare whether they are entirely immaterial, devoid of all corporeity, and accordingly incorruptible from within, and unmultipliable within the same species.

§ I

The Angels are altogether devoid of body.

That the Angels have aerial bodies, or subtle and thin ones, like air, and are therefore called aerial powers in Scripture, was formerly taught by several of the Holy Fathers, both Greek and Latin, whom among the Scholastics Cajetan favors, on chapter 2 of the Epistle to the Ephesians, where he says it is consonant with true philosophy that the Demons are aerial spirits. This opinion, however, is now rejected by all Theologians, first on account of the definition of the Lateran Council adduced above, by which God is said to have from the beginning of time founded each creature from nothing, corporeal and spiritual, Angelic and mundane, and then the human, as it were common, consisting of body and spirit. Where He opposes the Angelic nature both to the purely corporeal, and to that constituted of the corporeal and spiritual. Secondly, on account of the common sense of the Church, which, more enlightened in this time, commonly holds that the Angels are altogether incorporeal. And this is not obscurely gathered from Scripture, in which they are simply called spirits, which name could not be attributed to them, if they had any bodies naturally united to them, however subtle and thin they might be: for when men, after the resurrection, will have subtle and incorruptible bodies, they will not be, nor be simply called, spirits; for Christ, Luke 24, after His resurrection, denied that He was a spirit, because He had a body: "Handle," He says, "and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have."

There are also testimonies of the Holy Fathers, among whom the Areopagite has the greatest weight in this question; for he, chapter 1 On the Celestial Hierarchy, testifies that what he is about to say of the heavenly spirits, he received either through signs, or through the secrets of a more sacred understanding, delivered by the Fathers: The Fathers, however, were the Apostles, especially Paul, whom he calls his preceptor and teacher, On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 2, and On the Divine Names, chapters 1 and 7. Here, therefore, chapter 4 of the aforesaid book On the Celestial Hierarchy, he calls the Angels intelligible and spiritual substances, incorporeal, and lacking all matter. Ignatius, the Disciple of the Apostles, Epistle to the Trallians, calls the Angels incorporeal natures. Nazianzen, Oration 38 On the Nativity, says the Angels are incorporeal, and altogether devoid of matter. Likewise Damascene, Book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, says: An Angel is an intellectual and incorporeal substance. Nor is it an obstacle that he adds in the same place, that he is incorporeal with respect to us, but corporeal and material with respect to God: for he did not say this because he thought the Angel to consist of some matter, but to show that the materiality and spirituality of the Angel is so inferior to the spirituality of God, that in comparison with Him, he does

not even seem a spirit. For a mean compared to one extreme, seems the other extreme, just as the lukewarm compared to the hot, seems cold, and compared to the cold, seems hot. Finally, that the Angels are altogether devoid of body, is proved by the two reasons adduced in the preceding chapter, to demonstrate that the beauty and perfection of the universe demand that there be given in it substances purely spiritual, and altogether devoid of corporeity; whence there is no need to dwell further on this.

But it is objected to the contrary, that I have learned many things in Scripture of the Angels, which cannot be verified, unless they are corporeal, as that they begot men: Genesis 6: "The sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they bore them." Where the Seventy translate: "The Angels of God went in to the daughters of men." That the smoke of Tobias's fish drove away the Demon, Tobias 6. That at the melody of David's harp, the evil spirit departed from Saul, 1 Kings 16. Finally that the Demons are tortured in hell and bound by corporeal fire, 2 Peter 2, Apocalypse 21.

To the first I answer that by the name of Sons of God, or Angels of God, are understood those men who descended from Seth, the father of Enos, who, Genesis 4, first began to invoke the name of the Lord; for often in Scripture the just are called sons of God, indeed even Angels of God, as Ambrose noted, Book On Noah, chapter 4, and Augustine, Book 15 On the City of God, chapter 23, and proves it from Matthew 11, where John, according to the prophecy of Malachi, is called an Angel; and Deuteronomy 32, where the Vulgate edition has: "He appointed the bounds of the peoples, according to the number of the children of Israel," the Seventy read: "According to the number of the Angels of God." Those sons of Seth, therefore, received wives from the seed of Cain, who are called daughters of men, because, imitating the manners of their parents, they were addicted to earthly things, just as their forebears.

To the second it must be said that the burning of the fish's liver in Tobias did not drive away the Demon by corporeal power, but by divine virtue, and on account of the mystery which it signified; for by it was figured the fervor of the prayer of Tobias and his sacred spouse, or the death of Christ the Lord on the cross, consumed with charity, by whose virtue all demons are driven away or bound, as Augustine and other Fathers teach, cited by Serrarius, question 3, on chapter 8 of Tobias.

To the third it is answered, that the evil spirit, while David sang and struck the harp, departed by divine virtue, or on account of the hymns and psalms which David sang, which were sacred words, at whose supplication divine virtue drove away the Demons: or that that music concurred indirectly to this effect, by mitigating the sadness of the King, and tempering the melancholic humor, by the mediation of which the Demon

vexed him, or by exciting his soul to the contemplation of divine and heavenly things.

To the fourth, concerning the binding of the Demons by the fire of hell, I say the Demons are tortured, detained, and bound by corporeal fire, as by an instrument of divine virtue and operation; for although corporeal things cannot act on spirits by their own power, they can nevertheless be assumed by God as instruments, and elevated to touching, by the contact of virtue, a spiritual subject, as is clear in the water of baptism, which is elevated by God to produce grace in the soul of the child. On which more below, when we treat of the punishment of the Demons.

It can further be objected with Cajetan in the place cited: All the degrees of living corporeal things must be conceded, as necessary to the perfection and beauty of the universe: Therefore just as there are given vegetating things without sense, as in plants; sentient things without progressive motion, as in oysters; intellective, sensitive, and locomotive together, as in man; so there ought to be given intelligences without sense, with only progressive motion, such as the Angels would be, endowed with aerial bodies, and accordingly such must be conceded.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence; for although for the perfection of the universe it is required that in it there be all the possible degrees of being, which are only three, namely to be, to live, and to understand, it is not, however, required that in it there be all the modes of having such degrees, or all the species contained under those degrees, because those are multipliable to infinity: but to understand without sense, with only progressive motion, does not constitute a special degree, but is only a certain mode of having the intellective degree. I add that several think that mode of having the intellective degree is not possible, and this is gathered from Saint Thomas below, question 70, article 3, where he proves that an intellective form cannot be united to a body for the sake of local motion alone, because for that a substantial union of the mover with the mobile is not necessary, but the contact of the mover with the mobile suffices.

§ II

A corollary of the preceding doctrine.

From what has been said it is gathered that the Angels are incorruptible not only from grace, but also from their own nature, not only in that corruption strictly taken, which is opposed to generation, and occurs through the dissolution of a composite, and the separation of form from matter; but also in corruption broadly accepted, which imports the cessation of a thing and the transition from being to non-being. For in order that something be called corruptible in this way from its own nature, it does not suffice that it can cease to be through God's extrinsic power, which can withdraw from it preservative concurrence, but it is required that it have in itself some principle of corruption, or some potency to non-being. Whence although God can absolutely destroy the heavens, and separate the form of heaven from its matter; because, however, they lack the intrinsic principle of corruption strictly taken, namely the primary altering qualities, and matter appetent of other forms, they are said to be incorruptible from their own nature: But in the Angels there is given no intrinsic potency to non-being: Therefore although God can absolutely deprive them of their being, and reduce them to nothing, nevertheless they ought to be called, and truly are, from their own nature incorruptible, even in corruption broadly accepted. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. Every intrinsic potency to non-being comes from matter: But in the Angels there is no matter, as is established from what has been said above: Therefore neither is there any intrinsic potency to non-being. The Major is proved: No potency, nor appetite, regards per se primarily non-being, as is said in 1 Ethics, and Saint Thomas proves above, question 19, article 9, from the fact that every potency and inclination of nature tends per se to the good; but non-being, as such, does not have the notion of good, whence in created things, potency or inclination to non-being can only be given secondarily and per accidens, insofar, namely, as in them there is potency or appetite for another being incompatible with that which they in fact possess: thus the potency of wood, e.g., is per se primarily to the being of fire, but since the being of fire is incompatible with the being of wood, secondarily and per accidens the potency of wood is said to regard and tend to the non-being of wood: But there is no potency given in created things, which is secondarily to non-being, except prime matter; because just as prime matter alone is in potency to a substantial form incompatible with the one it has, so it alone is in potency to receiving a being incompatible with that which belongs to it: Therefore every potency to non-being comes from matter. Whence Saint Thomas rightly concludes here, article 5: The very immateriality of the Angel is the reason why the Angel is incorruptible according to nature.

You will object, first, many of the Holy Fathers, especially Sophronius, in the epistle recited in the Sixth Synod, action 11, and approved, action 13, teach that the Angels are not immortal from their own nature, but by grace. But it is answered that they do not take "immortal" for a nature denying an intrinsic principle of mortality, but also for a nature denying an extrinsic preserving cause; in which way God alone is said to have immortality, 1 Timothy 6: whence "grace" is not taken by them for a gift added to nature, but for the will of God freely creating and preserving the nature, which He bestowed on the Angels, no preceding merits of theirs, or positive exigency, since no exigency of the thing to be created is supposed for creation. For as the African Fathers teach in Saint Augustine, Epistle 95, natural gifts, insofar as they are bestowed from the gratuitous will of God, are not incongruously called grace.

I add that Damascene, and other Holy Fathers, when they teach that the Angels are not immortal from their own nature, speak of perfect immortality, which includes every mode of immutability from good to evil: but the Angels do not have this, except through grace confirming them in good. Whence although they are immutable and invariable from their own nature according to being, they are nevertheless subject to various mutations, which can be reduced to six kinds. In the first place, indeed, they are mutable as to evening knowledge and cognition, which they have outside the Word, which is varied in them and can daily increase, by receiving new revelations from God. Secondly, as to the will, for as Damascene says, Book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, the nature of the Angel is rational and intellectual, and supported by free power and choice, changeable according to purpose, or mutable in will. Thirdly, as to operation, for their intellection is not their being or substance, as will be clear below. Fourthly, as to place, for as the same Damascene says, "When they are in heaven, they are not on earth; and sent to earth by God, they do not remain in heaven." From which follows a fifth mutation, as to progressive motion; for since they are not everywhere, they are moved locally, and pass from one place to another, as we shall say below. Finally, they are mobile from good to evil, and from grace to sin, as the unhappy fall of the evil Angels sufficiently shows.

You will object, secondly, if in the Angels there were not an intrinsic potency to non-being, and accordingly an intrinsic principle of corruption, it would follow that God, by annihilating an Angel, would inflict violence on him, because He would act against his natural inclination, by which he connaturally requires to be preserved in being. But the sequel is denied, for although in the Angels there is not a natural potency to non-being, there is, however, in them an obediential potency, by which any creature is subject to God, that He might do in it, or of it, whatever does not imply a contradiction:

whence if God annihilated an Angel, He would inflict no violence on him; because although He would then act against the particular inclination which the Angel has to always endure and remain in being, He would not, however, act against the universal inclination, which he has as a part of the universe, to obey the Creator: just as no violence is done to water, while it ascends to fill a vacuum; because although this be against the particular inclination of it, in this, however, it serves the universal good of nature, and the preservation of the universe, to which it is more inclined, than to its own particular convenience. Whence excellently Cyril, Book 8 of the Treasury, chapter 2: Those things which are chiefly inherent in natures, are nothing with respect to the creator: wherefore just as fire is combustive, but not to God; so an Angel is indeed immortal, but not to God. By which words he not only confirms our response, but also insinuates that the Angels are from their own nature immortal and incorruptible. For that this comparison be good, it is fitting that just as the combustive power is inherent to the nature of fire, so immortality is inherent to the Angelic nature; and just as God, by denying concurrence to fire for burning, would deprive it of something naturally owed to it, so if He denied preservation to an Angel, He would deprive him of something which he ought to have from nature, or which is owed to him by the title of connaturality.

Chapter III

On the number and distinction of the Angels.

That the multitude of the Angels is very great and altogether stupendous, is established from various testimonies of Scripture; for it is said, Daniel 7: "Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." And Job 25: "Is there any numbering of his soldiers?" That is, such a number is plainly inenarrable. Whence Gregory, Moralia 17, chapter 9: In the knowledge of human reason, there is no number of the heavenly spirits, because it does not know how great is that multitude of the invisible army. The number of the heavenly citizens is expressed as infinite and undefined; so that He who is numerable to God, may be shown innumerable to men. It is not, however, credible or probable, what Lyra and others teach, namely that their multitude is so great, that it exceeds the number of individuals of this universe. For who would believe them to be more numerous than all the sands of the sea, and atoms of the air, and leaves of trees, and grains of wheat and millet, and that the number of Angels is greater than that of ants, flies, gnats, fleas, worms, and other similar animals, whose multitude is almost innumerable? It is probable, however, that the multitude of the Angels exceeds the number of material species: both because to each of them an Angel is given for a guardian, as Saint Thomas teaches below, question 113, article 2. Also because, as the same Holy Doctor discourses, 1 Against the Gentiles, chapter 92, the order of the universe seems to require, that what is nobler in things, exceed in quantity or number the less noble. For the less noble seem to be for the sake of the more noble: whence it is fitting that the more noble, as it were existing for their own sake, be multiplied as much as possible; and therefore we see that incorruptible bodies, namely the celestial, so far exceed corporeal ones, namely the elemental, that these have, as it were, no notable quantity in comparison to those. But just as celestial bodies are more worthy than elemental ones, as incorruptible than corruptible; so intellectual substances are more worthy than all bodies: as the immobile and immaterial than the mobile and material. The intellectual separate substances, therefore, exceed in number the whole multitude of material things. Where Ferrariensis notes that this reason of Saint Thomas proceeds concerning the excess of the multitude of intellectual substances above species, not, however, above the individuals of material and corruptible things, as the same Holy Doctor openly declares in the same chapter, fourth reason, in these words: The forms which are outside matter, therefore, which we call separate substances, do not seem to be of lesser multitude, than are the species of material things. And certainly if we run through the degrees of all beings, we shall find more species, the nobler the degree to which they belong; since there are more species of vegetable bodies, pure of flowers,

plants, trees, than of purely inanimate ones; again more species of animals, which are on land, in air, or in the sea, than of vegetables: Therefore in order that this gradation subsist, similarly, and a fortiori, the intellectual degree, most perfect of all, ought to contain more species of Angels, than the degree of being, living, sensing, contains species of inanimate, vegetable, and animal things.

As for the distinction of the Angels, Scotus, Suárez, Vasquez, and other more recent authors think that among the created Angels many of the same species are found. On the contrary, Saint Thomas, and his Disciples, Giles of Rome, Granado, and others, teach that all the Angels so differ in species, that it is repugnant that they be multiplied by number alone within the same species; which opinion seems truer, and more conformable to the principles of Aristotelian doctrine, as will be clear below. And indeed, that all the Angels created by God differ in species among themselves, Saint Thomas demonstrates, Book 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 93, by five reasons, among which two are chief. The first is: For this reason are there several individuals in one species in corruptible things, that the nature of the species which cannot be perpetually preserved in one individual, may be preserved in several; whence also in incorruptible bodies there is only one individual in one species: But a separate substance's nature can be preserved in one individual, since they are incorruptible: It is not necessary, therefore, that there be several individuals in those substances of the same species. The second proceeds thus: That which is of the species is more worthy in each thing than that which is the principle of individuation, existing beyond the notion of species: The multiplication of species, therefore, adds more of nobility and perfection to the universe, than the multiplication of individuals in one species: but the perfection of the universe chiefly consists in the separate substances: therefore it belongs more to the perfection of the universe, that there be several diverse according to species, than that there be many according to number in the same species.

That it is repugnant, however, that there be given several Angels of the same species, or that they be multiplied within the same species, he proves in the same place by this discourse: Whatever things are the same in species, but differ in number, have matter: For a difference which proceeds from form, induces diversity of species; but that which is from matter, induces diversity according to number: But separate substances do not have matter at all, neither as part of them, nor to which they be united as form: It is impossible, therefore, that there be several of one species.

But this principle, on which as a foundation the discourse of Saint Thomas rests, and on which entirely depends the resolution of this celebrated question, namely: Whatever things are the same in species, but differ in number, have matter, is denied by the

Adversaries, who think it is not repugnant that there be joined to the Angels some principle which is not matter, through which their individual distinction and multiplication may occur. But such a principle is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, chapter 8, text 49, saying: Whatever things are many in number, have matter, from which he proves that the first mover, being spiritual, and lacking matter, cannot be but one; whence those who deny this principle destroy the chief foundation, from which it can be proved by natural light that there is only one God, and favor polytheism. But whatever be the case with this, such a principle is proved by this fundamental reason: Matter, or an order to it, is that from which, as from the first root, numerical distinction is taken. Therefore whatever things are many in number, have matter, or say an order to it. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. In the first place, indeed, numerical distinction cannot proceed from form as from the first root: both because every distinction proceeding from form is formal, and consequently specific and essential. Also because numerical distinction does not arise per se from that which is indifferent to this or that singularity: but form, of itself, is indifferent to this or that singularity, nor does it demand one more than another. Also finally because the principle of individuation and numerical distinction ought to be a principle of incommunicability, since an individual is incommunicable: but form is not a principle of incommunicability, since it is a principle of the specific degree, which is of itself communicable to many individuals. Secondly, the principle of individuation and numerical distinction cannot be existence, or subsistence: both because these suppose an individual nature already constituted, since they are the ultimate term of nature: also because the humanity of Christ, as an individual, was presupposed to the assumption, and yet was deprived of its own subsistence, indeed even of its own existence, in the opinion of those who think existence is really distinguished from essence. Thirdly, numerical distinction, since it is intrinsic and substantial, cannot be taken from something extrinsic and accidental: Therefore only matter, or an order to it, is that from which, as from the first root, numerical distinction is taken.

The Adversaries meet this argument in two ways: For in the first place, Scotus and his Disciples respond that the principle of numerical distinction in the Angels is haecceity. But this response is a mere evasion of the difficulty: for although haecceity, or individual difference, be in the individual, the difficulty still remains: what is the principle of the multiplication of haecceities, whether matter, or form, or subsistence, or existence, or some accident? for unity and individual distinction must be founded in something: whence if none of these can be the foundation of numerical distinction, it follows that it can only be taken from matter, as from the first root.

Others respond, secondly, that although it be granted that the principle of numerical distinction is matter, or an order to it, it is not, however, efficaciously proved from this, that the Angels cannot, by God's absolute power, be multiplied within the same species; because it is not repugnant that there be joined to the Angels from without some principle which is not matter, through which there may occur in them individual distinction and multiplication; for God could, by absolute power, add some property to the nature of Gabriel, emanating from the form, not absolutely considered, but as it underlies God's supernatural action, to which every creature according to obediential potency is subject, from which numerical distinction within that species would arise. Which solution and doctrine they confirm by the celebrated testimony of Saint Thomas, taken from Opusculum 16, where he reprehends the Averroists, and calls them arguing rudely, because they proved that there could be only one intellect in individual men, since that faculty lacks matter. And he adds that although the intellect were naturally one for all, because it would have no cause of multiplication, it could nevertheless obtain multiplicity from a supernatural cause, nor would there be an implication of contradiction. From which testimony, not only Suárez, and other more recent authors, but also some of our own Thomists, as Ferrariensis, Capreolus, and Bañez, infer that the opinion of Saint Thomas was that several Angels distinct by number alone can be given, by God's absolute power, but not by ordinary power.

But this response and doctrine, which is the chief foundation of the opposing opinion, can be confuted in many ways. For in the first place it fights against the Adversaries themselves, who not only teach that, by absolute power, the Angels can be multiplied within the same species, but also that in fact many Angels of the same species are found. Secondly, it can be impugned from this, that since individuation is an intrinsic and substantial degree, it also demands an intrinsic and substantial principle: But whatever is communicated by God preternaturally to an Angel, comes from without, and is accidental and separable from him: Therefore the substance of an Angel cannot be distinguished or multiplied numerically, through something communicated to him preternaturally by God. Thirdly, it is proper to an intrinsic cause to cause through its own entity, and not through something superadded: whence it is commonly said, that in intrinsic causes there is not given a distinction of ordinary and extraordinary power: but the principle of individuation and numerical distinction has the notion of an intrinsic cause, not extrinsic, as is evident: Therefore only through its own entity, and not through something joined to it, can it cause individual distinction.

As for the mind of Saint Thomas, it is manifest that he stands for our opinion, and teaches that not even by God's absolute power can the Angels be multiplied within the

same species, for below, question 75, article 7, he says: It cannot be understood that any separate form be but one of its species: but that which cannot be understood, is repugnant, and cannot be done by God's absolute power. This is also clear from question unique On Spiritual Creatures, article 8, where he says: If the Angel is a simple form, abstracted from matter, it is impossible even to feign that there be several Angels of one species. But what is impossible even according to our feigning, is repugnant even to God's absolute power: Therefore it is manifest that the opinion of Saint Thomas is that not even by absolute power can the Angels be multiplied within the same species. Whence in the Opusculum cited, he reprehends only the form of arguing of the Averroists, badly and rudely inferring, that if by its own nature the intellect cannot be multiplied, this is also repugnant to absolute power. That this is his mind is clear from the fact that he adds that he says this, lest this form of arguing be extended to other things; for thus we could conclude, that God cannot make the dead rise, because this they do not have from their own nature. I add that Saint Thomas does not speak there of Angels, but of human intellects, between which and the Angels a great difference obtains; for although the human intellect is immaterial as to substance, it nevertheless says an order to matter, just as the rational soul, from which it emanates as a property, says a relation to the body; the Angel, however, since he is not the form of a body, but subsisting through himself and complete, not only lacks matter, but also says no order to it. Whence although rational souls, and human intellects, can be multiplied within the same species, the Angelic substances cannot.

From this remain resolved several instances, by which the Adversaries try to weaken the chief foundation of our opinion, and to prove that numerical division is not taken from matter, as from the first root: for two rational souls (they say) are distinguished by number, and yet do not consist of matter. Likewise two lights of glory, two beatific visions, two acts of Angelic intellect or will, tending in a similar way around the same object: two supernatural habits of faith, hope, or charity, differ numerically, and yet lack matter. Finally the Eucharistic accidents, separated from their subject, are distinguished by number alone from several others. But it is easily answered, that although these do not consist of matter, they nevertheless connote and regard it: for rational souls say an order to diverse bodies which they inform, but spiritual accidents to the subject in which they inhere, which, although it be immaterial, bears, however, the offices of matter, insofar as it receives and sustains them. The Eucharistic accidents, however, although separated from their subject, say a relation to some special subject, from which they are divinely separated.

You will say, if individuation be taken from matter, or from an order to it, as from the first root, it follows that there is not given individuation in the Angelic nature, and that the Angels have only specific unity without numeric, in the manner in which Plato posited the separate ideas of things, which seems ridiculous and absurd.

But the sequel is denied, for when we say that individuation is taken from matter, or from an order to it, we speak of individuation, with multiplication of nature; for that requires matter, or an order to it, because it requires a principle founding entitative or material division of substance, without formal division of species; not, however, of individuation without multiplication of nature, for this requires neither matter, nor an order to it; as is established in God, who has individuation and singularity, without any matter, or order to it, and without any capacity of multiplication. The same, with proportion, must be said of the Angelic nature, for in it there is given individuation, but unique and unmultiplied, and unmultipliable; and this is taken from the form, insofar as it is unreceivable, and incommunicable to any nature, which it has from the fact that it is a complete and subsisting form. Other objections can be seen in the Shield of Thomistic Theology.

From what has been said it is established, how imprudently and inconsiderately the opinion of Saint Thomas has been censured by some, since indeed it rests on the same foundation, by which the Philosopher established the unity of God. Whence such censure was revoked by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, who was the head of the University, and the book containing it was proscribed, and inscribed in the catalogue of prohibited books.

Chapter IV

On the assumption of bodies by the Angels.

It is certain that the Angels can assume bodies, and through them exhibit themselves visibly to men; for this is openly gathered from various passages of Scripture, in which it is read that Angels appeared to Abraham, Lot, Tobias, and others. Nor is it likely that all these apparitions occurred according to imagination, since Scripture so introduces them appearing, that they were commonly seen by all; but those things which occur only by imagination and delusion of the senses, are not commonly seen by all, as Saint Thomas observes here, question 51, article 2. And at least this cannot be said of Christ, to whom, Matthew 4, the Devil is said to have appeared, and to have taken him up to a pinnacle of the temple and to an exceeding high mountain. For it is not taught that Christ was deluded by the Devil, such that what happened only by imagination, Christ thought to happen in reality.

In order, however, that an Angel be said to assume a body, it is required that he unite it to himself in some way, not as a form is united to matter, since he is a complete and total nature; nor by hypostatic union, since no personality except an infinite one can terminate an alien nature, as I suppose from the treatise on the Incarnation, but as a mover to a mobile thing. This, however, does not suffice for assumption, because the Angels have this presence to the heavens which they move, and to the possessed whom they torment, whom, however, they are not said to assume; but it is furthermore required that the Angel so form and move the assumed body, that through it he represent to us intelligible properties, either his own, or those of superior Angels, or of God Himself, when he bears His person, as His legate.

The matter, however, from which the Angels ordinarily form the bodies which they assume, is air or vapor thickened and condensed, reduced by the force of a motive power into the figure of a human body, or of another animal, in whose body the Angel wishes to appear. A sign of which Saint Thomas gives, Book 1, dist. 8, question 1, article 3, from the fact that many wished to cut such bodies with a sword, and could not; because air, since it is fluid, being cut is immediately continued again. But it seems difficult, by what reason a body formed from air can be handled and touched, after the manner of a human body, since air can express to touch neither the softness of human flesh, nor the hardness of bone. But to this it is answered, that the Angels, in the bodies assumed, can express such qualities apparently to touch, either by resisting, and by their motive power tempering the motion of the touching body, lest it penetrate more or less of the assumed body, than would be enough to express the softness or hardness of a human body; or by

mixing and combining from the remaining elements in the assumed body, as much as would be enough to express qualities which could apparently refer to the temperament of a human body. Nevertheless I think, with Cajetan, 2-2, question 95, article 3, that they cannot so perfectly imitate the temperament of a human body, but that a fictitious body could be discerned from a true one by touch itself, if the utmost care and diligence, and attentiveness of intellect, be applied, according to that saying of Christ to the Disciples, Luke, last chapter: "Handle, and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones."

But if you ask, by what virtue an Angel can form bodies from air, and assume them? I answer that this can be by natural virtue: both because, for condensing air, and reducing it into the figure of a man or of some animal, the work of motive power alone is needed. Also because the Demons assume bodies for an evil end, as is established from histories: but God cannot concur by extraordinary concurrence to an evil work, because He cannot be the particular and principal cause of an evil work. Whence when Saint Thomas here, article 2, ad 3, says that the Angels assume bodies from air, by condensing it, by divine virtue, or through virtue, "divine" must be understood as that which the Angels received from God together with their nature. Or this must be interpreted and understood of the supernatural apparitions of Angels, such as were made to Abraham, Tobias, Daniel, and the Blessed Virgin; for in these it is quite probable that the bodies assumed by the blessed Angels were formed by divine and supernatural virtue.

If again you inquire, whether the Angels in the bodies assumed can exercise the works of sensitive life, such as to speak, eat, see, hear? I shall answer negatively with Saint Thomas here, article 3, because they do not live in such bodies by sensitive life, nor do they have sensitive powers, whence they exercise these operations in the assumed body only by way of similitude, as the Angel Raphael not obscurely signified to Tobias, chapter 6, when he said: "I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you, etc." Whence much less can an Angel generate in the assumed body, because generation requires the emission of one's own living substance, by the mediation of seed received in the womb of a female. The Angels can, however, be ministers of generation, and generate ministerially. For as Saint Thomas notes here, article 3, ad 6, a Demon in the assumed body can become a succubus to a man, and receive seed from him, and afterward, making himself an incubus to a woman, infuse the received seed into her womb; and thus from such seed, infused by the ministry of the Demon into the womb of the female, a fetus can be generated, which, however, ought not to be called the son of the Demon, but of that man, from whom the seed was received, as Saint Thomas says in the same place. Note, however, that although a Demon incubus can, in the aforesaid manner, generate human offspring, a Demon succubus, however, cannot, through human seed transferred from elsewhere, conceive offspring in

himself; because the organization of a human body, and of any perfect animal, requires determinate instruments of life, by which it may be formed and perfected: which instruments cannot be supplied by the Demon's virtue, since that vital heat cannot be supplied by him, by which the male seed received within the female's womb, is warmed, made prolific, and formed into the figure of a human body; for that necessarily depends on organs and vital spirits, which cannot be preserved outside an animated body. Of which see Delrio, Book 2 of the Disquisitions on Magic, question 15.

Chapter V

On the place of the Angels.

The substance of the Angels having been considered according to itself, and in order to the bodies which they assume, it remains that we contemplate it in order to place, and declare the formal reason by which they are constituted in a place.

§ I

The Angels are in a place through operation.

It is proved, first, by a reason which Saint Thomas insinuates, 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 68, where he thus discourses: Everything that is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, touches it in some way: for a corporeal thing is in something as in a place, according to the contact of dimensive quantity; an incorporeal thing, however, is said to be in something according to the contact of power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Thus, therefore, an incorporeal thing is related to being in a place through its power, just as a corporeal thing is related to being in a place through dimensive quantity. Whence I thus argue: That is to an Angel the formal reason of being in a place, by which he touches it, as is established of a corporeal thing located: But by transient operation alone does an Angel touch a place: Therefore transient operation alone is to an Angel the formal reason of being in a place. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. There is a twofold contact, one proper, which is exercised by the mediation of quantity; the other improper and metaphorical, which occurs by the mediation of transient action: But an Angel cannot touch a place in the first way, since he is devoid of quantity: Therefore he can touch it only in the second way, by the mediation of transient action.

It is proved, secondly: An Angel is not in a place through his substance, as through a formal reason, as Scotus, Molina, Valentia, and others think: nor through a mode of "whereness," as Suárez teaches: nor through some union of his to a body, as Vasquez contends: Therefore only through transient action. The consequence is clear from a

sufficient enumeration, for nothing else besides these can be assigned or reasonably conceived, which could be to an Angel the formal reason of existing in a place: The Antecedent, however, is thus shown. If an Angel were in a place through one of the three assigned, he could not be now in a greater, now in a lesser space, but would be necessitated and constrained to exist always in a place adequate to his power: But this cannot be said, as will be established from what is to be said below: Therefore neither can that. The sequel of the Major is proved. The Angel's substance is invariable, and always has the same substantial perfection; but the "where," or mode of presence, or of union to a body, cannot be now greater, now less, unless some cause be given founding such a mutation and diversity, which the Adversaries can assign none. For it cannot be said with Suárez, that such a cause is the Angel's will, because the will is only a cause or applicative condition of the Angel to a place, not, however, a formal cause by which he exists in a place: but a formal effect is not varied by the mere variation of the applying condition, the formal reason remaining unvaried; as is clear in us, who, although by free will we move and apply ourselves to a place, cannot, however, place ourselves in a lesser or greater place according to our will, unless in dimensive quantity, which is the formal cause by which we are constituted in a place, some mutation occur through compression or dilation. Necessarily, therefore, one must have recourse to the Angel's transient operation, which, since it can be extended, at his pleasure, to a greater or lesser space, he can exist now in a greater, now in a lesser place. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 37, question 3, article 2: The place of an Angel can be divisible or indivisible, or great or small, according as his operation is immediately terminated at something great or small. I add that it well befits a spiritual nature, independent of body, to be also independent of place, nor to be present to it, except insofar as it makes it depend on itself; whence Saint Thomas here, article 1, says that an Angel is said to be in a corporeal place, not as contained, but as somehow containing. He cannot, however, contain it formally, or materially, as is established, but only effectively, namely by acting on it through transient operation: Therefore such operation is the formal reason by which the Angel is constituted in a place. We shall subjoin another reason at the end of the following section.

§ II

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first: Saint Thomas here, question 52, article 1, thus says: Through the application of Angelic power to some place, an Angel is said to be in a corporeal place. He teaches the same, Book 1, dist. 37, question 3, article 1, and often elsewhere: Therefore he holds that an Angel is not formally in a place through the very transient operation, but through the application of power in first act.

Some respond with Cajetan, that an Angel is incompletely in a place through the application of power, and completely through transient operation; and that his presence begins through the application of power, but is completed through the exercised operation in the place. And through this they easily explain Saint Thomas, who sometimes teaches that the Angels are in a place through the application of power, sometimes through transient operation; for the passages of the first kind they explain of incomplete presence, the others, however, of complete presence.

I answer, secondly, with the Salmanticenses, that Saint Thomas, by "application of power to a place," understands nothing other than the very actual operation, as is established from the place cited from the Sentences, where he thus says: The third opinion posits that the Angel is in a place, insofar as he is applied to some place through operation. And therefore, following this opinion, which seems more reasonable, I say that the Angel and any incorporeal substance, cannot be in a body or in a place, except through operation, by which he causes some effect in it. Where those words "is applied through operation," clearly declare that the Holy Doctor, in the subject matter, does not distinguish the application of Angelic power from his operation. This solution will be more established below; for we shall show that the Angel's transient action has three inadequate offices, namely the notion of application to a place, the notion of operation in a place, or of the production of an effect, and the notion of "whereness" or presence in a place.

You will object, secondly: It is prior for an Angel to be in a place, than to operate in it: Therefore he is not constituted in a place through operation. The consequence is clear, the Antecedent is proved, first, because it is prior for an Angel to be, than to operate: Therefore likewise it is prior to be in a place, than to operate in a place. Secondly, because the approach or application of the agent to the patient, is a condition necessarily prerequired for operating concerning it, as the Philosophers teach, 7 Physics.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, and to its first proof, the Antecedent being granted, I deny the consequence. For as Saint Thomas says, Quodlibet 1, article 4, ad 1: Nothing

prevents something from being prior simply, which is not prior as to this, just as a subject is simply prior to a surface, but not as to being colored; and similarly a body is simply prior to touch, yet it is in a place through the touch of dimensive quantity, and similarly Angels through the contact of power. This doctrine Cajetan excellently illustrates and explains here, question 52, article 1, where he says that just as in a located body there are three things, namely the substance which is located, the quantity which is the reason of locating, and the "where" or relation of presence, which follows upon it as upon its proper foundation; so also in spiritual substances these three things are found, namely the Angel's substance, which is present and undistant from the place; the virtually transient operation, which is the contact of power, through which he becomes present; and the relation or denomination of presence which is founded on it. And these three can be considered in different ways, and according to different considerations have the notion of prior and posterior. For if they be considered in the order of being, substance holds the first place, second dimensive quantity in corporeal things, and the contact of power in spiritual substances: and third the relation or denomination of presence. It is otherwise in the order of locating, for in such order the first is dimensive quantity in corporeal things, and the contact of power in spiritual ones; second, the very substance of the corporeal or spiritual thing; third, the relation or denomination of presence, which is founded in such quantitative or effective contact.

To the second proof of the Antecedent, it must be said, that although in corporeal agents the approach of the agent to the patient is a condition prerequired for operation, it is not, however, so in spiritual ones; because corporeal things act through a power subjected in quantity, and thus dependent on it, and on the place to which they are commensurate, but it is otherwise with spiritual things, whence in these, approach is only a condition concomitant with operation, and which occurs through it; just as our soul, by informing the body, approaches and is united to it. Or just as, although for receiving a soul an organic body is required, it is not, however, prerequired, but by the very entrance of the soul, it becomes organic.

You will object, thirdly: It is not assignable what the Angels in the empyrean heaven produce, and the Demons in hell: Therefore they are not in a place through operation. It is confirmed: if operation were the formal reason by which the Angels were constituted in a place, it would follow that an Angel is nowhere, when he operates nowhere, which seems absurd, for since he is a part of the universe, he ought always to remain within the world, even if he in no way operates ad extra.

To the objection I answer that the blessed Angels in the empyrean heaven produce a certain light or adornment, or some other quality or effect hidden from us, just as also

the very nature of the Angel and of the empyrean heaven. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 37, question 3, article 1, says that an Angel is in a place, insofar as he operates concerning some located body, or moved, or light, or other such thing. The Demons, however, are in hell through binding and violent detention, which we shall explain below, when we treat of their punishment; for although in the Angels the reason of existing in a connatural place is operation, the reason of existing in a violent place, however, is passion, or passive binding, by which such spirits are so detained and bound, that they are not permitted to operate elsewhere. Whence Tobias 8 says that the Demon Asmodeus was bound by the Angel Raphael in the upper desert of Egypt, namely lest he be able to harm anything by his action and transient operation, by which those spirits, malign in themselves, are harmful to others, as much as they can.

To the confirmation Saint Thomas responds in the place next cited, in the response to the fourth, in these words: To the fourth it must be said that I do not reckon it inconvenient that an Angel can be without a place, and not in a place, when he has no operation concerning a place; nor is it inconvenient that then he be said to be nowhere, or in no place; just as it is not inconvenient that he be said to be colored by no color; but this, however, is not imaginable, because imagination does not transcend the continuous. He also teaches this, Quodlibet 6, article 3, and question 3 On Power, article 19, ad 2, where he thus says: Nothing prevents the Angels from not being in a place, if they should will it. Certainly if the Angels had been created before the world, as several of the Greek Fathers think, then they would have been nowhere except in God, nor would God have been except in Himself. From which an efficacious argument can be taken in favor of our opinion: For the reason attributing to an Angel being in a connatural place, ought to be so elevated and eminent, that by reason of it the Angel can, when he wills, free himself from every place: But this can belong only to the Angel's operation, not, however, to his substance; for the Angel's substance is something altogether necessary, nor can he be despoiled of it when he wills; on the contrary, transient operation freely belongs to him, and he can, when he wills, suspend it, or cease from it altogether: Therefore the reason attributing to an Angel being in a connatural place, is not the Angel's substance, but only his virtually transient operation.

For a fuller understanding of this celebrated difficulty, and the resolution of other arguments, it must be noted, that when we say that the Angels exist in a place through transient operation, we understand this of transient operation, which goes out from the Angel immediately, by immediacy of the suppositum, not, however, of that which proceeds from him immediately only by immediacy of power, that is, through power diffused and derived from himself. Whence although an Angel produces local motion in

the whole first sphere, he is not, however, substantially present to the whole sphere, but only to the eastern part, to which he first applies his power, and into which he acts immediately, not only by immediacy of power, but also by immediacy of suppositum, as Saint Thomas teaches here, article 2.

§ III

A corollary of the preceding doctrine.

All things which are taught by Theologians about the place of the Angels, especially by the Disciples of Saint Thomas, follow from that principle, which the Holy Doctor often repeats and inculcates, namely that an Angel is in a place through the application of his power, or through virtually transient operation. From this it follows, first, that the Angels are not properly in a place, but only metaphorically: both because an Angel is said to be in a place, insofar as he touches it: but the contact which occurs through operation, is not true and proper, but only metaphorical. Also because, in order that something be properly in a place, it is required that it be circumscribed and measured by it: whence "where" in the category of quantity is defined by Gilbert, as the circumscription of a body arising from the circumscription of place: An Angel, however, is not circumscribed nor measured by a place, but rather effectively contains and measures it. Whence the Angelic "where" is not in the category, but metaphorical; for it is the very operation of the Angel, as it has some analogy and similitude with corporeal "where," consisting in this, that just as corporeal "where," in the category, posits a body really present and united to a place, and limits it, so that it be present to one place, that it not be in another; so likewise the operation of an Angel into a place, posits the Angel's substance present and united to such a place, and limits it, that it thus be present to an adequate place, that it not be elsewhere. From which you will understand that Angelic operation, on account of its eminence, has three inadequate offices: for first it joins and subjects to itself the subject, second it produces some effect in the subject, third it renders the Angel present and located; whence it has the notion of application to a place, the notion of operation in a place, or of the production of an effect in it, and the notion of "whereness," or presence in a place. Which three offices, although furnished by the same entity of Angelic operation, one nevertheless precedes another in nature: for first belongs to it the notion of application, second the notion of operation or effecting, third the notion of presence or "whereness": just as in the Treatise on the Trinity we said that the divine relations have, in a certain eminent manner, the notion of subsistence, or hypostatic form, the notion of origin both active and passive, and the notion of relation or pure respect to the term; such that according to reason the first office belongs to them prior, then the second, afterward the third.

It follows, secondly, that since an Angel is not in a place except per accidens, insofar namely as the assumed body, or the body to which he is applied through operation, is in a place, he does not have local situation, distance, and proximity, except per accidens, and by reason of the corporeal place, in which he exists through virtually transient operation. Whence if God destroyed the corporeal world, or if the Angels had been founded before the machine of the corporeal world, as several of the Greek Fathers hold, they would not be mutually near or distant positively, but negatively only, at least in physical proximity or distance; although they could, or could have had, among themselves a certain moral and metaphorical proximity; because then one Angel could, or could have, acted on another by moral action, as by illuminating, or by commanding him.

It follows, thirdly, that the Angels are not actually in the imaginary spaces, or above the heavens, since there is no body there which they move locally, or concerning which they exercise some transient action; but also it cannot be said that they are there by potency; for since they do not act by creative virtue, but eductive, they can produce no body in the imaginary spaces, concerning which they could operate. If, however, God created some body above the heavens, then an Angel could, by local motion, transfer himself there, and exist there as in a place; because then he could move that body locally, or have another transient action concerning it.

It follows, fourthly, that the Angels are not everywhere, as Durandus thinks: for since their operative power is finite and limited, just as their nature, they have a certain and limited sphere of their activity, nor can they apply operative power to all places in the same moment. Whence Damascene, Book 2 On the Faith: "While they are in heaven, they are not on earth; and sent to earth by God, they do not remain in heaven." Wherefore when Tertullian, in the Apology, chapter 32, says that they are everywhere in a moment, the whole world is a place to them, he only intends to declare their supreme velocity and agility; for they are moved so promptly and swiftly, that they seem to be everywhere, as will be clear from what is to be said below.

It follows, fifthly, that although an Angel be unextended and indivisible, he can, however, be in an extended and divisible place, because he can apply his power to it; whence his operative power, and his operation, although they be formally indivisible in themselves, are, however, virtually extended and divisible, in that they infer a divisible and extended effect in the subject concerning which they operate.

It follows, sixthly, that an Angel is not necessitated or constrained to exist in the whole place or space adequate to his operative power; but can locate himself in a smaller one. For although from the quantity of the Angel's substantial perfection arises, as from the

first root, that he can be in so great a place, the proximate reason, however, by which he is formally constituted in a place, is operative power, as freely applied, and virtually extended in order to a place, through transient operation: whence just as, without change of substantial perfection or of operative power, an Angel can operate concerning a great or small quantity within the sphere of his activity, so he can now constitute himself in a place adequate to himself, now in a smaller one, in the proportional manner in which, if some body had at its disposal extension of quantity in order to a place, it could apply it now to a greater, now to a smaller place, within, however, the breadth of its adequate place; for the free operation of an Angel is related proportionally to operative power, as extension in order to place is to dimensive quantity.

It follows, seventhly, that an Angel can locate himself in a single point; for granted that an Angel cannot move a single point, he can, however, impress an impetus and impulse on a single point, by which the body in which he is may be moved, and thus apply his power to a single point. For although a point cannot be an adequate subject of local motion, it can well be a subject of impetus and impulse, as is clear if we should oppose a perfect plane to a perfect sphere falling downward, and repel it again upward; for just as a plane would not touch a sphere except at a point, as the Philosophers teach, so it would not begin to impress impulsive force on it except through a point. If, therefore, the action of a body on a body can begin immediately from a point, there is no reason why the operation of an Angel cannot also begin from a point, and accordingly an Angel locate himself in a point. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 2: An Angel is indivisible, existing outside the genus of quantity and situation, whence it is not necessary that one indivisible place according to situation be determined for him, but either a divisible one, or an indivisible one. Nor is it valid if you say that if an Angel could locate himself in a single point, he could also exist in another Angel as in a place, since indivisibility belongs to each. For the reason of disparity between a point and an Angel is manifest: for a point, since it is an indivisible having situation, and existing within the genus of quantity, can be touched by an Angel through the contact of power, and immediately receive his impetus and impulse, as has already been declared; but it is otherwise with an Angel, since he is altogether spiritual and incorporeal, and since he is (as the Holy Doctor speaks in the place cited) indivisible, existing outside the genus of quantity and situation: whence since an Angel is in a place through the application and contact of his power, one Angel can exist in a point, but not in another Angel, as in a place.

It follows, eighthly, that an Angel cannot naturally be in several adequate places, but well supernaturally. The reason for the first part is, that the adequate place of an Angel exhausts the whole natural power which the Angel has for occupying a space or place:

Therefore he cannot naturally go beyond it. Otherwise he could be in all places; for if it once be granted that he could naturally transcend the adequate limit of his power in one or two or three places, there will be no reason, why he could not be in all others, and it will not be necessary that he move himself and pass from place to place, which is repugnant to Scripture, as will be clear in the following chapter.

The second part, however, is proved from this, that, since an Angel is in a place through operation, just as his operative power can be supernaturally increased, so he too can supernaturally extend himself beyond the adequate place and exist in other places. By which an Angel differs from a body, which in the opinion of the Thomists cannot be in several places circumscriptively, because indeed a body is in a place circumscriptively, by reason of quantity, which cannot be multiple in one and the same body, since a body has its numerical unity from it: An Angel, however, is constituted in a place through the application of his operative power, which God can increase, and accordingly bring about that an Angel who could not operate except concerning the space of one league, e.g., operate in a much greater one. I add that, in formal causes there is not given a distinction of ordinary and extraordinary power, as in efficient ones, because indeed those do not cause except by communication of their entity, these, however, cause through a power either proper to themselves, or received from another; whence since quantity cannot naturally fill two places, neither can it do so supernaturally, since it occupies a place only in the genus of formal cause, and by furnishing itself; an Angel, however, can extend beyond his adequate place, if his active power be increased, which no one doubts can be increased.

It follows, ninthly, that an Angel can naturally be in several inadequate places, discontinuous, and distant among themselves, contained, however, within the sphere of his activity, e.g., in the four corners of a hall, without existing in the middle. For he is in a place through the free and non-natural application of his power, and accordingly can apply his power either to the whole sphere, or only to those parts to which he wills to join himself, the intermediate ones being left; because he is bound by no necessity to all the parts contained within the sphere of his activity. Nor is he in a place through information, as the soul is in the body, whose parts must be continuous, because the soul does not inform the body, except with dispositions supposed, of which the first is continuous quantity. Nor is he in a place after the manner of continuous quantity, through commensuration to the place, but through operation, which does not depend on place, but subjects it to itself. Whence just as the body of Christ can be placed simultaneously and at once, through the words of consecration, in several hosts, separated and distant from one another, although it does not exist in the middle; indeed

it can cease to be in the intermediate parts of the same host, if they be corrupted, remaining, however, in the extremities not yet corrupted; because indeed it is not in the Eucharist commensuratively to place, but in a certain more perfect and more elevated mode; so likewise, because an Angel does not exist in a place through commensuration to it, but in a certain more elevated mode, and absolute and independent of the laws of place, an Angel can locate himself in several partial and inadequate places, without existing in the middle.

Nor does it follow from this (as some indeed object) that an Angel could be in several places, as several things, which Saint Thomas here, article 2, teaches to be repugnant. For just as the place of a staff, one half of which is in water, and the other in earth, is formally said to be one place; because although the surfaces of the water and of the earth are really distinguished, they agree, however, in the notion of one measure containing and measuring the located thing, which in a place behaves as the formal element. So likewise, although two or more inadequate places of an Angel, distant among themselves, contained within the sphere of his activity, be neither entitatively, nor by continuity, nor by order, one; they are, however, one place formally, because they agree in that which in an Angel's place behaves as formal, namely in that which is to be touched and possessed simultaneously by the same power and operation of the Angel. For as the Holy Doctor says in the article cited: The whole to which the power of the Angel is immediately applied, is reckoned as one place of his. From which you will understand, that an Angel cannot simultaneously be in several inadequate places much distant among themselves, e.g., in two spaces designated in heaven and on earth, however small they be; because when the distance between some places is very great, this impedes their being contained within the sphere of the Angel's activity, and accordingly that they be compared to him after the manner of one place, but then they have the notion of several.

It follows, tenthly, that several Angels can be simultaneously in the same material place, not, however, in the same formal place. The first part is clear, for a material place is called that body or space, in which an Angel operates: But several Angels can apply themselves simultaneously to the same body or space, producing diverse effects in it according to species, e.g., if one Angel produce motion in the same part of the air, and another light, or another quality: Therefore several Angels can simultaneously exist in the same material place.

The reason of the second part is, because the formal place of the Angels is not taken from the surface and distance from the poles of the world; for this is only the formal place of bodies; but from operative power, determinate, and applied through adequate operation, and such that that space be formally one place, to which an Angel through his

operative power and adequate operation can extend himself, as is established from what has been said in the preceding corollary: But several Angels cannot, as total causes, elicit the same operation; since the same effect cannot proceed from two total causes; at least in the ordinary way, as all admit: Therefore several Angels cannot simultaneously be in the same adequate formal place. With which, however, it stands, that if the Angels, accommodating, and as it were tempering their power and action, wish to act partially, they will be in the same formal place partially and inadequately, although regularly this does not befit the good Angels, as is gathered from Saint Thomas here, article 3, and Book 1, dist. 37, question 13, article 3, because since the Angels are the supreme beings of the universe, and the most perfect agents, they do not operate regularly as partial causes, but each of them, by way of a perfect and total agent, either by his own or by divine virtue, produces the effects to which he is destined, as the Holy Doctor says in the places cited: whence to each celestial sphere only a single Angel is assigned.

Chapter VI

On the local motion of the Angels.

It is certain that the Angels can be moved locally from one place to another. This is not only openly gathered from several passages of Scripture, in which the Angels are said to descend from heaven, and ascend into heaven, but is also demonstrated by evident reason: For since the Angels are not everywhere, on account of the limitation of their substance and power, and since, moreover, they are endowed with intellect and will, they can know and desire presence in some place, or absence from it: But nature would in vain attribute such an appetite to them, if it denied them a locomotive power, by which they could approach those places, or recede from them: Therefore the Angels can be moved locally, not only per accidens, according to the motion of a body to which they are locally present; just as the soul is moved per accidens according to the motion of the body, and the body of Christ in the Eucharist, according to the motion of the species; but also by motion per se, because by operating successively in diverse immobile bodies, they can become present successively to diverse places. From which you will understand, first, that the local motion of an Angel, by which he is moved per se, consists in diverse operations concerning diverse places, without intermediate rest. For since he is in a place through operation, he is not moved locally except insofar as he varies operation concerning diverse bodies, and this occurs successively without intermediate rest. You will understand, secondly, that the local motion by which an Angel is moved per se, inheres in the Angel himself, according to that which it says in the direct case; but is received in the corporeal place, according to that which it imports in the oblique. For such motion, as we said, consists in diverse operations of the Angel concerning diverse places: those operations, however, since they are formally immanent, are received intrinsically in the Angel himself; since, however, they are virtually transient, they infer passion and a corporeal effect, produced in the place to which the Angel is applied. Furthermore, concerning this motion there are three difficulties and controversies, to be briefly resolved here. The first is, whether an Angel can be moved by motion both continuous and discrete? The second, whether he can be moved by discrete motion, not passing through the middle? The third, whether the motion of an Angel, both continuous and discrete, can occur in an instant.

§ I

Resolution of the first difficulty.

I say, first, an Angel can be moved by motion both continuous and discrete.

The first part is proved against Gregory, Hervaeus, and Vallesius: That local motion, according to Saint Thomas here, question 53, article 1, is called continuous, in which the mobile thing by parts leaves the term from which, and by parts acquires the term to which, without intermediate rest: But an Angel can by parts leave the term from which, and by parts acquire the term to which, without intermediate rest; for although he is indivisible and unextended, he can, however, locate himself in a divisible and extended place, as we showed in the preceding chapter, and accordingly leave one part of it first, and occupy another afterward, without intermediate rest: Therefore he can be moved locally by continuous motion.

You will say, for the continuity of motion, not only divisibility of space, and unity of time, are required, but also divisibility of the mobile thing: But an Angel, since he is immaterial, is altogether indivisible: Therefore he cannot be moved by continuous motion.

I answer that although an Angel, entitatively, and as to substance, is not divisible; as located, however, he is extended and divisible, insofar as he exists in an extended and divisible space. Or, as others say, although he is not formally divisible, he is, however, virtually or equivalently divisible; because the formal reason by which he is located, namely his operation, insofar as it is virtually transient, is divisible, as inferring and causing a divisible and extended effect in a corporeal place.

The second part, which is about discrete motion, is proved against Scotus and Molina: Discrete motion is that in which the mobile thing leaves the whole term from which at once, and immediately afterward acquires the whole term to which at once: But an Angel can furnish this: Therefore he can be moved by discrete motion. The Minor is proved, since an Angel is not dependent on place, nor commensurate to it, he ought not to be in it according to its exigency, nor consequently be moved continuously and by parts in a place, although that place be continuous, but he can leave that whole place at once, and immediately after similarly acquire another whole place at once; especially since an Angel is indivisible, and lacks extension; for the rational soul, by this very fact that it is indivisible, in a moment actuates the whole divisible body, and in an instant leaves the whole of it at once; and on the contrary a body, because it is extended and divisible, cannot leave a whole place at once, but it is necessary that the last part of it first go out from the last part of the place in which it is, and enter another place, before the first part does.

You will say, an Angel is not moved by discrete motion, while he is in the term from which, for in the term from which the mobile thing is not yet moved, but still rests; nor

when he arrives at the term to which, because when the mobile thing is in the term to which, it has already been moved, and is not moved further; nor as he is partly in the term from which, and partly in the term to which, because this belongs only to an Angel, when he is moved by continuous motion, as Saint Thomas teaches here, article 1, ad 1: Therefore an Angel is never moved by discrete motion, but only by continuous.

I answer that an Angel is not moved by discrete motion in neither term precisely and absolutely taken, but in each, as one says a relation to the other; for succession and the relation of one term to another has the notion of discrete motion, as Saint Thomas teaches in the place cited, and Cajetan proves in the same place, from the fact that discrete motion is nothing other than a number of diverse operations, by reason of which an Angel is successively in diverse places: Whence just as units compose number, not indeed absolutely considered, but one in relation to another; so also diverse operations compose discrete motion, not absolutely taken, but as one says an order to another.

§ II

Resolution of the second difficulty.

I say, secondly, an Angel can be moved by discrete motion, to distant places, passing from one extreme to another, without a middle. This is against Scotus, Suárez, Molina, Valentia, and other more recent authors, saying that this transit of the Thomists from one extreme to another, without the middle being passed through, is judged impossible as soon as it presents itself to the mind. But Vasquez severely censures them, disputation 196, chapter 3, where he says: Those more recent authors philosophize about spiritual things almost in all points after the manner of corporeal things, and it is necessary for them to abandon sensible things, and to investigate a higher mode of contemplating spiritual things. And certainly Saint Thomas, who wrote of the Angels angelically, and than whom no one penetrated their nature, motions, and operations more profoundly or more subtly, openly teaches our conclusion here, article 2, and Book 1, dist. 37, question 4, article 2, and in the same place to Annibaldus, question 2, article 1, ad 4, and Quodlibet 1, article 5, where he thus discourses: Because a body is in a place as contained by it, it is therefore necessary that in moving it follow the condition of place, namely that it pass through the middle before it arrives at the extremes of the place. But since an Angel is in a place through the contact of power, he is not subjected to a place as contained by it, but rather contains his place, being superior in virtue to the place; whence he does not have the necessity to follow, in his motion, the conditions of place, but it is subject to his will to apply himself through the contact of power to this place and to that, and if he wills, without a middle.

The conclusion can furthermore be proved by a twofold reason, which the Holy Doctor insinuates in the places cited. The first is: An Angel is in a place through operation, or through the free application of his power to a place: Therefore he can be moved by discrete motion from one place to another extreme, without transit through the middle. The consequence is proved; because just as from the fact that an Angel is in a place through the free application of his power to a place, it is free to him to apply his power to the whole place adequate to himself, or only to a part inadequately; so for the same reason, he can freely apply the same power to the extreme parts of some space, not applying it, or not operating, in the intermediate ones: in which case it is established that he will be moved from extreme to extreme, without transit through the middle.

The second is: A body cannot be moved from the extreme part of something to another extreme part, without transit through the middle, for this reason, that since it is in a place through commensuration to it, and as it were subjected to it, from the fact that it is contained by it, it ought to follow, in its motion, the laws of it: But an Angel does not so

exist in a place, but as containing and superior to it, and accordingly independent of it: Therefore he can be moved from one extreme to another, not passing through the middle.

It is confirmed: The body of Christ can cease to be in the middle part of the consecrated host (if it be corrupted), remaining in the extreme parts, for this reason, that it is there in an elevated, though supernatural, mode: But an Angel exists in a place, in an elevated, though natural, mode of being: Therefore he can exist in the extreme parts of some space, not existing in the intermediate ones, and accordingly be moved discretely from one to another, not passing through the middle.

It must be noted, however, that if an Angel, in moving himself from one place to another, wishes to carry some body, e.g., a stone, wood, or something similar, it is necessary that his motion be continuous, and accordingly he cannot pass from one extreme to another, without the middle being passed through; because those things, since they are corporeal, and exist in a place through quantitative contact, cannot be moved, unless they be moved by continuous motion, and through commensuration of their parts to the parts of the place.

You will object, first: An Angel cannot pass from future to past except through the present: Therefore neither from one extreme to another, except through the middle; for the order among the parts of space seems no less essential than that among the parts of time.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity: The reason of the difference is, that an Angel cannot, by reason of his duration, touch future parts of time, before they exist; for this is proper to eternity, which not only present, but also future and past, embraces in its most vast bosom, as we declared in the treatise on the knowledge of God: But the extreme parts of space, because they in fact exist, since they are permanent, an Angel can touch, without touching the intermediate ones.

You will say, the order prefixed to the parts of this universe, consists in this, that no creature can attain a later thing without a prior one: Therefore since an Angel cannot omit, or invert the order prefixed to the parts of this universe, he cannot touch the extreme parts of a space, without touching the intermediate ones.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, for as Cajetan excellently says, the situational order prefixed by God to the material parts of the universe, consists in this, that fire be above, earth below, air and water be intermediate between the two, etc. Whence an Angel cannot invert this order, by making one element occupy the place of another, or that

heavy things tend upward, and light ones downward. That order, however, does not require that an Angel touch the intermediate parts of a space, before the extreme; indeed rather, by reason of his immateriality and spirituality, he is immune from such a law, to which corporeal creatures are subject.

You will object, secondly: If an Angel could be moved from one extreme to another, without the middle being passed through, he would not have a limited sphere of his activity; for he could operate beyond it, at least in the case that the distance of the places, between which there would be discrete motion of the Angel, exceeded the breadth of the sphere of his activity.

On account of this argument some think that an Angel cannot be moved from one extreme to another, without the middle being passed through, when the extremes are not within the sphere of his activity. But it seems more probable, that he can be moved, without the middle being passed through, to whatever commensuration of place, however distant. Whence to the argument the sequel of the Major is denied, for in order that an Angel not have a limited sphere of his activity, he would have to, while remaining in the place in which he is, and consequently operating concerning it, simultaneously operate in another place however distant; which, however, in our opinion he cannot furnish: for we say, that when an Angel is moved by discrete motion, it is necessary that he cease to exist in the term from which, and to operate in it, that he may acquire another place, and arrive at the term to which.

§ III

Resolution of the third difficulty.

I say, thirdly, Angelic motion, whether continuous or discrete, cannot occur in an instant.

The first part is proved by an a priori reason: No successive thing can occur in an instant: But the continuous motion of an Angel is successive, since in such motion an Angel first applies his power to one part of space, then to another, and withdraws himself from one part of space before he touches another: Therefore the continuous motion of an Angel cannot occur in an instant.

It is confirmed: An Angel, by continuous motion, passing from one place to another, touches all the intermediate places: But an Angel descending, e.g., from heaven to earth, cannot touch all the intermediate places in a single instant: otherwise he would simultaneously touch several places adequate to his natural power, and would simultaneously be in heaven, and in the intermediate air, which is impossible, as

Damascene teaches, Book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3: Therefore an Angel cannot be moved in an instant by continuous motion.

These two reasons prove the same thing of discrete motion, for discrete motion too is successive, since it imports two operations of the Angel succeeding one another, one concerning the place he abandons, and the other concerning the place he acquires; for it is not by this understood to be moved, that he begin to occupy the whole following place, such that the operation by which he is in the place he abandons, does not pertain to motion: for if an Angel were newly created, while he began to be in a place, he would not be said to be moved locally for this reason alone, that he would not leave a term from which; and generally every motion properly taken, consists of two positive terms, for by this it differs from simple mutation, by which a subject passes from simple negation to form.

Furthermore, if an Angel in a single instant could touch two bodies by discrete motion, he could in a single instant exist in a twofold place adequate to himself; for we suppose that any body successively touched by an Angel, is the adequate place of him.

You will object, first: The local motion of an Angel consists in the acquisition of one place, and the abandonment of another: But an Angel in a single instant can acquire one place, and leave another: Therefore the local motion of an Angel can occur in an instant. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. When something is acquired in an instant, something else opposed and incompatible with it, is left in the same instant; for in the same instant in which form is in matter, its privation is removed; and in the same instant in which air is illuminated, darkness is expelled: But the term to which of an Angel's discrete motion is acquired in an instant: Therefore the term from which opposed to it, is left in the same instant; and accordingly in a single instant an Angel acquires one place, and leaves another, which is to be moved locally.

I answer by denying the Minor, and to its proof I distinguish the Major: When something is acquired in an instant, etc., through simple mutation, which is from a privative or negative term from which, I grant the Major. When it is acquired through proper motion, which is from one positive term to another positive term, I deny the Antecedent. For to remove negation or privation, the positing of form suffices; but to remove a contrary, or to overcome the breadth and distance which is between two positive terms, time is required. Whence because generation and illumination are simple mutations, in the same moment in which form is in matter, its privation is removed, and in the same instant in which air is illuminated, darkness is expelled. On the contrary, however, because the local motion of an Angel, whether continuous or discrete, is a

proper motion, proceeding from a positive term and place, to another positive term and place, and not a simple mutation, it is repugnant that in the same instant in which the term to which is acquired, the term from which be left, or the contrary; but for this at least two instants are required, not indeed of our time, which cannot immediately succeed one another, but of Angelic and discrete time, to whose prior, measuring the Angel's existence in the term from which, corresponds a part of our time, to whose posterior, however, which measures the acquisition of the term to which, corresponds an instant.

You will object, secondly: An Angel is not moved locally, while he is in the term from which, since he does not change place, as long as he exists in it: Therefore only when he is in the term to which: but he is in the term to which in an instant: Therefore he is moved in an instant.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: An Angel, while he is in the term from which, is not moved locally, completely and terminatively, I grant the Antecedent. He is not moved locally, incompletely and initiatively, I deny the Antecedent. For the Angel then has one initiative part of his motion, and dispositive toward another; for which it is not required that in that instant he change place, but it suffices that existence in the term from which belong to him, with an order to presence in the term to which, to be immediately acquired. Just as speech, which is a certain discrete quantity, is said to begin in the utterance of the first syllable, as saying an order to another immediately following.

From what has been said about Angelic motion you will understand that the celerity of the Angels is marvelous and altogether stupendous, and that it incomparably exceeds the velocity of all bodies: for an Angel can, by continuous motion, within a brief space of time, traverse a long space, and by discrete motion, in two instants, transfer himself from one place to another however distant, not passing through the middle, as is established from what has been said above. Whence Scripture, to declare this velocity, says that they operate in a moment, for Wisdom 18 has it that in one moment of time an Angel slew all the firstborn of the Egyptians. And Cyril of Alexandria, in the commentaries on Habakkuk, teaches that he was carried by the Angel's hands in a point of time into the den of lions where Daniel was, that he might bring him dinner, which the sacred text seems to indicate, when it says: "The Angel of the Lord took him by the crown of his head, and carried him by the hair of his head, and set him in Babylon, over the den, in the force of his spirit." Similarly the Holy Fathers so exaggerate this celerity of the Angels, that they say they are everywhere, and in a moment traverse the whole world. Every spirit is winged (says Tertullian), this is of the Angels and Demons: therefore in a moment they are everywhere. And Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 34: They traverse all places, they

are present nimbly to all, both on account of the promptitude of their ministry, and on account of the lightness of their nature. Likewise Chrysologus, Sermon 52: Since a thin nature does not know flesh, it passes through the whole world in a moment of time. Finally Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, last chapter: Theology has flowed to the winged feet of the holy Angels: for it declares the wing to lead upward with valiant celerity.

But if you ask, in what the locomotive power of an Angel consists, by which he is moved so promptly and swiftly? I shall answer that it is not distinguished from his intellect and will, but is the very practical intellect of the Angel, insofar as through an act of command, formally immanent, and virtually transient, he operates ad extra. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, text 40, says that intelligences move the heavens, as desiring and understanding. And Saint Thomas, Opusculum 12, article 1, thus says: The Angels move the heavens by the efficacious conception of their intellect. Reason also persuades this: for since in a simple and purely intellectual substance, there can be given only purely spiritual powers, which are only two, namely intellect and will, whatever it does, whether ad intra or ad extra, it does this wholly by the mediation of those powers, and accordingly it ought to operate through an act of command elicited by the intellect, as moved and applied by the will. In this, however, the command of an Angel differs from the command of God, that the first is of limited and finite virtue, and has a determinate sphere of his activity: the divine, however, is of infinite virtue and efficacy, and extends not only to those things which are, but also to those which are not, as the Apostle says, to the Romans 4.

If again you inquire, what is the measure of an Angel's being, and of his operations? I shall answer that an Angel's being is measured by the aeon; for it cannot be measured by time, which is the measure of corruptible things, nor by eternity, which is the measure of a thing altogether immutable: Therefore it ought to be measured by the aeon, which is the measure of a thing which, although it be invariable according to being, admits, however, variation according to operations: An Angel, however, although he be immutable according to substantial being, admits, however, with himself, mutability as to place, and as to diverse cognitions and affections, which he can exercise or not exercise, when he wills.

As for the operations of the Angels, some are measured by participated eternity, others by the aeon, others by discrete time, others finally by continuous time. For the beatific vision, which the blessed Angels enjoy, is measured by participated eternity, as we declared in the Treatise on the beatific vision. Natural cognition, by which they know themselves, and the love by which they naturally love themselves, are measured by the

aeon; because although operations of this kind are in themselves indefectible and incorruptible, they admit, however, some mutability on the part of the subject in which they are, and of other operations joined to them. The cognition, however, and love, by which the Angels know and love other things outside themselves, and their operations ad extra, or virtually transient, are measured by discrete time, if they be discrete, or continuous, if they be continuous. Time is called discrete, however, because just as number, which is discrete quantity, is composed from many units, so from many actions of the Angels succeeding one another, or rather from the durations of them, arises a certain measure of the Angel's operations, which we call discrete time: time indeed, because it is a duration having prior and posterior, which is proper to time; discrete, however, because those actions from which it arises, succeed one another, not continuously, but discretely, just as units in number.

Chapter VII

On the species by which the Angels understand.

Having explained these things which pertain to the substance of the Angel, considered both in order to himself, and in respect to other things, those things must be expounded which pertain to his cognition, which are chiefly three, namely its medium, or the species through which he understands, the things or objects which are attained by it, and the mode in which it occurs. Of the first we shall treat in this chapter, of the second and third in the following.

§ I

An Angel understands things other than himself through an accidental species, himself through his own substance, bearing the offices of an impressed, but not an expressed, species.

The first part is proved: An intelligible species by which some object is known, ought to represent it perfectly, since it is its formal similitude, as the Philosophers teach in the books On the Soul: But an Angel's substance cannot represent other things than itself perfectly: Therefore it cannot bear the offices of an intelligible species in the cognition of other things than itself, and accordingly for knowing them an Angel needs an accidental species, superadded to his substance. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. One thing cannot represent another perfectly, except either by reason of agreement and similitude with it, or by reason of causality: But an Angel's substance can represent other things in neither way; for it does not have formal agreement and similitude with so many beings, from which it is so greatly dissimilar, nor is it their cause, as is clear, since many of them can come to be only through creation: Therefore an Angel's substance cannot represent other things than itself perfectly; and in this it differs from God's essence, which, since it contains all created and creatable things, according to their proper differences, causally and eminently, represents them in the most perfect manner; whence, as the Holy Doctor says here, question 55, article 1, ad 3, God through His essence has proper knowledge of all things, but not an Angel.

The second part, asserting that an Angel knows himself through his own substance as an impressed species, is thus persuaded. In order that an object furnish the office of a form or intelligible species, three conditions are required and suffice: the first is, that it be of itself intelligible in act, and therefore material things, because they are not in act, but only in potency intelligible, insofar as they can be deputed by matter, cannot bear the offices of an intelligible species. Second, that it be proportioned in immateriality with the cognitive power, such that it be at least equally immaterial to it; for since it ought to be united to it as an intelligible form, it ought at least to equal it in immateriality. Third, that it be intimately present and united to it: But an Angel's essence has these three conditions, for since he is devoid of all matter, he is intelligible in act, and of the same immateriality as the angelic intellect; and since the intellect of an Angel is a property emanating from his substance, it is intimately conjoined to it; for a property and essence are most united, and more so than an intellect and a species coming from without: Therefore an Angel's substance furnishes the office of an intelligible or impressed species, in the cognition of himself.

But that he does not bear the offices of an expressed species, which is the third part of the assertion, is proved against Cajetan and Nazarius: This difference is found between an impressed and an expressed species, that an impressed species is an intelligible form, but an expressed species is in second act understood; such that the intrinsic being of the latter is to be understood, but the being of the former is to be intelligible, not yet reaching to the ultimate actuality of the intelligible order: But an Angel's essence, although it be of itself intelligible, is not, however, of such perfection and actuality, that it be of itself a form understood in second act: Therefore an expressed species is necessary, in which he might have such actuality, which he does not have of himself, and through which he might actually terminate his cognition. And certainly, if an Angel is not of such perfection and actuality, that he be his own intellection, much less can he be his own word, which is more distant from an Angel's substance, than his intellection, which mediates between the intelligible species and the word.

From this you will understand, that there is a wide difference between the cognition by which the blessed see God's essence, and that by which the Angels know their own substance: For the blessed do not produce a word, because although the divine essence is not denominated understood from eternity by the blessed, who did not yet exist, nevertheless by reason of its infinite immateriality, and most pure actuality, in both the intelligible and entitative order, as soon as the blessed intellect is suffused with the light of glory, it bears the offices of a word, and terminates its beatific vision actually and intrinsically. But an Angel's substance, since it is not pure act, neither in intelligible nor entitative being, cannot identify to itself the notion of a word, for the same proportional reason, on account of which it cannot identify to itself intellection. Whence Saint Thomas, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 11, says that in the Angels the understood intention is not their substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same, that is, because an Angel's substance is distinguished from his intellection.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: An Angel, through the species of a lion, e.g., perfectly knows the lion itself, and yet the lion is not contained formally or eminently in such a species, since that is an accident, but the lion is a substance: Therefore although an Angel's substance does not formally or eminently contain all natural beings, through it, however, as through an intelligible form, an Angel will be able to know them.

I answer that although the intelligible species by which an Angel knows a lion, does not formally contain the nature of the lion, in entitative being, it does, however, contain it formally, in intentional or intelligible being; indeed in such being it is the very substance of the lion, as our Thomists teach in the books On the Soul.

You will object, secondly, against the second part: It belongs to the notion of an intelligible species that it inhere in the intellect, since it cannot otherwise be united to it, than through inherence; that it be subordinated to it, since it is a principle by which of intellection, and every principle by which is subordinated to a principle which, and concurs effectively to intellection, since from the object, represented through an impressed species, and from the power, notice is generated: But an Angel's essence does not inhere in his intellect, since it is a substance; nor is it subordinated to it, since it does not depend on it; nor does it concur effectively to his intellection, since no created substance is immediately operative: Therefore it does not bear the offices of an intelligible species in the cognition of itself.

I answer that it is not of the notion of an intelligible species, that it inhere in the intellect, but this befits it per accidens, when namely it has accidental being; whence it is not necessary that it be united to the intellect through inherence, or informing, but it can be united to it by another, higher union, which is a certain identification, and can not incongruously be called intelligible informing. Similarly it is not of the notion of an intelligible species, that it be subordinated to the intellect, but this belongs to it only, when such a species is an accident. Nor does it matter, that it be a principle by which of intellection, for a principle by which is subordinated indeed to a principle which, when it depends on and is sustained by it; but if it be not sustained by it, but rather itself sustains it, it is not subordinated to it, but rather subordinates it to itself; whence since an Angel's essence sustains his intellect, it is in no way subordinated to it in the notion of species. From which is clear the response to that which is added about the active concurrence of the intelligible species, for it must be said that although it belongs to a species as such to influence actively into cognition, the mode of influencing is not, however, the same, when it is a substance, and when it is an accident; because when it is an accident, it is subordinated to the power, and accordingly immediately influences the act, just as the power does; but when it is a substance, it influences only mediately and radically. Whence from the fact that an Angel's substance bears the offices of an intelligible species in his own cognition, it does not follow that a created substance is immediately operative, but only mediately and radically.

You will object, thirdly, against the third part of the assertion: An Angel's substance is not only intelligible in act, but is also actually understood by the angelic intellect; for he is always in second act with respect to knowledge of himself, as we shall say below: Therefore he has sufficient actuality, that he bear the offices not only of an impressed species, but also of an expressed one, in the cognition of himself.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence: for although an Angel's substance be always actually understood by the Angel, this, however, belongs to him per accidens, and not essentially; otherwise it would be his intellection, and pure act in the intellectual order, as we showed above: but in order that he have the notion of a word or expressed species, he ought to be essentially understood, because it belongs to the essence of a Word to be actually understood, or to terminate actual intellection.

From what has been said is gathered, first, that one Angel cannot know others through his own substance, as through an intelligible species: for a species is the perfect and formal similitude of the object: But one Angel's substance is not perfectly assimilated to the substance of another, indeed it is of a diverse nature and species from it, as was shown in chapter 3: Therefore it is not, nor can it be, a representative species of it.

It is gathered, secondly, that one Angel cannot know another, through the substance of the known Angel bearing the offices of an intelligible species; both on account of the reason already assigned; also because, since it is of the notion of an intelligible species that it be united to the intellective power, and the substance of the known Angel cannot be united to the intellect of the knowing Angel, through inherence, or through informing, it would have to be united to it through influx into it, which is impossible, as we shall show below, when we treat of the illumination of the Angels. This reason Saint Thomas delivers, 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 68, where he thus discourses: The intelligible is within the intellect as to that by which it is understood: but no substance flows into a mind, except God alone, who is in all things through essence, presence, and power: it seems impossible, therefore, that a separate substance be understood by another through its own essence, and not through a similitude of it in that other.

It is gathered, thirdly, that an Angel, through his own substance as through a species, knows God as the author of nature: For if an Angel's substance has the notion of species and principle by which with respect to knowledge of himself, it ought also to be a species and intelligible form, with respect to the knowledge of those whose image and similitude it is; for by the same species by which the image is seen, the thing represented through it is also seen: But an Angel's substance is the image and similitude of God, according to that saying, Ezekiel 28: "Thou art the seal of similitude": Therefore by this very fact that it has the notion of a species with respect to knowledge of himself, it ought also to be a species, or bear the offices of a species, with respect to natural knowledge of God. And furthermore, because an Angel's essence is God's most perfect effect, in which the virtue of its cause shines forth, and through the effect the cause is known, an Angel's substance concurs to the knowledge of God, not only by way of species and unknown principle, but also by way of effect and known principle. Whence in the same way, proportion

being preserved, we ought to philosophize about an Angel's essence with respect to the knowledge of God, as about the divine essence with respect to the knowledge of creatures: for just as the divine essence is the medium by which and in which God and the Blessed know creatures; so also an Angel's substance has the notion of a medium by which and in which, in order to the knowledge of God the author of nature.

§ II

The species by which the Angels understand, are infused by God, not received from things.

It is proved, first, against Scotus, Gregory, and a few others, from Scripture, Ezekiel 28, where under the figure of the prince of Tyre, Lucifer is said: "The seal of the similitude of God, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty. Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation." But Lucifer could not have the fullness of wisdom, and be perfect from the day of his creation, unless then he had the species of all things, which are the perfections of the angelic intellect, without which there cannot be in it a fullness of wisdom: Therefore from Scripture an Angel had, from the beginning of his creation, the species of things instilled in him, and did not receive them successively in time from things.

The Holy Fathers also favor this, especially Dionysius and Augustine: For the former, chapter 7 On the Divine Names, says that the Angels do not gather divine knowledge from divisible or sensible things. The latter, Book 2 On Genesis to the Letter, asserts that things were first made in the minds of the Angels, than in their own natures: but they cannot be said to be made in the mind of the Angels, except in intentional being, which they have in the species. Nor is the response of Gregory valid, saying that Augustine does not speak of the natural knowledge of creatures, but of the supernatural, by which the things of this universe are known by an Angel in the Word, through the beatific vision. For Augustine there speaks of that knowledge which the Angels had from the moment they were made, or in the first instant of their creation, and which was common to all the Angels before the fall of the evil ones: But the Angels did not have supernatural knowledge of creatures in the Word, from the first instant of their creation, since they were not blessed in their creation, as we shall show below; nor was that common to good and evil Angels, as is established: Therefore Augustine there does not speak of the supernatural knowledge of creatures in the Word, through the beatific vision. Nor is it an obstacle that he calls that knowledge "in the Word," for as Saint Thomas teaches below, question 62, article 1, ad 3, even by natural knowledge does an Angel know things in the Word, although imperfectly.

The assertion can furthermore be proved by a twofold reason of Saint Thomas here, question 55, article 1. The first can be briefly and clearly proposed thus: The same order must be constituted (proportion, however, being preserved) between spiritual substances, which is preserved among corporeal ones: But in bodies, celestial things have their whole perfection from the beginning, through an unlosable form; it is otherwise, however, with sublunary things, which successively receive diverse forms, and are transmuted from one to another: Therefore likewise intellectual substances, such as rational souls, successively receive diverse forms or intelligible species; the superior ones, however, namely the Angels, from the first instant of their creation, are instructed with species and intelligible forms. Whence in the Book On Causes, proposition 10, it is thus said: every intelligence is full of forms.

It is confirmed: The angelic intellect, since it is a mean between the divine and the human, ought to behave in a middle way between each, as to intelligible species; whence it ought not to be so perfect, as the divine, which needs no other species for understanding, than its own substance; nor so imperfect, as the human, which is of itself pure potency, and is called a blank tablet, capable of all species; but it ought to have the species of all things, distinct indeed, but congenital, or instilled and infused by God, from the first instant of his creation.

The second reason of Saint Thomas proves specifically that an Angel cannot take species from corporeal and sensible things: for a purely immaterial substance, and one altogether absolved from body, such that it is never united to it, nor can be united as a form, does not have species from corporeal things: But an Angel behaves thus: Therefore he does not take species from corporeal and sensible things, but has them from God through infusion. The Major is proved, both because the mode of proper operation of some thing corresponds proportionally to the mode of the substance and nature of it: Therefore the operation of a substance altogether separated from body, and independent of it, cannot depend on corporeal things, and species received from them. Also because the reason why our soul is united to the body as a form, is that it may receive species from corporeal things, by the mediation of which it might be able to understand: Therefore a substance which is altogether absolved from body, and which cannot be united to it as a form, does not receive species from corporeal and sensible things.

Nor is it valid if you say with Scotus, that this reason indeed proves that the Angels do not receive species from corporeal things, by the ministry of the senses, as our soul receives them: it does not, however, demonstrate, that they do not receive them from sensible and corporeal things, as from objects. It is not valid, I say, this response: for

things of an inferior order cannot perfect, by way of object, a thing of a superior order, because that which is thus perfected, depends on that by which it is perfected, since the latter behaves as a formal cause with respect to it: Therefore since an Angel is of a superior order to corporeal and sensible things, he cannot even be perfected by them as by objects. Whence Saint Thomas, 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 96: The perfection of a superior nature does not depend on an inferior nature: but the perfection of a separate substance, since it is intellectual, is in understanding: their understanding, therefore, does not depend on sensible things, such that they receive knowledge from them. But if you say that the rational soul is immaterial and consequently of a superior order to corporeal and sensible things, and nevertheless receives its intellectual perfection from them: It is answered that although the rational soul be substantially of a superior order, being intellectual, nevertheless insofar as it is the form of the body, it pertains in a certain way to the order of sensible things; indeed even sensible things themselves, while they perfect the soul, enter in a certain way into its order, because they do not perfect it, except as they underlie the light of the agent intellect, and as they shine forth in the phantasm, which is the highest of the lowest sensible order, touching the lowest of the highest intellectual nature, namely the rational soul.

From these things you will understand, that an Angel cannot, even supernaturally, understand through species received from corporeal and material things; because if something corporeal and material cannot, by ordinary law, actuate and perfect that which is purely spiritual, it cannot do this either by extraordinary means and by absolute power. The reason is, because that which actuates and perfects another, behaves by way of formal cause with respect to it, since to actuate and perfect is proper to form, just as to be actuated and perfected is proper to matter: But a formal cause, since it does not cause otherwise than through its own communication, can furnish nothing supernaturally, other than what it does naturally, as our Thomists commonly teach, asserting that in formal causes there is not a distinction of ordinary and extraordinary power: Therefore if something corporeal and material cannot, by ordinary law, actuate and perfect that which is purely spiritual, it cannot do this either by extraordinary means, and by absolute power: e.g., because whiteness cannot, by God's ordinary power, perfect an Angel, this too it cannot do by absolute power.

If the Author of the Theology of Mind and Heart had penetrated this reason, he would not have despised it, nor called it exceedingly frigid, nor said that that doctrine about the formal cause was not to the point; because an Angel (he says) would not acquire those species, as a formal cause, but as an efficient one, producing them by divine virtue: which reason is indeed most frigid; for even if an Angel effectively concurred to their

acquisition, they would nevertheless perfect and actuate his intellect, and accordingly would behave after the manner of a formal cause with respect to it, and thus something corporeal and material, in the genus of formal cause, would perfect something purely spiritual, which cannot be done by God's absolute power.

You will say, although a species taken from corporeal things be material, God can nevertheless purify it from all material conditions, and thus purified, send it into an Angel's intellect: Therefore by God's absolute power, an Angel can understand through species received from corporeal things.

But I deny the consequence, for an Angel's intellect, in such a case, would not receive that species immediately from the object itself, but from God, whence it would behave in receiving it, just as if it were in no way taken from such an object, but produced by God alone. Or secondly it can be answered, that such a species, even thus purified from material conditions, still says a relation or dependence on the corporeal object from which it would be taken, as essential to it, and thus remains still corporeal; and accordingly not even in that case could an Angel receive it divinely; otherwise that which is corporeal and material, would actuate and perfect that which is purely spiritual.

You will object, first, if the species of the Angels were infused by God, and not received from things, they would be supernatural, for that which is infused by God, and can be done by Him alone, is supernatural.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, for since the species are not infused into the Angels by God as a supernatural author, but by God as operating according to the natural capacity of an Angel; just as the rational soul is created and infused by Him, when matter is disposed, they are not, nor ought to be called, supernatural.

You will object, secondly, to abstract species from sensible things is some perfection befitting the rational soul: Therefore it ought not to be denied to the angelic intellect, which is more perfect than the human.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence: for just as, although to understand by discourse is some perfection of the human intellect, nevertheless because it is only a perfection in a certain respect, having admixed imperfection, it does not befit the angelic intellect, as we shall say below; so likewise, because to have the power of educing species from sensible things does not say perfection simply, but only in a certain respect, since it supposes imperfection of potentiality and inferiority in the intellectual degree, it ought not to be found in the Angels.

You will say, that intellective nature which can reduce itself into act from its own principles, is more perfect than that which cannot: But human nature, by reason of the agent intellect, can reduce itself into the act of understanding, by acquiring species: Therefore if the angelic nature cannot do this, man will be of a more perfect nature, than an Angel. I answer that the Major is not universally true, for as Saint Thomas teaches, 1-2, question 5, article 5, ad 2, that nature which attains a nobler good, even if this occurs with external aid, is more perfect, and nobler than that which attains a more imperfect good from itself; for man is nobler than brute beasts, even though he cannot acquire his own perfection and beatitude, except with God's external aid.

You will ask, first, whether an Angel can receive species from spiritual things, for instance from other Angels? I answer negatively, for in order that one Angel produce intelligible species in the intellect of another, he would have to flow into his mind: but this is repugnant, as we shall show below, when we treat of the illumination of the Angels: Therefore also that. The Major is proved, since species of this kind, as spiritual, could not be diffused through a medium, an Angel would have to produce them immediately, by immediacy of the suppositum, within the intellect of another, and accordingly be constituted present within it, in the notion of the cause of such species: But this is to flow into the very confines of it: Therefore in order that one Angel produce intelligible species in the intellect of another, he would have to flow into his mind.

You will ask, secondly, whether the intelligible species of an Angel can be called, and are truly, his properties? I answer that they can be called his properties in a broad way, insofar as they are forms connatural to him, and this from a threefold head. First indeed, because they are owed to the Angel, for since he is the most perfect among intellectual creatures, he connaturally requires to be in complete first act for understanding, and for knowing all the natures of things pertaining to the order of the universe. Secondly, because the Angels received such species simultaneously with their nature in the instant of creation, according to which mode, original justice, if Adam had not sinned, would have been connatural to posterity, because they would have been born with it. Thirdly, the intelligible species are called connatural to an Angel, on account of the natural passive power and aptitude, which the angelic intellect has toward them, in which way the reception of light is called connatural to the diaphanous, and motion to heaven. Whence if an Angel were produced without species, or if the species infused into him by God were removed, he would suffer some violence; because that is called violent which is against the inclination of an active or passive principle; for although a second cause, with respect to God's concurrence, and a body with respect to the soul, do not have an active inclination, but only a passive one; nevertheless if such concurrence were denied to a

cause duly applied, and having complete and proportioned virtue for producing some effect, and if a soul were not infused into a body ultimately organized, they would suffer some violence.

They cannot, however, be called, nor are they truly, the intelligible species instilled into the minds of the Angels, the true and strict properties of them: for strict and rigorous properties ought to be determined from within, and not only from without, and invariably proceed or emanate from the essence: But the intelligible species instilled in the minds of the Angels have neither; for the angelic nature, of itself and from within, is not determined to having these species rather than others, but this depends only on the extrinsic and free will of God; wherefore if He had decreed to found another universe, consisting of other species and kinds of things, the Angels would not have had the species which they now have, but altogether diverse ones, whence Saint Thomas here, question 56, article 2, ad 4, says: If God had instituted to make more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species on the angelic minds: Therefore the intelligible species are not true and strict properties of the angelic nature, although they are connatural to it by the threefold title already explained.

Nor is it valid if you say, that the angelic nature is determined to having the species of natural things, supposing that they exist, and this suffices, that they be called true and strict properties of it. For sublunary matter, by this very fact that it is created by God, has a natural determination to having some form; nevertheless this does not suffice, for such a form to truly emanate from it by way of property: Therefore although the angelic nature have the aforesaid determination to species, it does not, however, suffice, that they be true and rigorous properties of it. Especially since the Angel's intellect is determined to having the species of natural things, supposing that they exist, from the fact that it is of itself pure potency, which naturally requires to be actuated by the intelligible in act; whence it is compared to species only by way of a passive and potential principle, not, however, in any way by way of an active principle, which, however, is required for the resultance of passions, as is taught in Philosophy.

Another reason in favor of our opinion can be taken from what was said in the preceding section: for an Angel, as we showed there, does not know other things than himself through his own substance: But this will be false, if his intelligible species are the true and rigorous properties of him: Therefore etc. The Minor is proved: he who comprehends some essence, knows in it all its properties, and accordingly if the intelligible species of an Angel are the true and rigorous properties of him, an Angel, by comprehending his own essence, will know all of them clearly and distinctly: But it is repugnant that such species be known from the force of knowledge of the essence, and that the objects represented

by them not be known, since intelligible species take species and distinction from the objects which they represent: Therefore if the intelligible species of an Angel are the true and rigorous properties of him, it will be false that an Angel does not know other things than himself through his own substance.

Nor is the response of a certain more recent Thomist valid, saying that with the essence comprehended, relative properties, and those saying an order to something extrinsic, such as intelligible species are, ought not to be known; but only absolute properties, and independent of whatever is extrinsic. For if this response were true, it would follow that an Angel could comprehend the rational soul, without its powers, namely intellect and will, being known; because although they emanate from the soul as its natural properties, they nevertheless say an order to something extrinsic, by which they are specified. Likewise the divine essence could be known, indeed even comprehended, without the relations and attributes, at least all of them, being known; because the relations are pure respects to a term; and among the attributes several regard creatures, and say an order to something extrinsic, such as omnipotence, providence, justice, and mercy: all of which is altogether false, and utterly alien from the common sense of the Theologians.

Nor is it of greater weight what the same Author adds, namely that the Angels comprehend propositions about a future contingent, and yet do not know, whether they be true or false, because truth and falsity are relative properties of such propositions. For the truth or falsity of propositions about a future contingent, since it is free or contingent, depends on the free decree of God as on the first root and cause of the whole futurition and contingency of things; whence such truth cannot be certainly known, unless such a decree becomes known through divine revelation: but natural objects, or the creatures of this universe, naturally and necessarily, and accordingly independently of God's decree and revelation, are represented through the intelligible species instilled in the minds of the Angels; and consequently it is repugnant that they be comprehended by an Angel, unless from the force of such comprehension, the creatures of this universe represented by them be known.

The arguments which are usually made against our opinion, remain resolved from what has been said, except one, which can be briefly thus proposed: Accidents which are produced through the same action by which substance is produced, are properties of it: But the intelligible species of the Angels were produced through the same action by which their substance was produced, namely through creation; for they could not be educed from it, because eduction presupposes a subject, but these species began with the very substance of the Angel: Therefore they are properties of the angelic nature.

I answer, first, the Major is not universally true, for not only properties, but also whatever accidents are connaturally owed to something, whether they be properties or not, are produced in the instant of generation through the same action through which the subject comes to be.

I answer, secondly, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, for species of this kind were produced through an eductive action. To the proof to the contrary it must be said, that for eduction it is not necessarily required that the subject be supposed prior in time produced and deprived of the form to be educed, but it suffices that it precede the form in priority of nature, and be produced through an action distinct from that by which the form is produced; whence eduction ought not always to occur with actual transmutation of the subject, but it suffices that it be of itself transmutative of it, as is established in the grace conferred on Adam and the Angels in the instant of creation; for that, according to the common opinion, was not created, but educed from their obediential potency; because although the subject did not precede in some instant deprived of such a form (for God, as Augustine says, was in the Angels simultaneously founding nature, and bestowing grace), it was, however, produced through a distinct action; whence although there was no actual transmutation of the subject there, that action was of itself transmutative of it, as productive of a form which was not necessarily connected with it, and which accordingly could suppose it prior in time produced. The same, with proportion, must be said in the present case.

§ III

The species of the angelic intellect are universal in representing, and the more universal, the higher the Angels are.

The first part is proved: The species of the angelic intellect are not taken from things, but infused by God, and immediately derived and exemplified from the divine essence, as we showed in the preceding section: Therefore they are universal in representing. The consequence is proved, for although species caused by an object, represent only that quiddity and nature from which they are caused, because from the very object from which they are caused, they have determination and limitation; those, however, which are infused by God, and which are immediately exemplified and derived from the divine essence, can represent several natures, just as the divine essence itself, as it is the species and exemplar of things, clearly and distinctly represents all created and creatable natures.

It is confirmed: those things which are dispersed in inferior things, are united in superior ones, whence all objects which are represented distinctly by individual species to individual external senses, are exhibited to the common sense through a single species;

and all things which are perceived by the senses, both internal and external, under really distinct specificative species, are attained by the intellect, under a single formal notion: Therefore since the angelic species are superior to ours, they will have the power of representing several things, which are not represented except through several inferior species, and accordingly will be universal in representing.

The second part, however, which asserts that the Angels, the higher they are, understand through the more universal species, is proved by a threefold reason of Saint Thomas. The first, which he has here, article 3, can be proposed thus: The more similar an Angel is to God in the intellectual order, the more he ought to understand through universal species: But he is more similar to God, the higher he is in essence: Therefore the higher he is than others in essence, the more he ought to understand through universal species. The Minor is established, the Major is proved. The more similar an Angel is to God in the intellectual order, the more he participates the divine perfections pertaining to such order: But to understand many things perfectly through one universal species, is a divine perfection, pertaining to the intellectual order: Therefore the more similar an Angel is to God in the intellectual degree, the more he participates such a perfection, and accordingly understands through a species representing many things distinctly, and accordingly more universal.

Nor is it valid, if you say, that that perfection of understanding through one most universal species, is not participable by a creature, just as neither is the notion of being through essence: for although (as Cajetan rightly observed) such a perfection cannot be participated by a creature, through approach to it, as power, wisdom, love, mercy, and similar attributes can be participated; it can, however, be participated through withdrawal from the opposite; just as the notion of being through essence is participated through withdrawal from nothing: Therefore the more perfect an Angel is in understanding, the more similar he is to God, through withdrawal from the opposite, namely from understanding through more, and less universal species, and accordingly he understands through fewer species, and more universal in representing.

The second reason, akin to the preceding, is had, 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 98, and can be thus formed: The angelic intellect is a mean between the divine intellect and the human, whence since a mean ought to participate something of each extreme, an Angel has something of the purity and actuality of the divine intellect, and something of the potentiality and composition of the human intellect; and consequently he does not understand all things through a single species, as God does, nor through species so particular as our soul, but through species more or less universal, according to his greater or lesser approach to God, and his greater or lesser withdrawal from our soul.

The third reason, taken from question 8 On Truth, article 10, is thus proposed: The more perfect an Angel is in nature, the more immaterial he is, and accordingly he requires more immaterial species: But intelligible species are the more universal in representing, the more immaterial they are: Therefore the higher an Angel is in nature, the more he requires species more universal in representing. The Major is clear, the Minor, however, is proved, both because it is proper to matter to contract, limit, and individuate, and accordingly the more something abstracts from matter, the more universal it will be. Also by induction, for (as we said above) the internal sense, because it is more immaterial than the external, knows through more universal species, and the intellect yet more through more universal ones, because it is more immaterial than the internal sense; finally because God, since He is pure act, and in the supreme degree of immateriality, through a single most universal species, namely His own essence, understands Himself and all other things.

These reasons prove not only that the Angels of a superior order, or hierarchy, understand through more universal species, as Ferrariensis thinks, but also that Angels more perfect in specific degree and nature, since they approach more to the divine similitude, and participate more of God's immateriality, than others less perfect in specific degree and nature, even though they be of the same order or hierarchy.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: An intelligible species takes its specific unity from the object which it represents: Therefore it is repugnant that one angelic species represent several natures specifically diverse, according to their proper differences, and consequently that it be universal in representing.

Some respond, that although the intelligible species which are received from things, take their specific unity from objects, those, however, which are infused by God, and exemplified and derived from the divine essence, such as the angelic species are, do not receive their specific unity from objects, but rather, on the contrary, the unity of the object depends on the unity of the species, just as a seal does not take specific unity from the sealed thing, but rather the sealed thing from the seal, although it express and represent very diverse things. This solution does not lack probability, nevertheless. I answer, secondly, that just as the specific unity of the sciences is not taken from the object materially and as regarded in the being of the thing, but as considered in the being of the knowable, and in the notion of object, as is usually explained in Metaphysics. So likewise the intelligible species of the Angels take specific unity from the natures which they represent, as they are one in the notion of object, and insofar as they underlie one formal notion under which, which constitutes the object in the notion of object, and is of one atomic species. But if you ask, what is that formal notion under which

constituting diverse natures represented through an angelic species, one formally and in the notion of object; I answer that it is a certain relation which those natures formally, as they are the object of one angelic species, import: such that one species of an Angel be, e.g., immediately representative of all stones or herbs, as they conduce to medicinal virtue, or as they pertain to the climates of this region: another be the similitude of birds, insofar as they serve such a region, or such an end, or according as they serve man, or insofar as they pertain to the adornment of a whole element, e.g., of air or earth, and so of others.

You will object, secondly, against the second part of the assertion: If, the higher an Angel is in nature, the more he ought to understand through more universal species, since the multitude of Angels exceeds the species of all material things, which can be represented through intelligible species, as we showed in chapter 3, much sooner than we should arrive at the supreme Angel, some must be assigned, who understands all material things through a single species. Similarly, descending from superior through inferior to the lowest, if the first understand all things through a single species, the next from the first through two, at last someone will occur, who will not be the last, who will have more species in his intellect, than there are species in things, because, as we taught in the place cited with Saint Thomas, there are more Angels, than species of material things in the universe. I add that God can create a first Angel more perfect, and accordingly one who understands all things through fewer species; whence if the first Angel knows all things through a single species superadded to his substance, a more perfect Angel newly created, would understand all things through his own substance bearing the offices of a species; which, however, is not to be admitted, since this is proper to God alone, to understand all things through His own substance as through a species.

I answer that although the higher the Angels are in nature, the more they ought to understand through fewer and more universal species, never, however, ascending from inferior to superior, before one arrives at the supreme, will one arrive at some being inferior to the supreme, who knows all inferior things by a single species; nor similarly, descending from superior through inferior to the lowest, will there occur someone, who will not be the last, who will have more species in his intellect, than there are species in things: because indeed the universality of the angelic species is not taken from the sole representation of several natures, but also from the representation of several intelligible notions, as Saint Thomas teaches, question 8 On Truth, article 10, ad 2, where he thus says: If a superior Angel knows all the species of animal through one species of animal, but an inferior only through many species, besides this the superior Angel knows more intelligible notions from the same things. Where by intelligible notions, cannot be

understood several properties of the same nature, for the same intelligible species represents specific quiddity, and simultaneously its properties. Nor several accidental modes, because if those pertain to the order of natural providence, they are represented through species which represent quiddities, or the singulars to which they occur; if, however, they belong to the order of grace and supernatural providence, they do not fall under the natural cognition of the Angels, but are known through infused knowledge, and revelations outside the Word: Finally through several intelligible notions cannot be signified, as some interpret, several individuals from possible things; for an Angel does not have a natural inclination to knowing merely possible things, since they are not parts of the universe, as will be established from what is to be said below. Whence by those intelligible notions must be understood the relations which created things have among themselves and to superior and more hidden causes, which relations can increase to infinity in created things, insofar as in them, from them, through them, more and more things to infinity can come to be; and therefore ascending, one will never arrive at some Angel inferior to the supreme, who by a single species attains all of them; nor descending will there occur someone before the last, who will have more species in his intellect, than there are, in created things, relations and respects to other created things, and to superior causes.

You will say, any Angel comprehends all things which are in the universe: Therefore he sees all the relations which created things say to one another and to superior causes. But I deny the consequence, for although any Angel comprehend all things which are in the universe as to absolute notions, he does not, however, as to relative ones. Whence just as a wood-craftsman knows indeed comprehensively all the absolute accidents which are in wood, for instance length, width, strength, color, and similar things, but not all the relative ones, for instance he does not see those which a sculptor attains in order to diverse figures, nor does the sculptor see those which a shipbuilder attains; nor does the latter see those which can serve other arts. So in the Angels, inferior ones do not know those hidden notions and connections of causes which are perceived by superior ones; or if they know them, they attain them through more species, and thus there always subsists a greater universality of species in superior Angels, because while an inferior expresses two relations in one species, a superior represents three, and thus ascending to the supreme ones.

To that which is added in the objection, Cajetan responds here, article 3, that with a superior Angel created, a new species would necessarily be superadded to all the inferior Angels, by which they could distinctly know him; and thus in that one who was formerly supreme there will be two species, supposing that before he understood by only one; but

in that one newly made there will be a single species by which he will know all things. And thus in the same way it must be said, if one proceed to infinity, for always the superior will have fewer species, not by lessening in the supreme, but by addition or multiplication in the inferior ones.

Chapter VIII

On the object of angelic cognition.

It is established from what has been said at the end of the preceding chapter, § 1, that an Angel knows God, himself, and other Angels. It is also certain that the Angels know singulars, even material ones. For as the Holy Doctor discourses here, question 57, article 2, the Catholic faith teaches that these lower things are administered through the Angels, according to that saying, to the Hebrews 1: "They are all ministering spirits": But if they did not have knowledge of singulars, they could have no providence over those things which are done in this world, since acts belong only to singulars.

But if you ask, by what species are these known by them? I answer that they are known through the same species by which the specific nature is known by them. For since such a species is a participation of the divine essence, insofar as it has the notion of an intelligible species, just as the divine essence represents the specific nature with all its individuals, so also does the angelic species; for this is not repugnant to it, since, notwithstanding such representation, it is simply finite, and infinite only in a qualified sense, insofar as it can extend itself to all the possible individuals contained in the power of natural causes, which are infinite categorematically and according as they are infinite. I add that the reason our intellect's species, in the present state, directly represents only the common nature, is that it comes about through abstraction from phantasms, and accordingly from singularity: But this reason ceases in the species which an Angel uses, as one which is not taken from things by the mediation of a phantasm, as was shown in the preceding chapter: Therefore such a species represents not only the specific nature, but also all its individuals.

This being premised, in order that all the objects of angelic cognition be declared, there remains to be resolved a celebrated difficulty, namely whether the Angels know naturally future contingents, and the secret thoughts of hearts.

I say, therefore, first, that future things which depend on free will, cannot be certainly known by the Angels by natural power. This is gathered from Sacred Scripture, and the Holy Fathers, asserting that foreknowledge and prediction of future things of this kind, is so proper to God, that it is the most certain sign and argument of divinity. For Isaiah

41 says, addressing the idols: "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Whence Tertullian, Apology 20: I consider a fitting testimony of divinity to be the truth of divination. And Origen, Book 6 Against Celsus: The prediction of future things is the character of divine speech. Likewise Chrysostom, Homily 18 on John: Certain prediction of future things is the work of the immortal God alone. There is added the common consent of men, for among all nations to foreknow future free things to be executed by others is called divine, so that by this it is signified that such foreknowledge is something divine, and most proper to God.

The conclusion can furthermore be proved by a twofold reason: The first is a posteriori, for if the Angels could know these things by natural power, God would not deny them this knowledge, nor would He perpetually impede them from an operation naturally owed to them: But it is established from histories that the oracles of the Demons are full of lies: it is a sign, therefore, that free and contingent future things cannot be certainly known by the Demons, because if they could, they would always have predicted them, since this itself they especially affect, to emulate divinity, according to that saying of Tertullian in the Apology, chapter 22: The demons, taking certain chances of times, imitate divinity while they steal divination.

The second reason is a priori, and can be thus proposed: Free and contingent future things can be known in only two ways, either in their causes, or in themselves: But the Angels cannot certainly know them in their causes, as being indifferent and undetermined to their position, nor in themselves, since they do not yet exist, and since they are not present in time, but only in eternity, which is not the measure of angelic cognition, but only of divine. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 57, article 3: Because God sees all things in His eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time, and includes it; therefore God's gaze is carried into all things which are done through the whole of time, as into things present, and He sees all things as they are in themselves. The angelic intellect, however, and any created intellect, falls short of divine eternity: whence a future thing cannot be known by any created intellect as it is in its own being: Therefore the Angels cannot naturally know free and contingent future things.

You will say with Vasquez, that although free and contingent future things cannot be naturally known by the Angels, in their causes, or in themselves, they can well be known in the objective truth of contradictory propositions which can be formed by them, since it is the nature of such propositions, that antecedently to any determination of causes, one be determinately true, and the other false. But we extensively impugned this solution and doctrine in the Treatise on the knowledge of God, where we showed that

propositions about a future contingent are not determinately true, in the sign antecedent to the decree, or the free determination of the first cause, but only indeterminately and under disjunction, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches, question 16 on Evil, article 7, in these words: Those things which stand toward either alternative cannot be foreknown determinately in their causes, but under disjunction, namely because they will be or will not be, for thus they have truth. I add that even if in future contingents there were given determinate objective truth, antecedently to the determination of causes, the Angels would not naturally know it, because it would not pertain to the order of the universe, which is a physical, real, and exercised order of being, and not merely objective: but the intelligible species of the Angels represent only those things which pertain to the order of the universe, as will be clear from what is to be said in the following conclusion.

What we have said of free future contingents, must also be said of fortuitous or casual future things; for these have no determination in any second cause, in which they can be certainly and infallibly known, but occur altogether per accidens, as Saint Thomas teaches below, question 115, article 6, where he thus says: That some earthly ignited body be generated in the highest part of the air, and fall down, has some celestial power for its cause. And similarly also that on the surface of the earth there be some combustible matter, can be reduced to some celestial principle. But that falling fire should meet with this matter, and burn it, has no celestial body as its cause, but is per accidens.

As for the past, likewise it must be said that the Angels cannot naturally know contingent or free past things, which they did not perceive as present, and which have left no trace of themselves. For those behave with respect to the angelic intellect, as if they had never been; wherefore one must philosophize about them in the same way as about future things not yet existing. Whence Scripture equally denies to the Angels, and reserves to God alone, knowledge of the past, as of the future, as is clear from Isaiah 41, where the Prophet, to show that idols are not true Gods, says by apostrophe: "Draw near, and tell us whatsoever things are to come: shew the things that shall come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods."

I say secondly, that the Angels cannot, by the powers of their nature, and God's revelation or special direction of the one thinking being excluded, certainly know the secrets of hearts, or the thoughts and affections of the human or angelic mind. This conclusion is delivered no less openly than the preceding by Scripture and the Holy Fathers, asserting that the knowledge of the secrets of hearts is proper to God: 3 Kings 8, and 2 Chronicles 6: "Thou alone knowest the hearts of the children of men." Jeremiah 17: "The heart is perverse (or, as the Seventy translate, deep) and unsearchable, who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart, and prove the reins." On which passage

Jerome: No one knows the secrets of thoughts, except God alone. And Chrysostom on John: The knowledge of human hearts belongs to God alone, who formed them. And this the Fathers judge so true, that from the knowledge of the secrets of the heart, they demonstrate the divinity of Christ against the Arians. For Jerome, from that passage of Luke 11: "As Jesus saw their thoughts," thus reasons: No one can see their thoughts, except God alone: Therefore Christ is God. Similarly Chrysologus, Sermon 50, says to the Pharisee, whose heart Christ knew, Luke 7: Take the marks of His divinity: hear that He has penetrated the secret of your breast: behold that He has arrived at the hiding places of your thoughts.

The conclusion can furthermore be proved by a threefold reason taken from Saint Thomas. The first is: the free acts of our will ought to be perfectly under its dominion. But the will would not have full and perfect dominion over its acts, if, against its will, its election and deliberation were naturally visible to other creatures; for this election would be, so to speak, as it were of public right, nor would it perfectly belong to its own principle: Therefore the secrets of the human heart do not lie open to alien eyes.

The second is had in the commentary on that passage of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 2: "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" where he thus discourses: Neither a good nor an evil Angel can know those things which lie hidden in the heart of man, unless they be manifested through some effects. The reason of this matter can be taken from the very word of the Apostle, who says that the spirit of man knows for this reason those things which lie hidden in the heart of man, because the spirit of man is in man: But an Angel, neither good nor evil, can flow into the human mind, so as to be in the very heart of man, and operate within it, but this is proper to God alone: whence God alone is conscious of the secrets of man's heart, according to that saying, Job 16: "Behold my witness is in heaven, and He that knoweth my conscience is on high."

The third is taken from question 8 On Truth, article 13, and from question 16 On Evil, article 8, and can be thus proposed: The Angels know nothing naturally, unless it be contained within the order of the universe, of which they are parts: But the free acts of the created will, remaining within it, and inferring no effect ad extra, do not pertain to the order of the universe: Therefore they cannot naturally be known by the Angels. The Major is commonly taught by Theologians, and can be proved from the fact that some limit ought to be assigned to angelic cognition, just as a determinate sphere is assigned to their activity: but no other limit can be assigned to it, than the breadth of the universe, of which it is a part; otherwise, if it extended beyond itself, it would have to be carried connaturally not only to existing things, but also to future ones, indeed even to merely

possible things; which is repugnant, since an Angel does not have the species of merely possible things. The Minor, however, in which is the difficulty, is thus shown. The order of the universe consists in this, that particular causes have a concatenation with universal ones, or in this, that inferior things be ruled and moved by superior ones, as Saint Thomas teaches, Quodlibet 6, article 10; whence in order that some inferior and particular cause, and its operation, pertain to the order of the universe, they ought to have necessary connection with other natural and universal causes, and be apt to be moved by them: on the contrary, however, if some particular cause be of such condition and eminence, that in its operations it does not depend on natural and universal causes, but on God alone, who is outside and above the whole order of the universe, it is fitting that such operations be outside, and in a certain way above, the whole order of the universe: But the human will, by reason of the liberty and perfect dominion which it has over its free acts, is of such a nature, perfection, and eminence, that in them it depends on God alone; because He alone can flow into it, and operate within it: Therefore the free acts of the created will do not pertain to the order of the universe, but exist outside it, and in a certain way above it.

You will say, Saint Thomas above, question 19, article 8, says: God wills some things to happen necessarily, some contingently, that there be order in things, for the completion of the universe: Therefore free acts pertain to the order of the universe.

I answer that Saint Thomas, by those words, only wishes to declare that the perfection of the universe requires that in it there be some necessary acts, and others contingent, or free; not, however, that it demand these or those determinately, but indeterminately, according as the free cause shall have willed. Whence they cannot be determinately known by the Angels, except only when they are directed to them: for then, from the force of such direction, they begin to pertain to them, and accordingly to the order of the universe; because those things pertain to the order of the universe, which are ordered either to it, or to some part of it, as will be more declared below, when we treat of the speech and illumination of the Angels.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: The Demons sometimes predict many free and contingent future things, either through themselves, or through men whom they inspire, such as changes of kingdoms, the outcomes of wars, and similar things which depend on the free wills of men: But in the Demons there is given no supernatural light, but only the natural knowledge which remained in them after sin: Therefore the Angels can naturally know future contingent and free things.

I answer that the Demons sometimes predict future things, not because they certainly know them by the powers of their nature, but because God, immediately or by the mediation of good Angels, reveals them, on account of the hidden ends of His providence: just as also sometimes He reveals many things through evil and impious men, as is established of Balaam, Caiaphas, and the Sibyls. So Augustine, Book 2 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 17. Or secondly it can be said, that the Demons truly predict things from revelations made not to themselves, but to others, from whose sayings, or writings, or other signs, they can know them, as Tertullian affirms in the Apologeticus, chapter 22, in these words: They also snatch at the dispositions of God, now from Prophets preaching, now from readings resounding. Thus, taking certain chances of times, they imitate divinity, while they steal divination. Thirdly it can be answered, that the Demons know future things from conjectures and the influences of the stars, which they know most excellently: for since they know that the greatest part of men follow their passions, excited by the influences of the stars, rather than reason, they often foresee several things certainly, at least conjecturally, and predict them as true, although they know them only conjecturally. So Saint Thomas, 2-2, question 95, article 5, ad 2. Similarly also the Demons sometimes reveal certain thoughts of the human heart, not because they certainly understand them, but because they explore and conjecturally know them from the internal alteration of the bodily temperament, or from certain external indications. For as the same Holy Doctor rightly says here, question 57, article 4, the Demons can, through external indications, such as pulse, alteration of countenance, and other affections of the body, apprehend the affections of the mind; which also physicians do; but they do this the better, the more subtly they notice and weigh such corporeal changes. Of which see Cassian, Conference 7, chapter 15.

You will object, secondly: The species instilled in the minds of the Angels are representative not only of existing singulars, but also of future ones. Therefore since any Angel comprehends his species, he will naturally know in them not only existing things, but also future ones.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence; for although the species instilled in the minds of the Angels are of themselves representative of singulars which will have existence in some difference of time, they do not, however, represent them in fact and in exercised act, for lack of some condition necessary for their actual representation, namely their actual existence and duration. For as Saint Thomas says here, article 2, ad 3: Those things which are present, have a nature by which they are assimilated to the species which are in the mind of the Angel, and thus can be known through them: but those things which are future, do not yet have a nature by which they

might be assimilated to them, whence they cannot be known through them. This can be explained by the example of a mirror, which, however perfect it be, represents only objects which exist, not, however, those which will exist, not from a defect of representative power in itself, but from a defect of the object, which is not representable. Wherefore just as when a mirror in fact represents some object, which before it did not represent, this does not occur through a change of itself, but rather through a change of the object, which becomes present to it and is placed before it. So likewise the angelic species, which represented only the specific nature, represents individuals, as existing, or future, without intrinsic change of itself, only some extrinsic connoted thing being posited, namely the existence or futurition of the object. Whence Saint Thomas, Quodlibet 7, article 3, ad 2: When something newly begins to be present, the Angel newly knows it, no mutation or innovation being made in the Angel himself, but in the knowable thing, in which there is something which before was not. And question 16 On Evil, article 7, ad 13: That a demon (he says) does not know that which is future, does not arise from the fact that his intellect is in potency, but from the fact that the future singular does not yet participate the form of nature, whose similitude actually preexists in the demon's intellect.

These testimonies of the Holy Doctor a certain more recent Thomist did not see, when he said in his Theology of Mind and Heart, that it is difficult to grasp that a species represent something new, which it did not represent before, unless some intrinsic perfection accede to it. For the representation of a species (he says) is something intrinsic, not an extrinsic denomination: Therefore in order that the angelic intellect represent something which it did not represent before, either it must be suffused with new species, or those which it has infused must acquire a new perfection. But the example of the mirror adduced above, which through the mere change of the object represents in fact something which it did not represent before, declares clearly enough that this matter is not so difficult to grasp. It can, however, be further explained and confirmed, by the example of the relation of paternity, actually terminated at a single son, which, without any change of itself, or addition of anything intrinsic, is terminated at and extended to others newly begotten. The same by the example of the divine essence, which, as it has the notion of an intelligible species antecedently to the decree and determination of the divine will concerning the production of things, does not represent them as existing, or future; and yet after the said determination, without its being understood that anything be superadded to it in the notion of species, it represents the same as existing, or future. The same, with proportion, must be said of the angelic species (which indeed has an excellent mode of representing, insofar as it is an expression and participation of the mode of representing of the divine essence, from which it was exemplified and derived),

namely that it can, without intrinsic change of itself, represent existing or future individuals, which it did not represent before, by this alone, that they pass from the state of mere possibility, to the state of existence, or futurition. Whence it is false what the aforesaid Author says, namely that actual representation in the angelic species is some intrinsic perfection supervening upon them, for it is only a new connotation of the object as present or future, which was not there before, from a defect of existence, or futurition of the object.

You will object, thirdly, against the second conclusion: An Angel can naturally know whatever is contained within the object proportioned to his intellect: But free acts are contained within the object proportioned to the angelic intellect: Therefore they can be naturally known by an Angel. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. Every natural entity is contained within the object proportioned to the angelic intellect: But free acts (since they are not supernatural, as we suppose) pertain to the natural order: Therefore they are contained within the object proportioned to the angelic intellect.

I answer, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, and to its proof, I distinguish the Major: Every natural entity, pertaining to the physical order, is contained within the object proportioned to the angelic intellect, I grant the Major. Every natural entity, regarding the moral and free order, I deny the Major. For as we said above, the object proportioned to the angelic intellect is only that which pertains to this universe, and has connection with it: but those things which pertain to the moral and free line, are outside this universe, since they do not depend on natural and universal causes, but on God alone, who is outside and above the whole order of the universe, and accordingly do not pertain to the object proportioned to the angelic intellect.

You will say, two objects of the same nature, are equally proportioned or disproportioned to two minds even of the same species and nature: But the thought of the heart of one Angel, e.g., of Michael, and the thought of Gabriel, are two objects of the same nature, and the mind of Gabriel and the mind of Michael, are of the same species: Therefore the thought which is in the heart of Gabriel is naturally equally proportioned to Michael, that he know it, as to Gabriel himself, who sees it in his own heart.

I answer with the same distinction: two objects pertaining to the physical order, I grant the Major: pertaining to the moral order, I deny the Major. For those things which pertain to the moral and free order, depend only on the will from which they proceed, and on him to whom such a will is subject, and who can flow into it and operate within it; and accordingly the thought elicited by Gabriel is proportioned only to him, that he

naturally know it, and to God, who alone can flow into the angelic mind, and operate within it.

From these things you will understand that the Angels cannot naturally know the mysteries of grace, for instance the mystery of the Incarnation, or of the Eucharist, since these are disproportioned to the angelic intellect, not only on account of liberty, since indeed they depend on the divine will alone, but also on account of supernaturality, by which they transcend all natural powers of any created and creatable intellect, whence they cannot be known except by divine revelation and supernatural light. Of which more at length in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

Chapter IX

On the mode of angelic cognition.

Concerning the mode of angelic cognition four difficulties occur, to be briefly resolved here. First, whether an Angel always and necessarily understands himself. Second, whether he discourses, or can discourse. Third, whether he understands by composing and dividing. Fourth, whether the inferior Angels comprehend the superior.

§ I

Resolution of the first difficulty.

I say first, an Angel always and necessarily understands himself.

This is proved by a reason of Saint Thomas, 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 96, where he thus discourses: Every living substance has some operation of life in act from its nature, which is always in it, although other things may be in it sometimes only in potency; just as animals are always nourished, although they do not always sense: But separate substances are living substances, nor do they have another operation of life except to understand: it is fitting, therefore, that from their nature they be always actually understanding. But no other object can be assigned which the Angels always and necessarily understand, than their own substance: both because their intellect is united to no other object more connaturally, than to its own substance; also because they always have it present, and are informed by it in intelligible being, as is established from what has been said above in chapter 7. Wherefore just as if the species of some object naturally affected the pupil of the eye, it could not desist from seeing it; so an Angel cannot cease from cognition of himself, but always and necessarily knows himself in second act. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 2, dist. 11, question 1, article 1, ad 4: An Angel is always in actual consideration of himself.

It is confirmed: Every motion, according to the order of nature, ought to be reduced to a first motion determined by nature itself, which is the cause of the others; whence in an animal all vital motions are reduced to the motion of the heart, which is, as it were, a property of animal nature, and always belongs to it, as Saint Thomas teaches in the Opusculum on the motion of the heart: Therefore likewise every natural cognition and volition of an Angel, ought to be reduced to the cognition and love of himself, as to the first operation, determined by and proceeding from nature itself.

You will say, no object, except God clearly seen, can necessitate the intellect and will to the cognition and love of itself: Therefore an Angel cannot be necessitated by his own substance to the cognition and love of himself. I answer that although an Angel is not necessitated to the cognition and love of himself, by his own substance, as by an object, since it does not have every kind of goodness; well, however, as by a principle, insofar as the cognition and love of self is a property of the Angel, emanating from his essence, in almost the same way that the motion of the heart flows as a property from animal nature.

From these things you will understand that an Angel always and necessarily knows God, as the author of his nature; for he cannot comprehend his own essence, unless he see the dependence which he has on God, and accordingly unless he always and necessarily know Him as the author of his nature.

§ II

Resolution of the second and third difficulties.

I say secondly, the Angels do not understand by discourse properly so called, nor by composing and dividing. So Saint Thomas here, question 58, articles 3 and 4.

The first part is proved by a fundamental reason: For a true and proper intellectual discourse, distinction and plurality of acts is required, of which one be the cause of the other, namely the act or cognition of the more known object, of the act or cognition of the less known object: But in the Angels such distinction and order or causality of cognitions is not found: Therefore neither is intellectual discourse properly so called. The Major is established, for one cognition understanding several things in one principle, is not discursive, but intuitive. Likewise two cognitions succeeding one another, without causality and dependence of one on the other, are not true and proper discourse, but only improper, as Saint Thomas teaches above, question 14, article 7. Whence there is a great difference among these three: to see something in another, to see after another, and to see from another. For God sees all things in Himself, yet not after

another, or from another: the Angels see one thing after another, yet not from another, as will soon be clear: men, however, see one thing after another, and from another. To see in another denotes complete simultaneity on the part of the act, and priority and posteriority, or dependence, between objects, such that one be the reason of knowing the other. To see after another denotes succession on the part of acts, without causality and dependence of one on the other. To see from another, however, imports not only plurality of acts, but also causality and dependence of one on the other. The Minor, however, in which lies the difficulty, is thus shown. All things which an Angel knows, he penetrates by a single simple intuition; for he sees conclusions in principles, effects in causes, and causes in effects: Therefore he does not have distinct cognitions of the things he knows, one of which be caused by another. The consequence is clear. The Antecedent is proved. In us, from the imperfection of species, and the weakness of intellectual light, it comes about that we do not immediately, from the force of the vision of principles, intuit the conclusions contained in them, and that, the cause being known, we do not immediately know its effect, or, the effect being known, we do not immediately penetrate its cause: Therefore since an Angel has perfect intellectual light, and is instructed with universal species representing all things, he penetrates all things by a single intuition, and immediately sees conclusions in principles, effects in causes, or causes in effects. Whence the Angels are called intelligences, but men are called rational; because indeed the latter arrive at the knowledge of truth by reasoning; the former, however, know all things by a single simple intuition. And certainly (as Saint Thomas reasons) those things which are perfect in some genus, ought not to acquire their perfection, in the way that those which are imperfect in the same order do; whence heaven does not acquire its perfection through the motion of alteration and augmentation, as inferior bodies do: since, therefore, an Angel is perfect in the intellectual order, he ought not to acquire his perfection through discursive motion, in the way that the human intellect does, which holds the lowest place in the same genus. Whence Dionysius, chapter 7 On the Divine Names, says that an Angel does not gather divine knowledge from diffuse discourses, that is, from discourses and mental reasonings.

You will say with Suárez and other more recent authors, that these reasons of Saint Thomas prove indeed that in the Angels there is no discourse concerning natural objects, but do not convince, however, that they do not use discourse concerning supernatural things, future contingents, the thoughts of the heart, and other things of this kind, since these are not evidently known to them, as natural objects are.

But on the contrary: grace does not depress nature to an inferior order, but rather ennobles it, and elevates it to a superior one; otherwise through grace man or an Angel would become of worse condition, which is absurd: Therefore an Angel, in knowing supernatural things, is not depressed to an inferior mode of knowing of his nature, such as is the mode of knowing by discourse, but rather is elevated to the mode of knowing proper to God and connatural, which is participated from the supernatural light. Whence such light of itself is not discursive, as Saint Thomas teaches, 2-2, question 9, article 1, but only on the part of the subject, when namely it is in a subject of itself discursive; wherefore since an Angel is not by his nature discursive, he does not receive such light as discursive, and accordingly does not discourse even concerning supernatural things; but just as through natural light he knows by a single simple intuition that Peter is a man and is capable of laughter, so by the supernatural light of faith, by a single intuition, in this principle, "Christ is man," he sees that He is capable of laughter.

Similarly when he explores future contingents, the secrets of hearts, then he conjectures indeed, but does not discourse; because by the same gaze and act by which he sees the effect, he sees the connection, whether necessary or probable, which it has with other things.

From these things is proved the second part of the conclusion, which asserts that an Angel does not understand by composing and dividing: for from the same principle by which it was shown that an Angel does not discourse, it is also deduced that he does not use formal composition and division: because just as in the principle he sees conclusions, so also, some subject being known, he knows also, by one simple act, all things which agree or are repugnant to it: Therefore just as he does not discourse, so neither does he compose nor divide.

You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: An Angel can, at his liberty, use any of his species inadequately, not contemplating all things which shine forth in it: Therefore he can proceed from one partial object of his species first known, to another partial object of the same species to be known, and accordingly discourse.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence; for when an Angel uses his species inadequately, he does not do this as if he knows one thing, and afterward infers another, from the force of the connection of one with another; but because at his will he applies the species now to one object now to another, but he furnishes each immediately, not illatively.

You will object, secondly: The Angels are admirative concerning supernatural objects, as is clear from that passage, Isaiah 63: "Who is this that cometh from Edom?" and from

that, Canticle 3: "Who is she that goeth up by the desert, as a pillar of smoke?" But he who is capable of admiration, is also capable of discourse: Therefore the Angels are capable of discourse, at least concerning supernatural things.

It is confirmed: when the Demons, having seen Christ's miracles, conjectured Him to be the Son of God, or when from certain signs or external indications they hunt for and explore the secrets of hearts or future contingents, all things necessary for discourse concur there: for there are found several acts, of which one is caused by another, namely the sight of Christ's marvels, and the suspicion of His divinity; the sight of this external sign, e.g., alteration of countenance, and the suspicion of such knowledge conceived in the mind: Therefore the Angels discourse at least concerning those things which they cannot know naturally, such as future contingents, and the secrets of hearts.

To the objection I answer that admiration in us contains three things, namely knowledge of a hidden thing, comparison of it with a hidden cause, and desire of knowing the cause, and this is found in the Angels indeed as to the first, but not as to the two latter, from the fact that they attain the effect and the cause by the same notice.

To the confirmation I deny the Antecedent, for while the Demons, seeing Christ's miracles, conjectured Him to be the Son of God, there did not intervene there a real plurality of acts, but there was one simple cognition, by which, from the sole penetration of those marvelous effects, they conjectured Christ to be the Son of God, and the promised Messiah. Similarly when from external signs they explore the secrets of hearts, or future contingents, by the same gaze and act by which they see the effect, they understand the probable connection which it has with those signs and effects.

You will say, it is repugnant that one and the same act be simultaneously evident and obscure, certain and opinionative, necessary and free: But the cognition of Christ's marvels was to the Demons evident, certain, and altogether necessary; the cognition, however, of His divinity, inevident, uncertain, opinionative, and contingent: Therefore there was a double act there, not a single one.

I answer by denying the Major, for just as it does not imply that the same act of cognition be simultaneously abstractive and intuitive, with respect to diverse things; as is established in the beatific vision, which is intuitive of God and of existing creatures, abstractive, however, with respect to possible ones; and in angelic cognition, for an Angel knows his own essence intuitively, and God represented through it only abstractively: so likewise it is not repugnant that the same act of the intellect be evident and obscure, necessary and opinionative, by order to diverse objects: indeed often in us are found acts having all conditions of this kind; for it happens many times that some principle is

known by us evidently by natural light, and simultaneously in it certain conclusions only confusedly and opinionatively; because we do not simultaneously penetrate, with the truth of such a principle, the truth of those conclusions, or the necessary connection of such a principle with those conclusions.

You will object, thirdly, against the second part of the conclusion, in which we said an Angel does not know by composing or dividing: Truth and falsity are not found in simple apprehension, but only in composition or division, as is taught in Logic: But truth and falsity are in the angelic intellect: Therefore also composition and division.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: they are not except in formal or virtual composition and division, I grant the Major: formal only, I deny the Major. Although, however, in the angelic intellect there is not formal composition or division, in it, nevertheless, is found virtual composition and division; because that simple penetration of quiddity befitting the angelic intellect is equivalent to our composition and division, and therefore in it truth or falsity is found; although it cannot be found in our simple apprehension for the opposite reason. What we said of composition must also be said of discourse, for in the Angels there is also virtual discourse, because that simple notice by which they penetrate conclusions in principles, and effects in cause, by a single intuition, is equivalent to our discourse, and suffices for the notion of true and strict science, as is clear in divine science, which is truly and properly science, and yet is not formally discursive, because it does not attain principles and conclusions by diverse acts.

§ III

The last difficulty is resolved.

I say lastly, the inferior Angels indeed imperfectly comprehend the superior, not, however, with perfect comprehension, and strictly and rigorously taken.

The first part is clear, and admitted by all; for imperfect comprehension, it suffices that nothing be in the known thing which is not manifested, or that through it all things which are formally and eminently contained in the object be attained. But the cognition which an inferior Angel has of a superior, attains not only the essence of the superior Angel, but also all the modes formally existing in it, and coacted eminently contained in it; since these are objects proportioned to the intellective power of the inferior Angel, as when all these are contained under natural being universally taken, which is the object proportioned to the angelic intellect: Therefore an inferior Angel imperfectly comprehends a superior. And of this imperfect comprehension must Saint Thomas be understood, when he says, 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 98: From this, that some

substance is intellectual, it is comprehensive of the whole of being. For by this he only intends to declare that intellectual substances have the power of knowing all natural beings, since they have their species instilled in them by God, and accordingly these are contained under the object proportioned to the angelic intellect.

The second part, however, which Bañez and the Salmanticenses deny, is thus proved: For strict and proper comprehension it does not suffice that through it all things which are formally and eminently contained in the object be attained, but it is furthermore required, that the object be known as perfectly as it is knowable from its own nature, or that the cognitive power of the knower be as great as the knowability of the object: But the inferior Angels do not know the superior as perfectly as they are knowable, nor does their cognitive power equal the knowability of these: Therefore the inferior Angels do not comprehend the superior, in comprehension strictly and properly taken. The Major is expressly taught by Saint Thomas, Part 1, question 12, article 7, in these words: That is comprehended which is perfectly known: but that is perfectly known, which is known as much as it is knowable: whence if that which is knowable by demonstrative science, be held by opinion from some probable reason conceived, it is not comprehended. For example, if someone should know by demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends it. But if someone should accept an opinion of it probably, because it is so said by the wise or by many, he will not comprehend it, because he will not attain to that perfect mode by which it is knowable. And in the response to the second: God is not therefore called incomprehensible (he says), as if something of Him were not seen, but because He is not seen so perfectly as He is visible. Likewise, Book 4, dist. 49, question 2, article 3: Then is something said to be comprehended by cognition, when the known stands under the act of the cognitive power, and does not exceed it: Therefore according to Saint Thomas, for true and strict comprehension it is required that the object be known as perfectly as it is knowable from its own nature, or that the power of the knower equal or exceed the knowability of the object. Reason also persuades this, for since comprehensive cognition does not add above quidditative cognition, at least necessarily, knowledge of more things, if it did not add the adequation of the mode of active cognition with the mode and perfection of the knowability of the object, it would not be distinguished from it.

The Minor, however, which asserts that the inferior Angels do not know the superior as perfectly as they are knowable, but in an inferior mode, is proved, first, from the same Holy Doctor, 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 98, where he admits this proposition from the Book On Causes: An inferior separate substance knows a superior according to the mode of the knowing substance, not according to the mode of the known substance.

And Book On Causes, lecture 8, near the end, speaking of intelligence, says: It knows superior things by the mode of substance, in an inferior mode than the superior thing is in itself. Which last words openly declare that he speaks of the inferiority of the mode of knowing holding on the part of the thing known, not on the part of the knower, as a certain more recent Thomist interprets, so as to elude the force of so evident a testimony: Therefore according to Saint Thomas, an inferior Angel does not know a superior in as perfect a mode as he is knowable from his own nature, but in an inferior and more imperfect mode.

Secondly, the same Minor is proved by this reason: A superior Angel is from his own nature knowable by his own proper cognition: But an inferior cannot know him with so perfect a cognition, since he does not equal him in intellective power, just as neither in perfection of nature: Therefore the same as before.

Thirdly, the same Minor is persuaded: Both intellectuality and intelligibility are taken from the same root, namely from immateriality, as Saint Thomas often teaches. But a superior Angel is more immaterial than an inferior, since he is closer to God, and more similar to Him, and understands through more universal species, which comes from his greater removal from matter, which is the principle of contracting and limiting, as we declared above, chapter 7, § 3: Therefore just as, for this reason, his intellectuality surpasses the intellectuality of the inferior, so also his intelligibility, which is equal to his intellectuality, will exceed that same intellectuality of the inferior Angel.

Nor is it valid what the Adversaries say, namely that it suffices for comprehension, that the inferior Angel be in the same generic degree of immateriality with the superior, although they exceed one another in specific degree; because (they say) that excess according to specific notion behaves per accidens and materially with respect to comprehension. It is not valid, I say, this response: for it is false that the excess in specific degree of immateriality, which is found between a superior and inferior Angel, behaves per accidens and materially with respect to comprehension: for it is essentially required for it that there be perfect adequation of intellective power with the intelligibility of the object, as we have already shown: But this adequation is removed, by the specific excess in immateriality; since it is the root of intellectuality and intelligibility, excess in immateriality impedes the inferior Angel from being able to know the superior, as much as he is knowable: Therefore etc.

It is confirmed, first: In order that an inferior Angel perfectly comprehend a superior, the latter's species would have to be received altogether connaturally in the intellect of the former: But for this complete connaturality, agreement in generic degree of

immateriality does not suffice, but furthermore agreement or excess in the mode of having the same degree is desired; because if the mode of being of the known object be above the mode of being of the knower, the species is not received altogether connaturally in the knower, but above his nature: Therefore for comprehension it does not suffice that a superior and inferior Angel be in the same generic degree of immateriality.

It is confirmed, secondly: Through intelligibility according to generic degree, the whole entity of an Angel is not rendered intelligible: Therefore in order that inferior Angels comprehend superior ones, it does not suffice that they equal their intelligibility according to generic degree and notion, but adequation or excess according to specific notion is required. The consequence is evident, because comprehension ought to equal the intelligibility which renders the whole entity of a thing intelligible; otherwise it would not equal the whole entity of the thing. The Antecedent, however, is proved, because intelligibility, just as truth also, follows entity by way of a passion, whence it is not extended more, than the entity itself: Therefore it is impossible that intelligibility, which follows upon the degree of immateriality common to all the Angels, render the whole entity of any Angel intelligible.

The arguments of the Adversaries remain resolved from what has already been said, for they are all founded on these two principles, which we have shown to be false, namely that for comprehension strictly and properly taken, it suffices that through it all things which are formally and eminently contained in the object be attained; and that, in order for an inferior Angel to comprehend a superior, it is enough that he be in the same generic degree of immateriality with him.

Chapter X

On the natural love of the Angel.

I say first, an Angel loves himself necessarily, not only as to specification, but also as to exercise.

It is proved by a fundamental reason: An Angel knows and contemplates himself necessarily, even as to exercise, as was shown in the preceding chapter, § 1: Therefore by the same necessity he loves himself. The consequence is manifest, both because if an Angel necessarily and always understands himself, he necessarily wills to understand himself: but this is to love himself, since this is to will oneself the greatest good. Also because the operation of the will is proportioned to the operation of the intellect, by which it is directed and regulated: Therefore if an Angel necessarily and always

understands himself, he equally necessarily and always loves himself. Whence Saint Thomas, question 16 On Evil, article 2, ad 6, speaking of an Angel, thus says: As to this his operation is immutable, that he always understands. And similarly it must be considered concerning the will, whose operation is proportioned to the operation of the intellect. From which it is clear that it is false, and against Saint Thomas, what a certain more recent author says in his Theology of Mind and Heart, namely that that cognition which an Angel has of himself and of God, is purely speculative, and not practical, or commanding love of self and of God. For if in an Angel the operation of the will ought to be proportioned to the operation of his intellect, and accordingly an Angel ought to love himself immutably, just as he immutably understands himself, it is manifest that cognition of self in an Angel is practical, and causes love, and not merely speculative, which does not bring forth love. An Angel, therefore, by contemplating himself and all his perfections, forms a practical judgment about loving himself continuously and without interruption, which judgment is altogether immutable, since no reason can be given for forming an opposite judgment, because such love generates no tedium, but the greatest delight; nor is it an impediment to a greater good, but rather helps as a means to other operations, especially indeed to the love of God, as will be established from what is to be said in the following conclusion.

I say secondly, an Angel naturally loves God, with a love necessary as to exercise. This conclusion follows from what has been said in the preceding, for in the natural love by which an Angel loves himself, is included love of God as the author and preserver of his own being, whose existence, and other perfections known by natural light, an Angel consequently cannot not-will: Therefore if he loves himself necessarily as to exercise, by the same necessity he loves God as author and natural end, especially since the natural beatitude of an Angel consists in the natural knowledge and love of God, and every intellectual nature is borne by natural weight into that beatitude, such as it can have according to its state.

I add that an Angel has it from his nature that from the first instant of his production he is in the actual intention of his ultimate natural end: Therefore also in the love of God above all things as the author of nature. The consequence is clear, the Antecedent is proved. An Angel has it from his nature that he be always from the first instant of his production completely able to move and apply himself to willing whatever shall have pleased him: but this he cannot have, unless he be always from the first instant of his being in actual intention of his ultimate natural end: Therefore he ought to be in it from the first moment of his creation. The Minor is certain, for since the angelic will does not tend and move itself to other things, namely to means, except from intention of the end,

it is manifest that he cannot be said, from his nature, to be from the first instant of his being completely able to move and apply himself to willing whatever he wills, unless from his nature he be from the first instant of his being always in actual intention of his ultimate natural end. The Major, however, is proved: since an Angel is an intellectual substance intermediate between God, who from His nature is always in second act, and man, who is naturally first in pure potency than in first act, that he participate something of each extreme, he ought to be in complete first act, and accordingly completely able to move himself to the second acts of intellection and volition.

Against these conclusions the aforesaid more recent author objects two arguments, one which he calls a priori, the other which he calls a posteriori. The first can be briefly proposed thus: From Saint Thomas, 1-2, question 10, article 2, no good besides the most universal good clearly seen can fill the capacity of the will, nor consequently necessitate it: But an Angel, neither in himself, nor in God known by natural light, sees every kind of goodness: Therefore he cannot necessarily, with necessity of exercise, love either himself or God.

The second, which is a posteriori, proceeds thus: if the love of God were in the Angels natural and necessary as to exercise, it would remain in the Demons, in whom all natural things have remained; the consequent is false, both because the supreme hatred with which the Demons pursue God, is incompatible with the natural love of Him, also because no one can be averted from God as supernatural author, without also receding from God as author of nature: But the Demons, through mortal sin, are averted from God as supernatural author; Therefore they cannot love Him, as the author of nature, with natural love.

To the first, in the preceding chapter, § 1, it was answered, that although an Angel cannot be necessitated to the cognition and love of himself or of God, by his own substance, as by an object, nor even by God known by natural light, since He is not represented under every kind of goodness; he can, however, be necessitated to such cognition and love by his own substance, as by a principle; because such cognition and love are, as it were, properties of the Angel, emanating from his essence, in almost the same way that the motion of the heart flows as a property from animal nature. The reason is, because a purely intellectual and immaterial substance naturally requires to have from the beginning the whole perfection pertaining simply to first act, required in order that it be able to reduce itself, in its own proper manner, to second act: whence since natural cognition and love of self and of God as author of nature, is the principle of all the natural operations of an Angel, and behaves in the Angels like the motion of the heart in animals, or like the motion of the first mobile with respect to the motions of inferior

things, it ought to emanate by way of property from the very nature and substance of the Angel.

I add that, if this argument were valid, it would prove that an Angel does not necessarily love himself, not to say with necessity of exercise, but not even with necessity of specification, and accordingly could hate himself, from displeasure at his own being, which no Theologian has hitherto dreamed. The sequel is clear, because nothing, besides the most universal good clearly seen, can necessitate the will of man or of an Angel, either as to exercise, or as to specification, as Saint Thomas teaches in the place cited in the objection: But an Angel does not see in himself every kind of goodness: Therefore he cannot be necessitated to love of self, even as to specification, if the Adversary's argument be valid. To the second the solution will be clear from what is to be said in the following chapter.

Chapter XI

On the Angels considered in supernatural being.

Hitherto we have considered the Angels in natural being; now we must also contemplate them in supernatural being, and briefly discourse of their beatitude, grace, state of the way, sin, and punishment.

§ I

The Angels were created in natural beatitude, not, however, supernatural.

The first part is proved: The Angels from the beginning of their state had the actual cognition and love of God as author of nature: But in this twofold operation the natural beatitude of an Angel consists, since it is the ultimate perfection to which the angelic nature can attain by the powers of nature: Therefore the Angels were founded by God in natural beatitude.

You will say, from this it would follow that the Demons would be blessed with natural beatitude, for in them there remained cognition and natural love of God, since according to Dionysius, natural things remained integral in the Demons. But I deny the sequel, and to its proof, in the first place I say it is false that natural love of God remained in the Demons; for since they sinned against God as supernatural author, indirectly, mediately, and per accidens, they sinned against God as He is author of nature, and were averted and disordered from Him. Whence that common saying taken from Dionysius, "Natural things remained integral in the Demons," must be understood of natural things considered in purely physical being, such as substance, powers, intelligible species, and

things of this kind; not, however, of natural things which have some morality admixed, of which kind are natural love of God, practical knowledge, and rectitude of will toward the ultimate end; for these, at least as to something, were destroyed in the Angels through sin. Secondly I say, that even if it were granted that natural love of God remained in the Demons, they could not, however, be called blessed with natural beatitude, since this imports not only cognition and love of God, as author of nature, but also rectitude of will, and immunity from all pain and torment, which are not in the Demons.

The second part of the conclusion, which asserts that the Angels were not created in supernatural beatitude, is not less certain than the preceding, for from the beginning they did not see God as He is in Himself, but by merit came to the vision of good; through sin, however, they were made unworthy of it, and deprived of it forever. Nor does it matter if you say that Lucifer, Ezekiel 28, is said to have been in the delights of the paradise of God, for by the delights of paradise can be understood the habitation of the empyrean, which is a most pleasant place, and full of delights, in which Lucifer was created together with the other Angels, as was shown above, chapter 1. Or by the delights of paradise can be understood those gifts of grace, with which the Angels were adorned from the beginning, and which Lucifer, and the other apostate Angels, lost by sinning. Nor is it an obstacle also, that Augustine, Book 11 On the City of God, chapter 9, says that the good Angels never wandered away from God; for he does not there take "to wander from God" in that sense in which Paul takes it, for "to walk in faith," but for "to be separated or to apostatize from God through sin," according to that saying, Luke 15, which is said of the prodigal son: "And he went into a far country," which the Fathers understand of wandering through sin. Finally, it does not matter, that the same Holy Doctor, Book 4 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 24 and following, teaches that the Angels from the beginning had morning knowledge of things in the Word, for as Saint Thomas says here, question 62, article 1, ad 3, there was a twofold morning knowledge in the Angels, one natural, the other glorious: natural, by which they know God through His similitude shining forth in themselves: glorious, by which they know the same God, through His essence. By each notice an Angel knows things in the Word; but by the natural, abstractively and imperfectly; by the glorious, intuitively and perfectly. The Angels had the first in the Word at the beginning of their creation, and of this Augustine speaks in the place cited; the second, however, only the good had, after the state of the way had been passed, at the entrance of supernatural beatitude.

§ II

The Angels were created in sanctifying grace, which, however, they received through their own disposition, although they did not merit it.

The first part is gathered from that passage, Ezekiel 28: "Thou art the seal of similitude, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty: every precious stone was thy covering. Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee." From which I thus argue: Lucifer was perfect from the day of his creation, until iniquity was found in him: Therefore he lost something through sin, which he received from the day of his creation; otherwise he would not have been perfect from the day of his creation, until iniquity was found in him: But this could not be some natural perfection, since he lost no natural perfection through sin: Therefore it was some supernatural perfection, which could be nothing other than sanctifying grace, expressed under the name of the seal of God's similitude, since it is a singular participation and as it were character of the divine nature, and since from it emanate supernatural and infused virtues, as properties from the essence, by which also, as by precious stones, and celestial pearls, Lucifer is said to have been distinguished and adorned, until iniquity was found in him.

The Holy Fathers also favor this: for Basil, on Psalm 32, says: The Word, maker of all things, founded the Angels indeed in the beginning that they might be: but the Holy Spirit Himself simultaneously bestowed sanctification. Similarly Damascene, Book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3: The Angels are created through the Word of God, and perfected through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit. Augustine also, Book 11 On the City of God, chapter 9, teaches that the Angels were immediately created participants of eternal light. Nor can this be understood of participation of natural wisdom and light, for he immediately subjoins: And thus they were, until those who are now evil had fallen by their own will from that light of goodness. They did not fall, however, from natural wisdom and light, which remained integral after sin, but from supernatural wisdom and light. Finally, the same Holy Doctor, Book 12, chapter 9, expressly says that God was in the Angels founding nature, and bestowing grace.

Reason also favors this: For the Angels were created by God, that through condign merits they might attain supernatural beatitude: But for this, habitual or sanctifying grace was necessary, as we shall show in the Treatise on grace: Therefore the Angels had it from the beginning of creation. Then, the Angels were not created in less perfection, than the first man: But the first man was created in grace, as will be clear from what is to be said in the following treatise: Therefore also the Angels.

Another probable reason Saint Thomas offers here, question 62, article 3, which can be thus proposed. In the first creation of the world, God made all things according to seminal and original notions in their principles, and instilled seeds in all corporeal creatures, by which they could produce their natural effects, as Augustine teaches, Book 8 on Genesis to the Letter, chapter 3: Therefore since grace is the seed of all supernatural gifts (on account of which it is called the seed of God, John 3), it was fitting that God, in the first creation of the spiritual creature, infuse it into the Angels.

The second part, which asserts that the Angels prepared themselves for it, through a motion of free will, is gathered from Saint Thomas here, article 6, where he teaches that the more perfect the Angels were in natural things, the more intense grace and glory they obtained, because they converted themselves more efficaciously to God, and accordingly supposes such conversion to have been a disposition for it. And Part 1, question 95, he expressly asserts that the first man was founded in grace, and prepared himself for it through his own consent, as he holds in the response to the fifth. Therefore the same, a fortiori, must be said of an Angel, as of a more perfect nature than man.

Reason also persuades this, for it is a more perfect mode to have grace through one's own disposition, than without it, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, Part 3, question 19, article 3, and question 34, article 3, from which he proves that Christ, in the first instant of His conception, prepared Himself for the habitual grace then instilled in Him, through an act of free will: But in the Angels, as the more perfect creatures of this universe, a more perfect mode of having grace must be admitted: Therefore they received it in the first instant of creation through their own disposition. For nothing prevents disposition and form from being in the same instant, because temporal antecedence between disposition and form is not necessarily required, but priority of nature and causality suffices, as is established in the increase of grace, which is rendered to the just in the same moment in which a more intense act is elicited, the habit preexisting.

That they did not merit it, however, as is asserted in the third part of the conclusion, is established from that common saying of the Theologians, "The principle of merit does not fall under merit," from which they infer that Christ did not merit the habitual grace received in the first instant of His conception, although He disposed Himself to it through an act of free will. The same, with proportion, must be said of the Angels. Whence they had, in the first instant of creation, two acts of conversion to God, one indeed natural to God as author and end of the order of nature, which was necessary as to specification and exercise, as was shown in the preceding chapter: the other, however, supernatural, to God as author and end of the order of grace, which, although it was necessary as to specification, as will be clear below, was, however, free as to exercise, and

accordingly meritorious of glory, not, however, of grace, because it proceeded effectively from it, and the principle of merit does not fall under merit: These two acts, however, since they were subordinated to one another, and concerned the same object, although under diverse aspects, and behaved after the manner of one, did not constitute two instants of angelic or discrete time, but only one.

You will say, an Angel is of such a nature, that to whatever object he has once adhered, he always adheres, as we shall say below: Therefore, if in the first instant he converted himself to God through an act of charity, he could not afterward be separated from Him and averted through sin; and accordingly all the Angels, in the second instant, obtained the beatitude which they merited in the first.

I answer that an Angel is of such a nature, that to whatever object, from perfect election and deliberation, he has once adhered, he always adheres; but it is otherwise if he adheres to some object without perfect election and deliberation, and as moved and applied, especially by God, as happens in the case proposed; for that act of charity and conversion to God as author and supernatural end, which an Angel elicited in the first instant, was free only as to exercise, not, however, as to specification, and proceeded from God as special mover. Whence immediately after such an act the Angels did not obtain beatitude, but after another which they elicited from their own deliberation, motion, and application, and which was free not only as to exercise, but also as to specification, as will be established from what is to be said in the following chapter.

Chapter XII

On the little moments or instants, by which the state of the way of the Angels was completed.

That the state of the way of the evil Angels was completed in three instants, is commonly taught by Theologians, a few excepted, and reason persuades this: For there are as many instants in the Angels as there are operations of theirs succeeding one another, for as Saint Thomas says, question 62, article 5: Since an Angel is above the time of corporeal things, diverse instants in those things which pertain to the Angels, are taken only according to succession in their acts. But from the creation of the evil Angels, even to their punishment inclusively, there were three operations succeeding one another: for in the first instant of creation they elicited a good and meritorious act, by loving God; then they broke forth into an evil act; and finally, the crime having been committed, they underwent the penalties of the crime: which three acts cannot but be really distinct, and succeeding one another; for love of God does not stand with mortal sin, nor does the highest complacency and delight in one's own natural perfection, which an Angel had when he sinned, stand with the greatest sadness and grief over the punishment, both of loss and of sense, which he incurred: Therefore the state of the way of the evil Angels was completed in three instants, comprehending under the name of "way" not only the intrinsic instants of the way, but also the instant extrinsically terminative of it; which in the evil Angels is the instant of their damnation.

The chief difficulty of this question, therefore, is concerning the state of the way of the good Angels: for several of our Thomists think that it was completed by only two instants or operations: for although (they say) the evil Angels, by eliciting an act distinct from that which they had elicited in the first instant of creation, made two instants for themselves, after which they were damned; the good, however, persevering in the act of love which they elicited in the first instant of creation, made only a single instant, after which they were immediately glorified.

The opinion, however, which teaches that the state of the way of the good Angels was also completed by a threefold instant, or that three instants flowed, from their creation, to their glorification inclusively, seems more probable, and can be thus persuaded. The instant in which the good Angels perfectly and perseveringly merited, is distinguished from the first instant of creation, in which all merited, and from the other instant in which they were glorified, and obtained the reward of eternal beatitude: Therefore the state of the way of the good Angels was completed also by a threefold instant, namely the instant of creation and imperfect merit, the instant of perfect merit, and the instant of

glorification. The consequence is clear, the Antecedent, however, as to the second part is also manifest, and is conceded by almost all. For as Saint Thomas discourses here, article 5, ad 2: Diverse instants in those things which pertain to the Angels, are taken only according to succession in their own acts. But there could not simultaneously be in the Angels a meritorious act of beatitude, and an act of beatitude, which is fruition, since the one is imperfect grace, and the other consummated grace: whence it remains that diverse instants must be taken, in one of which they merited beatitude, and in the other they were blessed.

The Antecedent, therefore, is proved as to the first part by four reasons. The first is: Instants are multiplied in the Angels according to intrinsic variation of operations: But when the good Angels perfectly merited, they had an act diverse from that which they had had in the first instant of creation, in which they merited imperfectly: Therefore also a diverse instant. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. The good Angels merited through a perfectly free act, and accordingly deliberated: But the act of the angelic will is made deliberate by this, that the will moves itself from one act to another: Therefore then the Angel moved himself from one act to another, and consequently there were two acts; one from which he moved himself, the other to which he moved himself.

The second reason: The imperfectly meritorious act which an Angel elicited in the first instant of creation, since it was necessary as to specification, was directed by a cognition proposing the object under the aspect of good only; his perfect merit, however, since it was perfectly free, was regulated by an indifferent judgment, or one proposing the object with indifference: But those diverse cognitions are diverse acts, and repugnant among themselves and incompatible, as is clear: Therefore when the good Angels perfectly merited, they had, on the part of the intellect, an act diverse from that which they had had in the first instant of creation, and accordingly such merit was measured by a diverse instant, for, as we shall show below, multiplicity of acts on the part of the intellect, suffices for multiplying instants of angelic time. It is confirmed: The whole reason why the meritorious act of eternal life, and the beatific love, cannot be in the same instant, is that they are directed by incompatible cognitions, although the same act, numerically, of the charity of the way can, as to substance, be continued in the homeland: Therefore likewise, although it were granted that the act of charity which an Angel elicited in the first instant of creation, in its continuation remained the same as to substance; because, however, the judgment which the Angel had in the first instant of creation, is incompatible with that which he had in meriting altogether freely, two diverse instants must be posited. Whence Saint Thomas, question 61, article 6, ad 4, says that in the Angels the first operation was common to all, but in the second they are distinct; and

therefore in the first instant all were good, but in the second the good were distinguished from the evil.

The third reason: In the first instant of creation the good Angels had, on the part of the intellect, a practical judgment, by which they judged that their own excellence of natural beatitude was to be loved, with subjection to the supernatural: but when Lucifer, and his followers, converted themselves inordinately to their own excellence, and, the divine rule despised, tempted others by their example, the blessed Angels had a practical judgment by which they judged that the excellence of natural beatitude was to be loved with subjection to the supernatural; notwithstanding also the temptation of Lucifer and his followers, inviting to the opposite: but this judgment was intrinsically diverse from the first: Therefore the blessed Angels, from creation to glorification, did not remain in the same unvaried operation, but had diverse acts on the part of the intellect, and accordingly on the part of the will, since diversity in acts of the practical intellect causes diversity in acts of the will. The Minor is proved: as often as some new difficulty arises concerning some action, so often is found a special practical judgment, by which that action is commanded, and the difficulty overcome: but to the blessed Angels, from this very fact that others sinned, there arose a new difficulty in conversion to God as supernatural end, which they did not have before their fall, since then they were tempted by the example and persuasion of Lucifer and his followers, and incited to sin: Therefore there ought then necessarily to have been in them some new practical judgment, by which this difficulty be overcome, and consequently a new effort of the will, because these two follow one another.

The fourth reason: Not only two operations of an Angel behaving successively demand two instants, but also intrinsic variety of the same operation according to diverse modes belonging to it; because an angelic instant is nothing other than a single operation behaving invariably as to intrinsic things, just as the instant itself is invariable as to those things which it intrinsically imports: But the operation by which an Angel imperfectly merited in the first instant of creation, was varied in its continuation, at least as to some intrinsic mode: Therefore, granted also that the act of love which an Angel elicited in the first instant remained the same as to substance, it was, however, measured not by the same, but by a diverse instant. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. The act of love elicited in the first instant of creation, was necessary as to specification, and free only as to exercise; the act of charity, however, by which he perfectly and perseveringly merited, was free not only as to exercise, but also as to specification: but necessity and liberty are certain intrinsic modes of acts of the will, and not pure extrinsic denominations; because liberty of action is a certain special notion of vitality, as the Theologians teach in the

Treatise on human acts: Therefore the operation by which an Angel imperfectly merited in the first instant of creation, was varied in its continuation, at least as to some intrinsic mode.

You will object, first: Saint Thomas, question 62, article 5, thus says: immediately after one act informed by charity an Angel was blessed. Therefore he holds that in the good Angels there were only two operations, of which the first merited the reward, the second received the reward, such that a single instant of merit preceded the instant of glorification. But it is easily answered that Saint Thomas there only means that an Angel, after the first act of charity altogether free, that is, both as to exercise and as to specification, was blessed.

But a certain more recent author insists in his Theology of Mind and Heart: The Holy Doctor not only says that the good Angels were glorified after the first act, but also after the first instant, for he says, question 63, article 6: Since the Angels arrive at beatitude through one meritorious act, if the devil, created in grace in the first instant, had merited, he would have received beatitude immediately after the first instant, unless he had immediately presented an impediment by sinning. Therefore evidently in the good Angels, who did not present an impediment, he does not acknowledge a second instant.

But this testimony too can easily be explained, for when Saint Thomas says: "If the devil, created in grace in the first instant, had merited," he speaks of perfect merit, and one supposing an act perfectly free, since to this merit alone beatitude is granted. Whence when he adds, "he would have received beatitude immediately after the first instant," this ought not to be understood of the first instant of the way of the Angels, but of the first instant of perfect liberty and merit, or one measuring the perfectly meritorious act, and free not only as to exercise, but also as to specification, after which immediately the good Angel received beatitude, and the Devil would have received it, if he had elicited such an act.

You will object, secondly: The good Angels continued the same act of charity which they elicited in the first instant, as long as the evil ones sinned: Therefore they did not make for themselves a new instant, by this, that they perseveringly merited, and accordingly their state of the way was completed by only a double instant, namely of merit and of glorification.

I answer, first, by denying the Antecedent, for since the act by which an Angel perfectly merited was deliberate, the will of the Angel then had to move itself, and accordingly transit from one act to another, as we declared above.

I answer, secondly, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence; for granted that a good Angel continued the same act of charity, because, however, that act had a new mode repugnant to the mode it had in the first instant, it was measured by a diverse instant in its continuation. I add that there were diverse acts on the part of the intellect, which suffices for multiplying instants of angelic or discrete time, as Cajetan well noted above, question 60: for since acts of the intellect are simpler and more regulative than acts of the will, on account of their greater excellence and perfection above the latter, instants ought rather to be taken from those than from these; such that even if the acts of the will be not varied, if, however, the acts of the intellect have been varied, and succession be found in them, variation and multiplication of instants ought also to be found there. Whence the aforesaid more recent author cited above does not stand consistent with himself, when in the Treatise on the Angels, page 655, he says that the deliberate will of an Angel moved itself formally, not proceeding from one act of the will to another, but from a new dictate and judgment, by which it judged and prescribed that the same act be continued, and obliged to persevering. For if a new dictate and practical judgment of the intellect be admitted in an Angel, a new instant too must be admitted, since multiplicity of acts on the part of the intellect suffices for multiplying instants of angelic time.

Chapter XIII

On the sin of the Angels.

Five celebrated difficulties are usually treated here. First, whether a creature could be founded impeccable by its own nature? Second, whether an Angel can sin directly and immediately against the natural law? Third, whether he could have sinned in the first instant of his creation? Fourth, what was the first sin of the Angels? Fifth, what was the excellent object concerning which the Angel first exalted himself.

§ I

No intellectual creature can be given, which from its own nature is impeccable simply, well, however, one which is impeccable in a certain respect, or against the natural law.

It is proved by a twofold reason of Saint Thomas: the first is had, question 24 On Truth, article 7, and can be thus briefly proposed. A nature which is defectible in its being, is also defectible in its operations: but every created intellectual nature, by this very fact that it is from nothing, is defectible in its being: Therefore also in its operations, even free ones, and accordingly by this very fact that some intellectual creature is from nothing, it is peccable. The Minor is clear, the Major, however, is proved. Operative power and mode of operating follow the mode of being: Therefore operative power and free operation founded in a defectible nature, are also defectible.

Nor is it valid if you say that these are indeed physically defectible, and as to being, but not morally, and as to rectitude and goodness. For by this very fact that a creature is defectible in mode of operating, it is also defectible in attaining the object and end: but from attaining the object and end is taken the rectitude or moral goodness of an operation: Therefore by this very fact that a creature is defectible in operating, it is defectible morally, or as to moral rectitude and goodness. This reason Gregory insinuates, Moralia 5, chapter 17, where he thus says: The angelic nature, even if by clinging to the contemplation of its author, it remains more immobile in its state, by this very fact, nevertheless, that it is a creature, has in itself the vicissitude of mutability. Likewise Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter, chapter 3: Therefore natures made by God can advance, because they began to be; they can also fail, because they were made from nothing.

The second reason of Saint Thomas is had here, question 63, article 1, and is thus proposed: a principle which is not the rule of its own operation, nor has such a rule inseparably conjoined to itself, can fail from the rectitude owed to such an operation, and accordingly sin: but no creature can be produced by God, which either be the rule of its own operation, or have that rule inseparably conjoined to itself: Therefore none can be produced which is from its own nature impeccable. The Major is clear and declared by Saint Thomas, by this example: If the hand of the craftsman were itself the rule of incision, the craftsman could never cut wood except rightly; but if rectitude of incision be from another rule, it happens that the incision be right, and not right. The Minor, however, is proved: The rule of the acts of the will is the ultimate end, for that behaves in practical matters, as the first principle in speculative ones; whence just as the first principle regulates all conclusions, so the ultimate end regulates all operations of the will: but no creature can be its own ultimate end, just as neither its own first principle; indeed

it cannot even from its own nature be conjoined to its ultimate end simply, that is, both natural and supernatural, because the end to which a creature is naturally, or from its own nature, conjoined, is not supernatural, but natural, as is established: Therefore no intellectual creature can be the rule of its own operation, or have that rule from its own nature inseparably conjoined to itself.

It is confirmed: only in two ways can an intellectual creature be inseparably and immutably conjoined with its ultimate end, namely by hypostatic union with some divine person, and by beatific vision, for no other mode is conceivable: But it cannot naturally be conjoined with its ultimate end by neither of these modes: Therefore it is implied that an intellectual creature, from its nature, be inseparably conjoined with its ultimate end simply. The Minor is proved: it is implied that that which is proper to God, become proper to a creature: but nothing is more proper to God, than His own personality, and the vision of His essence: Therefore neither of these can become proper to a creature, and belong to it from its own nature.

From these things is proved the second part, which asserts that an intellectual creature impeccable in a certain respect, or against the natural law, can be given: for an intellectual creature can be given, to whom love of God as author of nature, be connaturally owed: but natural love of God above all things excludes all sins which are against the law of nature: Therefore possible is an intellectual creature, from its own nature impeccable in a certain respect, and with respect to the law and precepts of the natural order. The Minor is clear, not to love God as ultimate natural end, is virtually to will to observe not all natural precepts; and without such virtual volition, love of God above all things cannot stand, just as neither efficacious intention of the end, without efficacious volition of the means. The Major, however, is proved from the fact that if natural love of God above all things could not be connaturally owed to any created or creatable nature, it would not be natural, but supernatural; for that is called supernatural, which is above the exigency or debt of any created or creatable nature. This part will be more established from what is to be said in the following section, where we shall show that an Angel cannot directly and immediately sin against the natural law.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion, with the Master of the Sentences, a testimony of Saint Augustine, taken from Book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 7, where he says: God could have made man such, that he could neither sin, nor will to: Therefore from Augustine, God could found an impeccable creature.

I answer by denying that such words are had in that place: But only these: Let them grant (he speaks against heretics) that nature is not evil, which is made such, that it could not

sin, if it willed. To be able not to sin, however, does not say negation of the power of sinning, but only the power of not sinning, which can stand simultaneously with the power of sinning, as is established in any just man, who, with the power of not sinning, has simultaneously the power of sinning. Our opinion, however, is openly favored by the Holy Doctor, Book 3 Against Maximinus, chapter 12, where he thus has it: To whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not its own nature, but God's grace. Which words Saint Thomas almost transcribed here, article 1, saying: To whatever creature it belongs that it cannot sin, this it has from the gift of grace, not from the condition of nature.

You will object, secondly: God can found a creature which from its own nature be determined to moral good as such: Therefore He can found a creature impeccable by its own nature. The consequence is clear, for every sin is some deviation from moral and honest good. The Antecedent also seems manifest, for if God can found a creature determined to the delectable good agreeable to sensitive nature, as brute animals are, why could He not similarly create some intellectual nature, determined to the moral and honest good, agreeable to reason.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: that be determined to moral good as such, if by moral good as such be understood only the moral good of the natural order in general taken, that is, honest good and consonant with natural reason, I grant the Antecedent. If by moral good as such be signified moral good both of the supernatural and natural order, I deny the Antecedent; for this would require that cognition and love of supernatural moral good be connatural to such a creature, which is impossible, since no created or creatable substance can naturally require some form of the supernatural order. This argument, therefore, only proves the second part of our assertion, in which we said, a creature impeccable against the natural law can be given.

§ II

An Angel cannot sin directly, immediately, and per se primarily against the natural law, well, however, indirectly, mediately, and consequently.

The first part is proved by a fundamental reason: An Angel has from his nature that he always be from the first instant of his production in actual love of God above all things as author of nature: Therefore also that he be impeccable directly and immediately against God as ultimate natural end. The Antecedent is established from what has been said above, chapter 10, conclusion 2. The consequence, however, is proved, first, because sin committed against God as ultimate natural end, is incompatible with natural love of God, as we showed in the preceding section in proving the second part of the assertion. Secondly, because a will which is always in actual love of God as author and natural end, is always conjoined to the rule of the whole moral goodness of the natural order, whence just as a craftsman who had inseparably annexed to himself a rule, could never fail from it in operating, so neither can a will which is always and necessarily in actual love of God as author of nature, sin directly and immediately against the natural law.

It is confirmed: just as principles behave to the intellect in speculative matters, so ends behave to the will in operable matters: Therefore just as it is repugnant that the intellect be well disposed and fully instructed concerning principles, and yet err concerning conclusions; so also it cannot stand that the will be naturally right in order to the ultimate natural end, and not be right concerning the means which are ordered to it.

The second part of the assertion, however, follows from what has been said in the preceding section: An Angel is directly peccable against the supernatural law and end: But he cannot directly sin against the supernatural law, unless he indirectly and consequently sin against the natural: Therefore an Angel can sin against the natural law indirectly, mediately, and consequently. The Minor is proved: although the natural end and its law do not formally prescribe anything about supernatural things, they dictate, however, this very fact that the intellectual creature is ordered to the supernatural end, that all natural things should be ordered to it, and be used as means to it. They likewise dictate that its law should be observed, whence direct transgression of a supernatural precept, is at least an indirect violation of the law of nature, and of that natural dictate: to whoever legitimately commands in any matter, obedience is owed: Therefore an Angel can sin against the natural end and law at least indirectly and mediately, namely by sinning against the supernatural end.

You will object, first: The Demons daily sin against the law and natural end, for they are liars, and incite men to theft, fornications, adulteries, and other sins which are against the

law of nature: Therefore they are not impeccable concerning the end and natural law.

I answer that just as, although the Demons sometimes do some things, which are from their genus only venial sins, as when they provoke men to laughter, or to a jocose lie, they nevertheless always sin mortally, on account of the intention with which they do these things, as Saint Thomas teaches, 1-2, question 89, article 4, ad 3: so likewise, although they seem to do certain things which are against the natural law, because, however, they do these from hatred of God the supernatural author, they always sin immediately and formally against the supernatural end; against the natural, however, only as it were materially and mediately, or indirectly and per accidens.

You will object, secondly: if an Angel could not sin against the natural law, it would follow that an Angel founded in pure naturals, and not ordered to the supernatural end, would be altogether impeccable, because he could sin neither against the natural end, nor against the supernatural: But this cannot be said, since, as we showed in the preceding section, it is repugnant that God found an altogether impeccable creature: Therefore neither can that.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, for although an Angel would not be ordered to the supernatural end, because, however, he would have obediential potency and capacity that he be ordered to it, it would not be repugnant to him, as far as is from his own nature, to be able to sin, and accordingly he would be peccable from his own nature; just as even if no law were imposed on him, he could sin, because a law could be imposed on him.

§ III

An Angel could not sin in the first instant of his creation.

The fundamental reason, taken from Saint Thomas here, article 5, is, because such a sin would be attributed to God as special author and mover: for an operation which begins simultaneously with the being of a thing, since it is, as it were, a certain corollary consequent upon nature, belongs to it from the agent from whom it has being, on account of which it is commonly wont to be said: "He who gives being, gives the consequences to being," which indeed occur in the first instant of production. Whence upward motion belongs to fire from the generator, because it begins with its being, and the motion of the heart in animals is attributed to the generator, because it begins with the animals themselves. And this is most necessary in an intellectual creature whose first practical judgment ought indispensably and specially to be infused by God: for the will does not command anything to be executed, except from the presupposed efficacy of the will, which then is not yet given, because the will presupposes judgment, since nothing is willed which is not first known; and accordingly the first volition presupposes the first judgment, which, since it cannot be from the will, lest a circle and process to infinity be given, must be from God as special mover applying the intellect to it, and effecting with respect to it what the will does with respect to other subsequent things. Whence just as a defect in a dictate proceeding from the will's special application, and regulated in an act of the will through it, is referred back into the applying will; so if there were a defect in that first dictate, to which God specially applies, and in the act of the will regulated by it immediately, it would be referred back into God as special mover.

You will say, if the first act of the angelic will were reduced to God specially applying it to the first regulative dictate, such an act would not be free, because it would not be regulated by a dictate or practical judgment, which would be in the power of the angelic will, but which would proceed from God alone applying.

I answer that such an act would not be altogether free, that is, as to specification and exercise simultaneously, but it would, however, be free as to exercise. For although for altogether complete liberty, in which the will is said to move itself, it is necessary that it be regulated by a dictate which be in its own power, and which proceeds from its application; for liberty of contradiction, however, and initiative of complete liberty, an indifferent judgment suffices, which proposes each part as fitting, intimating, however, that one rather than another is here and now, all things weighed, to be chosen. I add that, although the first regulative dictate of the angelic will is not in its power simply, and as to its inception, it is, however, in its power in a certain respect, and on the part of the object, and as to continuation, which suffices for liberty of exercise.

You will object, first: Man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason: Therefore also an Angel in the first instant of creation. The consequence seems good from parity of reason. The Antecedent is proved, because as Saint Thomas teaches, 1-2, question 89, article 6, a boy arriving at the use of reason is bound in the first instant to convert himself to God, which precept, however, not all, indeed perhaps few, fulfill.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity, on account of a twofold reason of difference. The first is, that an Angel does not proceed gradually from imperfect to perfect, but from the outset has full intelligence, and full use of liberty, to which accordingly he does not move himself through preceding imperfect acts, but ought to be moved and excited by God as special mover. But man arrives gradually at the use of reason, and before he arrives at the first instant of the use of reason, has other imperfect acts of intellect and will, from which he moves himself to operate deliberately; whence he can, in the instant of the use of reason (which is not mathematical, but moral), break forth into a deliberate act, and sin; especially since those antecedent volitions can, and frequently do, on account of the evil habituation of boys, concern delectable things contrary to reason. The second reason of difference between an Angel in the first instant of creation and man in the first instant of the use of reason, is, that man in such an instant requires only to be applied by God to the cognition and volition of beatitude, or of good in common, from which he can immediately afterward move himself to seeking that beatitude in sensible goods, or in the honest good, God only operating by way of a universal agent. But an Angel, from the higher degree of perfection by which he exceeds man, requires from God, in the first instant of creation, to be moved, as by a particular agent and mover, to the cognition and love of the ultimate end in particular, because he has it from his nature not to proceed from potency to act, or from imperfect to perfect, as we declared in chapter 10.

You will object, secondly: An Angel in the first instant of his creation was bound by divine precept to elicit an act of love of God above all things: but then he could omit this act; both because he was then free, also because God could then deny him efficacious aid to elicit it, since its conferral was not owed to him, but purely liberal and gratuitous: Therefore an Angel in the first instant of his creation could sin, at least by sin of omission.

I answer, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, and to its first proof I say, that although an Angel could absolutely omit the commanded act, that omission, however, in the first instant of creation, could not be privative, but negative, because in order that an omission be privative and sinful, it requires an act, for omission is not voluntary without some act at least presupposed: but in the first instant there could be no evil act,

which would render this omission evil and culpable. Whence Cajetan rightly says, that an Angel in the first instant could incur omission of an act, because otherwise he would not have been free, not, however, the sin of omission. This can be explained by the example of Christ, who, with respect to the act falling under precept, was free as to exercise, and yet could not sin; because although He could omit such an act, insofar as omission is pure negation of the opposite act, not, however, as it is privation of the said act as owed. Of which more in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

To the second proof I answer, that although God could absolutely have denied to an Angel in the first instant of his creation efficacious aid to the act of love of God above all things, not, however, from the hypothesis that He elevated him to the supernatural order: for since grace perfects an Angel according to the mode of his own nature, and the condition of angelic nature requires having in the first instant love of God as ultimate natural end, it happens that to an Angel elevated to the supernatural order, an act of charity is owed, and accordingly efficacious aid to elicit it; otherwise an Angel would in the first instant be converted to God as ultimate natural end, and privatively averted from Him as supernatural end, since to Him as such he is bound to convert himself. Just as from the supposition that God imposes on Christ a precept of supernatural love, He is bound to give Him efficacious supernatural aid, because He is an impeccable person.

You will object, thirdly: An Angel in the first instant had the power of sinning, because he was not then a rule of all his own operations: Therefore he could then sin.

I answer, first, by denying the Antecedent, and to its proof I say, that although an Angel was not to himself a rule of operating for that instant, he ought, however, then necessarily to have a rule of operating well conjoined to himself; because he could not be moved by any other than by God through a right and indefectible judgment, which suffices for there not then to be in him a power of sinning.

I answer, secondly, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence, because although in the first instant there was in the Angel a power of sinning, that, however, for that instant was not reducible to act, but only for other subsequent instants; because the first dictate of the angelic will instilled by God, dictating that God is to be loved above all things, and commanding and causing His love, impeded the power of sinning in that instant from breaking forth into act.

You will object, fourthly, against the reason of Saint Thomas: Granted that the first natural operation of a produced thing be attributed to the first producer, as upward motion belongs to fire from the generator; the first free operation, however, is not so, such as was the first operation of an Angel; because this does not flow necessarily from

the thing produced, as that does, but can, from the force of liberty itself, not be produced: Therefore if the first operation of an Angel were sinful, its defect would not be referred back into God as special mover, but into the angelic will alone, operating disformly to the rule of the divine law.

I answer that just as the first natural operation ought to be from the generator, so the first free operation necessarily requires to proceed from an extrinsic principle moving and applying the intellect to the first practical judgment indispensably required for it, as is established from what has been said above, and as Saint Thomas expressly declares, 1-2, question 109, article 2, ad 1, in these words: Man is lord of his acts of willing and not willing, on account of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one part or the other: but that he deliberates or does not deliberate, if of this too he is lord, it is necessary that this be through preceding deliberation, and since this does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary that finally one arrive at this, that the free will of man be moved by some exterior principle which is above the human mind, namely by God. I add from the same Holy Doctor, question 16 On Evil, article 4, ad 6, that the first operation of an Angel ought to be in some way natural; for just as nature is that which is prior in anything, so it is fitting that that which pertains to nature, be prior in each thing: whence in the will of an Angel there ought first to be an operation which is called natural, by reason of some determination to one, at least as to specification, such that it precede the free operation as to specification and exercise.

§ IV

The first sin of the Angels was pride, nor could it have been otherwise.

The first part is certain from the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, among whom the sin of the Angels is always called pride: Isaiah 14: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, thy pride is brought down to hell, who saidst in thy heart: I will ascend into heaven... I will be like the most High." Ezekiel 28: "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty." Tobias 4: "Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind, or in thy words, for from it all perdition took its beginning," that is, the perdition of men and Angels. Finally, Ecclesiasticus 10 calls pride the beginning of all sin, because, as Augustine explains, Book On Nature and Grace, chapter 29, it casts down the Devil, from whom is the origin of sin. Wherefore the same Holy Doctor, explaining that saying of the Psalmist, "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin," understands by the greatest sin, pride, because (he says) it made a Devil from an Angel, and shut him out of the kingdom of heaven forever. Whence Bernard, Book 1 On the Soul: Pride casts down from the heights to the depths, humility raises from the depths to the heights: an Angel fell from heaven into Tartarus: man ascended from the world to heaven. And Sermon 1 On the Advent: Flee pride, my brothers, I beg you, flee it much. Satan did nothing, he only thought pride, and in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, he was irreparably cast down. Pride is the beginning of all sin, which so swiftly darkened with gloom Lucifer, who shone more brightly than all the stars. Finally Saint Gregory, Moralia 34, chapter 17, speaking of the same Lucifer, says that while he proudly sought private loftiness, he justly lost the participated one: for having left the principle to which he ought to have adhered, he sought to be a principle to himself in a certain way: having left Him who could truly suffice for him, he judged that he could suffice for himself: the more he raised himself against the glory of his founder, the more he fell below himself. For what free servitude was exalting, captive liberty cast down.

Reason also favors this, for since the first sin of the Angels was not of omission, but of commission, as will be clear from what is to be said below, it neither was, nor could be, except from an inordinate affection to spiritual goods: for no one is affected except toward those things which are fitting to his own nature, but only spiritual goods are fitting to angelic nature: But an inordinate affection to spiritual goods, can be nothing other than the sin of pride: Therefore the first sin of the Angels neither was, nor could be, other than the sin of pride. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved by a reason of Saint Thomas here, article 2: in the affection of pursuit of spiritual goods, there cannot be sin, except through this, that in it the rule of a superior is not observed; for since spiritual goods, the greater they are, the better they are, they cannot be loved too much

absolutely; whence if there be excess in the love of them, it must necessarily come from this, that the rule of a superior is not observed: but not to be subject to the rule of a superior, is the sin of pride: Therefore in the affection of pursuit of spiritual goods, there can be nothing but the sin of pride.

You will object, first, against this reason of Saint Thomas: Not to wish to be subjected to the rule of a superior is the sin of disobedience, not of pride: Therefore if the Angels first sinned, by not wishing to submit themselves to the rule of a superior, their first sin was of disobedience, not of pride.

I answer, not to wish to be subjected to the rule of a superior, as legislator, is indeed the sin of disobedience; but not to wish to be subjected to the rule of a superior, as the measure of one's own dignity and excellence, is the sin of pride. For just as it is proper to humility to moderate the appetite tending toward loftiness, by adding to it the mode of subjection to the divine law, as it is formally the rule and measure of the dignity and excellence of the creature; so it is proper to pride to add immoderation to such an appetite, and not subjection to the divine law, as it formally has the notion of the rule and measure of one's own dignity and excellence.

You will object, secondly: The sin of pride consists only in this, that someone seeks that which is not owed to him, and which he cannot obtain by his own powers; because since to be proud sounds the same as to go beyond oneself, only he is properly called proud, who seeks to be exalted above himself, which does not happen unless he seek something which is not owed to him, nor acquirable from his own powers: But an Angel in the first sin did not seek something which was not owed to him, and which he could not obtain by his own powers: Therefore his first sin was not of pride. The Minor is proved: an Angel first sinned by inordinately seeking his own natural beatitude, as we shall say in the following section: but such beatitude was connaturally owed to him, and accordingly he could attain it by his own powers, indeed he actually possessed it before he sinned: Therefore an Angel in the first sin did not seek something owed to him, and exceeding his own powers.

I answer by denying the Major, for the sin of pride consists not only in this, that someone seeks that which is not owed to him, but also in this, that he inordinately intends his own excellence and perfection owed to him; or that he is affected toward it beyond or against the measure prefixed to him by a superior, for thus it is not to wish to be subjected to a superior, and to spurn him implicitly and interpretatively, and accordingly to go beyond oneself, or to exalt oneself above oneself.

From what has been said is gathered, first, that the first sin of the Angels neither was nor could have been of pure omission. For in order that an omission be sinful, it ought to be voluntary, or willed, directly, or indirectly, or interpretatively; therefore either it would be willed by an Angel as an end, or as a means to an end: but in neither way can it have been first willed by him: Therefore he could not first sin by the sin of omission. The Minor is proved, and in the first place that omission cannot be said to be willed by an Angel by way of an end, is manifest, because omission of itself is negation or privation, whence in order that it be appetible, it must necessarily be clothed with some apparent good, and some end. That, however, it could also not first be sought by him as a means, is proved from this, that an Angel cannot will a means, except in some end from which he always begins to will: Therefore sinful omission supposes intention of some evil end; nor does an Angel omit to refer himself to God, unless because he perversely converts himself to himself; for one does not recede from the term from which, except through conversion to the term to which. In which an Angel greatly differs from man, who does not by the same act will the end and those things which are contained under the end, and thus can will omission without commission, although he always has an act, which is the cause or occasion of the omission. Of which in the Treatise on human acts. The sin, therefore, by which an Angel loved his natural beatitude, not ordering it to the supernatural, was a sin of commission, not of pure omission, because it was some positive act, disordered from the omission of some circumstance owed to it; just as the recitation of the office without attention, or the celebration of Mass without sacred vestments, are not sins of omission, but of commission.

It is gathered, secondly, that the first sin of the Angels could not have been hatred or despair, because indeed hatred and despair behave by way of flight and withdrawal: But the first sin of the Angels could not be an act by way of flight and withdrawal: Therefore it could not have been hatred or despair. The Minor is proved: every act of nolition and flight presupposes an act of volition, for since nolition and flight regard a repugnant and disagreeable object, and nothing, however, is said to be disagreeable, except by order to the agreeable, because indeed it either injures or impedes the agreeable, it comes about that the disagreeable is never fled, except because the agreeable is loved; and consequently, inordinate flight from the disagreeable, always presupposes inordinate love of the agreeable: Therefore the first sin of the Angels cannot be an act by way of flight from some disagreeable thing, but must necessarily be pursuit of some good agreeable to their nature.

It is gathered, thirdly, that the first sin of the Angels neither was nor could have been an act of disobedience, because, as we have already shown, the first sin of the Angels could

not be a disordered act by way of flight and withdrawal: But disobedience regards the divine law, by way of flight and withdrawal from it: Therefore the first sin of the Angels neither was nor could have been an act of disobedience.

It is gathered, fourthly, that the first sin of the Angels was not envy, because as Augustine says, Book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, envy follows pride, it does not precede it. For hatred of another's good, of which hatred envy is a species, arises as it were from the root, from inordinate love of one's own excellence, in which the sin of pride consists. Whence Pope Leo, Sermon 4 On Collections and Alms, speaking of Lucifer, thus says: That inventor and author of sin, first proud, that he might fall, then envious, that he might harm. And Saint Thomas here, article 2: After the sin of pride, the evil of envy followed in the sinning Angel.

It is gathered, fifthly, that the inordinate delight which the evil Angels perceived from contemplation and love of their own natural perfection and beauty, is not reduced to the sin of luxury, and that Scotus badly calls it "spiritual luxury"; for not every inordinate delight is luxury, but only that of touch; just as inordinate delight of food is called gluttony; of praise, vainglory; of one's own excellence, pride: finally, inordinate delight which is perceived from the study and speculation of truth, is reduced to the sin of curiosity, and is opposed to the virtue of studiousness, which prescribes the mode in studying. Whence it is absurd what the same Author says, that the sin by which someone inordinately delights in the speculation of a geometric conclusion, is reduced to luxury.

§ V

What was the excellent object concerning which the Angel first exalted himself.

Some think that an Angel first sinned, by seeking every kind of equality with God in nature, because Sacred Scripture expressly asserts that Lucifer in fact sought to be as God, Isaiah 14: "I will ascend into heaven... I will be like the most High." Ezekiel 28: "Thy heart was lifted up," as it were the heart of God, saying, "I am God." Whence Augustine, in the book of Questions on the Old Testament, says that the Devil, inflated with elation, wished to be called God.

Nevertheless this opinion is rejected by Saint Thomas here, article 3, and can be briefly confuted, first from Saint Anselm, Book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 5, where he says that the Angel sinned by seeking that to which he would have attained, if he had stood, but if he had stood he would not have attained to every kind of equality with God in nature: Therefore he did not sin by seeking it. Whence in the same place he tacitly approves this discourse of his disciple: If God cannot be conceived, except as alone, such

that nothing similar to Him can be conceived, how could the Devil will that which he could not conceive? For he was not of such a dull mind, as not to know that nothing else similar to God could be conceived. By which words he insinuates that fundamental reason which Saint Thomas has in the place cited: No one can seek that which he cannot apprehend as possible: But the Devil could not apprehend as possible every kind of equality with God in nature: Therefore neither could he seek it. The Major seems certain, for the object of the will is the good and the fitting: but that which cannot be apprehended as possible, cannot be apprehended as good and fitting, since the first root of appetibility and fittingness is possibility; since a thing is called good only insofar as it is existing, or says an order to existence. The Minor is also not less evident, for since an Angel perfectly comprehends himself, he knows himself to be a created being and one by participation, and that no being by participation can be of the same nature with being through essence; and accordingly he could not apprehend as possible every kind of equality of himself with God in nature; especially since before his first sin, no error preceded in his intellect, by reason of which he might apprehend as possible that which is really impossible, as sometimes happens in us.

You will say, this reason of Saint Thomas proves indeed that the Devil did not sin, by seeking with an efficacious and absolute appetite every kind of equality with God in nature, but does not convince that he did not sin by seeking it with an inefficacious, conditioned appetite, since such an appetite can be carried to impossible things, even known as such; just as in fact a penitent might wish he had not sinned, and the damned that God be annihilated.

But on the contrary: The first sin of the Angels had necessarily to be a disordered appetite of something as an ultimate end, since indeed the natural appetite of the Angels always begins from the end, and disorder concerning means and intermediate ends, always presupposes disorder concerning the ultimate end: But appetite for the ultimate end, insofar as such, is an efficacious appetite, since it is of the notion of the ultimate end that for its sake all other things come to be: Therefore the first sin of the Angels cannot consist in some inefficacious and conditioned appetite. Whence in Scripture the sin of Lucifer is described, as an absolute will, by which he tended to attain what he desired, when he is thus introduced speaking: "I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God... I will ascend above the height of the clouds, I will be like the most High." Which words signify, not conditionally but absolutely, what Lucifer desired to obtain. I add that Lucifer had almost innumerable Angels as companions of his fault: But it is incredible, that so great a multitude of Angels wished to lose so great a felicity forever, on account of a simple affection only for a thing, which they could neither

obtain, nor efficaciously will: Therefore the first sin of the Angels was not a simple affection or inefficacious and conditioned appetite of every kind of equality with God in nature. Whence to the testimonies of Scripture adduced above, by which it is asserted that Lucifer in fact sought to be as God, Saint Thomas responds here, article 3, that they signify that Lucifer willed to be as God: not by equalization (namely by seeking perfect equality with God in nature), but by a certain proportional similitude, insofar namely as he willed to have his beatitude, as God has, namely either supernatural from his own powers, or natural without subjection to another superior and more excellent end. Of which below. Whence when he said, "I will ascend into heaven" (which of the heaven of the holy Trinity the same Holy Doctor explains here, question 61, article 4, ad 3), by this is signified that Lucifer indeed willed to ascend into the heaven of the Trinity, not, however, by seeking absolute equality with God, but only some kind, as he himself interprets, question 16 On Evil, article 3, ad 3.

Others think that an Angel first sinned by a proud appetite for hypostatic union with the person of the Divine Word: for God revealed the mystery of the Incarnation to the Angels existing in the state of life, at least as to substance, as Saint Thomas teaches from Augustine, 2-2, question 2, article 7, ad 1. Indeed He imposed on them a precept, that they adore Christ, and recognize Him as their own head and Lord, as is gathered from those words of the Apostle, to the Hebrews 1: "And again, when he bringeth in the firstbegotten into the world, he saith: And let all the angels of God adore him." Where "again" supposes that on another occasion Christ was adored by the good Angels, since at the beginning of creation He was revealed to them by faith as head of men and Angels, the evil ones resisting.

But this opinion also does not seem true. First because the first sin of an Angel ought necessarily to be concerning the ultimate end to be obtained by him, since rightly, according to Saint Thomas, 2-2, question 163, article 1, appetite is moved to the end before it is moved to that which is sought for the sake of the end: But hypostatic union is not the ultimate end of an Angel, to be acquired or possessed by him; for it is neither his natural end, as is clear, nor his supernatural end, to which he was elevated, as is also manifest: Therefore the first sin of an Angel was not concerning hypostatic union.

Secondly, because the motive by which an Angel in fact sinned, was in the power of the Angel, as is established from his own words, "I will ascend, I will exalt, I will sit," and from the words of Anselm related above, that the Angel sought that to which he would have attained if he had stood: But hypostatic union with a divine person, was not in the power of the Angel but of God, nor would he have attained to it, if he had stood: Therefore the motive by which the Angel was first moved to sinning was not hypostatic

union. Whence if some of the Holy Fathers, as Bernard, Sermon 1 On the Advent, and 17 on the Canticle, and Rupert, Book 8 on John, assert that Lucifer sinned from envy of the union of human nature with the Word, this ought not to be understood of his first sin, but of others consequent upon the first, for as we showed in the preceding section from Augustine, envy follows pride, does not precede it.

Others teach that the first sin of the Angels was the disordered appetite of dominating and commanding over others. But this opinion Saint Thomas rejects here, article 3, where he thus says: But because that which is per se is the principle and cause of that which is through another, from this too it followed that he sought to have some principate over other things, in which also he perversely willed to be assimilated to God: By which words he manifestly declares that the disordered appetite of dominating and commanding over others, was not the first sin of the Devil, but followed from the first.

Reason also persuades this: for inordinately to seek dominion and command over others, pertains to ambition, as Saint Thomas teaches, 2-2, question 131, articles 1 and 2: But the first sin of an Angel could not be ambition: Therefore neither the disordered appetite of dominating and commanding over others. The Minor is proved, because ambition presupposes pride, whence it is also called its daughter: Therefore the first sin of an Angel could not be ambition.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason. Just as being simply is necessarily presupposed to being in a certain respect, so also appetite for one's own excellence simply and absolutely taken, ought to precede appetite for excellence in a certain respect, or with an addition, namely in honors and dignities: whence since pride is concerned with excellence proper simply and absolutely taken, ambition, however, with excellence only in a certain respect, namely in dignities and honors, the sin of pride in the Angels must necessarily have preceded the sin of ambition, and accordingly the disordered appetite of dominating and commanding over others.

The truer and more probable opinion, therefore, which the Holy Doctor insinuates here, article 3, teaches that the first sin of the Angel was the disordered appetite of supernatural and natural beatitude: for, as we said above, the first sin of an Angel ought necessarily to be concerning his ultimate end, since appetite is moved to the end before it is moved to that which is sought for the sake of the end: But the ultimate end of an Angel is his beatitude: Therefore the first sin of an Angel could be nothing other than a disordered appetite for his own beatitude. In the first place, therefore, an Angel sinned by inordinately seeking supernatural beatitude, not because he formally and expressly willed to attain it by the powers of nature and without the aid of grace (for such volition

would suppose an error on the part of the intellect, which could not be in an Angel before sin), but because he refused it as to be acquired from grace and merits, which is virtually and interpretatively to will it without the aid of grace. And in this sense must Saint Thomas be understood, when he says here, article 3: Or if he sought as ultimate end that similitude of God which is given from grace, he willed to have this through the power of his own nature, not from divine aid, according to God's disposition: for he does not speak of formal and express volition of supernatural beatitude, but of virtual and interpretative volition.

An Angel then also sinned by inordinately seeking his natural beatitude, namely by not ordering it, as he was bound, to the revealed supernatural end. For as Saint Thomas says, 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 110: Just as in us there is sin, from this, that we seek inferior goods, namely of the body, without the order of reason: so in the Devil there was sin in this, that he did not refer his own good to the divine. And this opinion is consonant with Scripture and the Holy Fathers: for Ezekiel 28, the Prophet, to explain what was the matter or object concerning which the Angel exalted himself, enumerates the chief natural perfections which he had, such as wisdom, strength, beauty, and other most excellent gifts with which he then abounded, and from whose aggregation and accumulation his natural beatitude arose, as is established from those words: "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty." Similarly the Holy Fathers assert that the Angel sinned, because he was pleased with himself in the power and dignity which he had received from God: so Ambrose, on Psalm 118: or because he willed to suffice for himself for a blessed life: so Augustine, Book 12 On the City of God, chapter 1: Or because he judged that he sufficed for himself: so Gregory, Moralia 34, chapter 14, otherwise 17: Or finally, as Bernard speaks, Sermon 3 on the words of Isaiah, "I saw the Lord sitting," because he willed to be content with himself. All which openly signify that the Angel first sinned, because he too much pleased himself in his own beatitude and natural perfection, and adhered to it as an ultimate end, not ordering it to supernatural beatitude, nor observing the rule prefixed to him by God. From which you will easily understand how the Angel willed to be as God, not by equalization, but by proportioned similitude: for just as God in Himself has His own beatitude naturally, so the Angel, from his mode of seeking his natural beatitude, willed to have in himself naturally his ultimate end, and to suffice for himself for his felicity, and, as the aforesaid Saint Bernard speaks, he willed to be content with himself, just as God is content with Himself.

You will object, first: The object of Lucifer's first sin was something not yet possessed by him, whence in Scripture it is explained by words in the future, as is clear from that

passage, Isaiah 14: "I will ascend into heaven, I will be like the most High": But natural beatitude was possessed by Lucifer, when he sinned, since he was created by God with it: Therefore the object of Lucifer's first sin was not natural beatitude.

It is confirmed, first, from Anselm saying that the Devil sought that to which he would have attained, if he had stood: but he would not have attained to natural beatitude, since he had it before sin: Therefore he did not inordinately seek it.

It is confirmed, secondly: An Angel cannot sin concerning an object which he loves altogether necessarily, because a morally evil act ought to be free: But natural beatitude is loved by an Angel necessarily as to specification and exercise: Therefore it could not be the object of the first sin of the Angels.

To the objection I answer by distinguishing the Major: The object of Lucifer's first sin, was something not yet possessed by him, materially and as to entity, I deny. Formally, or as to the formal reason under which, according to which, from the mode of willing, it was sought by him, I grant. Similarly I distinguish the Minor: natural beatitude was possessed by the Angel when he sinned, materially and as to entity, I grant: formally, or as to the formal reason under which it was sought, I deny. For it was not yet had as to the reason of ultimate and perfectly satiating end, according to which reason, however, from the mode of appetition, the Angel tended into natural beatitude, by this very fact that he sought it without subordination to the supernatural. Whence,

To the first confirmation I distinguish the Minor: if the Angel had stood, he would not have attained his natural beatitude, precisely as considered in itself, I grant the Minor, for thus he had it before sin. He would not have attained to his natural beatitude, as unlosably to be possessed, and as subordinated to supernatural beatitude, I deny. For he did not possess it before his first sin under this reason, since indeed he could lose it, and omit its ordination to the supernatural end, as he in fact omitted. From which is clear the response to the second confirmation: for although natural beatitude, absolutely and according to itself considered, be an object altogether necessarily loved by an Angel, as subordinated, however, or not subordinated to supernatural beatitude, it is freely loved by him, and accordingly under this reason it could be the object of the first sin of the Angels.

You will object, secondly: if an Angel first sinned in this, that he refused supernatural beatitude, as to be had from grace and God's benefit, it follows that the first sin of the Angel behaved by way of withdrawal and flight, and not by way of volition and pursuit: the consequent is false, as is established from what has been said in the preceding section: Therefore also the Antecedent.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, for we do not assign in the first sin of the Angel only that flight and refusal of supernatural beatitude, as to be had from grace, but also the will of remaining and resting in his own natural felicity or excellence, nor do we separate one from the other; because just as a man sinning by appetite for sensible things, simultaneously refuses spiritual and superior goods, although he might wish to have them without labor, and without lacking the enjoyment of sensible things; so also an Angel, simultaneously and by the same act of pride, refused supernatural beatitude, as to be acquired from grace and merits, and adhered to his natural felicity, not ordering it to the supernatural.

You will ask, what defect on the part of the intellect preceded the first sin of the Angel? I answer that only a defect of inadvertence or inconsideration preceded: for ignorance could not precede, since an Angel from the beginning of his creation had knowledge of all things both natural and moral, as well as revelation and faith of all those things which are required for honestly operating in the supernatural order: nor could error precede, because it is an evil of punishment with respect to rational nature, and thus cannot precede fault. Whence Saint Thomas, question 16 On Evil, article 2, ad 5: It is not necessary to posit in the first sin of the Demon such a defect of intellect, that he judged something false, for instance that some evil be good, but in this, that he failed to apprehend his rule and its order. Inconsideration alone, therefore, was the cause of sin in the Angels, and that secret crack, through which poison entered into their minds, as the same Holy Doctor further declares, question 1 On Evil, article 3, where he writes this: This very fact, that one does not attend actually to such a rule (namely of reason), considered in itself, is not evil, nor fault, nor punishment, because the soul is not bound, nor can it, attend to such a rule always in act. But from this it first takes the notion of fault, that without actual consideration of the rule, it proceeds to such an election. Just as a craftsman does not sin, from this, that he does not always hold the measure, but from this, that not holding the measure, he proceeds to cutting. Similarly also, an Angel did not sin precisely from this, that he did not consider the divine law, prohibiting loving natural beatitude, without order and relation to God as author and supernatural end, but from this, that without consideration of this rule and precept, he doted upon that beatitude, and indeed was pleased with himself in it.

Chapter XIV

On the obstinacy of the Demons.

That the Demons are obstinate in their sin, is clear with the same certainty and evidence, by which it is established that they are damned; for while damnation lasts, its cause lasts, which is a sin committed and not retracted. Whence Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter, chapter 3: All those transgressor Angels can never lack either evil will, or punishment, but with the evil of unjust aversion remaining in them, the just retribution of eternal damnation also remains. And Saint Thomas here, question 64, article 2, relates the opinion of Origen saying that every will of a creature, on account of the liberty of free will, can be bent both to good and to evil, except the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word, and subjoins: This position is to be reputed as erroneous, and it must be held firmly, according to the Catholic faith, that the will of the good Angels is confirmed in good, and the will of the Demons is obstinate in evil. He adds, in the response to the third, that the first sin, not only in habit, but also in act, continuously perseveres in the Demons, according to that saying, Psalm 73: "The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually," because the first sin of the Angels was a disordered appetite for one's own excellence: it is probable, however, that from this motive all the Demons operate, because it is always and necessarily known by the Angel, since it is included in the cognition of his own nature, from which he never ceases, and it is of itself most apt for moving their will. He also teaches, Book 2, dist. 5, question 1, article 2, that the obstinacy of the Demons in evil is so great, that they can effect no work morally good in every respect; because just as it is impossible for a will indeclinably adhering to the ultimate end, to produce a work of sin: so, on the contrary, it is repugnant, from a will immovably adhering to a perverse end, that any right work should proceed. Whence Gregory, Book 18 Moralia, chapter 1: Every will of the Devil is unjust. And Bernard, Book 5 On Consideration, near the middle: What is so damned, as a will subjoined to this necessity of willing and not willing, so that to either alternative it is now moved, not except perversely, so not except miserably.

There is, therefore, only a difficulty and controversy among the Theologians, what is the cause of this kind of obstinacy: for the more recent authors refer it only to an extrinsic cause, namely the lack of grace, and the denial of divine aids, which are justly denied to the Demons, both in punishment of sin, and on account of the condition of their state; for they are in the terminus and not in the way, since according to Damascene, this is to the Angels the fall, which death is to men: therefore just as to heavy and light things existing outside the center is owed the concurrence by which they might be moved into the center, but not when they are already in the center, so also to an intellectual creature

existing in the terminus, is not owed the aid by which he might be moved to the terminus and to the ultimate end. Whence Saint Thomas, question 16 On Evil, article 4, in the body: It does not pertain to the notion of divine wisdom, that grace be further infused into the Demons, by which they might be recalled from the evil of the first aversion, in which they immovably persevere. The Thomists, however, besides this extrinsic cause of the obstinacy of the Demons, acknowledge another intrinsic one, with the Holy Doctor here, article 2, and in several other places, namely the inflexibility of their own free will, after perfect election, by reason of which they demand another extrinsic cause, namely to be outside the way, and deprived of every aid drawing back from evil.

I say, therefore, that the will of an Angel, after complete judgment, and full and perfect election, is inflexible; and accordingly such inflexibility is the intrinsic cause, and the first root, whence the obstinacy in the Demons arises.

It is proved by a fundamental reason taken from Saint Thomas here, article 2: The intellect of an Angel altogether fixedly and immovably apprehends the objects which it certainly and perfectly knows: Therefore also his will fixedly and immutably elects, and immovably adheres to them. The consequence seems legitimate, both because just as our will is therefore mobile from one object to another, because our judgment is mobile and flexible; so, on the contrary, if an Angel's judgment be altogether fixed and immutable, his will will immutably elect and adhere to the objects which it deliberately and perfectly apprehends. Also because, as Saint Thomas observes in the article cited, the appetitive power in all things follows the apprehensive, and is proportioned to it, as the mobile to the mover; of which an evident sign is, that the sensitive appetite is of particular good, but the intellective of universal good, just as the sense is apprehensive of singulars, but the intellect of universals: Therefore also in the Angels the will follows the apprehension of the intellect, and accordingly if that be immobile, its election will equally be immutable. The Antecedent, however, in which lies the difficulty, is thus shown. An intellect apprehending some object by a single intuition and without discourse, apprehends it altogether fixedly and immovably; for therefore we fixedly and immovably apprehend first principles, but other things mobilely, because we know the former by simple intuition and without discourse, but these either not perfectly, or with discourse: But an Angel knows all objects, both supernatural and natural, without discourse, as we showed in chapter 9, § 2: Therefore he apprehends them altogether fixedly and immovably.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason: in order that an Angel recede and be withdrawn from some object which he chose, he ought to detect in it some reason

which he had not known before: but this is repugnant, since, knowing things by simple intuition, and without discourse, and by penetrating conclusions in principles, and predicates in subjects, he attains them in a comprehensive manner, and accordingly by penetrating all their reasons: Therefore an Angel cannot be withdrawn and moved away from an object which he chose. And this is especially true of the regression from the perverse intention of the end, which he had in the way; for in the first instant of full deliberation, he apprehended in natural principles most perfectly comprehended, and in supernatural ones certainly known by the light of faith, all the reasons and all the motives, which could either induce him to the object of sin, or withdraw him from it; wherefore by this very fact that he converted himself to the other part, and, embracing his own good, despised the divine, inebriated with love of his own excellence, he immovably adhered to his natural perfection, as to his ultimate end. Whence Gregory, Moralia 34, chapter 6: The heart of the ancient enemy will be hardened like a stone, because it will never be softened by any penitence of conversion. And Lawrence Justinian, Sermon on the feast of Saint Michael, speaking of the nature of an Angel: After election (he says), whether in good or in evil, it has immutable firmness; for to whatever it turns itself, it is inflexible. Than which nothing can be said more clearly and expressly in favor of our conclusion.

Nor is it valid what some more recent authors say, that the reason of Saint Thomas proves not physical, but only moral inflexibility in the will of an Angel, after perfect election; that is, proves indeed that an Angel cannot easily retract an election already made, but does not convince that he absolutely cannot do so. It is not valid, I say, this response, for since this reason is founded in the sympathy, proportion, and dependence which the appetitive power has on the apprehensive, and the acts of the will on the acts of the intellect, which indeed is physical and necessary, and not only moral and ordinary, it is manifest that it proves physical inflexibility and not only moral, in the will of an Angel, after perfect election. And indeed that Saint Thomas cannot be explained of moral inflexibility, as some interpret him, is established from the fact that he constitutes this difference between the human and angelic will, that the angelic will, after perfect election, immovably adheres to its object, and accordingly is incapable of retraction and repentance, but not the human: for this difference would in no way subsist, if he spoke of inflexibility only moral, that is, difficulty of retraction and repentance, since man very often so adheres to some object, that he is only with difficulty moved from it, and capable of repentance.

For a fuller understanding of this celebrated difficulty, and the resolution of several arguments, it must be diligently observed that a twofold judgment can be found in the

intellect of an Angel concerning the objects which he apprehends, one perfect and altogether complete, proceeding from principles evidently or certainly known, and from the Angel's own deliberation and application: the other imperfect and incomplete, proceeding from principles only doubtful or conjectural, or from God's special motion and application. When, therefore, we say that an Angel cannot retract an election already made, this must be understood of an election regulated by a perfect and altogether complete judgment, as we expressly said in the conclusion, not, however, of that which presupposes only an incomplete and imperfect judgment. Whence the Angel guardian of the Persians, after hearing God's will through the Archangel Michael, changed his will, and permitted the captive Israelites to be liberated, to whose liberation he had before been opposed, as is had, Daniel 10. Likewise the Demons, before they certainly knew Christ to be God, deliberately procured His death, John 13, from which will, however, they afterward (Christ's divinity being known from the miracles wrought in attestation of it) desisted, as is gathered from Matthew 27. Finally all the Angels who sinned, changed the prior will in which they were created, and which they had in the first instant, because indeed in these three cases only an incomplete and imperfect judgment preceded the election of the angelic will: for in the first two it proceeded from principles only doubtful and conjectural; in the third, however, it was from God's special motion and application, and accordingly that judgment, and the election consequent upon it, were not fully free, but free only as to exercise, and necessary as to specification, as is established from what has been said above.

You will object, first: Damascene, Book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3, describing the nature of an Angel, thus says: The nature of an Angel is rational and intellectual, and supported by free power and choice, changeable according to purpose: for every created thing is changeable, only the uncreated is unchangeable. And below, speaking of the blessed Angels, he says they are immobile, not by nature, but by grace. Similarly Isidore, On the Supreme Good, chapter 10: We say the Angels are incommutable not by nature, but by grace, for if they were incommutable by nature, the Devil would certainly not have fallen.

To the first testimony of Damascene I answer, that he only means an Angel to be mutable through succession of intellections and volitions, not, however, that he can, after full and perfect election, reject and refuse an object once chosen by him. Or that he speaks of an Angel absolutely and before perfect election (in which state he is changeable and mutable), not, however, after it, because that being supposed, he is inflexible and immutable. For since an Angel is intermediate between God and man, he ought to behave in a middle way as to his elections and volitions altogether deliberate: whence

since God is altogether immutable before and after election, but man mutable, even after election, an Angel will indeed be mutable before perfect election, but not after it.

To the other two testimonies I say, that Damascene and Isidore said an Angel to be immobile or incommutable, not by nature, but by grace; because although he has from his nature that he be inflexible concerning the object which he once elected with full liberty, nevertheless that he elect supernatural good, rather than the evil opposed to it, comes to him from grace, and consequently from it too comes that he persist in the aforesaid good; for grace perfects an Angel, according to the mode and nature of himself, that is, to adhere firmly to an object once elected with full liberty.

You will object, secondly: No created object can immobilize a created will, since it cannot totally fulfill its capacity: Therefore to no created object can the angelic will immovably adhere.

I answer that the angelic will immovably adheres to an object once elected with full liberty, not from the merits of that object only contingently moving, but from another head explained above, namely from the mode of operating of an Angel knowing things by simple intuition and without discourse, and in a comprehensive manner, and accordingly penetrating by a single act all the reasons and all the motives, which can induce him to such an object, or withdraw him from it.

You will object, thirdly, if an Angel cannot retract an election already made, and withdraw from an object once elected, he will not be fully free concerning that act and such an object, since it is of the notion of liberty that the will can suspend the act which it elicits, or elicit the opposite, and choose or refuse any created object whatsoever.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, for it is not of the notion of liberty, that the will can retract itself after it has willed, as is clear in God, whose decrees once established are immutable: Whence for the liberty of the angelic will, it suffices that an Angel, before election, could elect either, and that he voluntarily threw himself into that state from which he cannot return. There are, therefore, given three degrees of liberty, according to three degrees of intellectual nature, namely human, angelic, and divine. The first says indifference to eliciting and not eliciting an act, and to revoking or not revoking an act already elicited; and this belongs to man, on account of the imperfection of cognition. The second says indifference to eliciting or not eliciting an act, but not to revoking it once elicited; and this belongs to an Angel, on account of a more perfect mode of knowing things without discourse, and by simple intuition. The third says indifference not to eliciting or not eliciting an act absolutely, and as to its entity, but only to the termination of the act to whatever object, either by way of volition, or by way of

nolition; and this degree belongs to God alone, on account of His supreme actuality and immutability, as we declared in the Treatise on the will of God.

Chapter XV

On the punishment of the Demons.

It is certain that the Demons are tortured by true and corporeal fire, as is clear from that passage, Matthew 25: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." Where it is treated of the fire by which the bodies of men will be tormented after the resurrection, and accordingly true and corporeal. Whence Augustine, Book 21 On the City of God, chapter 10: For why should we not say, although in wonderful, yet in true ways, that even incorporeal spirits can be affected by the punishment of corporeal fire? And below: Incorporeal spirits will cleave to, to be tormented by corporeal fires. And Gregory, Moralia 4, chapter 29: If the devil and his angels, though incorporeal, are to be tormented by corporeal fire, what wonder, if souls, before they receive bodies, can feel corporeal torments. Nor is it an obstacle that some of the Holy Fathers, such as Ambrose and Damascene, say that the fire of hell is incorporeal; for they only mean it to be incorruptible, and not needing, like ours, always new matter, that it be preserved.

This being presupposed, there is a threefold difficulty to be briefly resolved here. The first is, whether the Demons are tormented by the fire of hell, through their binding to it? The second, how this binding occurs? The third, whether besides it, another kind of torment is given, by which they are more bitterly tormented than by the fire of hell?

I say first, the Demons are tormented by the fire of hell, through their binding to it. So Saint Thomas, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 90, where he says that incorporeal substances suffer from corporeal fire, by way of a certain binding.

The reason is, in the first place, because without such a punishment, several passages of Scripture cannot stand consistent: such as that of the Canonical Epistle of Jude: "The angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, he hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains." And this of 2 Peter 2: "God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them, drawn down by infernal ropes, to be tormented in hell." The same, that of Apocalypse 20: "He laid hold on the dragon... and bound him for a thousand years... and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up."

The reason is, secondly, because this binding of the Demons is possible, and very afflictive; possible indeed because it does not occur by the natural power of the fire itself,

but by supernatural power, which God communicates to it as an instrument of His justice. Afflictive, however, because it submits the noblest creature to an ignoble thing (such as every corporeal thing is, compared to an Angel), and renders him its captive. Whence Saint Thomas, question On the Soul, article 21: Any spiritual substance, as far as is from its own nature, is not bound to any place, but transcends the whole order of corporeal things: that it be bound to something, therefore, and determined to some place through a certain necessity, is against its nature, and contrary to natural appetite.

I say secondly, the fire of hell binds the Demons, by causing in them an intrinsic form pertaining to the category of quality.

The reason for the first part is, that the powers of the Demon cannot be bound by an extrinsic form alone, or impeded from the exercise of their operations: for this is the difference between powers which operate through formally transient actions, and powers whose operations are formally immanent (such are all those with which the Angels are endowed), that the former can be impeded from the exercise of their operations by something purely external, but not the latter.

The reason for the second part, however, is sought from this, that a form ill affecting and disposing its subject, pertains to the category of quality, and is placed in its first species, as is clear of sickness, of vicious habits, of deformity, and similar things. But that intrinsic form which fire causes in the Demons, ill affects and disposes them, as it torments and tortures them: Therefore it pertains to the category of quality.

But if you ask what is its immediate subject: I answer, according to the common doctrine of the Thomists, not distinguishing the motive and executive power in the Angels from the practical intellect, that that binding quality is subjected in the practical intellect of the Demon, which, in the notion of a motive and executive power, is so intrinsically bound and coerced by it, that it cannot use its light, its species, and its power, in that mode and with that efficacy which is required, to move itself and other things at will, through an act of practical command, except as permitted by the fire itself.

If again you inquire, what are the effects of that quality? I answer that they are chiefly three. The first is, that the Demon himself be submitted to the fire by which he is to be bound, as an inferior to a superior, which effect, although it be not formally binding, because, however, from its nature it is ordered to it, and is presupposed and required, is comprehended under its name. The second is the binding of the powers, first in order to themselves, consisting in this, that the Demon's intellect cannot understand several things which the Demon himself would wish to understand; and, on the contrary, is necessitated, determined, and bound to meditate several things which he would not wish

to meditate: secondly in order to place, insofar namely as he is thus compelled to remain applied to one place, that he cannot apply his power elsewhere. From which results a third effect, namely the very incarceration, or detention in one place, and that a very narrow one, as it were in a prison.

I say thirdly, besides binding to the fire of hell, no punishment of sense is given in the Demons, which more bitterly torments them.

It is proved, first, from the fact that the aforesaid effects of the quality binding the Demons compose the most bitter torment, such that scarcely another more bitter kind of torment could be devised for spiritual substances: for since the cause or object of pain is a known evil, and the evil of something is that which is disagreeable to it, the quantity of pain ought to be weighed from the magnitude of disagreement (perfect cognition, such as the angelic is, being supposed). Those three effects of the quality binding the Demons, however, are most disagreeable to the nature of the Demons, and to their pride: For what is more disagreeable, than that the angelic nature, most excellent of all, and elevated above all corporeal creatures, be submitted to fire, as an inferior to a superior, that it be treated by it as a vile chattel? What greater disagreement and affliction can be devised, than that the Demons, who are the most active of spirits, and having the greatest inclination to operating, be impeded by the fire of Tartarus, lest they operate as and when they will? Finally, since any spiritual substance is not from its nature bound to any place, but transcends the whole order of corporeal things, it is most disagreeable and painful to it, that it be incarcerated and violently detained by the fire of hell, and impeded from moving locally as and when it might will, and from being able to enjoy that liberty which it could. This most bitter pain, from those three effects of the quality binding the Demons, is elegantly described by Cajetan in the oration on this matter delivered at Rome before Julius II, which is had in the third volume of the Opuscula.

It is proved, secondly, the conclusion is proved by impugning the individual opinions of those who admit another kind of torment, besides binding, in the Demons. For in the first place the opinion of Henry seems absurd, thinking that fire torments the Demons by impressing on them its own heat. Both because a corporeal accident cannot be received in a spiritual substance. Also because, granted and not conceded, that the heat of fire could be received in the substance or power of the Demon, it would injure or corrupt nothing in it, and accordingly would not be, as it is to a corporeal substance, a cause of pain.

No less improbable seems the opinion of those, who assert that the Demons are tormented by a representative species of the fire itself, as of their torturer. For either such

a species represents the fire to them as tormenting them through binding, or by another kind of punishment? If the first be said, that torment will not be distinguished from the punishment of binding. If the second be asserted, it remains for those authors to explain that kind of torment distinct from binding.

Nor does the opinion of Soto, Valentia, and Albertinus please, who teach that the fire of hell torments the Demons and separated souls, by causing in them pain and sadness of the same notion as that which the united soul suffers in the will, when the body is burned by fire. For whatever be the case with souls, it is evident that the Demons are incapable of this pain, since it arises in the soul whose body is burned, from this, that it is part of that composite which is destroyed, and from the union and sympathy which it has with the body: but neither is found in the Demons, since they neither are parts of any composite, nor have any body naturally united to them, as the soul does: Therefore they cannot feel pain of the same notion as that which the soul united to a body suffers, when it is burned.

Finally, fictitious seems the kind of torment which Suárez admits in the Demons, consisting, as he himself says, in a quality defiling and staining the substance of the Demon, and accordingly painful and afflictive. For in order that some quality be afflictive, it ought to be abjective or destructive of a form agreeable to the subject: But it does not appear what agreeable form to the angelic substance this quality destroys: Therefore it cannot be painful or afflictive.

Nor is it valid what Suárez says, that such a quality is not painful and disagreeable to the nature of the Demon, from the fact that it deprives him of some perfection owed and agreeable to him, but because it defiles, dishonors, and as it were stains his substance. For against this it is first, that since beauty consists in, or at least necessarily demands, the integrity of a thing, it cannot be understood that some quality render some subject deformed, unless it remove something from it.

Against it, secondly, to be defiled and dishonored is to lose some beauty: But no beauty can the Angel lose from that quality feigned by Suárez: Therefore his substance cannot be defiled by it. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved. Beauty and natural perfection remained integral in the Demons after sin, for it consists in integrity of substance, perspicacity of intellect, and excellence of will, all of which remain in the Demons: supernatural beauty, however, which comes from sanctifying grace and infused virtues, is expelled only by the sin contrary to it; whence the Angels were deprived of it in the second instant in which they sinned, but the quality which Suárez feigns was impressed on them only in the third instant, in which they were damned. I add that since grace is a

certain participation of the divine nature, a quality which is opposed to grace, is in some way opposed to the divine nature: But it is repugnant that God produce a quality opposed to His nature: Therefore from that quality which Suárez admits, an Angel can lose no beauty.

The defiling quality can furthermore be rejected, from its uselessness: for Suárez admits it for this reason, that he might save the locutions of Scripture and the Fathers, by which the Demons are said to burn, to be burned, and to be tortured: But such locutions can no more be saved through that defiling quality, which Suárez feigns, than through the quality binding the Demons to the fire of hell which the Thomists admit, and which we have expounded above: Therefore that defiling quality is, in Suárez's intent, altogether useless. The Minor is proved, for the impression of a quality dishonoring and defiling the substance of an Angel, can no more be called burning, than the impression of the quality binding him to the Tartarean fire; nor through it can the Demons be said to be tortured more than through this; since this does not say only simple detention and incarceration, as the Adversaries suppose, but also several other effects explained above, which cause in the Demons the most bitter pain and torment, as is established from what has been said above: Therefore etc.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: There are many of the Demons who are not detained in hell, namely those who are permitted to roam through our air, and who, on this account, are called by the Apostle "the powers of the air": Therefore it is false that the Demons are tormented by the fire of hell, through their binding to it.

Some respond that the Demons existing in this air, carry with them a certain particle of infernal fire, incarcerating them there. Whence it is said in the ordinary gloss on James 3, that they carry with them the fire of gehenna, wherever they go. But this opinion multiplies miracles without necessity, for it would be a miracle that that fire, placed before our eyes, should not be seen: a miracle, that, existing near a man, it neither burn him, nor warm him: a miracle finally, that a Demon carrying fire with him, should enter an altogether closed chamber.

I answer, therefore, with Saint Thomas here, article 4, ad 3, that the Demons, although they are not actually bound to the Tartarean fire, while they are in this air, are, however, tormented by this very fact, that they know such binding is owed to them: Just as the good Angels lose nothing of their beatitude, when they are sent to us, because they know the celestial place is owed to them; and a captive who is for a short time outside prison, suffers no less punishment, because he knows he must shortly be incarcerated. And in this sense the Holy Doctor understands that ordinary gloss, "they carry with them the

fire of gehenna wherever they go," because indeed they know that binding to it is owed to them.

You will object, secondly, against the second conclusion: Superior Demons sometimes bind inferior ones by their own connatural power, to certain bodies and places, and yet produce nothing real and intrinsic in them, otherwise an Angel could operate physically by his own power within another Angel: Therefore a fortiori the fire of hell, by divine power, will bind the Demons, without producing an intrinsic form in them.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: Superior Demons, by their own connatural power, bind inferior ones physically, I deny the Antecedent: they bind them only morally, by commanding them, as subjects to themselves, that by the mediation of some operation they constitute themselves in some place, and remain there, I grant the Antecedent, and I deny the consequence: for the fire of hell binds the Demons, not morally only, but physically.

You will object, thirdly, against the third conclusion: if the punishment of sense in the Demons consisted only in binding, it would be equal in all: But this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The Minor is established, for the punishment of sense ought to be proportioned to the fault of the Demons: but the fault or sin of the Demons is not equal in them. The sequel of the Major, however, is proved from the fact that the punishment of binding or detention does not receive more and less, for it is positive presence in a place, indivisible, and whole in each.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, and to its proof I say that the binding of the Demons caused by the fire of hell, is not, as the Adversaries think, their bare presence in a place, but a presence violencing and subjecting them to fire, and accordingly greater or lesser in the notion of binding, and of punishment, according to the inequality of the inclinations which it violences in them; or because it binds one of the Demons in more operations, or subjects him to more bodies, than another, for instance, to fire, water, earth, sulphur, and other things.

Chapter XVI

On the speech and illumination of the Angels.

That the Angels mutually address one another is established from various testimonies of Scripture: for it is said, Isaiah 6: "The Seraphim cried one to another." Apocalypse 7: "I saw an Angel ascending from the rising of the sun," who cried with a loud voice to the four Angels. And in Jude, in his Canonical Epistle, Michael disputes with the Devil about the body of Moses; but disputation cannot be understood without some kind of speech. Reason also persuades this, because it is no less proper to intellectual nature to be able, when it has willed, to manifest its secrets to another, than, when it has not been pleasing, to conceal them within itself; since the order of perfect society demands the one no less than the other.

That illumination too is found among the Angels, the Holy Fathers everywhere teach, especially Dionysius, chapter 7 On the Celestial Hierarchy, where he writes this of this illumination: Theologians plainly teach that the inferior orders of the heavenly natures learn sciences from the superior ones, rightly explicating divine works: but the highest are taught by God Himself, according to their capacity, of the mysteries. And Damascene, Book 2 On the Faith, chapter 3: Some illuminate others by reason of the excellence of order or nature. This indeed is clear, that those who are more excellent and sublime, impart splendor and knowledge to inferiors.

Reason also favors this, taken from the accustomed mode of operating of divine wisdom, which, as far as can be done, operates all things through mediating second causes, subordinating the lowest to the intermediate, and the intermediate to the supreme, that thus His goodness may shine forth more, which not only, according to the prescript of His good pleasure, communicates itself to creatures, but also imparts to them full power, that they may be able to communicate to others the perfections drawn from the first fount, and accordingly that the superior Angels can illuminate the inferior, according to that saying of the royal Prophet, Psalm 75: "Enlightening wonderfully from the everlasting hills," that is (as some of the Holy Fathers interpret) by the mediation of the supreme Angels, who are metaphorically called mountains, because just as mountains receive the first rays of the sun, and communicate them to inferior bodies, so the supreme Angels receive divine illustrations immediately from God, and afterward pour them forth into the inferior. For which cause also Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 8, calls them translucent mirrors, and pure from every stain, which receive the first ray of divine light, and pour it forth without envy into those who follow. Finally Nazianzen, Oration 40, calls them rivulets of the first light, because just as a rivulet,

receiving water from the first spring, derives it into other subject places, so the supreme intelligences, receiving supernatural influxes from the first fount, diffuse them into other inferior intelligences. Whence Bernard, Sermon 5 On Consideration, chapter 4: The Cherubim (he says), drawing from the very fount of wisdom, from the mouth of the most High, and pouring forth the streams of knowledge, infuse them into all the citizens of heaven. These things are certain and undoubted among all; whence the whole weight of the difficulty lies in this, that we declare the mode by which one Angel can address another, and illuminate another.

§ I

The speech of the Angels does not occur through the sending in of species, but through the direction of concepts.

The first part is proved against Suárez and other more recent authors, by the testimony of Saint Thomas, question 9 On Truth, article 5, ad 2, where he thus says: An Angel speaking effects nothing in the Angel to whom he speaks, but something is effected in the speaking Angel himself, such that from this he be known by the other in the manner said before. Whence it is not necessary also that the speaker infuse anything into him to whom he speaks. And article 6, ad 4: The Angel (he says) to whom speech is made, does not receive anything from the speaker, but through the species which he has within himself, he knows both the other Angel, and his speech. Than which nothing more express can be said against Suárez and others asserting that a speaking Angel produces a species of his own concept in the intellect of him to whom he speaks.

Reason also favors this, first because an Angel does not receive species from things, even spiritual ones, but has them infused by God, from the first instant of his creation, as we showed in chapter 7, § 2. Secondly, because if the speech of the Angels occurred through the sending in of a species, the reason of secrecy in speech of this kind could not be preserved; for since that species is not a future contingent, nor a free act, nor anything supernatural, especially when speech is about natural things, it is contained within objects naturally knowable by any Angel whatsoever, and accordingly there is no reason why it should be known by one rather than another. Thirdly, since there cannot be given action at a distance, and an intelligible species, as it is spiritual, cannot be diffused through a corporeal medium, if a speaking Angel produced the species of that act which he manifests through speech, in the intellect of the Angel to whom he speaks, he would have to be, not only through his power, but also through his substance, within the intellect of him, and accordingly flow into his mind: but this is repugnant, since this prerogative is reserved to the supreme and uncircumscribed spirit, as Bernard expressly

teaches, Sermon 5 on the Canticle, in these words: Know this, that no created spirit is applied to our minds through itself, so as to be mixed and infused into us, by whose participation, being taught, we might become learned, or more learned, or good, or better. None of the Angels, none of souls, is in this way capable to me, nor am I capable of any. Nor do the Angels themselves so grasp one another mutually. Let this prerogative therefore be sequestered to the supreme and uncircumscribed spirit, who alone, when He teaches an Angel or a man knowledge, seeks no instrument, either of our corporeal ear, or of His own mouth. He is infused of Himself, He becomes known of Himself, the pure is grasped by the pure: Therefore etc.

Nor is the response of Suárez valid, saying that that flowing-in which the Holy Fathers say is proper to God, is that which occurs by way of containing and giving being, or which is within the terms of essence, not, however, that by which some quality or some species is impressed on the mind of another; because such species behave by way of a circumstance existing to the Angel, and is received in his intellect already existing. It is not valid, I say, this response: first because Saint Bernard in the place cited speaks expressly of that flowing-in, by which we are made more learned or better, not, however, of that which occurs by way of containing and giving being, or which is within the terms of essence. Secondly, because Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 64, article 1, says that God alone works (by way of principal agent) the interior effect of the sacrament, because God alone flows into the soul in which the effect of the sacrament exists: Therefore according to Saint Thomas, not only that flowing-in which occurs by way of containing and giving being, or which is within the terms of essence, but also that by which something real and physical is impressed on or effected in the mind of another, is proper to God alone, and can belong to no creature. Thirdly, since intelligible species, either are the strict properties of an Angel, as some think, or at least are accidents connaturally owed, as others more probably hold; only He can impress them on the angelic intellect by way of principal cause, who can create and preserve the nature of an Angel: Therefore if one Angel cannot flow into the mind of another, by way of giving and preserving his being, neither can he flow into it, by way of causing and producing intelligible species in it.

The second part of the assertion, which teaches that angelic speech occurs by this, that one Angel directs and orders his concept to another, is Saint Thomas's here, question 107, article 1. His reason is, that to speak is nothing other than to manifest externally the concept of the mind interiorly latent: But by this, that one Angel directs and orders his concept to another, he manifests it to him: Therefore in that direction and ordination angelic speech consists. The Major is clear: the Minor is proved from the doctrine which the same Holy Doctor delivers there in the solution to the first, where he says that in us

the interior concept of the mind is closed, as it were, by a double obstacle, lest it become known to another; first indeed by the very liberty of the will, on account of which it is above the order of the universe, and depends on no extrinsic cause, except God: secondly by the grossness of the body, by reason of which man ought to use some sensible sign, that he manifest his concept to another man. Whence excellently Gregory, Moralia 2, chapter 5: To alien eyes we are, as it were, smoke behind the wall of the body, within the secret of the mind; but when we desire to manifest ourselves, we go forth as it were through the door of the tongue, that we may show what we are inwardly. In an Angel, however, since he is spiritual and incorporeal, that obstacle is not found, but only the other; for the concept of one Angel is hidden from another, only by the veil of liberty, and accordingly by this very fact that this veil is removed, the concept of one Angel is manifested to another: But such a veil is removed by this, that the concept of one is directed to the other, because by that very fact the Angel yields the dominion and right which he has of concealing such a concept from another: Therefore by this, that one Angel directs and orders his concept to another, he manifests it to him.

It is confirmed: In order that the free concept of one Angel can actually be known by another Angel, it suffices that it be rendered as pertaining to him, for by this very fact it is placed within the sphere of his intellectuality; any Angel is by nature apt through the species which he has in himself to understand whatever pertains to himself: But by this very fact, precisely, that one Angel voluntarily orders his concept to another, with this end, that it may become known to him, by this very fact, I say, he renders this thought as pertaining to him; because by this very fact he wills such a concept to pertain to him: Therefore by this very fact he brings it about, that that thought can be known by him.

This mode of speaking seems more probable than others, in that it more easily explains all the things necessary for the free and secret speech of the Angels, which are only with difficulty explained by the Adversaries. For in the first place it easily resolves that the speech of the Angels can be secret, and known to one only, because an Angel can order his concept to one and not to others. It also easily explains, how one can address several others simultaneously, even distant ones, for he can direct his concept to several, even distant ones. Likewise it easily explains how the Angel to whom speech is made, is morally moved and excited by the speaking Angel, to this, that he attend to his speech. For as Saint Thomas says, Book 2, dist. 11, question 1, article 3, ad 4: An Angel is always in actual consideration of himself, and consequently of those things which pertain to himself, of all of which he is himself the reason of knowing... As soon, however, as one Angel orders his speech to another, it is made to be of things pertaining to the other, and thus is known by him. Whence, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, nothing

physical is newly received in the hearing Angel, that he be excited, but there is only newly placed a direction or ordination of the speaking Angel's concept to him whom he wishes to address, which is a certain moral motion and excitation. Finally, by this opinion it is not difficult to explain, how an evil Angel, speaking to another, can lie to him; for having formed in himself a concept or affection directed to another, he can form another concept directed to him, by which he denies that he has that undirected one, or affirms that he has the opposite: in which case it is evident that he will manifest to him something other than that which he has in mind, and accordingly will lie to him. Which the good Angels, speaking among themselves, cannot furnish, since among them there can be no deception or lie.

From what has been said, the opinion of Scotus remains impugned, thinking that a speaking Angel produces actual knowledge of his concept in the intellect of the hearer, such that the intellect of the hearer behaves merely passively toward it, in no way eliciting it, but only receiving it. It remains, I say, confuted, this opinion, both because intellection, since it is essentially a vital and immanent act, cannot be from some extrinsic principle, but ought to be elicited by the same principle in which it is received, for living things, insofar as such, are those which move themselves. Also because in order that a speaking Angel produce actual knowledge of his concept in the intellect of the hearer, he would have to be, not only through his power, but also through his substance, within the intellect of him, and accordingly ought to be present to him by flowing-in, which is repugnant to any creature, and is reserved to God alone, as we showed above.

Exploded also, from what has been said, remains the opinion of some, who say that the speech of the Angels occurs by the mediation of certain signs, which some wish to be external and sensible, and to consist in certain figures or characters engraved in heaven, just as we produce voices or letters on paper, that we may manifest our inner mental concepts: which opinion Nazarius calls foolish, both because those signs are fictitious and chimerical, also because the Angels would be said rather to write, than to speak. Others, however, say those signs to be spiritual: But this is easily rejected, for either they would be natural signs, or instituted by the Angels at pleasure? Not the first, otherwise each would know what the other might say, and accordingly there could not be secret speech among them. Nor the second, because in order that the Angels could institute such signs, some speech would have had to precede among them, by which they agreed among themselves to institute such signs, and thus these would not be necessary for angelic speech, but altogether useless and superfluous.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: When the Angels speak to one another, either he to whom the other speaks, has the representative species of the

speaker's concept, or he does not have it? If the first, nothing is lacking to him that he know it, independently of the will and ordination of the speaker. If the second, since he cannot know the concept of the speaking Angel without its species, he ought to receive it from the speaker, and accordingly the speech of the Angels ought to occur through the sending in of species. Especially since the Angel to whom speech is made, ought to be moved and excited to this, that he attend to the speaking Angel, which cannot occur, without impression of a species. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 2, says that just as the sense is excited by a sensible sign, so by some intelligible power the mind of an Angel can be excited to attending.

I answer that the Angel to whom another speaks, has indeed in himself the representative species of the speaker's concept, but cannot know it, independently of his direction and ordination; because in the actual representation such a species depends on the will of him whose is the concept itself, as on a condition without which not; in exactly the way in which we said above, that although any Angel has a species which represents a future contingent, he nevertheless does not know it, because actual representation depends on the existence of the aforesaid future thing.

To that which is added about the excitation of the Angel to whom speech is made, it must be said, that an Angel is excited to attending to the speech which is made to him by another, and accordingly to knowing his concept, in the same way that he is excited to knowing the individuals which, under the human species, e.g., newly come to be: whence just as for this excitation it is not required that the new production of individuals of human nature, cause and place something physically in the angelic intellect, but it suffices that the species which the Angel innately has of the nature and quiddity of such individuals, their production being posited, as a condition without which he cannot represent them, be newly determined to representing them; so likewise, in order that the intellect of one Angel be efficaciously excited and moved to attending to the speech of another, and to perceiving that of which he speaks to him, it is not required that through that speech he receive something physical anew, but it suffices that there newly accede an ordination and direction on the part of the speaking Angel; because through such ordination the veil is removed which was concealing his concept, as was shown above. Whence to the passage of Saint Thomas it must be said, with Cajetan, that the Holy Doctor, by the name of intelligible power, by which he says the mind of an Angel is excited to attending to another speaking, understands the ordination of the concept of one Angel to another, which has a morally excitative power, in that it makes this concept to be of things pertaining to him to whom he speaks, as he himself teaches in the place adduced above from the second book of the Sentences. The

comparison of Saint Thomas, however, holds only as to the motion and excitation, not, however, as to the mode of motion and excitation.

You will object, secondly, against the second part of the assertion: The ordination of the speaking Angel's concept to him to whom he speaks, is an internal and free act, and accordingly occult: Therefore through it precisely such a concept is not manifested, for the occult is not manifestative of another.

I answer that that ordination is indeed formally internal and immanent, but is virtually transient and external, because it removes the moral impediment by which the speaking Angel's concept is concealed: whence although it be a free act as to exercise and use by which it comes to be, this liberty, however, does not stand in the way, but that it be manifest to another, by this very fact that the speaking Angel wills it to pertain to the Angel to whom he speaks, and accordingly to be known by him.

From what has been said is gathered, first, that for the speech of the Angels, non-distance of them is not necessarily required, but that one Angel can address another at whatever distance, because he can direct his concept to him. So Saint Thomas expressly teaches here, article 4, where he thus discourses: The speech of an Angel consists in an intellectual operation: but the intellectual operation of an Angel is altogether abstracted from place and time: neither the diversity of time, nor the distance of place, effects anything, however, in that which is altogether abstracted from place and time. Whence in the speech of an Angel, distance of place makes no impediment. I add that one must philosophize about the Angels in the same way as about separated souls: it is established, however, from Scripture, that the soul of the impious rich man existing in hell, addressed the soul of Abraham existing in the bosom of the Fathers. Therefore a fortiori one Angel will be able to address another however distant.

You will say, Isaiah 6 it is said of the Seraphim, that one cried to another: But loud speech has no place, except on account of the distance of him to whom we speak: Therefore it seems that distance impedes the speech of the Angels.

I answer with Saint Thomas, question 9 On Truth, article 6, ad 3, that that cry of the Seraphim did not signify distance of places, but the magnitude of the things which they said, namely the unity of essence, and the Trinity of persons, whose infinite sanctity they praised, saying, "Holy, Holy, Holy." Or also it declared the ardor of their affection, for as Gregory rightly says, Moralia 2, chapter 4: A great cry is a great desire; for the less someone desires, the less he cries; and he expresses a greater voice in the ear of the uncircumscribed spirit, the more fully he pours forth his desire into it... A motion of the heart excited with reverence, is a great cry of voice to the ears of the uncircumscribed

spirit. And Augustine, on Psalm 37: The fervor of charity is the cry of the heart. If charity always remains, you always cry; if you always cry, you always desire.

It is gathered, secondly, that the tongue of the Angels (of which, 1 Corinthians 13: "If I speak with the tongues of men, and of angels") is nothing other than the power which an Angel has of ordering his concept to others; which power resides formally in the intellect as moved and applied by the will: For to order is a proper act of reason, as Saint Thomas says, 1-2, question 17, article 2. Whence when he says here, article 1, that the will orders the concept of the angelic mind to manifesting it to another, he only means this ordination to be from the Angel's will, as moving or applying his intellect to eliciting it. Wherefore Theodoret, explaining the aforesaid words of the Apostle, thus says: The tongue of the Angels ought to be called the power of understanding, by which they manifest not what is perceived by sense, but by intelligence; by which they praise God, and differ among themselves. And Theophylact on the same passage: A certain power of understanding, by which they mutually communicate divine sentiments, is the tongue of the Angels.

§ II

The illumination of the Angels does not occur through the infusion of species, or the production of intellectual light, or the union of the superior Angel's light with the light of the inferior Angel, but through the sole proposition of the object, accommodated to the capacity of the inferior.

The first part of this assertion is expressly taught by Saint Thomas, question 9 On Truth, article 1, ad 10, where he thus says: When one Angel is illuminated by another, new species are not infused into him, but from the same species which his intellect had before, being strengthened by the light of the superior, he is made capable of knowing more things. This part is also established from what has been said above in § 1 concerning the speech of the Angels, for the same is the reason concerning illumination and speech, as to this, and all the Theologians who think the speech of the Angels occurs without the sending in of species, likewise teach that a superior Angel does not produce a new species in the intellect of the inferior whom he illuminates.

That he does not illuminate him, however, by producing in him some intellectual light, is thus shown: either that light would be natural or supernatural: not natural, because that would not suffice, since illumination is chiefly about supernatural things. Nor supernatural, both because Saint Thomas here, article 1, ad 2, says that one Angel does not illuminate another, by handing over to him the light of nature, or grace, or glory. Also because supernatural light cannot be produced, except by God as supernatural author.

Nor is it valid if you say, that although one Angel cannot principally produce supernatural light in the intellect of another, well, however, as an instrument of divine virtue. For one Angel illuminates another, on account of the fullness of light which he copiously receives from God, not, however, from this alone, that he is moved by Him, by way of instrument, to producing light in the intellect of another, in the way that a stone, or any other insensible thing, could also produce such light.

The third part, however, which asserts that a superior Angel does not illuminate an inferior, by uniting his intellectual light with the light of the inferior Angel, and thus simultaneously with him effecting the intellection of him whom he illuminates: is proved against Bañez and Zumel: For these authors wish that a superior Angel unite his intellectual light with the light of the inferior Angel whom he illuminates, because they think that the latter, with his own light, is not completely capable of perceiving the truth of which he is illuminated: but through this union he is not rendered more capable of this, since through it nothing physical is impressed on him, but only the superior Angel assists him, as they themselves say: Therefore the illumination of the Angels does not occur through the union of the superior Angel's light with the light of the inferior, to simultaneously with him effect the intellection of him of which he illuminates him.

I add that, if one and the same intellection were effected by the superior and inferior Angel, or produced by them, as by two total causes, or partial ones? Not the first, since it is repugnant that one and the same effect proceed, at least by the ordinary way, from two total and particular causes, or of the same order. Nor the second, because since the intellection of the inferior Angel is an immanent and vital action, it cannot proceed from some extrinsic principle (such as a superior Angel is), as from an even partial cause.

From these things is proved the fourth part of the assertion: for if the illumination of the Angels does not occur through the infusion of species, or the production of intellectual light, or the union of the superior Angel's light with the light of the inferior, it remains that it occurs through the sole proposition of the object, accommodated to the capacity of the inferior Angel, which is called by the Theologians "artificial teaching," and is thus explained by Saint Thomas, question 9 On Truth, article 5: A superior Angel has cognition of things through more universal forms, whence an inferior Angel is not proportioned to receiving cognition from a superior Angel, unless the superior Angel in some way distinguish his cognition, conceiving in himself that of which he wishes to illuminate him, in such a mode that it be comprehensible by the inferior Angel, and by manifesting it, illuminates him... It is similar to a master who sees the disciple cannot grasp those things which he himself knows, in that mode in which he himself knows, and therefore he studies to distinguish and multiply through examples, so that thus they can

be comprehended by the disciple.

This artificial teaching, therefore, consists in this, that a superior Angel distinguishes, divides, and as it were partitions the truth which he knows in universal, and thus divided and articulated, proposes it to the inferior Angel through speech, accommodating himself to his capacity; for thus he illuminates him: for every manifestation of truth is called light, according to that saying, to the Ephesians 5: "All that is made manifest is light."

The Angelic Doctor received this sublime doctrine from Dionysius, who testifies that he received it from the supreme Theologian and his most blessed preceptor Paul: for Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 15, near the middle, explaining the mode by which a superior Angel illuminates an inferior, says it is through the division and partition of the intelligence, which he himself receives uniform from a more august substance, into various concepts, which he divides by provident virtue, and proposes to the inferior, according to his capacity. Than which nothing can be said more clearly and expressly in favor of our opinion.

You will object, first: A superior Angel cannot divide universal knowledge, and multiply it into several concepts proportioned to the inferior Angel: Therefore the illumination of the Angels cannot consist in that artificial teaching, or in that proposition of the object, accommodated to the capacity of the inferior Angel. The consequence is clear, the Antecedent is proved. The connatural mode of understanding of the superior Angel, requires that universal knowledge, since he understands through universal species: Therefore he cannot divide and multiply his knowledge into several particular concepts, proportioned to the inferior.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, and to its proof I say, that although the natural mode of understanding of the superior Angel, demand this universality of knowledge; this, however, does not impede, but that he can divide and multiply it, according to the capacity of the inferior: whence that connatural mode, does not require every concept of the superior Angel to be universal, but only that he can have it, when he wills.

You will object, secondly: An inferior Angel is intrinsically impotent to attaining the truth, proposed to him by the illumination of a superior Angel; for if he were able to know it, he would not need illumination: Therefore he requires something physical to be infused into him, by which he be intrinsically strengthened, and made capable of knowing it. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 1, teaches that since two things concur for understanding, namely intellective power and similitude of the thing understood, according to these two, one Angel can notify truth to another, first indeed by fortifying

his intellective power, secondly on the part of similitude, insofar as a superior Angel receives knowledge of truth in a certain universal acceptation, for grasping which the intellect of the inferior Angel is not sufficient, and he divides it in a certain way, that it can be grasped by the inferior: Therefore he does not constitute the illumination of the Angels in the sole proportioned proposition or exhibition of objects, which we call artificial teaching, but also in something holding on the part of the intellective power, and strengthening and altering it.

I answer, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence; for the intellect of the inferior Angel is sufficiently strengthened, and made capable of knowing the truth proposed to him by the superior Angel, through this, that it be proposed to him in a mode proportioned and accommodated to him. For just as the corporeal eye, without change of itself, can be made capable of seeing some object, which before it could not see, by this namely, that that object be changed in itself, and from disproportioned become proportioned; so also the intellect of an inferior Angel can be made capable of attaining some truth, which he could not know before, by this, that it be, through the artificial teaching of the superior Angel, divided and multiplied into several concepts, according to the capacity of the inferior, and thus rendered proportioned to his intellect. Whence these two, to propose the object in a mode proportioned to the intellect of the illuminated Angel, and to fortify his natural light, do not enter into number, but import one and the same action of the illuminating Angel; since indeed by this very fact that a superior Angel proposes to the inferior, in a mode proportioned to him, the truth which he understands more universally, the intellect of the inferior Angel is strengthened; just as the visual power is confirmed by the assistance of exterior light, by which the medium and object are illuminated; and just as the mind of a disciple is strengthened from this, that the master proposes to him truth which he did not know before, in a mode proportioned and accommodated to his capacity. From which the doctrine which the Holy Doctor delivers here, article 1, is easily understood and explained.

From what has been said is gathered, first, that angelic speech differs from illumination chiefly in two respects: first because speech is a simple manifestation of the speaking Angel's concept; illumination, however, besides manifestation of the object, says strengthening of the intellective power, in the mode already explained. Secondly, because speech can be about false things, but illumination is always about true things, since illumination is a perfective act; but the intellect is not perfected except by knowledge of truth.

It is gathered, secondly, that although the inferior Angels can speak to the superior, and manifest to them their concepts, they cannot, however, illuminate them; because they

cannot strengthen their intellect, by helping it, through a more illustrious exhibition of the proposed truth, according to their grasp; since they are of inferior light, and understand through species less universal, than the superior Angels.

It is gathered, thirdly, that the Demons, although they be superior, do not illuminate those inferior to themselves; for since the illuminative act (witness Dionysius, chapter 8 On the Celestial Hierarchy) is purgative and perfective, because it purges from ignorance, and perfects by manifestation of truth, only that manifestation of new knowledge will be illumination, which renders the intellect of the illuminated certain of the truth of the thing known. This certitude, however, cannot be in the Demons, because they can always doubt, whether he who manifested to them a thing they were ignorant of, spoke truly. For since one Demon can lie to another, the one hearing can never be certain of the truth manifested. I add that illumination properly so called, is manifestation of truth according as it has an order to God, from whom is all light and truth, as Saint Thomas teaches here, article 2, ad 1, and proves from Dionysius, chapter 15 On the Celestial Hierarchy: although, however, some Demons perceive some truths more clearly than others, and sometimes reveal them to others, they do not order this manifestation of truth to God, but twist it to their own wickedness; and therefore they do not illuminate, but rather induce darkness.

It is gathered, fourthly, that illumination can occur not only concerning supernatural things, and mysteries of grace, but also concerning natural ones, such as future contingents, or past things, which, because one Angel knew them, while they were present, but not another, has complete species of them, but not another, who, while they were present, did not attend to them; wherefore the first can manifest them through illumination, just as also future contingents; for one can know some contingent natural truths, which another does not know. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 1, ad 2, says that one Angel illuminates another, by manifesting to him truth concerning those things which pertain to the state of nature, and of grace, and of glory.

You will say, if the sole manifestation of natural truth sufficed for illumination, an Angel manifesting his heart's secrets to another, would illuminate him, which Saint Thomas expressly denies, question 107, article 2.

I answer by denying the sequel, whose reason the Holy Doctor assigns in the same place, because illumination, according to Dionysius, is a perfective act, for it perfects the illuminated intellect, through manifestation of truth: it does not pertain, however, to the perfection of one Angel to know what another wills, or thinks to do, which is to know the internal secrets of another, but what the truth of the thing itself has in itself. Whence

in the same place, in the response to the third, he says that every speech of God is illumination, because since God's will is the rule of truth, even to know what He wills, pertains to the perfection and illumination of the created mind; but it is not the same reason concerning the will of an Angel, because (as he had said in the body of the article) the created will is not light, nor rule of truth, but participating light. Whence to communicate those things which are from the created will, insofar as such, is not to illuminate.

You will ask, first, whether illumination can occur between the Angels concerning those things which are known by them through blessed vision?

I answer with Saint Thomas here, article 1, ad 1, that illuminations among the blessed Angels do not occur concerning God, or the divine essence, because all Angels, both superior and inferior, immediately see the divine essence, and as to this one does not teach or illuminate another, but all are immediately illuminated by God. It can, however, occur concerning other things which they see in the Word, for as the same Doctor discourses in the same place: The reasons of the divine works which are known in God as in a cause, God indeed knows all of them in Himself, because He comprehends Himself: of the others, however, seeing God, each one knows more reasons in God, the more perfectly he sees Him. Whence a superior Angel knows more in God concerning the reasons of the divine works, than an inferior, and illuminates him of these.

You will ask, secondly, whether the supreme Angels are immediately illuminated by God, or by Christ?

I answer it is probable that they are immediately illuminated by Christ, because Christ is not only the head of men, but also of the Angels, as the Apostle teaches, to the Colossians 2; it pertains, however, to the dignity of a head, to influence immediately into the members. Of which in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

You will ask, thirdly, whether the illuminations of the Angels are to endure through the whole of eternity? I answer that they are to endure only until the day of judgment, because they are about things pertaining to the Ecclesiastical hierarchy, especially about the mode of helping it to attain its end: which reason will cease after the day of judgment. Whence the Apostle, 2 to the Corinthians 15, says that God will then evacuate all Principality and Power and Virtue, not indeed as to the distinction of degree and perfection of hierarchy, but as to the offices of illuminating, presiding, and governing.

Chapter XVII

On the hierarchies and orders of the Angels.

That there are three hierarchies of the Angels is commonly taught by Theologians, following Dionysius On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 6, and Saint Thomas proves it here, question 108, article 1, by this discourse: A multitude ordered under a Prince, is multiplied according to the modes by which it receives governance from him: But the Angels receive divine governance, or the illustrations by which they are governed by God, in a threefold diverse mode: Therefore three hierarchies of Angels are given. The Major is clear, the Minor is proved: Some Angels intuit the reasons or secrets of divine providence in the first and most universal cause, others in universal second causes, others in special causes: for example, the salvation of Saint Peter is known by some Angels in the most universal cause, which is God's will; by others in universal principles, for instance in Christ's passion; by others in the particular cause, namely his martyrdom: Therefore there are given three diverse modes by which the Angels receive divine illustrations, the first pertains to the first hierarchy, the second to the second, the third to the third.

The first, which always assists God, is distinguished into three orders, according to the threefold mode by which the Angels of that hierarchy regard God: for in the first place, some have a relation to God by reason of most excellent union, which occurs through most ardent love, and these are called Seraphim from the Hebrew word Seraph, which is called in Latin "to burn." Whence Gregory says of them, Homily 34: The more subtly they gaze upon divinity, the more powerfully they blaze in His love. Secondly, others regard God, as peculiarly revealing His secrets to them, and these are called Cherubim, which signifies fullness and outpouring of divine science and wisdom: Whence Dionysius, chapter 7 On the Celestial Hierarchy, says they are as translucent mirrors, pure from every stain, which receive the first ray of divine light, and pour it forth without envy into those who follow. Of them also Bernard writes, Book 5 On Consideration, chapter 4: The Cherubim, drawing from the very fount of wisdom, from the mouth of the most High, and pouring forth the streams of knowledge, infuse them into all the citizens of heaven. Thirdly, others regard God, as peculiarly sitting in them, and ultimately resting in His illuminations, and these are Thrones, and are called by Dionysius Theophori, or God-bearers. They are also called the seats of God, because just as a seat receives the one sitting, who can also be carried in it; so also the aforesaid Angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way carry Him to the inferior.

The second hierarchy, which presides over created things, and to which pertains the general disposition of things to be done, is also divided into three orders: the first is called of Dominations, to whom it pertains to distribute to others those things which are to be done; for it belongs to lords to prescribe things to be done. Whence Bernard, Book 5 On Consideration, chapter 4, says of them: They are so preeminent, that with respect to them all the rest seem administering spirits, and to these, as to lords, are referred the regimens of principalities, the guardianships of powers, the operations of virtues, the revelations of Archangels, the care and providence of Angels. The second order is of Virtues, which now begin to execute general works, such as to move the heavens, and to work marvelous works, which pertain to the governance of the world and the regimen of the Church; and they are therefore called Virtues, because by the divine virtue with which they abound, they work signs and prodigies. The third is of Powers, to whom it pertains to preserve the unshaken order of divine providence, by removing impediments, and coercing the Demons, lest they pervert it.

The third hierarchy also, to which it pertains to commit to execution, and apply to particular causes, the order of divine providence, is likewise distinguished into three orders: The first is called of Principalities, because, as Gregory says, they preside over even the good spirits of the Angels themselves (namely Angels and Archangels), because, other things being subject to them, while they dispose the things to be done, they preside over them for accomplishing the divine ministries. The second is called of Archangels, who, being conscious of the divine mysteries, are sent to announce only for great and chief causes, according to that saying of Gregory the Great: Those Angels who announce the smallest things, are called Angels, but those who announce the greatest are called Archangels. The third is called of Angels, who announce the smallest things, and to whom the guardianship of private men has been committed. Of these nine choirs of Angels Bernard discourses elegantly, Book 5 On Consideration, chapter 4.

Of these, some are called assisting, because they continuously assist God, and receive illuminations immediately from Him: others are called ministering, because they minister to the governance of the world, either by way of executing, or by way of disposing, according to that saying of Daniel: "Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." There is, however, a difficulty and controversy among the Theologians, whether, by extraordinary law, the Angels of the first hierarchy, who are called assisting, are sent by God to exterior ministries?

I answer negatively with Saint Thomas here, article 2: The order of nature is not passed over by God (says the Holy Doctor) except because it is thus expedient for the

manifestation of grace, or for the confirmation of faith: but these reasons cease in the ministries of the Angels, because those pertain to the order of grace, and otherwise the passing over of an established order does not avail for the confirmation of faith, since it cannot become known to wayfaring men: Therefore the assisting Angels, neither by God's ordinary law, nor extraordinary, are sent to exterior ministries.

Nor is it an obstacle that the Apostle, to the Hebrews 1, says that all Angels are ministering spirits, for thus they are called, because all minister, by mediate or immediate mission, as Saint Thomas explains in the article cited, ad 1, for either they exercise exterior ministry, or move others to exercising it.

Nor does it matter also, that Isaiah 6, the Angel who purged the lips of this Prophet with a fiery coal, is called a Seraph, and that he whom, Genesis 3, God placed before the gate of the earthly Paradise, is called a Cherub. And Tobias 12, Raphael said: "I am one of the seven, who stand before God." These, I say, do not stand in the way, for the first Angel is called a Seraph, not because he was of the first hierarchy, and the order of the Seraphim, but because he had come to burn and purge the lips of the Prophet, and this he furnished by the virtue and authority of some Seraph, whose vicar and minister he was, as it were. Whence Gregory, Homily 34 on the Gospel: Those spirits who are sent, receive the name of those whose office they bear: for the Angel who, that he may burn the sins of speech, carries a coal from the altar, is called a Seraph, which means burning. The second also is called a Cherub, not because he was of the order of the Cherubim, but because he was placed before the gate of the earthly Paradise, to guard the tree of knowledge, which is attributed to the Cherubim, and that from this it might be understood that a most watchful and most wise guardian of Paradise was placed by God, whom no one could deceive, and by guile or cunning enter Paradise. The third, however, is said to be one of the seven who stand before the Lord, not because he was one of the Angels of the first hierarchy, who are called assisting (for the guardianship of Tobias was not a ministry so excellent, that it could not be exhibited by an Angel of the lowest hierarchy), but because he is one of many Angels who stand before the Lord, seeing His face always; for, witness Gregory, Homily 33, by the number seven universality is figured. Or also because he is one of the seven Angels, who, as princes, are set over the whole earth, of whom mention is often made in the Apocalypse.

It must be observed, however, that although the Angels of the first Hierarchy are never sent to those ministries, which are ordered to the salvation of men and the good of the elect; for as Gregory says, Homily 34 on the Gospel: Those who assist, so enjoy intimate contemplation, that they are least of all sent to accomplish external works. Nevertheless it is probable and likely, that they were sent to minister to Christ, as to their head, after

His temptation and fasting in the desert, and descended to earth in honor of Christ, both on the day of His nativity, when "there was a multitude of the heavenly army praising, and saying, Glory to God in the highest" (for Chrysostom says this was composed from all the choirs of the Angels), also when Christ rose and ascended into heaven, that they might honor His victory and triumph. For since in Christ there is the order of hypostatic union, which is superior to the order of grace, on account of it the order which is observed in the ministries of the Angels, which is attended to according to the gifts of graces, could be passed over; just as, on account of the order of grace, the order of nature is passed over.

Treatise VIII

On Man, and the Various States of Human Nature.

Since man, after the Angel, holds second place among the creatures founded by God, the absolute treatment of the Angels being finished, it follows that we discourse briefly of man, whom Nazianzen calls another Angel, but Chrysostom an earthly Angel, and who is as it were the compendium of the world, the horizon of time and eternity, and the bond of corporeal and spiritual things. For he is, as Augustine says, Book 9 On the City of God, chapter 13, a mean between beasts and Angels, inferior to the Angels, superior to beasts, having with beasts mortality, but reason with the Angels. Whence the same Holy Doctor rightly said that of all the marvelous things which God made for man's sake, man himself is the greater marvel. But since the Philosophers discourse of the parts of man of which he is composed, namely soul and body, of the powers both spiritual and corporeal, and also of the passions and affections, one thing remains, that we briefly discourse of the various states in which man is, or was, or could have been, namely the state of innocence and integrity, the state of fallen nature, and the state of pure nature.

Chapter I

On the creation of the first man.

Although man holds the first place among corporeal creatures, he was nevertheless produced last: for it was fitting that the great world be created first, afterward the small one, which would be, as it were, a perfect compendium of the whole great world. Or as Nazianzen says, Oration 43: The palace had first to be built, and then the King to be introduced. Or as Nyssen discourses, Book On the Making of Man, chapter 2: It was not fitting that a prince and ruler should exist, before those things existed over which he might rule; but that, the empire now being constituted, then finally the King should be proclaimed.

Describing his production, Moses, Genesis 1 and 2, introduces God speaking thus: "Let us make man to our image and likeness, etc." By which words the dignity and excellence of man is commended in a wonderful manner. First indeed, because although God, for the production of other corporeal things, used only command, in the creation of man, He first, as it were, employed consultation and deliberation about founding him, not that God acts by consultation and deliberation, but that the dignity of the human workmanship might be more openly insinuated; for craftsmen are wont to deliberate long, where something of great moment is to be undertaken. Secondly, because while other corporeal things are only certain signs and vestiges of the Creator, man is a certain image of divinity, on account of the free will with which he is endowed, and on account of the royal dignity which he obtains over all earthly things, whence Scripture adds: "That he may have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, etc." He is said, however, to be made to the image of God, not the image of God, to signify that that image is not yet perfect and complete, as is God's Son, but tends toward the perfection which it will obtain through glory and the beatific vision; for then, as the Apostle says, we shall be like Him, since we shall see Him as He is. It is added, "to our likeness," because, as Bernard suggests, Sermon 1 On the Annunciation, in the image are understood liberty of will and other natural gifts; the likeness, however, refers chiefly to the gratuitous and supernatural gifts, with which Adam was created, which were, as it were, certain ornaments and complements, poured over the image of God, and marvelously increasing its beauty and comeliness.

Moses adds: "The Lord God, therefore, formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life." By which words he explains, in the first place, the matter from which the body of man was formed, namely the slime of the earth, which God wished to employ in his production for this reason, that man might be

confounded by the lowly vileness of his own principle, and that the consideration of his origin might be, as Basil says, a certain salutary amulet against every sin. Then he declares the form to which he refers, when he adds: "he breathed into his face the breath of life," where the Hebrew reading has "the breath of lives," by which Cajetan thinks, in his commentaries on this passage, is signified the threefold life which the rational soul confers on the body, namely vegetative, sensitive, and rational.

The place where Adam was created is altogether unknown; it is certain, however, that he was founded outside the earthly Paradise, for this Moses openly declares, Genesis 3, when he says: "God cast out Adam, that he might till the earth from which he was taken," which several of the Hebrews think was the field of Damascus, and that Adam was formed from the red earth of this field, such as is the earth not yet worked, which is commonly called virgin earth.

That he was created by God perfect as to the mass and magnitude of the body, and in an age fit for generating, is established from those words which God said to the first parents, after their production: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." Reason also persuades this: for it was fitting that those first works of God, which in the production of the world, were made proximately and immediately by Him, be perfect. Just as, therefore, He founded the other animals perfect in mass and age of body, so also, and much more, man must be thought to have been founded in perfect age and magnitude of body.

God did not immediately produce Eve together with Adam, in the way that in producing the other species of living things, He had formed both sexes simultaneously, but educed her from man already produced, and fashioned her from his rib; and this was quite fitting, both that man might know himself ordained to the nobler work of life, which is to understand, and not to generation and propagation, which woman serves. Also that in this a certain dignity of man be preserved, so that just as God is the principle of the whole universe, so also man might be the principle of the whole species: Acts 17: "God made of one every nation of men."

But if you ask, why God employed a rib for the production of Eve; I shall answer that God furnished this, both that He might show the woman to be the companion and side-partner of the man, not a servant; but neither also a mistress; but inferior to the man her head, and subject to him. Also that He might mystically designate that the Church takes its principle from Christ. Whence the Apostle, to the Ephesians 5: "This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

Chapter II

The privileges of the state of innocence.

Various were the privileges of this most happy state. The first and chief was, that Adam was created in the state of grace and original justice. Thus expressly Trent, session 5, in the decree on original sin, canon 1, where it says that Adam, by sinning, lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted. And it is gathered from Scripture, Ecclesiastes 7: "God made man right"; the rectitude of man, however, as to the soul, of which Scripture speaks, is attended to by conversion to the ultimate end simply, which is the effect of grace and charity. And certainly if God created the other corporeal creatures in a perfect state, and founded trees, e.g., in that magnitude in which they could produce the fruits proper to their nature; how much more fitting was it, that He create man in that state and perfection, in which he could produce the meritorious fruits of eternal life, to which He had destined him, and accordingly that He adorn him with sanctifying grace, which is the root and principle of the merit of eternal life.

You will ask, whether original justice was a habit entitatively distinct from sanctifying grace? I answer negatively. For thus it is gathered from Saint Thomas here, question 95, article 1, where he thus says: Through grace existing in the soul, inferior things were subjected to it, namely to Adam, in the state of innocence: But they were subjected through original justice: Therefore this was the habit of sanctifying grace. Just as, therefore, capital grace and habitual grace in Christ, habitual and sacramental grace in us, are not really distinguished, but are a single simple habit, receiving diverse names, however, from the diverse effects which they furnish, or the diverse aids which they connote. So likewise original justice and sanctifying grace in Adam were the same habit in reality, which is called by diverse names, by order to the diverse effects which it caused; for insofar as it was the cause of sanctity, and the principle of merit of eternal life, it is called sanctifying grace: insofar, however, as it was the root of a threefold subjection, namely of the body to the soul, of the inferior appetite to the superior, and of the superior to God, and of other gifts and privileges, which God had conferred on Adam for himself and his posterity in his creation, it is called original justice. Sanctifying grace, however, had in Adam, as it was itself original justice, some mode of perfection which it does not have in us, nor had in Adam after the fall, when through penance he recovered it, not indeed as to greater intensity (for sanctifying grace is now more intense in some of the just than it would have been in some men in the state of innocence, if he had persevered, and yet in them it does not have the notion of original justice, as in these), but as to greater dominion of grace over the soul, and greater subordination of the latter to the former; in the proportional manner in which, in the homeland, from the most full

dominion of grace over the soul, the endowments redound into the body, which most perfectly subordinate and subject it to the soul; for the more grace dominates the mind, the more it gives the soul greater dominion over the body, and subjects it more to it.

You will say, Saint Thomas here, question 100, article 1, ad 2, says that the supernatural subjection of reason to God, which was through sanctifying grace, was the root of original justice, in whose rectitude man was made: Therefore since nothing can be the root of itself, original justice, according to Saint Thomas, was a habit diverse from sanctifying grace.

I answer that Saint Thomas does not mean that original justice according to itself as a whole was rooted in such subjection, but because the rectitude of original justice embraces several things, namely the subjection of the body to the soul, of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of reason to God, he intends that the order in it is such, that the subjection of the mind to God be the root of the others: as if he should say, that among the things which original justice embraces, the first, and root of the others, is the subjection of the mind to God, which is through grace, as the same Holy Doctor declares here, question 95, article 1, in these words: There was rectitude (in the first man) according to this, that reason was subjected to God, but the inferior powers to reason, and the body to the soul: but the first subjection was the cause of the second and the third.

The second privilege granted to Adam in the state of innocence, and in his production, consists in this, that his intellect was suffused with fullness of knowledge. For of the first parents it is said, Ecclesiasticus 17: "The discipline of understanding filled them, he created in them the science of the spirit, he filled their heart with sense, and showed them good and evil." Saint Thomas also proves this here, question 94, article 3, by a twofold reason: The first is, that Adam imposed names on the animals, as is said, Genesis 2: but he could not do this skillfully, unless he rightly knew their nature and properties: Therefore God infused knowledge of them into him in creation. The second is taken from the fact that Adam was first instituted, that he might be the principle of others, not only as to generation, but also as to instruction and governance; whence just as he was instituted in a perfect state as to body, that he might immediately generate, so he ought to have been instituted in a perfect state as to soul, that he might immediately instruct and govern others: Therefore he received knowledge of all those things concerning which man is naturally born to be instructed, which are those things which are deduced from principles known per se naturally.

Nor did Adam have only knowledge of natural things in his creation, but also of supernatural ones, especially indeed of the mystery of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation, which were then revealed to him; although he knew this only as to substance, not, however, as to motive; insofar, namely, as it was ordered to the redemption of the human race, and satisfaction for original sin; for Adam was not foreknowing of his own sin, as Augustine teaches, Book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 18, otherwise he would then have been most miserable, which misery cannot cohere with the most flourishing state of innocence.

The third privilege granted to Adam in his creation, is that then his will, or appetite, was instructed with all infused virtues, both moral and theological; both because that excellent grace, with which he was then adorned, demanded this, which the virtues, as it were, properties, follow; also that most happy state, in which all the powers of the soul, demanded to be disposed and adorned with virtues. Whence Augustine, in an address to Catechumens, chapter 2, speaking of Adam in the state of innocence, says that he was then armed with chastity, composed with temperance, resplendent with clarity, and Saint Ambrose, Book On Elijah and Fasting, chapter 4, that he was covered with the veil of all the virtues.

The fourth privilege: the first parent enjoyed full and despotic dominion over all living things, as is established from that passage, Genesis 2: "Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth." And certainly it was most fitting, that he should dominate, who alone was endowed with reason and prudence, and who through original justice was perfectly subjected to God, and fully dominated his own appetite and the sensitive and inferior powers. As a sign of this, God brought the animals to Adam, that he might impose names on them as on servants, as Saint Chrysostom weighs distinctly, Homily 14 on Genesis.

The fifth privilege was immunity from every error and deception: for error and deception are evils of the soul, defects or miseries of intellectual nature, which are punishments of sin: whence man in the state of innocence, before he sinned, could not err or be deceived, as Saint Thomas teaches here, question 94, article 4, following Augustine, Book 3 On Free Will, chapter 18, where he thus says: To approve false things for true, so that one errs unwillingly, is not the nature of instituted man, but the punishment of the damned.

You will say, Eve was deceived by the serpent: Therefore in the state of innocence, not only could there be, but there in fact was, deception before sin. But I deny the consequence, for as Saint Thomas says in the place cited, in the response to the first: Although that seduction of the woman did not precede the sin of the deed, it followed, however, the sin of internal elation: for Augustine says, Book 11 on Genesis to the Letter, chapter 30, that the woman would not have believed the word of the serpent, unless already there were in her mind love of her own power, and a certain proud presumption about herself.

The sixth privilege was immunity from all sickness, pain, and sadness. For the most happy state of innocence was, as it were, a certain foretaste and inchoation of celestial beatitude, in which not only will there be affluence of all goods, but also immunity and lack of all evils. Whence also in the state of innocence man was immortal, not because he had the impotence of dying, but because he had the power of not dying, if he had kept the law prescribed to him, as Augustine teaches, Book 7 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 25, in these words: The body of Adam before sin was both mortal, because it could die, and immortal, because it could not die: for it is one thing not to be able to die, as God created certain immortal natures; another, however, to be able not to die, according to which mode the first man was created immortal, which was furnished to him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature.

That this privilege be better understood, it must be observed that there are three chief causes of man's death. The first is, that his body consists of contrary things, and things fighting among themselves, namely the four elements, and the four humors, and parts not only diverse, but also demanding diverse dispositions, affections, and temperaments. The second is natural heat continuously consuming the radical moisture, and although it be repaired through food and drink, not, however, according to that purity and sincerity which it first had. The third is from extrinsic agents which can inflict death on man, such as venomous or ferocious animals, hostile men, Demons, etc. In the state of innocence, therefore, God had so fortified man against those three causes of death, with most powerful remedies and most valid safeguards, that if he had remained in God's grace, nothing from them would have been to be feared by him. For against the first cause God had given man a certain supernatural power, by which he could keep the contrary things of which man's body is composed, in due temperament and equality at all times. This power was nothing other than original justice itself, which had a threefold effect, namely to subject the mind to God, the body to the soul, and the inferior appetite to the superior; wherefore it was not only the root of charity, by which the will is subjected to God as ultimate end, and of integrity, by which the inferior appetite is subjected to

reason, but also of immortality and impassibility, by which the body is perfectly subordinated and proportioned to the soul as a receptive power to the act informing it. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 81, article 5, ad 2, thus says: The immortality and impassibility of the first state, was not from the condition of nature, but from original justice. Against the second cause of death provision was made for man in the state of innocence, through the tree of life, whose fruit perfectly repaired the daily loss of radical moisture, and altogether restored its primordial purity and integrity. Against the third, through God's singular providence and care, through the guardianship of the Angels, and through the singular prudence which man then had, by which he could easily foresee and avoid all noxious and pernicious things.

The seventh privilege was immunity from any venial sin whatsoever, which arose not only from God's special providence and protection, by which man was impeded, lest during that most happy state he sin venially, before mortally, but also from the force precisely of the gift of integrity, or as Saint Thomas speaks, 1-2, question 80, article 3, on account of the infallible firmness of order, by which the inferior was contained under the superior. By the name of the inferior, however, he understands not only the sensitive appetite, but reason as inferior, insofar as it regards those things which are to the end, for thus it is in a certain way inferior to itself, insofar as it regards the end. Whence just as, on account of the perfect subordination of the sensitive appetite to reason, which the gift of integrity furnished in the state of innocence, venial sins from surreption of the sensitive appetite, or from lack of deliberation, were repugnant to this state from within (for these do not occur, except when the sensitive appetite forestalls reason, and perturbs its judgment); so, on account of the perfect subordination of inferior reason regarding the means, to the superior which considers the end (which also in the state of innocence the gift of integrity effected in man, since in that most happy state all inferior things were subjected to their superiors), venial sins from genus, and from the smallness of matter, were repugnant to this state. For as the Holy Doctor says in the same place: That the human mind be disordered concerning those things which are to the end, the due order to the end being kept (as happens when it sins venially, even by a venial sin from genus, or from smallness of matter), arises from this, that those things which are to the end are not infallibly ordered under the end, which holds the supreme place, as it were the principle among appetible things.

There is also another reason on account of which any venial sin whatsoever was repugnant from within to man in the state of innocence, for from the nature and condition of the state of innocence, any misery, sadness, punishment, and vicious habit, from which arises difficulty of operating well, was repugnant to man: Therefore also any

venial sin whatsoever. The consequence is clear, for any venial sin whatsoever is a misery, requires punishment and sadness of repentance that it be remitted, and generates a habit of vice, if it be committed frequently enough. Whence Saint Thomas, in the place cited above, proves that venial sin could not have been in the state of innocence, from the fact that in it nothing could be penal, according to that saying of Augustine, Book 14 On the City of God, chapter 10: "Nor was anything lacking which a good will might obtain, nor was there anything present that might offend the flesh or mind of man living happily."

You will say, first, the state of original justice, from within and from its own nature, did not have to preserve man from mortal sins, as the fall of the first parents sufficiently shows: Therefore much less from venial ones, which are lesser and lighter.

But I deny the consequence and the parity, because the state of original justice did not from its own nature demand that it be unlosable, nor accordingly that it preserve man from sins on account of which it could be lost, of which kind are mortal sins: But from within and from its own nature it required to preserve man from those sins by which it would not be lost, of which kind are venial sins; since that most happy state by its own nature demanded to exclude all pain and sadness, and all penalty; which it could not have furnished, if with it venial sins had been compossible, as is clear from what has been said above. Whence Augustine, in the place cited above, describing the state of innocence, says that it was a tranquil avoidance of sin, which remaining, no evil at all rushed in from elsewhere, which might sadden. The solution is Saint Thomas's, article cited, in the response to the third, where he thus says: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the first state to such an extent that it corrupts it, which venial sin cannot do, and because whatever disorder cannot simultaneously be with the integrity of the first state, it is consequent that the first man could not sin venially, before he sinned mortally.

You will say, secondly: Just as God prohibited the first parents from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil under mortal, so He could have prohibited it under venial, since that eating was not evil of itself: But this being granted, Adam could have violated that precept: Therefore he could have sinned venially.

Some respond that even if God had commanded Adam to abstain from eating of the forbidden tree under venial only, nevertheless by eating of it, he would have sinned mortally, not indeed by reason of the precept, obliging only under venial, but by reason of the damage and most grave harm, which he would have inflicted on himself and his posterity through such eating, depriving himself and his posterity of original justice. Just as (they say) a Carthusian, by eating meat, sins mortally, not by reason of the precept of the rule, prohibiting such eating, since it does not oblige under mortal, but by reason of

the most grave punishment to which he exposes himself, and the greatest harm which he inflicts on himself. This solution does not lack probability.

I answer, however, secondly, in conformity with the principles already established, granted that God could have imposed such a precept obliging only under venial, by denying that Adam could have transgressed it, except after original justice had been lost; because he could not be disordered concerning means, before he was averted and disordered from the end, as is established from what has been said above. I said, granted that God could have imposed such a precept, for although God could absolutely have prohibited Adam from eating of the forbidden tree, under venial only, not, however, from the hypothesis of the state of innocence, in which (as we showed) there was such subjection of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of inferior reason to superior, that, while it endured, no venial sin could be in man.

Chapter III

A brief description of the earthly Paradise.

It is certain that the paradise which Moses describes, Genesis 2, was a visible and corporeal place, not purely intelligible and spiritual, as Philo the Jew, Origen, and others formerly thought. For several things which Scripture says, cannot be drawn to the mystical and allegorical sense, but must necessarily be understood in the proper and literal sense, as when it is said: "And the Lord God brought forth of the ground all manner of trees, fair to behold, and pleasant to eat of," for "to behold" is there properly taken for corporeal sense, and the word "to eat" for corporeal eating, otherwise what is said in chapter 3: "The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold: and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat," would have to be understood not properly but metaphorically, and thus all that the Church believes concerning the sin of the first parent would be false. Whence Epiphanius, in the Anchoratus: If paradise is not sensible, there is no fount, no fig tree, no leaves, Eve does not eat, etc. But now truth has been turned into fable.

It is also established, against others whom Hugh of Saint Victor cites, Annotations on Genesis, chapter 2, that by the name of earthly paradise must be understood not the whole earth, adorned with flowers and trees, but a particular place, situated in a determinate region of the world. For Scripture says paradise was planted in the East, that God transferred Adam from the place in which He had founded him, into paradise, and cast him out of paradise in punishment of sin, and placed a Cherub before paradise, to guard the way of the tree of life. All of which cannot be verified except of some particular

place, and one situated in its own determinate region of the world. There remains, therefore, only that we here briefly declare the site, magnitude, and pleasantness or beauty of this most excellent place, paradise itself.

As to the first, there are two extremely opposed opinions: for some formerly thought the loftiness of the earthly paradise to be so great, that it reaches even to the globe of the moon: so Strabo on Genesis, and Bede, whom Saint Thomas cites, Part 1, question 102, article 1. Not much removed from this opinion seems Tostatus, on chapter 2 of Genesis, question 9, where he asserts that the earthly paradise does not indeed reach up to the orb of the moon, but is higher than all the mountains of the earth, by at least twenty cubits; both because it ought to be free from the winds and vapors of the earth, also because the four rivers which go out from it, could not conveniently irrigate the whole earth, nor run through so many various regions of the world. On the contrary, Pereira, Book 3 on Genesis, disputation on paradise, question 2, thinks it more probable that it was situated on some plain, both because too great a height is not healthy, on account of the vicinity of the stars, and of the element of fire, also because plains are ordinarily more fertile, and generally have better fruits. Between these extremely opposed opinions, the middle seems more probable, which asserts that paradise was neither so low, that it be constituted on some plain, nor so lofty and elevated, that it reach up to the lunar globe, or the supreme region of the air, or exceed the higher mountains of the earth, but that it was placed in the highest part of this lowest region of air, and reaches almost to the second region of air; for the highest part of this lowest region is the most fitting place for the habitation of men, since it is free from the perturbations and excessive frigidity and humidity of the second region, and from the excessive heat which is wont to arise from the reflection of the sun's rays ascending from the earth; nor are there violent winds there, and that place can better receive the influences of the sun and stars. Nor is it an obstacle what the authors of the first opinion say of the four rivers going out from paradise, for a river descending through long spaces does not necessarily require a great height of source, as is established in many rivers.

How great the breadth of this paradise is, is also a problem among the Theologians, some thinking it to be most vast, and to equal the magnitude of one not small kingdom, such as France, or Spain, which they gather from the great river by which it is irrigated, and which is divided into four heads. Others asserting that it is not so ample and spacious, since Scripture calls it a garden, and says it was located in the region of Eden, toward its eastern quarter, and that in the midst of it was the tree of life, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Certainly in a matter so arduous and obscure, and in such variety of opinions, it is difficult to define anything certain. Indeed I do not see why

twenty or thirty leagues would not suffice for one garden, and why, although that river by which paradise was watered was great, the space of so many leagues would not be sufficient for its course. Nor was it necessary, that all Adam's posterity should be able to remain in it, for they were to be multiplied, and fill the earth; they could, however, all often visit that place, as it were by hereditary right, thence carry away the fruit of the tree of life, or graft its branches in various places.

Finally, the beauty and pleasantness of the earthly paradise is established from the various names by which it is designated, for it is called by Moses the paradise of pleasure, by the Hebrews Ganeden, which is interpreted the garden of delights, by Saint Basil a place overflowing with delights in every way, exuberant with all the beauty of sensible creation; and by Damascene, every storehouse of joy and pleasure. It is also gathered from the end to which it was founded by God, for God founded it, that it might be a fitting place for felicity and innocence, and that it might shadow forth on earth the incomparable beauty of the celestial Paradise. Whence according to William of Paris, and Tostatus, paradise, as it were preparing God's vision, was so called, since indeed its habitation was, as it were, a certain foretaste and pre-tasting of celestial glory, as Saint Gregory elegantly explains, on Psalm 5 On Penance, where, speaking of Adam in the earthly paradise, before he was constituted in sin: "His bread (he says) was the delight of the divine vision (through the mirror of creatures), the satiety of God's Word, the joy of internal quiet, the splendor of inaccessible light: the refreshment of wisdom, the presence of the Creator. O happy ancient days, bearing nothing of darkness, nothing of gloom, which the presence of Divinity illumined, the serenity of security purged, the immensity of joy adorned. Days of joys and light, days of virtues and peace, days of delights and sweetness, which grief did not disturb, anguish did not infest, infirmity did not overshadow. These days the soul had in paradise, before it fell from the state of rectitude, through the fault of transgression."

The marvelous pleasantness of this paradise Alcimus Avitus excellently celebrates and describes in these verses:

Here the clemency of heaven preserves perpetual spring. The turbid south wind is absent, and always under a clear sky The clouds flee away, about to yield to unbroken serenity. Nor does the nature of the place demand rains which it does not have, But the shoots, content, are endowed with their own dew. Thus, since winter is absent, nor does torrid summer burn, Autumn is occupied with fruits, spring with flowers throughout the year.

By these verses he declares the pleasantness of the earthly Paradise to have been placed chiefly in four things, namely in the sky, and the air, in the waters, and in the very soil of the earth. In the sky there was supreme healthfulness, and at all times a most sweet equability, which caused, as it were, a perpetual spring. In the air there was great serenity and purity, and accordingly great clarity, because, as Bede says, clarity of light is proportioned to purity of air. Of waters there was a huge abundance irrigating paradise, and in the midst of it a huge spring burst forth, which was derived into four rivers into various regions of the world. The first is the Phison or Ganges, fecundating India. The second the Gehon, or Nile, irrigating Egypt and Ethiopia. The third the Tigris, running down most rapidly and swiftly, like a tigress. The fourth the Euphrates, which two water Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Chaldea. Finally, the earth of paradise was excellent and most fertile, and spontaneously, without labor and trouble of man (yet not without cultivation) bringing forth whatever could fill all man's senses with most sweet pleasantness and delight. But its fertility appeared especially in the production of the tree of life, whose fruit, as we said in the preceding chapter, repaired the diminished and lost radical moisture, with equal purity and sincerity to that which it had had before, even at man's origin, and accordingly did not allow the flower and vigor of youth to wither. Whence Augustine, to be cited below, says that Adam had from the tree of life stability against old age. There was also in it the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was so called, as Saint Thomas teaches, because after eating of it, man learned by the experience of punishment what difference there was between the good of obedience, and the evil of disobedience. Just as the well which the servants of Isaac dug, was called the well of contention or calumny, from the contention and strife which was between the shepherds of Gerar, and the shepherds of Isaac, as is had, Genesis 26.

You will ask, whether the earthly paradise still exists? I answer it is more probable that it still perseveres entire. For it is said, Ecclesiasticus 44: "Enoch pleased God, and was translated into paradise, that he may give repentance to the nations." By which words Scripture openly seems to teach that Enoch is kept alive in paradise, that he may come at the last time of the world and of Antichrist, and preach repentance to all. Whence Irenaeus, Book 5 Against Heresies, chapter 5, says it is the Apostolic tradition, that Enoch and Elijah now remain in paradise, and asserts that he learned this from the Presbyters who were disciples of the Apostles. Augustine, Book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 3, says that Enoch and Elijah are fed in the paradise of life, just as Adam before sin, who had refreshment from the fruits of the trees against decay, and stability against old age from the tree of life. Jerome, Epistle 61, calls Enoch and Elijah cultivators of Paradise. Finally, Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 49, article 5, ad 2, has this: Enoch was taken up into the earthly paradise, where he is believed to live together with Elijah until

the coming of Antichrist. From this the chief foundation of the opposing opinion is overturned, which asserts for this reason that the earthly paradise no longer exists, because it was overwhelmed by the waters of the flood, since these exceeded the highest mountains by fifteen cubits, as Scripture says. Nor indeed is it more inconvenient, that paradise was miraculously preserved from the inundating waters of the flood, than that Enoch was liberated from them: especially since it would be a more fitting miracle, that the waters be prevented from overwhelming paradise, than that Enoch be preserved in the air above the waters, or in the earth in the midst of the waters, for a whole year, like a fish.

You will say, first, with Pereira: If Paradise was untouched by the waters of the flood, Noah would have vainly fabricated the ark, since he could easily have been preserved, safe from the flood, in Paradise with his family and animals.

Malvenda responds that Paradise is the genuine place, destined for the innocence and felicity of men on earth, nor did it in any way befit Noah, and his sons, who were subject to sin, and death, and the troubles of this life: but it was fitting and congruous, that there Enoch and Elijah should dwell, candidates for eternity, exempt from the miseries of this life, as pure ones, and consecrated to the greatest mysteries; until in the last time they return into this world, to fight against Antichrist, and, as Tertullian speaks, extinguish him with their own blood.

You will say, secondly, if Paradise still existed entire, it would have been discovered by someone, since the whole world has been known to men, and through all its parts some have traveled.

Saint Thomas responds, Part 1, question 102, article 1, ad 3, that this place has not yet been discovered after so many wanderings, because it is secluded from our habitation by some impediments, either of mountains, or of seas, or of some torrid region, which cannot be traversed. From which you will understand that fabulous and fictitious are those things which are read in certain apocryphal books, of a certain Macarius the Roman, and three other Monks, who, when with all zeal they had given themselves to investigating the place of Paradise, having traversed distant regions, at last arrived at the very entrance of Paradise, but were prohibited from its entrance, nor dared to approach there, terrified by the horrible guardianship of a Cherub, holding a flaming and turning sword.

Chapter IV

On the state of integral nature.

The state of integral nature is constituted through that vigor of the lower part of the soul, the sensitive appetite perfectly subjecting it to reason, and making man in no act or affection of his dissonant from reason. This vigor, however, Cajetan says is neither of nature simply, since it does not flow from nature, nor of grace simply, since it extends to nothing, except to the good of nature proportioned to reason, namely to live according to reason; but is in a certain way of nature, and in a certain way of grace, insofar as man never has, nor can have, from natural things this vigor, but it comes to him from conjunction to original justice.

From this it is clear, that the state of integral nature is diverse from the state of pure nature, because the aforesaid vigor, perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason, is not connaturally owed to human nature, whence man could be created without it, as we shall show in chapter 6, and is established from the Bull of Pius V and Gregory XIII, by which this proposition of Michael Baius is condemned: "It is a false opinion of the Doctors, that the first man could have been created and instituted by God, without natural justice." Where by natural justice, he understands the gift of integrity, with which Adam was endowed in his creation.

Whether this same state be really distinguished from the state of innocence, or of original justice, there is dissension and controversy among the Theologians, some affirming, others denying. But the affirming opinion seems more probable: because the state of innocence indeed includes this vigor, the appetite perfectly subjecting itself to reason, but besides it imports several other gifts and privileges, namely immortality, painlessness, immunity from every error and deception, and other things which we declared in chapter 2: Therefore the state of integral nature is distinguished from the state of innocence, by way of the included from the including. Whence although in the first parents human nature had the gift of integrity from conjunction to original justice, and accordingly the state of integral nature, and the state of innocence, were never separated, they are, however, separable from one another; for the gift of integrity can be communicated to man, without original justice, and other gifts and privileges annexed to it.

Chapter V

On the state of fallen nature.

That the first sin of Adam was pride, is openly gathered from Scripture, for it is said, Ecclesiasticus 10: "Pride is the beginning of all sin." And Tobias 4: "Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind, or in thy words: for from it all perdition took its beginning." Which words, concerning the first sin of Adam, from which all our perdition and sin draws its origin, Augustine understands, Book 14 On the City of God, chapter 13, and Gregory the Great, Moralia 34, chapter 17, where he thus has it: It is written, the beginning of all sin is pride; for through this the devil succumbed, through this he laid low the man following him; indeed with the dart of our immortality he assailed our salvation, whereby he extinguished the life of his own beatitude. This is also established from the first motive which the Devil proposed to the first parents for eating of the forbidden tree, which was their own inordinate excellence, which is the proper object of pride, and similitude with God: "You shall be as Gods." Whence Augustine, on Psalm 68: Adam and Eve wished to seize divinity, and lost felicity. Not that they sought every kind of equalization with God, and willed to change their nature, and from men to become gods by essence (otherwise they would have fallen into error and infidelity, before falling into elation and pride), but that they wished to be gods by imitation and similitude, first indeed as to knowledge of good and evil, as the serpent suggested to them, namely that by the power of their own nature they might determine for themselves what would be good and what would be evil to do; or even that they might by themselves foreknow what good or evil would befall them, as Saint Thomas teaches, 2-2, question 163, article 2. Secondly as to power of operating, namely that by the power of their own nature they might operate to attain beatitude, as the Holy Doctor says in the same place, and Augustine suggests, Book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 30, where he says that in the woman's mind there was love of her own power and a certain proud presumption about herself. And in the Enchiridion, chapter 45, he says that through pride man loved to be rather in his own power than in God's. This same thing not obscurely Prosper indicates in his poem On the Ungrateful, chapter 43, in these words:

By this counsel the sower of death insinuated himself to the first parents, By this art he laid all prostrate in the one, While he persuades that it would be much more excellent, what to them, Though the Lord had not granted it, might be promised to be had, A prudent liberty, and instructed with forbidden desire.

Whence some not incongruously observe, that the first parents were the first Patriarchs of the Pelagian heresy, and could deservedly be called both Protopelagians and

Protoparents.

Adam's sin, beyond the deformity of pride, also had a twofold other species of malice, namely of disobedience, and of gluttony. For in the first place he inordinately sought his own excellence as end and primary motive, then he willed that which was proposed to him as a means to having such excellence, namely not to be subjected to the divine precept about not eating of the forbidden tree, and finally he in fact violated that precept, and ate of the forbidden fruit. By reason of the first, that act was of pride, whose object is one's own excellence, without due measure. By reason of the second there was there the special malice of disobedience, for this consists in the contempt and violation of the divine precept, as expressly willed. By reason of the third, the same act is constituted in the species of gluttony, because since the precept was about not eating, the effect of violating such a precept was an inordinate appetite for food, in which gluttony consists.

That sin was most grave, by reason of a threefold circumstance. First from the circumstance of the sinning person, who excelled in grace, wisdom, virtues, and other privileges explained above. For what (says Bernard, Sermon 2 On the Annunciation) was lacking to him whom mercy guarded, whom truth taught, whom justice ruled, whom peace served? Who was the inhabitant of Paradise, lord of the earth, citizen of heaven, of the household of the Lord, brother of the blessed spirits, and co-heir of the celestial virtues. Secondly, the place of Paradise, which Adam by his crime dishonored, notably aggravates his sin; since indeed in that place there was no occasion for sinning, no incitement for acting badly; indeed rather the most numerous and most keen incitements for praising, worshiping, and loving God, and obeying His commands. Thirdly, such a sin was most grave, on account of the damages which followed from it, that is, the loss of so many and such great goods, never afterward to be recovered, and of so many and such great evils which it produced the necessity of. Nor did such damage redound to Adam alone, but by his fall and ruin, drew all his posterity, as many as afterward were, and are to be, into the outcome of sin and death. Whence Bernard, Homily 2 on "There was sent," addressing Adam and Eve, thus says: Just as you were the parents of all, so you were the destroyers of all, which is more unhappy, destroyers before parents.

The gravity of this sin will be more established by explaining the privations, defects, and wounds, which it introduced into human nature. In the first place, therefore, it despoiled it of original justice, and the gift of integrity, which Adam had received from God in his creation for himself and his posterity. For as Saint Thomas discourses, Opusculum 192: Since such ordered integrity was caused from the subjection of the human will to God, it was consequent, that the human will being withdrawn from

divine subjection, that perfect subjection of the inferior powers to reason, and of the body to the soul, should perish, whence it followed, that man should feel in the inferior appetite, concupiscence, and anger, and the disordered motions of the other passions. Which doctrine he took from Augustine, who, Book 13 On the City of God, chapter 13, writes this: After the transgression of the precept was made, immediately, the divine grace deserting them, the first parents were confounded at the nakedness of their bodies: for they felt the motions of their disobedient flesh, as a reciprocal punishment of their own disobedience. Gregory has similar things, Moralia 26, chapter 13, where speaking of Adam he thus says: Because he did not wish to be subject to his Author, he lost the right of the flesh which he was ruling, subjected to him, so that confusion might redound in himself from his own disobedience, and, overcome, he might learn what, elated, he had omitted.

Secondly, Adam's sin rendered human nature liable to death, sicknesses, pains, and other corporeal miseries: for although death, sicknesses, and other corporeal miseries naturally befall man, since he is composed of four elements, and accordingly of four primary qualities fighting with one another; because, however, original justice, perfectly subjecting and subordinating the body to the soul, impeded these defects, no less than a stake, which holds a ship placed in the midst of a river, lest it roll down into the sea; therefore just as he who removed the stake, would be a cause per accidens, and as it were removing an impediment, of the descent of the ship into the sea; so also Adam's sin, which removed original justice, is a cause per accidens of death, and of other corporeal defects, which are the means to it. Whence Augustine, Book 13 On the City of God, chapter 15: It is established among Christians truly holding the Catholic faith, that even the very death of the body was inflicted on us, not by the law of nature, but as the merit of sin. Hence Isidore, in the Book of Etymologies, says that death is called from "biting," because when the first parent bit the forbidden apple, he incurred death by that bite.

Thirdly, human nature, through Adam's sin, was not only despoiled of original justice, the gift of integrity, and of immortality and impassibility, and other gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in natural things, as is established from the parable of the man descending from Jerusalem to Jericho, who fell among robbers, who despoiled him, and having inflicted wounds went away, leaving him half-dead. Where the Venerable Bede: Sins are called wounds, because by these the integrity of human nature is violated.

These wounds inflicted on human nature through Adam's sin, Saint Thomas excellently explains, 1-2, question 85, article 3, where he says that just as in the human body a wound is spoken of, when between continuous and united parts some rupture or division is made; so in the soul that rupture or division is rightly called a wound, which was made

through sin in its powers, while, from the order of reason, to which through original justice, and the gift of integrity, they were perfectly united, they were divided and separated through the destitution of the aforesaid order. Whence since through original sin four chief powers are destitute of order to their proper object; namely the intellect, which is destitute of order to the true; the will, which is destitute of order to the honest good and consonant with reason; the concupiscible, which is destitute of order to the delectable moderated by reason; and the irascible, which is destitute of order to the arduous and difficult, lest it be borne promptly and readily into it, there are four wounds inflicted on man by such a sin: namely the wound of ignorance, by which reason is retarded from cognition of the true; the wound of malice, by which the will is retarded from pursuit of the honest good; the wound of concupiscence, by which the concupiscible appetite blazes forth, and is immoderately borne into a delectable good contrary to reason; and the wound of infirmity, by which the irascible languishes and grows torpid in pursuit of the arduous good. Original sin itself, however, is not properly called a wound, but rather infirmity or languor of nature, because through it the whole man is infirmed and languishes: just as we do not call a fever, by which the whole animal labors, a wound, but a languor or infirmity.

That Adam obtained pardon through penance for his sin, and was restored to God's grace, is certain of faith, and the opposite is condemned as erroneous by Augustine, Epiphanius, and other Holy Fathers against the Encratites, denying that Adam was liberated from his sin through penance. Sacred Scripture also favors this, for Wisdom 10 thus says: "She (that is, wisdom) preserved him, that was first formed by God, the father of the world, when he was created alone, and brought him out of his sin." By which words Scripture openly testifies that God liberated Adam from his sin, and restored him to pristine grace. Whence Tertullian, Book 1 Against Marcion, chapter 25, says that God did not curse Adam nor Eve, but treated them benignly after their own fall, as candidates for restoration, as relieved by confession. Similarly Irenaeus, Book 3, chapter 37, says that Adam did penance for his transgression: but God bestows his benignity on the penitent. And he asserts that Adam showed this penance, by making himself a girdle from fig leaves, by which he could afflict his flesh. Others add, that God made for Adam and his wife tunics of skins, that by this clothing He might indicate their penance; for the skins of dead animals figured the virtue of penance, by which one must die to sins, and all carnal desires must be tamed and mortified. Finally the Holy Fathers commonly teach, that Adam and Eve, through Christ's blood, were liberated from extreme punishment, and obtained eternal salvation. Whence Epiphanius, heresy 46, teaches that not without mystery was Adam buried on Mount Calvary, because indeed he was to be the first to experience the efficacy of Christ's blood.

For a fuller understanding of this state, there must be briefly resolved here a celebrated difficulty which is usually agitated among the Thomists, namely whether man in the state of fallen nature, through original sin, has been made weaker toward good and more prone to evil, than he would have been in the state of pure nature, if he had been founded in it? Alvarez affirms, Disputation 45 On the Helps, whom some of the more recent Thomists follow. Cajetan, Conrad, Soto, Medina, Aravius, and others deny it; whose opinion seems more probable, and more conformable to the principles to be established in the Treatise on grace.

The fundamental reason is, because from the removing of an impediment there does not follow a greater or lesser natural effect, than would follow from the nature itself: e.g., a stone, the impediment being removed, is not moved more swiftly, than if it had been advanced only by its own gravity: But original sin behaves only as removing an impediment in order to the disordered motions of the will or sensitive appetite, insofar as it took away original justice, which, as it were a golden rein, coerced or impeded the disordered motions of the powers in the state of innocence, as Saint Thomas teaches, 1-2, question 82, article 1, ad 3, and question 4 On Evil, article 2, ad 7, where he calls original justice the retainer of the inferior powers: Therefore from original sin there does not follow any disorder or weakness of the powers, in order to the pursuit of good or the avoidance of evil, which would not have been in pure nature.

A certain more recent Thomist responds indeed, in his Theology of Mind and Heart, that original sin not only removes original justice, but also adds a moral impediment, which would not be in the state of pure nature, namely aversion from God as author of nature, which we confess to be a great impediment to natural love of God in the treatise on grace, which doctrine, he says, cannot cohere with those things which we here teach about the powers of fallen nature.

But on the contrary, it is false that aversion from God as author of nature would not be in man founded in the state of pure nature: Therefore although it be an impediment to natural love of God, it cannot, however, from this be inferred, that original sin adds a moral impediment to natural love of God, which would not be in the state of pure nature. The consequence is clear, the Antecedent is proved. Since man naturally consists of a twofold contrary appetite, namely rational, inclining to the honest good, and sensible, drawing to the sensible good contrary to reason; he does not require from his nature to be applied by God to the love of the honest good, or to natural love of God, but only to the love of good as such, and of beatitude in common; from which, through discourse of reason, and election of the will, he could move himself to seeking beatitude in particular, in the honest good, or in the sensible good; in God, or in a creature.

Whence if he had been founded in the state of pure nature, in the first instant of the use of reason, he would have been averted from God, even as author of nature; not indeed by privative and culpable aversion, as in the state of fallen nature, but purely negative and inculpable; for he would have lacked conversion to God as author of nature, not on account of some preceding fault, but on account of a defect of natural condition, and as Cajetan rightly says, would differ from fallen man only as a naked man from a stripped or despoiled one.

You will say, first, with the same more recent author: Man in the state of pure nature, with only God's general concurrence, could have loved God as author of nature, because he was bound to this, and God obliges no one to the impossible: but this man in the state of fallen nature cannot do, as the Thomists teach in the treatise on grace: Therefore man in the state of pure nature would have greater powers for loving God as author of nature, than he has in the state of fallen nature.

I answer by denying the Major, for as we shall show in the aforesaid treatise, although man founded in pure naturals, could love God above all things as author of nature without grace, or aid of the supernatural order, which the state of pure nature would exclude, not, however, from his own powers, and with only God's general concurrence; but for this he would need special aid of the natural order, which the state of pure nature would not exclude, as we shall say in the following chapter. Whence such aid God would offer to man founded in pure naturals, as often as the precept of love urged, this being required by the sweetness of His providence, which never commands impossible things.

You will say, secondly, man through original sin was despoiled of gratuitous things, and wounded in natural things, as we declared above: But this wounding, as distinct from the despoiling of gratuitous things, cannot be understood, without diminution of natural powers to moral good; just as in the physical order a corporeal wound can scarcely occur, without some debilitation of the body, and diminution of corporeal powers: Therefore through original sin the natural powers of man have been diminished, in order to moral good.

I answer, first, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor absolutely: for just as human nature is said to be integral in natural things, by reason of the union and concord between the inferior and superior part, which original justice effected in the state of innocence, so it can be said to be wounded in natural things, on account of the loss of this kind of union or subordination. For just as in natural things that which divides parts of the body conjoined among themselves is said to wound; so in moral things the division made through sin between the superior and inferior part of man, before united

and subordinated, can not incongruously be called a wound, by metaphor drawn from the solution of corporeal continuity.

If you insist, and say, man founded in pure nature would not have that perfect union and subordination of the inferior part to the superior, and yet on this account he would not be said to be wounded in natural things: Therefore neither in the state of original sin. I shall deny the consequence, because it is of the notion of a wound, that it divide and separate between those things which were before united, or at least ought to have been united; whence the same division, which, by connoting a preexisting union of the extremes, or its debt, has the notion of a wound; this connotation excluded, cannot be called a wound; as is clear in the division found between the fingers, which is not a wound, because the fingers were always divided: but if someone were born with them united and glued together, in no way could their division occur without a wound. Since, therefore, in the state of pure nature there would not have preceded in man a perfect union and subordination of the inferior part to the superior, nor would it have been owed; the division and discord between them, would not have had the notion of a wound. Now, however, since such a union in the state of innocence preceded in man, and its debt always remains, nothing is lacking to this, that that division made through sin between the superior and inferior part, have the notion of a wound, and accordingly that man in the state of original sin be said not only despoiled of gratuitous things, but also wounded in natural things. Whence Saint Thomas, 1-2, question 85, article 3: Through original justice, reason perfectly contained the inferior powers of the soul, and reason itself was perfected by God, as subject to Him. This original justice, however, was withdrawn through the sin of the first parent; and therefore all the powers of the soul remain in a certain way destitute of their proper order, by which they are naturally ordered to virtue, and this very destitution is called a wounding of nature.

I answer, secondly, to the principal objection, by distinguishing the Minor: wounding cannot be understood without diminution of natural powers to moral good, which man had in the state of integral nature, or of original justice, I grant the Minor. Which he would have had in the state of pure nature, I deny the Minor, and the consequence; and thus in order that man can be said to be wounded in natural things through original sin, it is not required that he be made more prone to evil and weaker to good, than he would be from his own nature, or in pure naturals, but it suffices that he have lesser powers in fallen nature, than he would have had in integral nature. Whence when Saint Thomas, Book 2, dist. 30, question 1, article 1, ad 3, says that man through sin has been made less able, and more distant from attaining the end, and on account of this too man, despoiled of gratuitous things, is said to be wounded in natural things, he speaks of fallen man,

comparatively to the state of innocence, not, however, by respect to the state of pure nature. In the same sense must be understood what is said in the Second Council of Orange, canon 1, and at Trent, session 5, on original sin, that through the offense of Adam's prevarication, according to body and soul, man was changed for the worse. Likewise what is had, session 6, chapter 1, namely that free will was attenuated in its powers.

Chapter VI

On the state of pure nature.

The state of pure nature says two things, namely nature, and its purity: nature includes essence, and those things which are connaturally owed to it; purity excludes all things not owed, or not connaturally demanded by the essence; which can be of a twofold kind: for some perfect man in order to the end connatural to himself and the operations of the natural order, such as the gift of integrity, of which in chapter 4; others in order to the supernatural end, and operations proportioned to it, such as the gifts of grace strictly taken.

That this state never actually existed, is certain, since God created Adam with the gift of integrity and original justice, as was shown above, and the Angels together with their nature obtained sanctifying grace in their creation, according to that saying of Augustine: God was in the Angels, founding nature, and bestowing grace. There is, therefore, only difficulty and controversy among the Theologians, whether that state is possible? And indeed that it be possible by God's extraordinary and absolute power, by which God can act beyond the ordinary course of things, and against or beyond the natural inclination of created things, can scarcely be called into doubt; since God freely confers supernatural gifts on the intellectual creature, and it depends on His free decree that it be elevated to the supernatural end. Whence the only difficulty is, whether by God's ordinary power, that is, operating according to the natural course and inclination of things, man could be created in pure nature, or devoid of the gifts of sanctifying grace, integrity, and immortality?

Some more recent authors deny it, with Jansenius, to whom most recently among our own Vincent Contenson has adhered, Volume 5, dissertation 1, speculation 2. The Thomists, however, commonly affirm it, with the Angelic Doctor, whose words we shall relate below.

I say, therefore, first, God could, even by ordinary power, create man without sanctifying grace, and accordingly not elevate him to the supernatural order and

beatitude, but leave him in pure naturals. So Saint Thomas, 1-2, question 113, article 2, ad 1, where he thus says: Although man, before he sins, could have been without grace, yet without fault, after sin he cannot be without fault.

Reason also favors this, for God, using His ordinary power, is only bound to confer on creatures those things which are connaturally owed to them, and according to their connatural exigency and inclination: But the gifts of grace and glory are connaturally owed to no intellectual creature, since these do not regard its natural power, but only its obediential; and since it is implied in terms, that something be gratuitous and supernatural, and be owed to nature, or according to its connatural exigency and inclination: Therefore God could, even by ordinary power, produce an intellectual creature without those gifts.

It is confirmed, first: Every creature is naturally, and from its origin, God's servant, since such servitude is founded in creation: But a servant is not naturally the heir of his lord, as is had, Genesis 21: Therefore no creature, however pure and innocent in its origin, demands from its own nature the gifts of grace and glory, nor is it ordered to the clear vision of God, and supernatural beatitude, which is God's inheritance, and accordingly it could be created by God, even by ordinary power, without gifts of this kind. This reason Cyril insinuates, Book 1 on John, chapter 13, in these words: Since a creature is a servant, it is elevated to supernatural things only by the nod and will of the Father.

It is confirmed, secondly: Men, even innocent ones, and Angels, are only adoptive sons of God, for the natural Son is one, Christ: But an adoptive son is not called to the inheritance by right of birth, but by gratuitous adoption, not consequent upon nature: Therefore neither the Angels, nor innocent men, can have the clear vision of God, which is His inheritance, by their nature, but must be elevated to it through grace, that is, through some gift higher than nature, and owed to it not, and accordingly they can be created without such a gift. Whence Saint Thomas, question 4 On Evil, article 1, ad 14: The lack of divine vision belongs to someone in two ways: in one way such that he does not have in himself whence he could arrive at the divine vision; and thus the lack of divine vision would belong to him who would be in pure naturals, without sin; for thus the lack of divine vision would not be a punishment, but a defect consequent upon every created nature. Than which nothing can be said more clearly and expressly for our conclusion, and the possibility of the state of pure nature.

I say secondly: by God's ordinary power, providing for individual things according to what they naturally demand, man, even before Adam's fall, could have been created in the state of pure nature, as to the gift of integrity, or with the inclination of the

unbridled and rebellious sensitive part against reason.

It is proved, first, from Saint Thomas, Book 2, dist. 31, question 1, article 2, ad 3, where he thus has it: God could from the beginning, when He founded man, have also formed another man from the slime of the earth, whom He would leave in the condition of his nature, that is, such that he would be mortal and passible, and feeling the struggle of concupiscence against reason, in which nothing would be derogated from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Not, however, would this defect in him have the notion of fault or punishment, because this defect would not have been caused through the will. By which words he openly teaches our conclusion. Nor is it valid what the aforesaid more recent author cited above says, namely that Saint Thomas there speaks of the possibility of the state of pure nature, in order to God's extraordinary and absolute power, not, however, with respect to God's ordinary power. For the reason by which he proves that man could be produced with a struggle of concupiscence against reason, and accordingly without the gift of integrity, namely because this follows from the principles of nature, manifestly shows, that he speaks of the possibility of the state of pure nature, in order to God's ordinary power, since God's ordinary power is that by which God operates conformably to the nature of things, and those things which follow from it. Whence,

The conclusion is proved, secondly, by a fundamental reason: The integrity of nature, or the perfect subjection of the inferior appetite to the superior, is not connaturally owed to man: Therefore he could be created without it, not only by absolute power, but also by ordinary power. The consequence is clear, for God's ordinary power is bound to provide for things only according to what they connaturally demand, not, however, according to those things which are not owed to their nature. The Antecedent, however, is proved, first, from Augustine, Book 4 Against Julian, chapter 17, where, speaking of the first man before sin, he thus says: The grace of God was indeed great there where the earthly and animal body did not have bestial libido (that is, unbridled concupiscence, as Jansenius himself explains it). Because, therefore, clothed with grace, he did not have in his naked body that which might shame, despoiled of grace he felt that which he ought to cover. Certainly if it was a great grace, that the first man before sin did not have bestial libido, or unbridled concupiscence, the subjection of the inferior appetite to the superior, is not connaturally owed to man. The same Antecedent is proved, secondly, by the authority together with reason of Saint Thomas, Part 1, question 95, article 1, where he thus says: It is manifest that the subjection of the body to the soul, and of the inferior powers to reason, was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the Demons the natural things given remained after sin. Thirdly it is proved by this reason:

To no nature is connaturally owed a remedy for a defect which is connatural to it, e.g., to sublunary nature, a remedy for corruptibility: But the integrity of nature, or the perfect subjection of the inferior appetite to the superior, is a remedy for a defect natural to man, namely the rebellion of concupiscence against reason: Therefore it is not owed to man connaturally. The Major is clear, the Minor also seems manifest; for since man is composed of two contrary parts, namely rational and sensitive, he consists of a twofold inclination or appetite, of which one tends to the honest good, consonant with reason, the other to the sensible and delectable good, which is sometimes prohibited by the laws of reason, from which arises the struggle and rebellion of concupiscence against reason, as unhappy experience sufficiently shows.

I say thirdly, by ordinary power, God could, before Adam's fall, have created man in the state of pure nature, as to the gift of immortality, or with the necessity of dying.

This conclusion is proved in the same way as the preceding: For immortality, or the power of not dying, is not connaturally owed to man: Therefore he could be created without it, not only by absolute power, but also by ordinary power. The consequence is clear from what has been said above, the Antecedent, however, is proved from Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 15, where he thus has it: The power of not dying was furnished to Adam from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature; and man was mortal by the condition of his animal body, but immortal by the benefit of the Founder. Saint Thomas teaches the same, Book 2, dist. 19, question 1, article 4, in these words: That immortality and impassibility which man had in the first state, was not in him from the principles of nature, but from the benefit of the Founder. Therefore according to each Holy Doctor, immortality, or the power of not dying, is not owed to man naturally. Reason also persuades this, for as we argued in the preceding conclusion: To no nature is connaturally owed a remedy for a defect which is connatural to it: But the gift of immortality is a remedy for some defect connatural to man, namely mortality, or corruptibility, which follows from his intrinsic constitution, or from his natural principles which are prime matter and the rational soul; for since prime matter is not fully satisfied by its form in any composite, but remains always as it were famished, and with appetite for another, it consequently gives place to contrary qualities, passions, and corruptive alterations, by which the composites themselves tend to destruction and corruption: Therefore the gift of immortality is not connaturally owed to man.

Against the preceding conclusions Father Contenson objects, first: It is not fitting that man be produced in that state, in which he could not obtain his perfect beatitude which he naturally desires, otherwise God would have implanted the appetite of beatitude in men in vain: But in the state of pure nature man could not attain his perfect beatitude,

which he naturally desires; since this consists in the clear vision of God, to which the state of pure nature could by no means arrive, because that state excludes all grace, and a fortiori the blessed vision, which is the consummation of grace: Therefore the state of pure nature is not fitting, nor possible by God's ordinary power.

I answer, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, and to its proof I say, that although in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, man's perfect beatitude consists in the clear vision of God, not, however, in the state of pure nature; because man created in pure naturals, would not be ordered to the supernatural end, but only to the natural. But if you ask, in what it would consist? I answer that the Theologians constitute it in the most perfect and most sweet contemplation of God the author of nature, which would not attain to the clear vision of God, but would be only His abstractive cognition, and would be had from creatures, especially separate substances, known not only through acquired species, but chiefly through infused ones, and through implanted knowledge. They add that that most perfect cognition or contemplation would be the root of natural love of God, and of the other natural virtues and of the whole rectitude of the will, and accordingly would exclude all sin, all disquiet and anxiety.

But the aforesaid Author insists, and says that there is implanted in man by nature the desire of seeing God, as Saint Thomas teaches, Part 1, question 12, article 1, from which he proves the beatific vision to be possible, and confirms this, Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 6, by six excellent reasons: But in the state of pure nature such a desire would be vain, since never to be fulfilled: Therefore that state is not possible by God's ordinary power.

I answer by denying the Major, for as the Thomists commonly teach in the Treatise on the beatific vision, there is not given in man, according to himself considered, or destitute of faith and grace, an appetite for the clear vision of God. Whence Saint Thomas, question 20 On Truth, article 2, in the body, says there is in man a natural innate appetite for natural beatitude, but not for supernatural, which consists in the clear vision of God. And Book 4, dist. 49, question 1, article 3, question 3, he thus has it: Although from natural inclination the will is carried into beatitude according to common notion, yet that it be carried into this or that beatitude is not from the inclination of nature, but through the discernment of reason, by which it discovers that the supreme good consists in this or that. To that, however, which is objected from the first part, and from the Summa Against the Gentiles, our Thomists respond in two ways. For in the first place Ferrariensis, in the place cited from the Summa Against the Gentiles, says that when Saint Thomas says that, the effects of God being seen, there

arises in us a natural desire of seeing the cause, he does not intend that there be in us a desire of seeing God, arising from the powers of nature, but that there be in us a connatural desire of seeing God, and proportioned to the cognition which we have of Him. Whence since through the natural light of the intellect, we know Him very imperfectly, and only as author of nature, from it there arises in us a certain imperfect desire, of knowing and seeing Him as natural author, and as to those predicates and attributes which shine forth in creatures. On the contrary, however, since through faith we know Him perfectly and as author of grace and glory, from such supernatural cognition, there arises in us a connatural desire, and one proportioned to such cognition, of seeing Him as He is in Himself.

Secondly others respond, that the Holy Doctor means, man naturally desires the clear vision of God, not by an innate appetite, but an elicited one, not indeed absolute and efficacious, but inefficacious and conditioned, namely if it were possible for a creature to see God intuitively. Nor is it valid what the aforesaid more recent author objects to the contrary, namely that Saint Thomas in the places cited proves the possibility of vision from that appetite: but from an elicited inefficacious and conditioned appetite, the possibility of the thing desired is not concluded, since an appetite of this kind is often carried to impossible things. To this instance we responded in the Treatise on beatific vision, at the end of the first chapter. Whence we refer the Reader to that place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

The same Author objects, secondly: in the state of pure nature man would be subject to miseries, punishments, and troubles, and even to death: but it is not just that man be afflicted with sicknesses, pains, and death, unless he has deserved these through sin: Therefore the state of pure nature is not fitting to God's equity and goodness, nor consequently possible by God's ordinary or ordained power.

I answer that corporeal miseries and afflictions are of a twofold kind, some are natural defects, consequent from the very nature of men, or from the matter of which they consist, such as sicknesses, and corporeal death; others, however, are preternatural to man, such as the punishment of eternal burning. These second God inflicts on no one without his fault; the first, however, can befall man without his fault, and accordingly be found in the state of pure nature, since God is not bound to impede the course of nature, and the action of natural causes, that creatures, even rational ones, be free from every evil, as if (says Augustine) they were the supreme and incommunicable good. I add that irrational creatures, even innocuous ones, such as doves, and innocent lambs, although they be guilty of no sin, nevertheless suffer pains, and death, because this is the natural condition of the body of which they consist: But the human body is of the same

nature and constitution as the bodies of animals: Therefore even if in the state of pure nature man were devoid of all sin, even original, he would nevertheless be liable to sicknesses, pains, death, and other natural miseries and defects.

He objects, thirdly: Nor is that state possible by ordinary power, in which the resurrection of the dead after death is not possible: But in the state of pure nature the resurrection of the dead would not be possible: Therefore such a state is not possible by God's ordinary power. The Minor is established, because the resurrection of the dead is supernatural, and exceeds all the powers of nature, since from privation to habit there is no regress; the state of pure nature, however, excludes all supernatural things. The Major, however, is proved from the fact that man's natural desire tends to felicity, but the soul cannot attain this, unless it be again conjoined to the body, because as Saint Thomas says, 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 79: Ultimate felicity is the perfection of the happy: to whomever, therefore, something is lacking for perfection, does not yet have perfect felicity, because his desire is not yet totally quieted: Therefore the soul separated from the body, desires to be reunited to it, that it may obtain complete and perfect felicity, and accordingly that state is not possible by God's ordinary power, in which the resurrection of the dead, or reunion of the separated soul with the body, is not possible.

I answer by denying the Major, and to its proof I say that although in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, the soul separated from the body desires to be reunited to it, that it may attain complete felicity, this, however, it would not seek in the state of pure nature. The reason is, because in the first state the soul separated from the body, knows through the supernatural light of faith, or of glory, its reunion with the body to be not only possible, but even at some time future; from which cognition is born the desire of such reunion, which, if it never obtained, its appetite would never be quieted; and accordingly the resurrection of bodies, for the perfect felicity of the soul, in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, is required; and this only the Holy Doctor intends in the place cited, where he proves the future resurrection of the dead, from man's natural desire for felicity. But in the state of pure nature, since the soul separated from the body, would lack all supernatural light, and would not know the reunion of it with the body to be possible, it would not desire it as a complement of its felicity, but its appetite would be perfectly quieted, although in that state the resurrection of the dead would not be possible.

You will say, this reason proves indeed that in the state of pure nature, there would not be in the separated soul an elicited appetite for reunion with the body, not, however, that it would not have an innate appetite for it; since this appetite does not suppose cognition, as the other does, but is implanted by nature.

But on the contrary, an innate appetite is a certain weight of nature toward a good connaturally owed to it, and attainable by the powers of nature: But the reunion of the separated soul with the body, is not owed to it connaturally, nor is it possible by the powers of nature, since it is most supernatural and miraculous, and one of the chief mysteries of our faith: Therefore the separated soul does not have an innate appetite for it, but only an elicited one, faith and cognition of its possibility being supposed.

It is confirmed: An innate appetite is from God as author of nature: But the appetite of the separated soul for reunion with the body, is not from God as author of nature: Therefore it is not innate, but elicited. The Major is established, the Minor is proved. The author of nature does not give an appetite which he cannot fulfill: But God as author of nature cannot fulfill or quiet the appetite which the separated soul has, that it be reunited to the body: Therefore such an appetite is not instilled by God as author of nature. The Major is clear, for nature, or the author of nature, does nothing in vain: but he would do something in vain, if he gave an appetite for something to which he could not lead. The Minor is, however, proved. The author of nature would fulfill or quiet the appetite which the separated soul has, that it be reunited to the body, if reunion followed naturally from the powers given to it; but this is repugnant, since the reunion of the separated soul with the body is entirely supernatural, and lies outside the sphere of the whole of nature, indeed even of the author of nature considered precisely as such, for thus He is restricted to natural effects. Whence the resurrection of bodies will proceed from God as supernatural author, otherwise it would not be a mystery of our faith, which is concerned only with supernatural objects.

The final objection remains, from the aforesaid Author: That state is not fitting nor possible by God's ordinary power, in which man could not love God above all things: But this he could not do in the state of pure nature, since man cannot efficaciously love God above all things without supernatural aid, incompatible with the state of pure nature, as excluding all supernatural things: Therefore that state is not possible by God's ordained power.

The solution to this argument is clear from what has been said in the preceding chapter: there we said that man could, in the state of pure nature, love God above all things as author of nature, with a special aid of the natural order, which God would grant him, as often as the precept of love urged, this being required by the sweetness of His providence, which never commands impossible things. Of which more at length in the treatise on grace.

You will say, the state of pure nature excludes every special aid, even of the natural order, otherwise it would be confused with the state of integral nature: Therefore no solution.

I answer by denying the Antecedent: for the state of pure nature would not exclude special aids of the natural order, but only supernatural grace entitatively, or natural grace by way of a permanent habit and form, such as would be the grace healing nature, and constituting it integral with natural integrity, as is established from what has been said in chapter 4. Whence the state of integral nature is not confused by us with the state of pure nature, but is sufficiently distinguished from it by that habitual gift, perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason.

The arguments of Jansenius against the state of pure nature have been proposed and resolved in the Shield of Thomistic Theology.

Last Chapter

Whether man in the state of pure nature would have had greater moral powers for operating rightly, than he now has in the state of fallen nature?

The negative part is taught by almost all the Recent authors, Suárez, Vásquez, Molina, and others, thinking that human nature was not wounded in its naturals by original sin, but only despoiled of the gratuitous gifts, which it had in the state of innocence, and that pure and fallen man differ only as the naked differs from one stripped bare. This opinion is favored by some of the more ancient Thomists, especially Cajetan, who uses this example of the naked man and the stripped man; and this opinion did not otherwise displease us, but seemed to us quite probable; whence not only in our Shield, but also in earlier editions of our Manual, we taught it. The matter, however, having been discussed more maturely, and weighed more attentively, I now judge altogether true the opinion of Diego Álvarez, and Thomas Lemos, which asserts that man, by original sin, was not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in his naturals; and consequently that the moral powers in fallen man are lesser, than they would have been in pure man, or one constituted in pure naturals. This opinion they pronounce to be so true, that the infirmity of nature wounded by sin is the basis and foundation on which the whole doctrine of Augustine concerning medicinal grace rests, which, that being overturned, must necessarily collapse. And indeed St. Prosper, letter to Demetrias, expressly teaches that that depraved opinion of the Pelagians, by which they said that grace is not necessary for observing the mandates, and that it is given from our merits, arises from that other opinion, by which they denied original sin, or asserted that man's free will was not wounded by it. His words are: "Hence was that fraudulent praise of human nature, and that unwounded defense, through all men, of original dignity. Hence Adam's sin was asserted to have harmed his posterity by example, not by transmission; and it was said to be as possible for each one not to violate the commandment, as it had been possible for him to decline transgression. Hence the emptying of the Baptism of infants, who were said to be given only by adoption, but to be absolved of no guilt. Hence, finally, the simulated and insincere confession of divine grace, which was given according to merits, not that from which merits would arise."

§ I

The affirmative conclusion is established

I say therefore, that man in the state of fallen nature has lesser moral powers for operating rightly, than he would have had in the state of pure nature, if he had been established in it.

The conclusion is proved, first, from Scripture, in which this truth seems shadowed and typically signified, Luke 10, in the parable of the man descending from Jerusalem to Jericho, who, falling among robbers, was not only despoiled, but also wounded by wounds inflicted, and left half-alive. For by that man the holy Fathers understand the first man, and the human race in him, descending through sin from the state of innocence, into the state of misery, or fallen nature, in which he was both despoiled of the gratuitous gifts, and wounded in his naturals. Whence since a wounded man has lesser powers for acting, than a man lacking wounds, it seems manifest from that parable that the powers for operating rightly are lesser in fallen man, than they would have been in pure man, or one constituted in pure naturals, in whom there would have been no wounds.

The Adversaries respond that man in the state of fallen nature is said to be wounded in his naturals, because he lost that integrity and union of parts, which existed by virtue of original justice, since a wound is nothing other than the dissolution of continuity and of united parts.

But this explanation is foreign to the mind of the holy Fathers, for they do not refer that wounding to the despoiling of the gratuitous gifts, but to the harming as regards those things which befit man in his naturals. For Ambrose, on that passage of Luke, thus says: "These robbers, that is, Demons, first strip us of the garment of spiritual grace which we had received, and thus they thought to inflict wounds." By these words he shows that man was first, that is, previously, despoiled of the gratuitous gifts, and afterward wounded in his remaining naturals. Augustine teaches the same, Book 2 of the Evangelical questions, question 19, where he thus has it: "A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho: Adam himself is understood in the human race." And afterward he adds: "And he fell among robbers, the devil and his Angels, who, having stripped him of immortality, and having inflicted wounds by persuading to sins, left him half-alive." By which he refers the stripping to one thing, and the wounding to another. Finally, Fulgentius, book On the Incarnation and grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, chapter 13, declares this, when he says that that first man, and in him the human race, was stripped of the garment of faith, and wounded with the wounds of carnal concupiscences. By which last words he constitutes man harmed in his naturals, just as by the earlier words he says he was stripped of the garment of all the supernatural and gratuitous gifts, whose foundation is faith. Whence rightly it is noted in the margin: "He alludes to the man stripped and wounded by robbers, Luke 10."

The Master of the Sentences distinguished and explained this more openly, In II Sent., dist. 25, letter D, where he writes this: "Through sin, the natural goods in man are

corrupted, and the gratuitous withdrawn; for this is that man who was wounded and stripped by robbers: wounded indeed in his natural goods, of which he was not deprived, otherwise reparation could not be made, but stripped of the gratuitous." And a little after: "These are the best gifts and perfect gifts, of which some are corrupted through sin, that is, the natural, such as ingenuity, memory, intellect; others withdrawn, that is, the gratuitous." What is clearer?

But St. Thomas explains this still more clearly, In II Sent., dist. 29, art. 2, q. 1, in the argument sed contra, where he thus says: "No one is stripped of that which he does not have: but man, through sin, was wounded in his naturals, and stripped of the gratuitous, as is said in the gloss on Luke 10; therefore he had grace." In which he manifestly distinguishes the wounding of the naturals from the stripping of the gratuitous, and refers the stripping to one thing, and the wounding to another, the former to the gratuitous, the latter to the naturals. But he teaches this still more clearly, In II Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3, in these words, which are greatly to be noted: "To the third it must be said that natural goods are said to be twofold: either as they are considered in themselves, according as they are owed to nature from its own principles, and thus neither man, nor Angel, lost anything of the naturals through sin, nor was diminished in any respect, because Dionysius even says that the natural things given remain integral in the sinning Angels; or according as they are ordered to the ultimate end, and in this way, in each, the natural goods indeed are diminished, not altogether lost, inasmuch as each was made less able, and further distant from the attainment of the end, and on account of this too man is said to be stripped of the gratuitous, and wounded in his naturals, Luke 10, in the gloss." Nothing plainly could be clearer and more manifest: for he speaks of those naturals which are owed to man's nature, not of original justice, which was altogether gratuitous; and he says these naturals owed to man must be considered in two ways: either according to themselves, that is, as they are caused from their own principles, and thus, with Dionysius, he teaches that they were neither removed nor diminished through sin: or according as they are ordered to the end, and thus he teaches that they, both in the Angel and in man, were diminished through sin; and thus it is true what is said, namely that man is stripped of the gratuitous, and wounded in his naturals.

The conclusion is proved, second, from Trent, which, after it said, session 5, canons 1 and 2, that man lost the holiness and original justice in which he had been established, afterward, at the beginning of session 6, adds that man's free will remained, weakened in its powers and inclined [to evil], through original sin. Where, with respect to diverse things, it establishes stripping and wounding: stripping indeed, or loss of holiness and justice, with respect to original justice, and the gratuitous gifts; but harm, or wounding

and weakening, with respect to the natural powers, which man's free will has, according to itself, before it was weakened and inclined toward evil through sin.

Nor can it be said that the Council speaks of the powers of free will which man had in the state of original justice, but not of those which he would have had in the state of pure nature, or which befit him from his naturals: for the Council does not speak of the powers of free will which are extinguished, or altogether removed, but of those which remained weakened and inclined: but the powers of free will which original justice furnished, were not only weakened and diminished, but altogether removed, original justice itself, from which they flowed, being removed: therefore the Council does not speak of the powers of free will which original justice furnished, but of those which belong to man from his nature, and because he is rational, and consequently which would belong to him in the state of pure nature, if he were established in it.

A similar argument can be drawn from the second Council of Orange, canon 1, where by the offense of Adam's transgression, it says the whole man, that is, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse. And canon 25, he teaches that we ought to believe that through the sin of the first man, man's free will remained inclined and weakened: but these cannot be understood and explained of man by comparison to the state of integrity and original justice: therefore they must be understood of man considered in his natural faculty, which he would have without sin and without grace. The minor is proved: that Council, as is established, was held against the Semipelagians, whence when it defines that, through Adam's sin, man's free will was wounded, this must be understood in that sense in which the Semipelagians denied it: but the Semipelagians, since they did not deny, as the Pelagians did, original sin, by which we are deprived of the gift of integrity and original justice, did not deny that the liberty of free will remained wounded by comparison to integral nature and original justice and the powers which it furnished, but they contended only that free will, through original sin, did not remain wounded in its own natural powers, from which they inferred that it could overcome every temptation, however most vehement, do every moral good, and love God the author of nature above all things, and thus they denied the necessity of grace for furnishing these things: therefore when Orange, against them, defines that through the sin of the first parent, free will remained inclined and weakened, this must be understood of the harm to free will, as to the powers which it has from nature, not, however, as to those which it had from original justice.

The conclusion is proved, third, by a reason drawn from St. Thomas: for that holy Doctor, Quodlibet 1, art. 8, teaches and proves that if man were established in pure naturals, he could love God as author of nature above all things; not with a love of

concupiscence, as some contended, but with a love of friendship: but this natural love of God, that man in fallen nature could have it, from his own powers, and without grace, he denies, I-II, q. 109, art. 3: therefore according to St. Thomas, man in fallen nature, and corrupted by original sin, does not have equal powers with man, if he were established in pure naturals.

Nor is the response of some valid, saying that St. Thomas does not deny the natural love of God above all things to man in fallen nature, from the fact that he has lesser powers, and is weaker, than he would have been in his pure naturals, but because in fallen nature, with the natural love of God above all things, there is joined the supernatural love of God, which conjunction would not exist, if man were established in pure naturals, because in that state he would not be elevated to the supernatural end. This solution, however, plainly conflicts with St. Thomas cited, q. 109, art. 2 and 3, where, giving the reason why man in fallen nature cannot, without grace, love God with a natural love above all things, he assigns no other, except that on account of the corruption of nature, man pursues the private good, unless he is healed by grace: therefore this powerlessness does not arise on the part of the supernatural love of God, joined with that natural love, but per se, from the corruption of nature, inclined by sin toward the private good.

From these the conclusion is proved, fourth, by a fundamental reason: he who is averse from the ultimate end, has lesser powers for operating morally well, than he who is not averse; because the efficacy and powers of the will for tending toward means, are drawn from the love and conversion toward the end, which, as Aristotle teaches, is related in matters of action, as the first principle in speculative matters: but man in the state of fallen nature is averse from God the ultimate end, not only supernatural, but also natural; for since Adam, by his sin, violated not only the supernatural law, but also the natural, he consequently turned his whole progeny away from God as natural author; which aversion man in the state of pure nature would not have, both because in it there would be no original sin, and also because, as we showed by the preceding reason from St. Thomas, he could have loved God as author of nature with an efficacious love, which would have converted him toward God as natural end: therefore man in the state of fallen nature has lesser powers for operating morally well, than he would have had in the state of pure nature, if he had been established in it.

Nor is it valid what the Adversaries say, that man in each state, both pure and fallen, is averse from God as Author of nature, with this difference nevertheless, that in the second he is averse with a privative aversion, arisen from original sin: but in the first he would be averse with a purely negative and inculpable aversion, as not proceeding from a preceding fault, but from a defect of natural condition, to which is not owed conversion

to God as ultimate natural end, but only an inclination toward good as such, and beatitude in common. This response is not valid, I say, since it presupposes something false, namely that conversion to God as Author of nature is not naturally owed to man, or from the condition of his nature, in the first instant of the use of reason; since to any thing whatsoever a connatural inclination toward its end is owed, and consequently love of the ultimate end is owed to intellectual nature as, so to speak, a dowry of the soul, of which it cannot be stripped, apart from its own fault, or unless it should have voluntarily renounced it of itself. Whence St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, art. 8, thus says: "It is manifest, however, that God is the common good of the whole universe and of its parts, whence any creature whatsoever, in its own way, naturally loves God more than itself: insensible things indeed naturally, brute animals sensitively, but the rational creature through intellectual love, which is called love [dilectio]." Man, therefore, would not be, if he were established in the state of pure nature, averse from God as Author and natural end, even negatively, but positively converted toward Him, inasmuch as such love is a conversion toward God as toward a natural end.

Fifth, the conclusion can be persuaded by another a priori reason: a power which is subject to several impediments, is judged to have lesser moral powers for operating, than that which lacks such impediments: but in the state of fallen nature man has more impediments for operating rightly, than he would lack in the state of pure nature: therefore he has lesser moral powers for operating rightly, than he would have had in the state of pure nature. The major is clear, for an unencumbered power is judged more apt for operating, than a faculty impeded, and subject to several obstacles, which restrain and hinder it, so that it cannot go forth into act. The minor, however, is proved by declaring these impediments, which can be reduced to four or five. For in the first place, in the state of fallen nature there is a huge impediment, during which man cannot convert himself to God as Author of nature, nor, from the love of God the ultimate end, gird himself for eliciting works of virtue, namely original sin, which can only be wiped away through sanctifying grace, exceeding all the possible powers of nature. Then, there are four wounds left from such sin, and explained in chapter 5, which gravely wound man, and consequently render him weak and infirm for operating morally rightly. Third, in the state of fallen nature, concupiscence is more vehement, and draws more toward the delightful things contrary to reason, than it would have been in the state of pure nature, in which the higher part would dominate the lower, and the lower would be subjected to the higher, although not so easily and perfectly, as in the state of integrity and innocence, as will appear from what is to be said below. Whence Anselm, book On the virginal conception, chapter 5, compares the sensitive appetite, deprived of original justice, to a wild beast which was formerly bound, and afterward, its bonds broken, rages more

fiercely. Fourth, human nature, through original sin, has been made worthy that it be protected by God's providence less sweetly than pure nature would be protected, and be permitted to be more sharply tempted by Demons, envious of that felicity in man from which they themselves fell, and that several good thoughts for operating well, which would be granted to him in the state of pure nature, be denied to him. Fifth, in fallen man, by reason of original sin, there is an unworthiness of lacking several efficacious helps, which would not exist in the state of pure nature. Whence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, art. 5, ad 1, says that the help of grace, to whomsoever it is divinely given, is given mercifully; but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given from justice, in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original sin, as Augustine says in the book On correction and grace.

From these you will understand how many and how great are the impediments in fallen man for operating rightly, which would not have existed in the state of pure nature, and how truly St. Thomas said, In II Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3: "Man, through sin, was made less able, and further distant from the attainment of the end, and on account of this too man is said to be stripped of the gratuitous, and wounded in his naturals."

You will also understand the excellent discourse of the same holy Doctor, I-II, q. 85, art. 2, where he inquires, whether the good of nature can be taken away by sin? And thus he responds: "Diminution can be understood in two ways, in one way on the part of the root, in another way on the part of the term: in the first way indeed it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature itself, as was said above: but it is diminished in the second way, inasmuch as an impediment is placed to attaining the term." He judges, therefore, that through original sin the powers for operating rightly are diminished, in fallen man, not indeed physically, by diminishing nature itself, but morally, by placing several impediments for operating rightly, which would not have existed in the state of pure nature. Just as a man bound with ropes, or constrained with fetters, has physically indeed the same power for walking, as a man free from bonds, or fetters, but not morally; because obstacles of this kind impede the progressive power from being able to go forth into act.

§ II

The objections are resolved

The Adversaries object first: St. Thomas, I, q. 95, art. 1, says that according to Dionysius, even in the Demons, after sin, the naturals remained integral: therefore also in men, and consequently man, through original sin, was not harmed in his naturals, but only stripped of the gratuitous.

I respond that it is strange these words of Dionysius are objected to us by the Adversaries, since St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, art. 1, asking whether sin diminishes the good of nature, first objects them to himself: "It seems," he says, "that sin does not diminish the good of nature, for man's sin is not graver than the Demon's sin: but the natural goods remain integral in the Demons after sin, as Dionysius says, chapter 4, On the divine names. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of human nature either." To which argument he thus responds: "To the first it must be said that Dionysius speaks of the first good of nature, which is to be, to live, and to understand, as is clear to one attentive to his words." The good of nature, therefore, which, according to St. Dionysius and St. Thomas, remained integral after sin, was to be, to live, and to understand, and the other principles of nature, and natural properties; which does not conflict with there being another good of nature, namely the inclination toward virtue, which remained after sin, both original and actual, wounded, diminished, and attenuated, as the same holy Doctor plainly hands down in the body of the same article, in these words: "The good of human nature can be spoken of in three ways: first, the very principles of nature from which nature itself is constituted, and the properties caused by these, such as the powers of the soul, and other things of this kind. Second, the very inclination toward virtue is a certain good of nature. Third, the good of nature can be called the gift of original justice, which was conferred on the whole of human nature in the first man. The first good of nature, therefore, namely the natural principles, and the powers, is neither taken away nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature, however, is altogether removed through the sin of the first parent. But the middle good of nature, namely the natural inclination itself toward virtue, is diminished through sin." Than which nothing can be said more clearly and more openly. He has similar things In II Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3, where he thus says: "To the third it must be said that natural goods are said to be twofold: either as they are considered in themselves, according as they are owed to nature from its own principles, and thus neither man, nor Angel, lost anything of the naturals through sin, nor was diminished in any respect, because Dionysius even says that the natural things given remain integral in the sinning Angels; or according as they are ordered to the ultimate end, and in this way, in each, the natural goods are diminished, not altogether lost, inasmuch as each was made less able, and further distant from the attainment of the end, and on account of this too man is said to be stripped of the gratuitous, and wounded in his naturals, Luke 10, in the gloss." By these words he plainly teaches that although the naturals, considered in physical being, and according as they flow from nature, as its properties, or powers, are not diminished by original or actual sin: they are, however, indeed [diminished], if they are regarded in moral being, that is, insofar as they incline toward virtue, or as they are ordered to the ultimate end.

They object, second: those defects which theologians call the wounds of human nature, would befit man constituted in pure naturals: therefore man in that state would not have greater moral powers for operating rightly, than he has in the state of fallen nature. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved, first, from St. Thomas, 4 Contra Gentes, chapter 52, where he expressly teaches that not only the death of the body, but also the weakness of reason, by which man with difficulty arrives at the knowledge of the true, and easily slips into error, and bestial appetites, which man cannot altogether overcome (which are without doubt those wounds of human nature explained in chapter 5), are natural to man, and befit human nature considered in itself absolutely. The words of the holy Doctor are: "Thus, therefore, although defects of this kind seem natural to man, absolutely considering human nature on the part of that which is lower in it, nevertheless considering divine providence, and the dignity of the higher part of human nature, it can be proved probably enough that defects of this kind are penal, and thus it can be gathered that the human race is infected with some original sin." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, defects of this kind would befit man, if he were established in pure naturals.

Reason also persuades this: for it is natural to a body endowed with animal sense and appetite, to desire the sensible good; it is natural to a rational spirit, to desire the spiritual good: therefore since man is composed of both, it will be natural to him to have diverse inclinations fighting against each other, and consequently the rebellion of concupiscence, which is in him in the state of fallen nature, would befit him in the state of pure nature, if he were established in it.

To the testimony of St. Thomas I respond, that he did not assertively say that those defects which are called the wounds of sin, are natural to man, but "although they seem natural to man, considering," etc. For he intended to respond to the argument of those to whom those defects seemed natural, and from this inferred that they are not penal, nor proceed from original sin. To which he himself responds, that although they seem natural to man, or this is granted, or conceded; nevertheless, given divine providence, which, from original justice, altogether gratuitous, established man without those defects, it is sufficiently gathered that they are penal, and proceed from original sin; just as, for this reason, death, which would be natural to man, if he were established in pure debts of nature, is, for this reason, the punishment of sin, as all are bound to confess. However, when the same holy Doctor establishes his assertive and final opinion on this matter, he expressly teaches that those defects, or wounds of human nature, were inflicted on him through original sin, as is to be seen, I-II, q. 85, art. 3, where he thus discourses: "Through original justice, reason perfectly contained the lower powers of the

soul, and reason itself was perfected by God, being subject to Him: but this original justice was withdrawn through the sin of the first parent, as has already been said. And therefore all the powers of the soul remain in a certain way destitute of their own order, by which they are naturally ordered to virtue; and this very destitution is called a wounding of nature."

To the reason which is subjoined to the testimony of St. Thomas, the same holy Doctor himself responds, q. 4 De Malo, art. 2, ad 1, that something can be natural to man in two ways. In one way, insofar as he is an animal, and thus it is natural to him that the concupiscible power be borne toward the delightful according to sense, speaking commonly. In another way, insofar as he is man, that is, a rational animal, and thus it is natural to him that the concupiscible power be borne toward the delightful according to the order of reason. Concupiscence, therefore, by which the concupiscible power is prone to be borne toward the delightful according to sense, beyond the order of reason, is against the nature of man, insofar as he is man, and thus it pertains to original sin. By these words he plainly teaches that concupiscence which, beyond the order of reason, is borne toward the delightful good, proceeds from original sin, and does not befit man from the condition of his nature, but rather is against his nature, as it is rational, and consequently could not have been in him, if he were established in pure naturals. Whence, in his response to the second, he again says: "Just as the concupiscible power is natural to man according to instituted nature, so too that it be subjected to reason is natural to him, according to what the Philosopher says in Book 3 On the Soul, that the sensitive appetite follows the appetite of reason, just as a sphere is moved by a sphere." Reason also persuades this, for since man, from his nature, has the soul superior to the sensitive appetite, and it is of the nature of the superior to dominate the inferior, if he were established in pure naturals, the soul, from such order, would have the power by which it could moderate (albeit with some difficulty) the lower part; and the lower part, from the natural order, ought to be by nature apt to be ruled by the higher, although not so easily, as in the state of integrity, or original justice.

They object, third: if human nature were not only stripped of the gratuitous, but also wounded and corrupted in its naturals, some cause of such harm and corruption ought to be assigned: but none can be assigned; not indeed God, as is manifest, nor the serpent's whistling, or the forbidden fruit, or a morbid quality derived from these, as theologians commonly think: therefore such harm and corruption in pure naturals seems fictitious and imaginary.

I respond that this argument is similar to that which Julian once proposed to Augustine, arguing thus: "If original sin is given, through what crevices, among so many defenses of

innocence, do you feign that it entered into the world?" To which the holy Doctor responded: "Why do you seek a hidden crevice, since it has a most open door?" Similarly we can now respond: "Why do you seek a cause of the corruption and harm of the natural powers in fallen man, since you have it most openly, namely original sin, which, as we showed above, has both to strip man of the gratuitous, and to wound him in his naturals."

You will say, first: the power of some nature or power can only be diminished in two ways, either through the subtraction of some real and physical perfection of such a thing, or through the addition of some habit or quality discordant with nature, and inclining it toward evil: but in fallen man neither of these is found, because through original sin nothing physically real is subtracted from the soul, or from any of its powers, which would be its intrinsic perfection; nor is any habit, or quality discordant with it, and inclining it toward evil, added to it: therefore through it, the power of human nature, or its inclination toward good, is not diminished and attenuated.

I respond by denying the Major, for the power or inclination of some nature can be diminished in another way, namely through the placing of an impediment, as St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 85, art. 2, in the body, where he thus says: "The good of nature which is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination toward virtue, which indeed befits man from this, that he is rational, for from this he has that he act according to reason, which is to act according to virtue... This inclination is understood as a mean between two, for it is founded as in a root in rational nature, it tends toward the good of virtue as toward a term and end. Its diminution, therefore, can be understood in two ways: in one way on the part of the root, in another way on the part of the term; in the first way indeed it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature itself, as was said above: but it is diminished in the second way, inasmuch namely as an impediment is placed to attaining the term." The diminution of the natural powers in man, or of the inclination toward virtue, through original sin, therefore, was not made on the part of the principle or root, through the subtraction of some physical perfection or through the addition of some depraved habit, or morbid quality, but only on the part of the term, through the placing of an impediment, through which fallen man is made less able, and further distant from the attainment of the end, as St. Thomas, related above, speaks.

You will say, second: original sin is nothing positive, but a mere privation of original justice, as our Thomists more commonly teach in the Treatise on sins, and as the holy Doctor insinuates, I-II, q. 82, art. 3. Therefore it cannot place in fallen man a positive impediment to the good of virtue, through which he is made less able, and further distant from the attainment of the end.

But the Antecedent being granted, I deny the Consequence, for although original sin is nothing positive as to what is formal, nevertheless as to what is material, it consists in concupiscence and a positive inclination toward evil, or toward a depraved act, which is a positive impediment to the good of virtue, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, where he thus says: "Original sin materially indeed is concupiscence, but formally is the defect of original justice."

They object, fourth: man, through original sin, was not made of a worse condition as to the body, than he would have been in the state of pure nature: therefore neither as to the soul and its faculties. The consequence seems legitimate from parity of reason. The Antecedent also seems certain, for the body, through original sin, did not become more corruptible, or more infirm, or more or sooner liable to death, than it would have been in the state of pure nature.

I respond by denying the Antecedent, for several think not improbably, that the body in the state of fallen nature, is subject to greater troubles, than it would have been subject to in the state of pure nature. To this opinion the Council of Orange, canon 1, seems favorable, saying that by the offense of Adam's transgression, the whole man, that is, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse. That this must not be understood of man only with respect to the state of integrity, but also by comparison to pure nature, or one constituted in pure naturals, we showed above, § 1.

I respond, second, the Antecedent being granted, by denying the consequence and the parity: for the worse condition of fallen man, such as we admit, is not something physical, but moral, namely lesser ability toward the good of virtue, or toward the attainment of the end, and greater distance and removal from it, on account of the various impediments explained above, which proceed from original sin. The body, however, is not capable, as the soul, of moral impediment, with respect to the attainment of the end, just as it is not capable of the attainment of it.

The Adversaries object last, and this is their principal foundation: from a removing of the prohibiting, no greater or lesser natural effect follows, than would follow from nature itself: e.g. a stone, the prohibiting being removed, is not moved more swiftly, than if it had been moved only by its own gravity: but original sin was a removing of the prohibiting original justice, which impeded those disordered motions which now exist in fallen nature, as St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 82, art. 1, ad 3, where he thus says: "From original sin there follows some inclination to a disordered act, not directly, but indirectly, namely through the removal of the prohibiting, that is, of original justice, which prohibited disordered motions: just as from bodily sickness there indirectly follows an

inclination to disordered bodily motions": therefore in fallen nature there are not more disordered motions, than there would have been in the state of pure nature, but plainly the same disorder of appetite or concupiscence exists in each state.

This is the principal foundation, for which some Disciples of St. Thomas attribute to man, if he were established in pure naturals, exactly the same defects, or the same wounds, which befit him in the state of fallen nature, and say that man in the state of pure nature is distinguished from fallen man, just as the naked man is distinguished from the stripped man, as Cajetan speaks. But this foundation, on which the opposite opinion chiefly rests, is weak and ruinous. For St. Thomas in the place cited only means that, with respect to those defects which human nature now suffers, original sin was a removing of the prohibiting, as to something which is in them, but not that it is only and purely a removing of the prohibiting, as to all that is in these defects, but in comparison to something, it is the true cause from which they follow. This can be declared by three examples. The first is of bodily sickness, which St. Thomas, related above, uses: for who would doubt that infirmity, by removing health, per se weakens nature, and from weakened nature there per se follows a weak or disordered motion of the body? Or who would persuade himself that sickness is only and purely a removing of health, so that it is a cause per accidens and not per se of that weak motion? Another example is of limping, which the holy Doctor also often uses: for the disordered motion of limping is not reduced only per accidens to the curved shin, for the first thing which the curvature effects is to remove the health of the shin, the second is to cause per se that defect of limping, into which the curved shin per se flows. In the same way original sin has, first and per se, to remove original justice, but secondarily indeed it per se inclines toward the disordered act or effect, which it per se causes, namely ignorance of a depraved disposition, obscuring the natural light of reason, proneness of the will toward evil, and concupiscence so vehemently rising up against reason, that reason can in no way conquer and overcome it, without the help of grace. A third example can be adduced, namely of a man removing the column on which a stone has been placed. For if he should immediately impress a great force on the stone placed above, to send it downward, and with this force should simultaneously remove the column, would he be said to be only a removing of the prohibiting with respect to the descent of the stone? By no means. In the same way one must philosophize in the subject matter, and it must be said that man, through original sin, was not only a removing of the prohibiting of original justice: but further, by removing this, he infected and corrupted the powers, and attenuated their strength for doing good, and gravely wounded nature itself in its natural order toward good; whence he was not only and purely a removing of the prohibiting, in comparison to these defects which human nature now suffers after sin.

Reason also persuades this, for if God, just as through Himself He bestowed original justice, so likewise, without any fault of man, through Himself He should take it away, there would not follow, in nature thus stripped of those gratuitous gifts, this positive disorder of the powers, wounding, infection, and corruption in their naturals, which is found in the state of fallen nature; and yet if the first parent's sin were only a removing of the prohibiting with respect to this effect, or defect, from whatever cause such prohibiting were removed, such corruption and infection would follow from the condition of nature; just as from whatever [source] the prohibiting of the descent of the stone should be removed, exactly the same descent would occur from the nature of the heavy thing, as is manifest: but who does not see that this is not only false, but also absurd? For who would persuade himself that original sin, which is a true guilt of the soul, brought no greater harm to the human race, as to infecting, weakening, and inclining the powers of the soul, than God would bring, if He, through Himself, without any fault of man, should take original justice away from him? Or who would affirm that true sin in the soul, from its intrinsic nature, does not weaken the powers more, than if there were no sin in it? Without doubt, those who so opine, scarcely acknowledge original sin, and plainly conflict with the Councils and holy Fathers related above, who affirm that through such sin human nature was wounded, infected, and corrupted in its natural powers and faculties. They also conflict with St. Thomas, because after I-II, q. 85, art. 3, he taught that through the sin of the first man, the aforesaid four wounds of human nature were inflicted, ignorance in the intellect, malice, or proneness and inclination toward evil, in the will, and weakness and concupiscence in the appetite, he immediately adds that also through actual sin the same wounds are inflicted on the person who commits it: but it is manifest that those wounds are inflicted on the sinning person per se, and not only per accidens, or as it were through a removing of the prohibiting, through actual sin: therefore in the same way they are inflicted on the whole of human nature through original sin.

§ III

Certain things are explained which would be proper to man if he were established in pure naturals

For a more perfect understanding of both the state of pure nature, and the state of fallen nature, there remain certain things briefly to be declared, which would be proper to man, if he were established in pure naturals, that is, in only those things which are owed to his nature.

In the first place, since such a man established in pure naturals would lack the gifts of integrity, and original justice, which are altogether undue to human nature, he would also lack their own proper effects. Whence the body would not be subject to the soul, but would burden it, and would be dissolved through death, as being composed of contraries fighting between themselves. Similarly the lower parts would not be perfectly subject to reason in him, but the motions of the lower parts would arise beside and against reason.

Second, man in that state could, for some brief time, love God the Author of nature, and fulfill the whole natural law, with the general concurrence of God proportioned to that state, as is gathered from St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, art. 8, and manifest reason persuades this; for since in that state nature would not be corrupted by sin, it would not pursue the private good, and it could be borne toward every good connatural to itself. And through this such a man established in pure naturals would be distinguished from man in the state of fallen nature, not repaired by grace; because he cannot, even for a brief time without the help of grace, love God above all things with an absolute and efficacious act, or fulfill the whole law, as the same holy Doctor teaches, I-II, q. 109, art. 3. Of which more at length in the Treatise on grace.

Third, such a man in pure nature, with that same general concurrence alone, could not, for long, love God as Author of nature, observe the whole natural law, and much less finally persevere in the good of reason, but for this he would need some special help within the order of nature. For since in that state vehement passions would arise, and motions of concupiscence, and manifold and most grave temptations, although free will, by its natural powers, and with God's general concurrence, could resist some of them, it could by no means overcome all, and for long overcome all these, and consequently attain the natural end, unless God should grant it this special help of the natural order for this purpose. Whence it would pertain to divine providence, to give or offer to man constituted in pure nature such help, by which he could, if he wished, for long observe the law, and remain in the good of reason, and attain his natural end. Otherwise God would command him impossible things, which is plainly repugnant to His infinite goodness and equity, and to His most sweet providence; and man in that state would be, among all creatures, the most unhappy, if God, by His providence, could not come to his aid, and, by special helps within the order of nature, or means proportioned to his natural end, so help him, that he could attain it, and escape eternal damnation.

Nor is it valid to say that the state of pure nature excludes every special help, even of the natural order, otherwise it would be confused with the state of integral nature. For to this we responded above, that the state of pure nature by no means excludes special helps

of the natural order, but only supernatural grace entitatively, such as would be original justice, or natural [grace] by way of habit and permanent form, such as would be the gift of integrity, perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason.

Someone perhaps will ask, whether that special help, which in that state God would give to man, would be owed to him, or not? But to this it is easily answered, that such help is indeed not owed to that state, since it excludes all things merely gratuitous, and not connatural to man; but God Himself would owe it to Himself, and to His providence (supposing that He wished to so establish such a man), to give him such special help, by which he could, for long, observe the whole law of nature, and persevere in it if he wished; just as also now grace is given infallibly to a man contrite, nor is it, however, owed to a contrite man, but God owes it to Himself, and to the law which He established, to give such grace.

From what has been said you will understand that man established in pure naturals would have a certain middle state, between man established in the state of integrity, or with the vigor of original justice, and fallen man; for he would neither be as integral as the former, nor as harmed and corrupted in his powers as the latter. For man in the state of integrity, or original justice, would have neither ignorance in the intellect, nor malice in the will, nor would he feel anything in the lower appetite which would be against, or beside, reason, but the lower part would be perfectly subject to the higher. In fallen nature, however, through original sin, he feels a great fight, contradiction, and rebellion against the spirit, which, since it is vehement, man cannot resist by his natural powers alone. But established in pure naturals, although he would feel motions of concupiscence rising beside reason, that is, anticipating the judgment of reason, nevertheless reason attending, he could, although they be more vehement, restrain and overcome them; so that if attending reason should actually impede them, as it could and would be bound to do, man would preserve in himself that state of pure nature, but if he should consent to them, he would sin, and through sin would lose in himself that state of pure naturals, and would incur, by that very fact, the state of fallen nature.

You will also understand from what has been said, that the motions of concupiscence can be considered in four ways. First, as they are subject to reason. Second, as they are beside reason. Third, as they are against reason, moderable, however, and restrainable by it. Fourth, as they rise so vehemently against reason, that reason can neither overcome nor conquer them, without the help of grace. In the first three ways they are not against nature, but either of nature, or beside nature; in the fourth way, however, they are against nature; whence in pure nature they would not exist, but they are only in fallen and wounded nature, and are the material of original sin, as is clear from what has been

said above.

You will ask, what in the state of pure nature would become of infants who, before attaining the use of reason, through which they could convert themselves to God as natural Author and end, should die?

I respond that they would attain natural beatitude, since it would be connaturally owed to them, and there would be no original sin in the state of pure nature, in punishment of which they would be deprived of such beatitude: for it seems repugnant to God's sweet providence, and His infinite goodness, that, no guilt being presupposed, He should deprive man of things naturally owed to him, or that He should establish man in that state, in which he could not attain natural beatitude; otherwise human nature in such a state would necessarily be miserable, and consequently evil, which savors of Manicheism. There is another reason concerning infants dying without baptism in the state of fallen nature, for since in such a state, before the reception of the grace of regeneration, they are infected with original sin, which turns man away from God, both as natural and as supernatural end, justly, in punishment of this, such infants are deprived not only of supernatural beatitude, but also of natural, as theologians commonly teach, against Catharinus, Salmerón, and Molina, who think that those infants, after the day of judgment, their bodies reassumed, will lead a happy and perpetual life upon the earth, will enjoy natural beatitude, and, the punishment of loss, or the lack of the blessed vision excepted, will be in all things as infants who would die in the state of pure nature. But this opinion seems akin to the error of the Pelagians, who, as Augustine says, On the predestination of the Saints, chapter 13: "labored, seeking for their infants, outside the kingdom of God, some place of I know not what felicity." And Book 2 On the soul and its origin, chapter 12: "The authority of the Catholic Councils, and of the Apostolic See, most justly condemned the novel Pelagian heretics, because they dared to give to unbaptized infants a place of rest and salvation. Which they would not have dared, unless they denied them to have original sin." Likewise, Book 1, chapter 9, has these words: "Let no one promise to unbaptized infants, between damnation and the kingdom of heaven, any place, as it were, of rest or of felicity of whatever kind, and wherever, as it were a middle place: for this the Pelagian heresy promised." Where those words, "of felicity of whatever kind," are to be noted, by which the holy Doctor plainly declares that even natural felicity must be denied to those infants, if we wish to avoid the heresy of Pelagius; for he did not promise them supernatural felicity outside the kingdom of heaven, but only natural. Whence Cardinal Bellarmine rightly teaches, Book 6 On the state of sin, chapter 1, that the opinion of the Pelagians is condemned, that to infants dying without baptism, natural beatitude outside the kingdom of heaven is given. For

thus he says: "The other opinion, a little less liberal indeed, but nevertheless quite mild, was of those who excluded unbaptized infants from the kingdom of heaven, and the blessed life promised to the saints, yet gave them eternal life, and natural beatitude, without any trouble or grief, outside the kingdom of the Blessed, and far from the prison of the damned, that is, in a middle place between hell and heaven, than which place scarcely another can be imagined, than the convex surface of the earth. That the Pelagians thought this of old, St. Augustine teaches, book On heresies, chapter 88. For, he says, even if they are not baptized, they promise them, indeed outside the kingdom of God, but nevertheless an eternal and blessed life of their own." That the Pelagians, however, did not promise to unbaptized infants supernatural eternal life, which consists in the vision of God, but only natural eternal life, or natural beatitude, is clear from Book 5 against Julian, chapter 8, where, on Augustine's testimony, the Pelagians alienated unbaptized infants from the life of God, since they alienated them from the kingdom of God: but what is the life of God, if not the vision of God; nor indeed does the kingdom of heaven itself signify anything else in the Scriptures, than eternal felicity, which consists in the vision of God. These things Bellarmine.